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Abstract 
Why do incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes retain power? This study seeks to 
answer this fundamental question by linking electoral fraud and sincere voting for the 
incumbent with incumbent’s distributive politics and, accordingly, by looking at the puzzle of 
authoritarian survival from two perspectives. An elite-oriented incumbent’s strategy suggests 
that, unlike democracies, where distributive politics is primarily targeted at voters, 
authoritarian incumbents inevitably have to deliver benefits to political elites in order to 
secure their loyalty, which is eventually converted into electoral fraud, repression of the 
opposition forces, persecution of the media, refraining from challenging the incumbent, and 
other authoritarian policy outcomes. A mass-oriented incumbent’s strategy implies that, if 
electoral competition is not meaningless, authoritarian incumbents also have to deliver 
benefits to the general public in order to secure genuine mass support, which eventually 
results in sincere voting for the incumbent. This argument is tested on cross-regional data 
from Russia as a prominent case of persistent electoral authoritarianism. The analysis begins 
with a poorly studied but an immanent element of any kind of authoritarianism – electoral 
fraud perpetrated by political elites and their local agents. Having developed a novel measure 
of electoral fraud forensics based on quintile regression, I demonstrate that electoral fraud in 
the Russian 2000–2012 presidential elections played a typical role for electoral 
authoritarianism: it was neither outcome-changing as it occurs in closed authoritarian regimes 
nor intrinsically sporadic as in electoral democracies, but it was widespread and hardly 
avoidable by the incumbent. The study then dwells on examination of the federal transfers to 
regional budgets as a type of public and formally legal yet politically motivated distribution. 
Not only were the central transfers allocated to the regions according to the principle of 
electoral allegiance to the federal incumbent presidents, but it also appears that, as 
authoritarian regime was consolidating over time, the larger amount of transfer funds was 
allocated to the bureaucracy (as part of the regime’s elite clientele) in order to secure its 
loyalty. The loyalty of regional elites, in its turn, was eventually converted into distinct 
authoritarian policy outcomes, including electoral fraud and persecution of the media. This 
resulted in a general bias of the electoral playing field and, thereby, contributed to sustaining 
the authoritarian equilibrium. By contrast, the analysis finds no evidence that the politicized 
transfers influenced sincere voting for the incumbent. These mixed findings indicate that 
popular support under electoral authoritarianism is still puzzling and calls for further 
examination, whereas securing loyalty of political elites via delivering them clientelist 
benefits is crucial for regime survival in personalist electoral dictatorships. 
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Chapter 1. The Puzzle of Electoral Authoritarian Dominance 
Introduction 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of socialism around the world, an 
unprecedented number of democratic transitions occurred (Huntington 1991; 
Doorenspleet 2000, Przeworski et al. 2000: 44; Geddes, Wright and Franz 2014: 
316). Nonetheless, very soon it turned out that few of the newly-established 
democracies succeeded in their way to establish fully competitive systems. The 
lion’s share of these transitions ended up with fragile hybrid regimes known as 
pseudo-democracies, façade democracies, electoral democracies or illiberal 
democracies, political life in which is marred by feckless pluralism, the lack of rule 
of law, and recurrent violations of civil liberties (Collier and Levitsky 1997; Zakaria 
1997; Carothers 2002). Other political regimes did not merely get “stuck in 
transition”, but overtly returned to authoritarian forms of government, even though 
in updated non-Socialist, non-military, generally speaking, non-fully dictatorial 
forms. Since multiparty elections have become the worldwide standard of 
“democracy”, former authoritarian rulers and their successors have had little choice 
but to run the gauntlet of this regular inevitable institutional threat to their power 
in order to gain international legitimacy. For this and other reasons (Gandhi and 
Lust-Okar 2009), the adoption of democratic institutions in formerly closed 
authoritarian regimes has frequently resulted in transition to electoral (Schedler 
2006) or competitive (Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010) authoritarianism. A widespread 
view on this kind of political regimes is that electoral playing field is highly uneven 
and heavily skewed in favor of the incumbent by political repression and electoral 
malpractices. As a consequence, incumbents in these regimes win elections with 
huge margins and the opposition can only dream about victory.   
Why do incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes manage to stay in power? 
Why, in particular, do political elites perpetrate multiple authoritarian practices – 
electoral fraud, repression of the opposition, persecution of journalists, and others – 
given high potential costs to be paid due to intrinsic illegality of these practices? 
Why do voters give their votes for authoritarian leaders regardless of economic 
downturns and poor policy performance? To what extent do intrinsically 
authoritarian practices, especially electoral fraud, contribute to persistence of 
electoral authoritarianism and can authoritarian leaders refrain from their use? 
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This study seeks to answer these questions by considering the determinants of 
authoritarian regime survival with a special focus on Russia.  
After the turbulent events of the early 1990s, Russia has evolved from an almost 
failed state and electoral democracy toward one of the most emblematic cases of 
consolidated electoral authoritarianism. Vladimir Putin was welcomed as a national 
hero after the 1998 economic crisis, governmental turmoil, terrorist attacks, and 
the war in Chechnya. The presidential election of March 2000 demonstrated his 
triumph. Several observers claimed this outcome to be a result of electoral 
investments in future expectations. The long-awaited economic recovery was in fact 
favorable to these expectations until 2008 when the Global Recession has affected 
the Russian economy, which became more internationally integrated and dependent 
on exports of natural resources in the first decade of Putin’s rule. The economic 
troubles coincided with regime’s first electoral losses during the electoral cycle of 
2011–2012 in which United Russia, the “party of power”, did not manage to obtain 
a constitutional majority of seats in the State Duma, the incumbent’s vote declined 
by seven percent, and, more importantly, the regime encountered the first strong 
wave of post-electoral protest. While the Russian economy has been rather 
stagnating after 2008, a positive impetus of the economy on regime’s popularity has 
obviously been exhausted by the end of 2014 when oil prices slumped nearly 
twofold and then established at such low level with a weak tendency to upward 
correction until 2018. As a result, the country lost a considerable share of its 
income. In spite of this fact, United Russia regained a constitutional majority and 
Putin received an impressive 76.7% of the vote in the elections of 2016 and 2018, 
respectively. 
In a parallel process, immediately after Putin took power in 2000, a new course 
was set for restricting political rights and suppressing civil liberties. The first attack 
occurred on freedom of the media. The most critical TV channel – NTV – part of 
oligarch Vladimir Gusinskiy’s Media-Most holding, was prosecuted simultaneously 
under several articles of the Criminal Code in 2000. Under duress, Gusinsky has 
had to flee Russia and NTV was sold to the state-controlled company Gazprom. 
Once NTV’s leadership has been changed, its media policy became much more pro-
incumbent. Governors began to emulate this model of using law-enforcement bodies 
of the state for influencing independent journalists and media companies at the 
regional level. Consequently, criticizing state authorities has virtually become 
inadmissible in the most of public media. Next, a new electoral legislation was 
adopted in 2001 that tightened requirements for registration of parties and 
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candidates and togeather with numerous amendments, which followed in 
subsequent years, it have restricted electoral competition so tightly that only 7 
political parties managed to keep their official registration by 2012, compared with 
44 in 2003, and the number of presidential candidates decreased from 11 in 2000 
to 4 in 2008. Besides this, under the pretext of war on terrorism, direct 
gubernatorial elections were canceled after the 2004 terrorist attack in the North 
Ossetian city of  Beslan, which claimed the lives of over than three hundred people. 
The law-enforcement state apparatus was also began to be used for political 
repression. Opposition candidates, their assistants, and ordinary activists were 
subjects to multiple unmotivated detentions during electoral campaigns. 
Businessmen were intimidated that they are to lose their businesses if they will 
donate to the opposition. While the regime has initially lacked legal tools for 
repression, the articles of the Criminal Code 282 (the “Extremism Law”) and 280 (on 
“public calls for extremist activities”) with their numerous amendments gave great 
opportunities for law-enforcement agencies to act on their own discretion with 
regime dissenters, including placing them in jail for comments in social networks. 
Finally, incumbent’s engagement in electoral fraud became a routine self-evident 
practice when individual polling stations and entire regions began to report 
absolutely untrustworthy election results with the incumbent’s vote exceeding the 
80-percent level. As a result, Russia was estimated to be a non-free country by the 
Freedom House organization in 2004 and it holds its authoritarian status thus far.  
Notwithstanding the success of the authoritarian consolidation of the 2000s, 
the regime’s limits of power were identified during the election cycle of 2011–2012. 
The Russian parliamentary election of December 2011 was heavily criticized by 
opposition forces as fraudulent. Civil activists who conducted electoral monitoring 
and collected copies of polling station protocols reported that United Russia gained 
31.2% (Oreshkin 2011) or 34.3% (RuElect 2011) of the vote. The Central Electoral 
Commission declared it to be 49.3%. This discrepancy between the actual electoral 
support and the officially declared result triggered a nation-wide wave of mass 
protests. Civil enthusiasm sprang up from anticipation of an opposition victory 
resulted in the most prominent electoral observation campaign ever seen in Russia. 
More than twelve thousand observers scrutinized the presidential voting in March 
2012. Yet, this time the official result of Vladimir Putin was much closer to the data 
of electoral observers: 63.6% officially declared versus 54.3% (Combined Protocol 
2012) and 51.3% (SMS-CIK 2012) reported by observers. Both citizens and 
opposition forces recognized that Putin, in fact, received as many votes as he would 
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have won even without resorting to fraud. Although the wave of post-electoral 
protest has eventually come to naught, the regime had to make political 
concessions. The legal restrictions on electoral competition were relaxed so that the 
number of registered parties increased to 56 by the end 2013 and 8 candidates 
were allowed to compete in the presidential election of 2018. Direct gubernatorial 
elections were reintroduced in 2012. Few or none concessions, however, were made 
in the areas of political repression and media bias. Nor was an independent 
electoral commission or a system of electoral monitoring established. The 
incumbent’s victories in 2016 and 2018 have again demonstrated the persistence of 
electoral authoritarianism. 
Thus, Russia’s recent political history provides fertile land for competing 
explanations. The incumbent’s dominance can be viewed from different angles – 
economic advantages, electoral fraud, political repression, persecution of journalists 
or manipulation with electoral laws – yet none of these explanations provide prima 
facie evidence in favor of decisiveness of its effect. Do these and other factors 
contribute equally to authoritarian survival? Or are there factors of primary and 
subsequent order? Is there, metaphorically speaking, gasoline that sets the engine 
of authoritarian politics in motion?   
In this dissertation, I argue that electoral fraud, political repression and other 
intrinsically authoritarian practices are immanent characteristics of electoral 
authoritarianism. Their role, however, should neither be exaggerated, nor 
underestimated. On the one hand, as opposed to closed authoritarian regimes, 
electoral fraud is not outcome-changing and political repression does not take the 
form of mass terror, that is, the scope of authoritarian practices leaves some space 
for electoral competition under electoral authoritarianism. On the other hand, such 
informal practices are embedded into the nature of authoritarianism. Authoritarian 
incumbents cannot refrain from their use without losing loyalty of political elites. 
This conclusion directly follows from the core argument of the study: authoritarian 
incumbents secure loyalty of political elites by offering them material benefits and 
political elites signal their loyalty by implementing authoritarian policies in 
response. More specifically, electoral fraud and other authoritarian practices are 
typically carried out by political elites, which would hardly consent to bear high 
risks and pay high costs associated with these illegal practices gratuitously. Hence, 
unlike democracies, where the distributive game is played primarily to win votes, 
authoritarian leaders have inevitably to please political elites in order to secure 
their loyalty, which is eventually converted into electoral fraud, repression of the 
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opposition, persecution of the media, refraining from challenging the incumbent, 
and other authoritarian outcomes. At the same time, despite voter coercion, vote 
buying and other types of electoral fraud perpetrated through the mediation of 
political elites, authoritarian incumbents have also to secure loyalty of some 
fraction of voters for their sincere voting. Thus, the argument of this study is 
twofold. In a concise form, it implies that incumbents in electoral authoritarian 
regimes deliver clientelist benefits to political elites in order to secure their loyalty, 
which is subsequently converted into various formal and informal practices aimed 
to bias the electoral playing field in favor of the incumbent, and they also deliver 
patronage benefits to voters in order to obtain their political support, which 
translates into sincere voting for the incumbent. 
The remainder of the introductory chapter develops the argument in more detail 
by gradually moving from a broader to a narrower perspective. The next section 
presents an overview of major theoretical approaches to electoral authoritarian 
dominance in the context of this study. The third section draws a distinction 
between democratic and authoritarian practices designed to bias the electoral 
playing field in incumbent’s favor and shows their combination in different types of 
political regime. I argue herein that authoritarian tools of dominance are in no case 
legal (they can be also called informal practices), whereas the tools employed in 
electoral democracies to bias the electoral playing field are legally permitted. 
Electoral authoritarianism implies the widespread use of both legal and illegal tools 
of dominance. In this regard, electoral authoritarianism, as opposed to closed 
authoritarianism, cannot rely exclusively on informal practices – electoral fraud, 
repression or voter coercion. From this standpoint, I conceptualize 
patronage/clientelism in the fourth section. The contemporary literature on 
clientelism has two faults. First, it overemphasizes the incumbent’s opportunity to 
monitor electoral behavior and withdraw goods from opposition voters. In doing so, 
the literature implicitly equates clientelism to voter intimidation (“punishment 
regime”). Another sort of literature explicitly equates clientelism to vote buying. In 
both cases clientelism appears to be an informal practice (voter intimidation and 
vote buying are treated as two types of electoral fraud in this study) that leaves no 
room for sincere voting and makes electoral competition meaningless. Contrary to 
this literature, I argue that clientelism should be a formal practice. Second, the 
literature does not differentiate between the politically contingent distribution in 
democracies and autocracies. As a result, multiple authoritarian practices turn out 
to be unexplained. It is argued in this regard that taking the distribution targeted at 
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elites into consideration is crucial for explaining electoral fraud, repression, 
persecution of the media, and other authoritarian practices perpetrated by political 
elites, whereas the distribution favorable to voters result into sincere voting for the 
incumbent. This argument is presented in an aggregated form in the fifth section. In 
the final section, I discuss the case of Russia in comparative perspective. In 
particular, I claim that Russia pertains to a type of neopatrimonial personalist 
regimes and overview its generic characteristics vis-à-vis party-based regimes. 
Theoretical Approaches to Electoral Authoritarian Dominance 
Incumbent victories with huge margins and high turnout rates are common in 
electoral authoritarian regimes. A multitude of them have successfully managed to 
survive through economic crises and external democratizing pressure. There are 
several approaches seeking to answer why authoritarian regimes persist. Without 
making attempt to compile a full “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002) or to 
present an exhaustive survey of the existing literature, this section aims to 
delineate the main explanations of authoritarian survival, to discuss their strengths 
and weaknesses, and to find possible theoretical lacunas, which can be filled in this 
study. 
Economic Explanations 
A classical theory of economic voting (Downs 1957; Kramer 1971; Fiorina 1981; for 
a review see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000) stresses the importance of economic 
conditions for incumbency survival. Positive perceptions of personal economic 
situation (the pocketbook hypothesis) or national economic conditions (the 
sociotropic hypothesis) are typically translated into reelection of the incumbent, 
whereas voters with negative perceptions of the economy tend to punish 
incumbents at the polls. Cross-national studies revealed that retrospective, 
prospective and affective evaluations of government economic performance exert 
statistically significant and substantively strong effects on the likelihood of a vote 
for the incumbent coalition in four developed democracies (Lewis-Beck 1986); GDP 
growth, inflation, and unemployment in interaction with the “clarity of 
responsibility” determine the change in governing party’s vote share in 19 
industrialized democracies (Powell and Whitten 1993); GDP growth influences the 
vote of the major party in office in 38 countries holding, according to Freedom in 
the World, free or relatively free elections around the world (Wilkin, Haller and 
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Norpoth 1997); and current economic conditions influence differently electoral 
chances of two types of incumbents – primary and other incumbents –  in five East 
European transitional countries (Tucker 2001).  
However, very little attention has been paid to comparative studying of economic 
voting beyond the spectrum of democratic regimes. Studying authoritarian 
dominant party regimes, Greene (2010) found that GDP growth reached statistical 
significance in only three out of six models of dominant party’s margin of victory. In 
contrast to Yeltsin’s period (Colton 1996), when Russia was an electoral democracy, 
studies reveal a weak effect of the economy on the vote in the Putin era (Schofield 
and Zakharov 2010; Treisman 20111). 
Such poor empirical confirmation of the economic voting hypothesis in 
authoritarian regimes is theoretically predictable. If analysis relies on official 
election results, the dependent variable appears to be intrinsically biased due to 
vote buying, voter intimidation and other practices of electoral fraud. Using survey 
data on incumbent popularity may help to avoid this bias, yet mass surveys are not 
necessarily reliable under authoritarianism. Moreover, popular economic 
perceptions are manipulated by the incumbent-controlled media that do not deliver 
objective information but rather misinterpret facts, report false information and 
divert public attention to other (frequently minor) issues. Finally, even if public 
dissatisfaction with the economy increases, it cannot directly translate into anti-
incumbent voting since opposition parties and candidates, as a result of incumbent 
strategies toward opposition elites, turn into political radicals who are out of step 
with the median voter (Greene 2007), political loyalists (Lust-Okar 2004), regime 
collaborators (Bunce and Wolchik 2010), and other repulsive alternatives. 
Economic shocks may theoretically influence authoritarian incumbency survival 
through other mechanisms than economic voting. Londregan and Poole (1990) 
found that lower levels of economic growth increase the probability that a 
government is overthrown by a coup d’état. Reuter and Ghandi (2011) demonstrate 
that the likelihood of elite defection from hegemonic parties increases in the periods 
of economic decline. However, if we assume that economic shocks equally affect the 
probability of regime breakdown in democratic and authoritarian states, then we 
should observe an alternation in power resulted from economic downturns in nearly 
                                                          
1
 Contrary to the general argument in the article, the change in perceptions of the current economy explains 
much more variation of the change in Yeltsin’s popularity (t-value = 8.3, Model 5 in Table 2) compared with the 
change in Putin’s popularity (t-value = 2.1, Model 7 in Table 3). The major share of explanatory power of the 
Putin popularity model comes from dummy variables, which primarily contribute to a high R-squared. 
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equal frequencies between democracies and autocracies – this expectation is 
definitely far from reality. In particular, Gazirowski (1995: 889) show that economic 
growth has a negative effect on the probability of democratic breakdown (i.e. slumps 
undermine democracies), whereas changes in the economy have no significant effect 
on democratic transitions from autocracies. Przeworski et al. (2000: 110) show that 
2.4% of dictatorships, which experienced a prior economic decline, have eventually 
become democracies, whereas 4.2% of democracies have drifted into dictatorships 
after an economic recession. And this result is only partial inasmuch as the fact of 
losing elections by the incumbent, which may occur due to an economic crisis, is an 
ordinary practice in democracies that is quite not necessarily associated with 
regime change. In autocracies, by contrast, losing power by the incumbent in the 
electoral contest almost always implies democratization. Thus, the effect of 
economic hardships on incumbency survival is less pronounced in authoritarian 
regimes than in democracies.  
Presumably, not short-term fluctuations of the economy but long-term economic 
development should do away with authoritarianism. One of the first in the field to 
make such a claim, Lipset (1959) suggested that the more developed (i.e., the 
wealthier, the more industrialized, urbanized, and educated) a nation is, the greater 
the chances that it will sustain democracy. The earlier studies used energy 
consumption as a proxy to economic development and found that it is positively 
linked to democracy (Jackman 1973; Bollen 1979). In a more consistent way, the 
developmentalist hypothesis offered by Lipset has been tested by Barro (1999). His 
study has shown that only per capita GDP, the share of Muslim population, and a 
country’s dependence on oil export have strong effects on Electoral Rights and Civil 
Liberties scores, whereas the effects of other variables associated with development 
(life expectancy, infant mortality, education, and inequality) appeared to be feeble or 
insignificant. Other studies (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Timmons 2010) found no 
relationship between economic inequality, which is perhaps the most important for 
the developmentalist argument so long as the low inequality is associated with 
strong middle class, and democracy.  
The later examination of economic development theory by Przeworski and 
Limongi (1997) and Przeworski et al. (2000: Ch. 2) specified that economic 
development gives more chances for democratic survival (they called it exogenous 
democratization) but it does not lead to democratization of authoritarian regimes 
(endogenous democratization). They concluded that “[t]he emergence of democracy 
is not a by-product of economic development. Democracy is or is not established by 
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political actors pursuing their goals, and it can be initiated at any level of 
development. Only once it is established do economic constraints play a role: the 
chances for the survival of democracy are greater when the country is richer” (1997: 
177).  
Boix and Stokes (2003) challenged this finding. Extending the sample back to 
the year 1850 and using dynamic probit modeling, they found statistically 
significant confirmation for the endogenous democratizing effect of economic 
development. Quantitatively, however, the results are rather favorable to the 
exogenous theory: the estimated probability of democratic breakdown sharply 
decreases from roughly 77 to 5 percent as the level of per capita income increases 
from its minimum of $1,000 to $5,500, whereas the probability of transition to 
democracy increases almost indistinguishably from 4 to 6 percent as the level of per 
capita income increases from its minimum of $1,000 to the maximum of $12,000 
(see p. 537). The marginal change in probabilities of democratic transition is more 
pronounced if the Soviet and oil countries are excluded: the probability increases 
from 6 to 33 percent, however, this effect is still about four times smaller than the 
effect of exogenous democratization. Hence, economic development rather keeps 
already-existing democracies afloat but it is unlikely to lead to a democratic 
transition from authoritarian rule.  
Acemoglu et al. (2009) argue that there is no a causal effect of income on 
democracy at all. They show that once country fixed effects are controlled for or 
parameterized random effects are included, the correlation between income and 
democracy, and the likelihood of transition to and from democracy disappear. Boix 
(2011: 816) attributes this null effect to a reduced number of countries and years in 
the sample of Acemoglu and colleagues. He also uses fixed-effects OLS regressions 
with country and time dummies, yet preferably with 10-year lags for democracy and 
GDP (that also reduces the number of observations), and finds a positive effect of 
income on democracy.2 This effect is, however, significant in only two out of five 
historical periods indicating that lag selection crucially impacts the results. 
Substantively, there is unclear why historical rather than current levels of the 
economy should influence the current level of democracy.3 And if this effect appears 
                                                          
2
 If a 5-year lag is chosen, the effect of GDP is significant (primarily due to N = 2,172) but small (0.036 versus 
0.660 – the effect of the lagged democracy). Using a 10-year lag decreases the effect of the lagged democracy 
to 0.374 and increases the effect of GDP to 0.124. See Table 1 in the article. 
3
 A 25-year lag yields even a stronger effect – 0.172 compared with 0.124 (the 10-year lag effect), even though 
the former is less significant (primarily because the 25-year lag model’s N is smaller (295) than the 10-year lag 
model’s N (989)). See Table 1 in the article. 
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as a result of a diminishing explanatory power of the lagged dependent variable 
(LDV) at larger lags, why is the lagged dependent variable used in the cross-section 
analysis?4 A full-fledged time-series analysis would allow to examine the effect of 
time much better than the LDV. 
Apart from this, if a causal relationship exists, not only cross-sectional but also 
time-series correlation between variables should be present in the most of cases.5 
Nevertheless, despite the over than fifty-year history of extensive research, the time-
series dimension of the relationship between democracy and development has 
neither been duly examined nor a robust relationship has been demonstrated. 
Goldstone and Kocornik-Mina (2005) traced trajectories over time of all sovereign 
nations over 500,000 in population between 1955 and 2000 in a two-dimensional 
democracy/development space. Their results, however, “provide only slim support 
for the notion that the ‘Authoritarian transition’ model is an effective path to 
democracy; most autocratic regimes neither experience sustained economic growth 
nor experience transitions to democracy, even those that reached incomes in excess 
of the most common transition level ($6,000 gdp/cap)” (p. 26). Very few countries 
(among which Taiwan and South Korea) have experienced gradual, multi-step 
improvements in both democracy and income directions, as predicted by theory. In 
other cases, sudden transitions have occurred after authoritarian economic growth 
(Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Cyprus) and after authoritarian stagnation (Chile, 
Argentina). In many cases, political regime and economic development vary over 
time independently of each other in a haphazard manner (Nigeria, Peru, Ghana, 
Fiji).  
The Russian case is in line with the skeptical view on democratization by 
economic development. In spite of the fact that Russia has become a “normal” 
middle-income country like Argentina, Brazil or South Korea (Shleifer and Treisman 
2005), it has not yet undergone a democratic transition. Furthermore, Russia under 
Putin has become wealthier than under Yeltsin but more authoritarian. In this 
study, I decompose the official incumbent’s vote share into two parts – one 
consisting of the genuine incumbent’s vote and the second resulted from electoral 
fraud. In multilevel models encompassing the period of 2000–2012, I found no 
                                                          
4
 It generally follows from Table 1 in the article that the effect of GDP gets stronger at larger lags proportionally 
to a diminishing explanatory power of the LDV at larger lags – 0.660 at the 5-yer lag, 0.374 at the 10-yer lag, 
and 0.225 at the 25-yer lag. 
5
 The simultaneity of cross-section and time-series relationship can be violated in some cases. In Chapter 5, I 
argue that the central government can elaborate such rules of allocation of central transfers that the most loyal 
supporters were constantly rewarded, if the group of supporters is stable over time and sizable enough to 
overweigh fluctuations in the vote of other groups of the electorate. 
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consistent effect neither of the level of gross regional product (GRP) nor of GRP 
growth on electoral fraud and found only modest effects of these variables on the 
sincere voting for the incumbent (see Chapter 6).  
Thus, the prerequisites of democracy related to economic development are 
probably necessary but definitely not sufficient conditions for authoritarian 
breakdown. It is also worth noting that regardless of the impact of the economic 
indicators on the future trajectory of authoritarianism, incumbents are in no 
position to manipulate them for the purposes of creating incumbency advantage.  
Political Repression 
O’Donnell (1988: Ch. 9) has shown that worsening of economic conditions was 
accompanied by political violence from the sides of guerilla and the government in 
the Peronist Argentina. The actions of state’s security apparatus and extralegal 
procedures were so important that “taking them into account is indispensable for 
understanding the crucial place that violence, and the fear of violence, came to 
occupy in the lives of Argentines” (p. 297). More recent studies came to mixed 
conclusions with respect to the extent of repression in various regime types and 
political effects of repression. Regan and Henderson (2002) found an inverted u-
shaped relationship between regime type and repression. Other studies claim that 
there is a threshold effect – movement from closed autocracy to electoral democracy 
does not lower the level of repression until a threshold of 0.8 at 0 – 1 scale (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2005) or 8 at 10-point scale (Davenport and Armstrong 2004) is 
reached, that is, only full democracies are less repressive. Building analysis upon a 
sample of both democratic and authoritarian leaders, Bueno de Mesquita and 
Smith (2010) found no significant effect of repression on leader survival rates. 
Escribà-Folch (2013) included only authoritarian leaders in her dataset and 
uncovered that physical repression (measured by the Political Terror Scale) decrease 
only the likelihood of nonviolent ruler exit, while restrictions on civil liberties 
(measured by the corresponding Freedom House’s scale) produce negative effects on 
both violent and nonviolent types of ruler exit from power.6 
                                                          
6
 The reliability of the dependent variable, which is the Political Terror Scale (PTS) or its composite sources – 
Amnesty International (PTS_A), Human Rights Watch (PTS_H), and the US Department of State (PTS_S), is 
questionable in these and similar studies. A critical article by McCormick and Mitchell (1997) discusses a 
conceptual problem of aggregation of different types of political terror – the use of imprisonment versus the 
use of torture and killing. Besides this, the PTS does evidently not capture what it is designed to capture (Wood 
and Gibney 2010), namely, state-sponsored repression for political reasons. In 1992, the first year for which the 
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If the use of repression for creating incumbency advantage is discussed, it 
should be noted that a ruler’s reliance on a large-scale repression is limited by costs 
and unintended consequences that repression may entail. It may, for instance, spur 
mass protests (Francisco 1995; Kricheli, Livne and Magaloni 2011). Bratton and 
Masunungure (2006: 23) argue that a massive “urban clean up” campaign led by 
ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe “ultimately undermined the legitimacy of key state 
institutions, notably the police force, and boosted overt political support for the 
Movement for Democratic Change”. More importantly, from a dictator’s point of 
view, large-scale repression dangerously strengthens repressive bodies of the state 
that increases their capacity to overthrow the dictator (Svolik 2012: Ch. 5). Svolik 
(2012: 11) metaphorically describes this threat by noting that “[a]authoritarian 
reliance on repression is thus a double-edged sword: It shows the seeds of future 
military interventions.” A regime of unlimited repression also creates discontent 
among the ruling elite, which suffers from permanent purges. In this connection, 
Khrushchev relaxed Stalin’s regime of terror at the XX party congress being 
primarily guided by “class” interests, that is, to exclude the Soviet nomenklatura 
from the threat of extralegal physical repression. Politicians, thus, have to rely on 
harsh mass repression when other tools of political survival are unavailable. 
Modern dictatorships, as Guriev and Treisman (2015: 3) show, use violence 
sparingly compared with their counterparts from the 1980s. This also holds true for 
Putin’s regime. It does not rely on political repression as heavily as did the 
Bolsheviks in their early period soon after the seizure of power (Melgunov 1926) or 
during Stalin’s rule (Solonevich 1938). Instead of crude violence, the regime relies 
more on violation of civil liberties by taking under custody and penalizing peaceful 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
scores are available, the level of repression was relatively low in Russia: the PTS_A = 2 and the PTS_S = 3 (at 1 – 
5 scale). In the next year, when Yeltsin has undertaken a military assault of the parliament in which numerous 
unarmed citizens who were trying to defend the parliament were killed, the PTS scores remained unchanged. 
Then the scores varied between 3 and 5 during the 1990s in unexplainable manner. The PTS_A has reached its 
maximum of 5 in 2000 and the PTS_S has also reached 5 in 1998. The codebook construes the level 5 of terror 
as follows: “[t]he terrors of Level 4 have been extended to the whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (the data 
and the codebook are available at: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org). Judged impartially, this definition was 
empirically met in Russia only in times of Stalin. The PTS_A and the PTS_S were constant at the level of 4 under 
Putin’s rule from 2001 through 2016 (an exception is the PTS_A in 2015 = 3). Neither the PTS responds in a 
consistent way to a growing repressive capacity of the state apparatus under Putin, nor does it respond to 
election-related mass detentions of opposition protesters in 2008 and 2012 in Russia. Other countries can be 
discussed respectively but a nearly null share of explained variance in a country, for which the relevant 
information is largely available, is sufficient to understand why the literature does not find a clear-cut 
distinction between closed and electoral autocracies and electoral democracies with respect to the scope of 
political repression. In the next section of this chapter, I offer a theoretically driven classification of the scope of 
informal practices, including repression, by several regime types, which differs from findings of these studies. 
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demonstrators, especially in relation to post-electoral protest, and by prosecuting 
most serious opponents “for extremism” applying the article of the Criminal Code 
No. 282 – the Federal Law On Counteracting Extremist Activity (“Extremism Law”), 
which effectively allows to place citizens in jail for their comments in social 
networks. The number of convicts under the article 282 rose from 137 in 2011 to 
414 in 2015, the major group of them consists of nationalists (Dergachev and 
Vinokurov 2016). It must be noted that such litigations do not follow the logic of 
formal institutions. Although the Extremism Law de jure allows for prosecution of 
citizens who publically criticize state officials – in this regard, it is in fact a legal tool 
against the opposition – the Extremism Law contains no explicit definition of 
extremism. Instead it offers a highly vague and heterogeneous list of activities 
considered to be extremist.7 As a result, “no one publicly criticizing the state, its 
policy, and public officials, even with a good understanding of the current 
legislation, can predict whether his words contain signs of extremism” (Roudik 
2014). For this reason, the application of the law in courts largely depends on 
expertise. Experts frequently come from state structures or institutions affiliated 
with the state, they do not have sufficient competence in area they examine, 
whereas reports of alternative experts are routinely disregarded (Roudik 2014; 
Rozalskaya 2011)8. Therefore, article 282 is rather a contemporary analog of the 
notoriously known article 58 “on counter-revolutionary activity” of the criminal code 
from the Soviet past. Both articles are highly targeted at political opposition, while 
their enforcement practices have nothing in common with law. Their essence is 
repression. 
In this study, I do not examine state-sponsored repression in detail. However, it 
is puzzling why, given a potential cost of repression (repression is an illegal practice 
and its perpetrators will have to be subjects of criminal punishment if a committed 
to the principle of rule of law government comes to power), do state officials still 
                                                          
7
 Interestingly, among these activities, one kind of activity is especially endemic to numerous state officials, 
including the president: “preventing citizens from exercising their electoral rights and the right to participate in 
a referendum, or violating the secrecy of the vote, combined with violence or threats to use violence”. 
Chapters 2–4 provide evidence for this proposition. Simultaneously, this dissertation, until its findings are not 
defended in court, is unequivocally defined as an “extremist material”. A penultimate item in the list states that 
“dissemination of knowingly false accusations against federal or regional officials in their official capacity, 
alleging that they have committed illegal or criminal acts” also constitute extremist activities. Those who will 
read or publish this dissertation should take this into consideration. 
8
 See also other reports and materials on extremism issued by the SOVA Center for Information and Analysis at: 
https://www.sova-center.ru/en/misuse/reports-analyses/. Videos by Andrey Saveliev, ex-deputy of the State 
Duma fraction Rodina, can also be helpful as first-person information from the litigations, sometimes in the 
role of expert. See a series of videos entitled RN-Extreme on Youtube, for example, RN-Extreme. Grudinin and 
Article 282: Repression in Sergiev Posad [RN-Ekstrim. Grudinin i 282-ya statya, Repressii v Sergiyevom Posade] 
at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4AAMdZsh57Q. 
  
14 
 
perpetrate it? The main argument of the study, which is more diligently developed 
with respect to electoral fraud, can be applied to all authoritarian practices, 
including political repression. The argument suggests that regional elites, local 
agents and other actors are rewarded by the regime for their authoritarian activities 
and these actors signal their loyalty to the regime by implementing authoritarian 
practices in order to receive material benefits in return.  
Electoral Fraud 
Electoral malpractices and blatant falsification of election results may also account 
for high turnout rates and impressive vote shares in authoritarian regimes. 
Anecdotal stories, media information, and electoral observers support this 
assertion. The literature on electoral fraud also offers evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis (Schaffer 2007; Alvarez, Hall and Hyde 2008; Mebane and Kalinin 2009; 
Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009; Beber and Scacco 2012; Kobak, Shpilkin 
and Pshenichnikov 2012; Simpser 2013; Rozenas 2017). However, scholars argue 
that elections under competitive authoritarianism “are generally free of massive 
fraud” (Levitsky and Way 2002: 53) and that electoral fraud does not play a decisive 
role but is rather used as an additional or temporary tool when a dominant party’s 
patronage fund exhausts (Greene 2007: 34; Magaloni 2006: 21–23). These 
assertions have rather a normative character since the amount of electoral fraud in 
electoral authoritarian regimes has not been studied properly in quantitative terms. 
Falsification of electoral results is still a sort of latent variable that is only implied 
“by default” in non-democratic regimes but its real values remain unknown. 
 In this study, I examine electoral fraud thoroughly to fill this gap in the 
literature, at least partially. Chapter 2 discusses types of electoral fraud. Then, I 
review existing methods of election forensics in Chapter 3. And, taking finding of 
these two chapters into account, in Chapter 4, I develop a novel approach based on 
quantile regression applied to the distribution of the incumbent’s vote conditionally 
on the level of turnout to estimate the qualitative and quantitative amount of fraud 
in the Russian presidential elections from 2000 through 2012. Although the 
analysis includes only the case of Russia and does not allow for cross-sectional 
variation of electoral fraud between several countries and types of political regime, 
the cross-temporal data on electoral fraud makes possible to trace the variation of 
electoral fraud conditional on regime type. The results show that the scope of 
electoral fraud was the least in 2000 (it could be assessed as equal to an upper 
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threshold for electoral democracies), when authoritarianism was only beginning to 
be established, then electoral fraud proliferated and reached its maximum in 2008 
and after that decreased slightly in 2012 as a result of a large-scale electoral 
observation campaign driven by enhanced opposition activity during the election 
cycle of 2011–2012. Consistently with theoretical expectations proposed in the 
literature, electoral fraud has not substantively affected election outcomes; Putin 
and Medvedev could have seemingly won without resorting to fraud. At the same 
time, it was widespread and essential for regime survival. Specifically, electoral 
fraud appears to be inextricably linked with the regime by two main factors. First, 
increasing the probability of losing power in elections by refraining from fraud is 
unacceptable for authoritarian incumbents due to high costs of losing power under 
authoritarianism. Second, electoral fraud, as Chapter 5 and 6 of this study show, is 
“embedded” into the mechanism of distributive politics that is designed for 
rewarding regional elites for their political loyalty. Refraining from fraud would 
imply dismantling of, at least, one such a mechanism that allows the incumbent to 
secure loyalty of the elite. 
The cross-sectional variation of electoral fraud suggests that electoral 
malpractices were not evenly distributed between Russia’s regions. In the election of 
2012, for instance, where the average level of fraud is equal to 8.9% that matches a 
standard of electoral authoritarianism, the estimated amount of fraud in Moscow  
(fraud = -0.8%, vote = 47.9%), Vladimir Oblast (fraud = -0.7%, vote = 54.2%), and 
Perm Krai (fraud = 1.0%, vote = 63.8%) worth a good standard of electoral 
democracy. On the other tail of the continuum of electoral regimes, where electoral 
competition ends, are located Tatarstan (fraud = 23.3%, vote = 83.3%), 
Bashkortostan (fraud = 19.2%, vote = 75.9%), and Kemerovo Oblast (fraud = 16.5%, 
vote = 78.0%) – they are cases of a hegemonic subtype of electoral authoritarianism. 
Finally, Chechnya (fraud is undefined, vote = 99.9%), Dagestan (fraud = 27.5%, vote 
= 93.1%), and Mordovia (fraud = 25.0%, vote = 87.6%) are cases of closed 
authoritarianism where electoral competition is meaningless. The classification of 
regions based on their level of fraud is in line with the common wisdom regarding 
the nature of politics in these regions. This empirically confirms that, as 
theoretically predicted (Greene 2007: 34; Levitsky and Way 2002: 53; Magaloni 
2006: 21–23), electoral fraud does not play a decisive role in survival of electoral 
autocracies. On the example of electoral fraud, this also empirically supports my 
theoretical expectations concerning the extent of occurrence of illegal practices in 
different types of political regime presented in the next section. 
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Media Bias 
Besides resorting to fraud and repression, authoritarian incumbents systematically 
distort the delivery of information to the public. It is shown by Stier (2015) that 
authoritarian regimes are characterized by significantly lower levels of media 
freedom. The media in electoral democracies are, however, not absolutely impartial 
as well. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) studied the effect of the introduction of the 
conservative Fox News Channel between 1996 and 2000 on the vote share change 
of the Republican candidate in the same period. They found that Republicans 
gained an additional 0.4 – 0.7 percentage points of the vote in towns with Fox News 
broadcasting. Gerber, Karlan and Bergan (2009) conducted a field experiment to 
examine the effect of newspaper reading on the vote. They found that subjects who 
were assigned Washington Post reading were 7.9% more likely to vote for the 
Democratic candidate than subjects from the control group and 3.9% more likely to 
vote for the Democratic candidate compared with those who were assigned 
Washington Times reading.  
Similar effects were found in the studies of Russian parliamentary and 
presidential elections of 1999–2000. Enikolopov, Petrova and Zhuravskaya (2011) 
demonstrate that a one standard deviation increase in the probability the NTV (a 
private media channel) is available decreases the vote for Unity by 1.6% and 
increases the vote for OVR and SPS by 0.36% and 0.35%, respectively. White, Oates 
and McAllister (2005: 191) even argue that the elections of 1999–2000 “have been 
won in large part through the partisan use of (particularly state) television.” The 
authors show that the communist party received more than twice less news 
coverage by state channels than Unity, the major “party of power”, and the main 
opponent Zyuganov received about four times less news coverage from all sources 
than Putin. However, out of those who voted for Putin, 67% watched state television 
and 58% of Zyuganov’s voters also watched state channels. The exposure to state 
television is significantly associated only with the vote choice for Putin (positively) 
and Yavlinsky (negatively) but not with the vote choice for Zyuganov.   
Authoritarian regimes differ from their democratic counterparts with respect to 
media bias in the fact that political leaders in authoritarian regimes possess much 
more resources and tools to bias the delivery of information in their favor. 
Authoritarian leaders can directly control the media through state ownership in 
which “appointments to key positions are linked to political loyalty” (Becker 2004: 
149) or by encouraging friendly businessmen to invest in the media (Gehlbach 
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2010). They can indirectly control the media as well through tax privileges, 
subsidized newsprint, and cash payments to journalists (Gehlbach and Sonin 2014) 
or by applying quasi-legal actions to journalists under the guise of fight against 
slander and libel that threaten the image of state officials  (Price and Krug 2000: 
18). Finally, authoritarian incumbents can illegally persecute and torture 
journalists. 
It is worth mentioning that media bias and even outright propaganda have lower 
costs related to their consequences than electoral fraud or repression. While 
electoral fraud should be perpetrated in secrecy and political repression should be 
selective and “dosed” to not entail a backlash in the form of mass protest, riots or a 
coup, propaganda has much fewer such limitations. Propaganda as a public 
delivery of false facts and distorted information does not put legitimacy of the 
incumbent into question as categorically as public awareness of electoral fraud 
does. Unlike political repression, it does not affect the interests of personal security 
of social groups. Therefore, it can be repeated time after time until people believe it. 
Nevertheless, Guriev and Treisman (2015: 4) raise a conceptual question: “the 
effectiveness of propaganda in authoritarian regimes is a prima facie puzzle. Given 
that citizens know the dictator has an incentive to lie about his type [of 
competence], why do they ever listen?” Guriev and Treisman’s answer to this 
question is that dictators, besides propaganda, sometimes choose to spend their 
budget on public goods that can be directly observed by the public and convincingly 
support messages sent by propaganda. This explanation, however, assumes that 
citizens are absolutely incapable of differentiating between actual outcomes of 
incumbent’s policies and outcomes declared by propaganda. This assumption is too 
strong. Consider a citizen who directly observes the state of the economy, 
healthcare, education, law enforcement, and other public goods in the country. He 
knows, for example, that consumer goods have become much more expensive in 
recent years, healthcare and education are becoming of less quality and less 
affordable, roads are falling apart in many areas of the country, other types of 
infrastructure are also poorly maintained (the list of examples can be supplemented 
in contemporary Russia), yet the official television says that the incumbent is 
always competent. Under such conditions, why should this citizen believe 
propaganda, even if he observes that public goods are sometimes actually delivered? 
I agree with Guriev and Treisman (2015) that propaganda plays an important 
role in modern dictatorships. It is beginning to play a more and more prominent 
role in Putin’s Russia, especially after the military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, when 
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state-sponsored media resorted to pseudo-patriotism as a tool of mobilizing popular 
support for the regime. However, the question on citizen willingness to adopt false 
believes remains decisive for understanding the effectiveness of propaganda in 
authoritarian regimes. It cannot be answered in the current study and deserves 
further examination. Nevertheless, I offer a preliminary explanation in Appendix F6. 
Building upon the theory of motivated reasoning, I argue therein that the adoption 
of admittedly false information delivered by propaganda is associated with lower 
psychological costs than an objective truth-seeking view on reality. For this reason, 
authoritarian incumbents can simply redirect responsibility for poor policy 
performance from themselves to an external enemy (Obama, Americans, the West, 
etc.) and voters will willingly accept this informational message since there is easier 
to blame someone else for country’s troubles than themselves for supporting the 
regime and voting for dictatorship. 
Political Institutions and Co-Optation 
Additionally to “sticks” in the form of fraud, repression, and censorship, 
authoritarian leaders can also use a “carrot” in the form of co-optation of opposition 
activists into executive structures of the state or into a dominant party. Gandhi and 
Przeworski (2007) found that those authoritarian rulers who had fewer legislative 
parties than there was necessary given the strength of the opposition 
(underinstitutionalized cases), survived in power for only 3.3 years on average 
during the 1946–1996 period. In the overinstitutionalized cases, the rulers survived 
for 9.4 years. Magaloni (2008) argues that autocratic parties mitigate commitment 
problem by institutionalizing the exchange between the ruler and the elite. 
Members of the ruling elite know that they will receive spoils and privileges until 
they are party members; if they decide to split, they lose benefits. Svolik (2012: Ch. 
6) argues that parties in autocracies help dictators to solve the problems of power-
sharing and control. Geddes (1999)9, Brownlee (2007), and Boix and Svolik (2013) 
also argue that parties play a crucial role in longevity of authoritarian rule. 
Nevertheless, authoritarian dominant parties are not the only institutions to co-opt 
potential challengers. Arriola (2009) argues that a larger cabinet size allows 
dictators in African countries to prolong their regime duration by expanding 
patronage coalitions.  
                                                          
9
 Smith (2005), however, shows that if the USSR and Mexico are excluded from the sample, the positive effect 
of a single party on regime duration disappears. 
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This literature, however, underestimates the perils of co-optation and does not 
clarify that power-sharing by authoritarian incumbents with the opposition can be 
effectively carried out to a decorative extent only. Opponents cannot be admitted to 
key positions of policy making, otherwise they would endanger dominance of the 
incumbent. Studying the effect of political system on political stability in Africa, 
Kirschke (2007) fund that, consistently with the co-optation theory, pure 
parliamentary systems have experienced no coups in 1990–2005, whereas the 
probability of coup d’état was higher in pure presidential systems (25% of changes 
of government). However, a higher risk of coups experienced semi-presidential 
systems (52% of changes of government), where the head of state have to take the 
influence of opposition parties in the parliament into account to appoint a prime 
minister. And the highest risk was observed in extreme cases of power-sharing 
characterized by a politically divided executive (presidents have to share power with 
prime ministers from an opposition party), where governments were overthrown in 
coups with the probability of 83%. 
Besides this, two major factors make the co-optation strategy problematic: 1) 
opposition strength vis-à-vis incumbent weakness, and 2) high degree of ideological 
commitment of the opposition.10 Put otherwise, only moderate opposition activists 
can be effectively co-opted. Those activists who value political program more than 
office (message-seekers) are more likely to reject the incumbent’s offer on co-
optation (Greene 2006).  Even for office-seekers, co-optation is preferable only as a 
choice between political extinction and at least some, even minor, office. Otherwise, 
if the incumbent does not have an overwhelming advantage over the opposition, 
they would stay in opposition parties. Hence, if the opposition is strong and 
ideologically committed, it cannot be co-opted at an acceptable cost. This was the 
case if the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF). Although KPRF 
dominated in the parliament in 1995–1999, the Communists were not (and could 
have not been) offered any significant ministerial portfolios in the government so 
long as this would imply a policy change, which was unacceptable for Yeltsin.  
The situation has changed in the 2000s when the number of opposition parties 
and their influence in the State Duma substantively reduced. The Kremlin did not 
have incentives to co-opt KPRF since it lost the credibility of its threat to the regime. 
At the same time, the political party Rodina (motherland) emerged in 2003 as a 
coalition of minor parties that received 9.2% of the vote in the 2003 parliamentary 
                                                          
10
 Similarly, Magaloni (2008: 11–13) suggests that dictators facing strong and highly polarized opposition will 
find it harder to consolidate a stable party dictatorship. 
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election. The party adopted increasingly nationalist rhetoric that was persistently 
not tolerated by the Kremlin (since the 1990s, nationalism is allowed in Russia only 
in the form of Zhirinovsky’s LDPR). As a result, the party was denied of registration 
in several regional elections. Dmitry Rogozin has had to step down as party leader 
in 2006. Under the new leadership, Rodina merged with Russian Party of Life and 
Russian Party of Pensioners, was renamed into Just Russia, and abandoned its 
nationalist rhetoric. After leaving the opposition activity, Rogozin was appointed (co-
opted) a Russian Ambassador to NATO in 2008 and a Deputy Prime Minister of the 
Russian Federation in 2011. Analogously, another leader of the party – Sergey 
Glazyev – was appointed a Deputy Secretary General of the Eurasian Economic 
Community (EurAsEC) in 2008 and an Advisor to the President of the Russian 
Federation in 2012.  
The case of Rodina shows that while its leaders were offered positions in the 
executive, which is more valuable in Russia than the legislature (see the last section 
in this chapter for more details in this regard), the rank-and-file members were co-
opted into a new loyal party. Very few (if any) opposition leaders were co-opted into 
United Russia. An increasing rate of governors’ membership in United Russia could 
be deemed as an exception. However, governors are rather “forced into joining the 
party” (Reuter 2010: 299) than co-opted. They do not receive upper appointments 
but retain their prime offices (governorships), whereas United Russia’s party ballot 
has about the same legal meaning as Mongolian jarlig (a “formal diploma”) during 
the Mongol-Tatar yoke, which authorized the rule of local princes in Rus’. 
Stressing the capacity of dominant parties to co-opt opposition leaders and 
monitor their behavior, the literature assumes the existence of a dominant party as 
taken for granted, it does not consider whether a dominant party can be feasibly 
created under a certain type of political regime. In the Russian case, United Russia 
as the “party of power” was not invented by Putin. Multiple attempts to establish a 
stable dominant party in the State Duma have been made by Yeltsin’s regime, yet 
all of them resulted in a fiasco. During the 1990s, Yeltsin was backed by several 
parties that managed to receive only minor shares of the vote: Russia’s Choice 
(15.5%) and the Party of Russian Unity and Concord (PRES) (6.7%) in 1993, Our 
Home Is Russia (10.1%) and Democratic Choice of Russia (3.9%) in 1995. Two 
“parties of power” – Unity and Fatherland – All Russia (OVR), which eventually 
merged into United Russia in 2001, represented different factions of the ruling elite 
and even competed with each other in the parliamentary election of 1999. The only 
Putin’s institutional invention with respect to the “party of power” was apparently 
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liquidating the dualism of the “party of power” that existed during the 1990s, when 
at least two parties represented interests of the ruling elite. 
Thus, there is a huge discrepancy between intention to create a reliable 
dominant party and implementation of this idea in practice. Even if dictators would 
like to create dominant parties to co-opt all oppositionists into them, they cannot do 
it by decree for several objective reasons. From the perspective of this study, I 
would offer to change the chain of causality by setting elite loyalty and mass 
electoral support prior to authoritarian institutions and the possibility to co-opt 
challengers. Once dictators are capable of securing loyalty of elites and masses, 
they have more space for maneuver to establish and amend institutions that seem 
to be the most appropriate for their purposes; if they are not – they are powerless in 
institution-building.  
Legal Restrictions on Competition and Manipulation with Electoral Rules  
Another kind of institutional explanation of authoritarian survival refers to electoral 
engineering, which peruses a goal of skewing legal rules of competition in favor of 
the incumbent. Earlier studies put forward a hypothesis that the plurality single-
member district (SMD) system reduces the number of relevant parties to two, while 
the proportional representation (PR) system favors a multi-party system (Duverger 
1954; Rae 1967). Later studies revealed that not only the type of electoral system 
but also the number of policy issues (Taagepera and Grofman 1985), electoral 
formula and district magnitude (Lijphart 1990), social cleavages, district magnitude, 
district level and other factors (Cox 1997) determine the effective number of parties 
and the degree of disproportionality. Benoit (2007), however, suggests a reversed 
causation: not electoral systems determine party systems but rather electoral 
systems are established under the impact of party competition, societal cleavages, 
external actors, office-seeking and other interests. Extrapolating these findings to 
electoral authoritarian regimes, it follows that authoritarian incumbents should be 
most interested in the adoption of majoritarian electoral systems that favor a 
candidate that comes first at the polls. Higashijima and Chang (2016) find support 
for this proposition. In their data set of electoral authoritarian regimes, the average 
effective electoral threshold decreases from 27 to 20 over time with the grand 
average of 24 (all values above 10 indicate a majoritarian electoral system and 37.5 
indicates the SMD system). Higashijima and Chang estimated that authoritarian 
parties obtain 3.1% more seats under SMD than under PR systems, on average, 
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whereas this seat premium increases to 8.3% when the ruling party receives 85% of 
the vote.  
While using a majoritarian electoral system for electoral concerns is apparently 
the basic form of electoral engineering, the manipulative electoral practices are 
highly diverse. Among others they include highly disproportional electoral formulas 
for conversion of votes into legislative seats in PR systems, especially the Imperiali 
and d’Hondt methods (Benoit 2000); manipulation with districting, especially 
jerrymandering (Erikson 1972; Wong 2017) and malapportionment (Tan and 
Grofman 2013); restrictions on donations and limits on total campaign spending 
(Treisman 1998c); restrictions on media advertising, including television time 
(Holtz-Bacha and Kaid 2006); high deposits and fees candidates have to pay and/or 
large numbers of signatures candidates have to submit for getting access to ballot 
(Stratmann 2005); and excessive thresholds in PR systems (Jaklic 2008). This list is 
far from complete. The extent of manipulation is limited only by imagination of 
incumbent’s advisors and social resistance to their innovations. Additionally to 
traditionally studied characteristics of electoral systems, Grofman and Lijphart 
(1986: 2–3) offered a 13-item list of more detailed characteristics to be considered, 
ranging from suffrage and registration requirements to mechanisms of voter 
intervention. These characteristics and their political effects, especially with the 
focus on authoritarian regimes, are unfortunately poorly studied so far. 
It should be noted that, likewise media bias, electoral law manipulation can be 
practiced in electoral democracies and in electoral autocracies as well. In his 
profound study of electoral rules manipulation by the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) in Japan, McElwain (2008) argues that the LDP altered campaign regulations 
approximately fifty times during the postwar period to manufacture its 
parliamentary dominance.11 The LDP was unable to replace the multimember 
district single non-transferable vote (MMD-SNTV) system with SMD system due to 
the interests of intraparty incumbents and has had to rely upon numerous 
microlevel changes in electoral rules. These include extremely high deposits,12 
prohibition of advertisements prior to electoral campaign and reduction of campaign 
duration from 25 days in 1952 to 12 days in 1994, abolishing of door-to-door 
campaigning, and granting little time for candidates on public television given that 
candidates were not allowed to purchase advertising time on commercial broadcasts 
                                                          
11
 Scheiner (2006), however, argues that electoral rules played a minor role in sustaining the LDP’s dominance, 
whereas clientelism contributed the most. 
12
 If a party wanted to run one candidate in all 129 districts in 1992, it would have to pay a $3.5 million 
equivalent, which could not be reclaimed if the candidates obtained less than a specified share of votes. 
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until the 1990s. On the authoritarian spectrum of political regimes, Diaz-Cayeros 
and Magaloni (2001) show that Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico 
established a mixed electoral system by adding multi-member districts (MMDs) to 
SMDs in 1977 primarily to discourage coordination between opposition parties and 
voters, and facilitate, thereby, party dominance.  
The argument regarding electoral engineering developed in this study is the 
same as with regard to political institutions – it plays an important yet secondary 
role in stabilizing authoritarianism. The Russian political experience confirms this 
proposition by showing several examples when incumbent’s attempts of electoral 
manipulation failed due to the lack of loyalty of elites or masses. In the 1990s, any 
such attempts were simply blocked in the parliament, which was controlled by the 
opposition. For example, when Yeltsin proposed an amendment to State Duma 
Election Law, which stipulated a change in seats proportion from 225/225 to 300 
seats to be elected in SMDs and 150 – under PR, Duma voted against this 
amendment (Remington and Smith 1996). 
In the early 2000s, United Russia obtained a majority in the State Duma that 
allowed Kremlin’s political strategists (Vladislav Surkov, then-First Deputy Chief of 
the Russian Presidential Administration, was most outspoken of them) to amend 
electoral legislation considerably. These changes initially occurred at micro level 
and related primarily to restricting the access of minor parties and independent 
candidates to ballot. To be registered, a political party was required to have regional 
branches in over than a half of all regions. The minimal required number of party 
members in the half of regions was increased from 100 in 2001 to 500 in 2004, and 
the total minimal party membership was increased from 10,000 to 50,000 in these 
years, respectively. Accordingly, the number of registered parties has gradually 
reduced: 44 in 2003, 36 in 2005, 15 in 2007, and 7 in 2012 (TASS 2012). The 
requirements for registration of a candidate were not less restrictive. Candidates 
running for the presidential office in the 2000s were expected to submit 2 million 
signatures, and candidates from party lists seeking Duma mandates – 200 
thousand. Parties represented in the parliament and their nominees are exempted 
from this legal requirement. As a consequence, the number of presidential 
candidates also decreased over time: 11 in 2000, 6 in 2004, 4 in 2008, and 5 in 
2012; as well as the number of party lists in State Duma elections, in these 
election-cycles respectively: 30, 23, 11, 7. 
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When Kremlin’s political strategists began to enjoy the regime’s strength, they 
proposed a macrolevel electoral law amendment. For reasons of better 
manageability of regional representatives that were elected as independents (White 
and Kryshtanovskaya 2011), the SMD layer of the State Duma electoral system was 
eliminated in 2005. This decision has obviously been premature. In Stalin’s terms, 
it was driven by “dizziness from success” (golovokruzheniye ot uspekhov). United 
Russia received only 37.6% of the vote in the election of 2003 and forged a 68.3-
percent majority of seats mainly due to absorption of independents and other 
parties’ deputies into its State Duma fraction (Golosov 2005). Using a Monte Carlo 
simulation, Smyth, Lowry and Wilkening (2007) estimated that United Russia 
would gain the support of 45.6% of the electorate and would win a total of 210 seats 
if the election of 2007 conducted under the PR system. Notwithstanding such 
expectations, the actual election result of 2007 was favorable for the “party of 
power” – 64.3%.  
The failure of excessive electoral manipulation, however, has become evident 
when United Russia officially received 49.3% of the vote in the 2011 election 
(slightly over 30%, according to electoral observer reports (Oreshkin 2011; RuElect 
2011)) and the public awareness of fraud has triggered a strong wave of post-
electoral protest. The regime has had to admit its excesses due to “dizziness from 
success” and to roll back several legal restrictions formerly imposed on electoral 
competition. The amendments of 2012 decreased the minimal party membership to 
500 and the number of required signatures to register a presidential candidate – to 
300 thousand and 100 thousand – to register a party list for State Duma elections. 
As a reaction, the number of registered parties jumped to 56 by the end 2013. The 
number of presidential candidates reached 8 in 2018 and the number of party lists 
in the State Duma election of 2017 increased to 14. Besides this, gubernatorial 
elections, which have been canceled in 2004, were reintroduced in 2012 and 
electoral threshold of the parliamentary PR system was reduced from 7% to its 
previous level of 2003 – 5%. Thus, electoral engineering is a cartage, not a horse, 
that brings the leader to authoritarian dominance. What Golosov (2017) calls 
“authoritarian learning” in the process of development of Russia’s electoral system, 
is rather a confirmation of the fact that authoritarian leaders will have to learn this 
lesson from their own bitter experience if they put the manipulation with electoral 
rules prior to the actual balance of power. 
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The Role of External Pressure  
The external political environment is ordinarily viewed as favorable for democracy 
promotion, especially in the post-Cold War period. Said differently, dictators tend to 
lose power under the influence of external pressure. One of the first, Starr (1991) 
has shown the importance of diffusion approaches to the spread of democracy in 
the world. Studying governmental transitions based on yearly Freedom House data 
in 1974–1987, he has demonstrated that 31.6% of positive transitions at home were 
accompanied by positive bordering government transitions in the past two years, 
whereas only 10.1% of the positive domestic transitions were accompanied by 
negative bordering transitions.13 O’Loughlin et al. (1998) presented evidence of 
temporal clustering (the waves of democracy in Huntington’s (1991) terms) and 
spatial clustering of democratic and autocratic trends. The later studies (see Houle, 
Kayser and Xiang 2016: 639 for a review) have shown that the proportion of 
neighboring democracies and a neighboring transition to democracy increase the 
probability of transition to democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 2006), yet countries 
“catch” between 8% and 11% of the average change in democracy of their 
geographic neighbors – much less than the theory of democratic domino predicts 
(Leeson and Dean 2009), whereas the effect of the change in the share of 
democratic neighbors on the probability of transition to democracy becomes 
stronger after authoritarianism has experienced a breakdown (Houle, Kayser and 
Xiang 2016). 
Although the literature on diffusion of democracy finds empirical support for the 
geographic clustering of democratization, it does not offer a comprehensive 
examination of international linkages that bond adjacent countries and make 
diffusion effects possible. Foreign trade can theoretically contribute to establishing 
such cross-country linkages. Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2008) show that trade 
openness (i.e., the value of imports and exports divided by GDP) increases 
propensity to democracy measured by Polity IV score. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), to 
the contrary, show that trade openness has a negative impact on democracy and a 
positive (yet significant in one specification only) impact on rule of law. Given such 
sharp discrepancy in the results, the analytical debate cannot be effectively 
completed only by using different estimation procedures. To establish causality of 
the effect, studies should theoretically substantiate the relationship between the 
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 The reversed influence, however, was also strong enough. 23.1% of negative neighbouring transitions were 
associated with negative home transitions and 17.3% of positive neighbouring transitions were associated with 
negative home transitions (calculations are based on Table 5 in the article). 
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predictor and the outcome variable and then empirically test the association within 
and between each link of the theoretical chain. The causal chain, according to 
Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2008: 543), is the following: the globalization of trade 
leads to economic growth and economic growth then leads to democracy. However, 
as it is earlier shown in the subsection on economic explanations, no strong robust 
relationship between democracy and economic development was found. 
Furthermore, in their profound survey of studies on the relationship between trade 
barriers and economic growth, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000: 266) conclude that 
“[t]he issue is far from having been settled on empirical grounds. We are in fact 
skeptical that there is a general, unambiguous relationship between trade openness 
and growth waiting to be discovered.” Additionally to the weak causal and dubious 
empirical confirmation, the literature on the relationship between trade openness 
and democracy does not specify – with whom to trade, with democracies or 
autocracies.  
This shortcoming was corrected by Levitsky and Way (2010). Measuring 
economic ties, they take into account the extent of trade (exports and imports over 
GDP) with the United States and 15 EU member countries only. Along with 
economic linkage, the authors also define five dimensions of “Western linkage” – 
intergovernmental linkage, technocratic linkage, social linkage, information linkage, 
and civil-society linkage – each of which is a specific kind of ties to the West. While 
Western linkage promotes democratization, two factors in the model inhibit it. 
Incumbent’s “organizational power” (state coercive capacity, party strength, and 
state economic control) allows authoritarian incumbents to effectively resist the 
external democratizing pressure. “Western leverage” also indicates the extent of 
vulnerability or strength of the regime vis-à-vis the West. Leverage is low when the 
following criteria are met: a large economy, a country is major oil producer or 
possesses nuclear weapons, and a country belongs to the sphere of interests of a 
major power that is not the EU or the United States. The implications of the theory 
to Russia suggest that the country was most vulnerable to democratization in the 
1990s when its economy and state institutions collapsed, then organizational power 
enhanced in the 2000s and lowered chances for democratization. 
The aforementioned literature positively assesses the external influence on 
democratization. This is, however, not necessarily the case. During the Cold War, 
the major superpowers exerted pressure on the third countries and granted them 
economic assistance conditionally on their systemic commitment to capitalism or 
socialism. Only after the Cold War when the Soviet threat disappeared, the Western 
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donors began to allocate assistance conditionally on economic liberalization and 
democratization that has left dictators’ patronage networks unfunded. Gibson and 
Hoffman (2002: 16) argue that “during the Cold War rulers could easily transform 
external assistance into a resource for patronage. With the end of the Cold War, 
donors began to provide less assistance generally, and the assistance became 
imposed with more onerous conditions [...] only countries that demonstrated a 
commitment to political liberalization received external assistance.” Similarly, 
Dunning (2004) found that a positive effect of foreign aid on democracy in Africa is 
limited to the post-Cold War period. A significant effect of the Cold War was also 
found in the study by Wright (2009) with data from 190 authoritarian regimes 
worldwide.  
The role of external pressure is not univocally in line with democratization 
hypothesis in Russia as well. Levitsky and Way (2010: 187) note that “[d]espite the 
external vulnerability – and opportunities for Western influence – created by the 
post-Soviet economic collapse, Russia’s economic and strategic importance 
inhibited Western democratizing pressure.” Clarifying this strategic importance, 
they mention that Russia possesses strategic nuclear weapons, massive oil reserves 
and it is one of the world’s largest suppliers of natural gas. The authors, however, 
do not formulate explicitly why these factors might inhibit Western democratizing 
pressure. If they had formulated, the role of the Western pressure would have 
looked unpleasant. At least two events that might (and probably did) decisively 
influence the balance of power in most crucial periods of Yeltsin’s rule can be 
mentioned to designate the role of the Western pressure. There can be no dispute 
that the Western community (primarily the United States) has supported the side of 
Yeltsin in his military attack on the parliament in 1993 and informationally backed 
Yeltsin’s electoral campaign against Zyuganov in 1996. In particular, Kramer (1996) 
divulges how a group of American political consultants clandestinely guided 
Yeltsin’s presidential campaign and, along with the implementation of typical yet 
hitherto unknown in Russia techniques of political campaigning, insisted to change 
the main topic of campaign from an election on Yeltsin’s stewardship in which 
Yeltsin would lose and lose badly to a referendum on restoration of Communism in 
which the Communists must be stopped at all costs. A positive (and conventional) 
view on these events suggests that the West was concerned about the restoration of 
communism and supported Yeltsin as a “lesser evil”. 
Notwithstanding, KPRF of the 1990s has not been an analog of the CPSU of the 
1970s; even if KPRF can be compared with the CPSU, it would be the CPSU after 
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Gorbachev’s perestroika. The hard-core communists were represented by the 
Russian Communist Labor Party (RKRP) that as a part of an electoral bloc 
Communists – Labor Russia – For the Soviet Union received only 4.5% of the vote in 
the 1995 State Duma election and did not have real chances to get into power. 
KPRF, instead, was a moderately reformed nationally transmuted, though not 
adopted a social democratic platform, communist successor party (Bozoki and 
Ishiyama 2002; Sakwa 2002). Similarly to Russia, communist successor parties in 
East-Central Europe were trying to take electoral advantage of economic crises that 
hit their countries as a result of radical liberal market reforms. In several cases they 
successfully managed to defeat incumbents (Orenstein 1998). The alternation of 
power has rather positively affected democratization in these countries, yet it was 
blocked in Russia by the West. In response for the Western support, Yeltsin made 
immense concessions in the reduction of Russia’s nuclear weapons and the 
reforming of the economy toward the Washington Consensus. Thus, the basic 
assumption of Levitsky and Way’s (2010) theory does not hold in Russia. The 
Western influence was motivated by realpolitik interests rather than by 
democratization of the country in the 1990.  
More recent studies uncover that external pressure may also have a negative 
effect on democratization due to various forms of authoritarian diffusion (see Soest 
(2015) for a review). In particular, the MENA countries adopted similar strategies to 
counteract the spread of the Arab Spring. They raised salaries of armed forces 
personnel, increased public spending targeted at the poor, and blamed violence on 
rioters (Heydemann and Leenders 2011).  Russia and China responded similarly to 
color revolutions and the Arab Spring. They publically framed these events as 
orchestrated by the United States, both countries adopted similar laws that 
increased restrictions on NGOs (see also Bader (2014) on the spread of election laws 
from Russia to adjacent post-Soviet states), and elaborated mechanisms of co-
opting the youth (Koesel and Bunce 2013).  In his case-study of Russia, Ambrosio 
(2009) argues that Russia under Putin has adopted several strategies of 
authoritarian backlash against democracy to promote authoritarianism in its 
neighboring post-Soviet states, especially in Belarus. Moreover, Russia’ resistance 
to democracy, according to Ambrosio, appears to be akin to the past-time 
confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. He notes that 
“Russia emerged as a principal opponent of democracy promotion globally and its 
relationship with other like-minded states formed the core of the authoritarian 
alignment in the international system” (p. 5). Way (2015), however, shows that 
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Russian foreign policy was driven not by the interests of autocracy promotion as 
such but rather by economic and geopolitical interests.  
Due to the ambiguity of theories of democracy/autocracy diffusion, I do not test 
their predictions in this study. At any rate, consolidated authoritarian regimes are 
capable of resisting the external democratizing pressure and even exert their own 
external influence for autocracy promotion.  
A Supply-Side Theory 
Although this study is focused on restrictions imposed by authoritarian policies on 
electoral demand, one influential supply-side explanation of opposition failure in 
electoral autocracies should be mentioned here. According to Kenneth Greene’s 
insightful argument, dominant-party systems manage to persist for longer periods 
of time due to their illicit access to resources, derived from the public budget and 
state-owned enterprises, in order to make opposition parties ideologically radical 
and unattractive to voters (Greene 2007; Greene 2010). Even though opposition 
parties in most authoritarian regimes act as niche-oriented competitors, one 
essential theoretical question arises. If voters do not consider opposition parties as 
viable alternatives and the probability of alternation of the ruling party in power is 
dramatically low, why should voters participate in elections at all? Extrapolating 
Greene’s argument regarding opposition elite participation to voters, we should 
expect that voters, who support ideologically radical opposition parties, also have 
radical policy preferences and they support their parties as message seekers. 
However, Greene argues that the majority of voters in Mexico were moderate. It is 
puzzling, therefore, why do moderate voters support radical opposition parties and 
(even if they do not support the radicals) why do they persistently vote for the 
incumbent but do not deny their support from time to time as it happens in 
democracies or do not abstain? 
Furthermore, in his earlier article, Greene (2002: 763) notes that “[t]he 
dominant party’s patronage advantages detailed above make the squeezing strategy 
electorally suicidal despite its proximity to the median voter in each dimension.” In 
other words, the possibility of political moderation for opposition parties is limited 
by hyper-incumbency advantages. First, authoritarian incumbents commonly resort 
to electoral fraud and repression of opposition activists, they deprive the opposition 
of access to the public media, deny the right of opposition candidates to be 
registered and run in elections, and use other legal and illegal tolls of dominance. 
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As a result, as Greene (2007: 39) metaphorically depicts it, the incumbent can 
speak to voters with a megaphone, while challengers can only speak in a whisper. 
Second, the credible commitment problem limits the efficiency of ideological 
moderation. In consolidated authoritarian systems, voters have no prior information 
on the opposition’s economic performance because the opposition has never been in 
office or ruled the country in another historical context (Magaloni 2006: Ch. 7). 
Hence, given similar (moderate) policy appeals, voters should rather prefer the 
incumbent, who is a more prominent and credible option and is additionally 
capable of supporting his/her policy appeals with patronage benefits. 
Finally, it should be noted that hyper-incumbency advantages enjoyed by 
authoritarian leaders, which allow them to make opposition parties ideologically 
radical and unattractive to voters, could be impossible without securing elite 
loyalty. It is not the incumbent president who personally bribes and intimidates 
voters, falsifies votes, represses opposition activists, and persecutes journalists. In 
all these and many other authoritarian activities, the incumbent has to rely upon 
central, regional and local elites. Authoritarian incumbents, therefore, have 
inevitably to pay for loyalty of the ruling elite, the bureaucracy and other relevant 
agents. Acknowledging the importance of incumbent strategies toward the 
opposition (repression, co-optation, marginalization, and a specific type of co-
optation that I call “affiliation with the incumbent”) but do not dwelling on their 
examination,  this study contributes to the supply-side literature of authoritarian 
survival by showing in detail how the politicized access to state resources translates 
into particular authoritarian policy outcomes that create what Greene calls “hyper-
incumbency advantages” – primarily electoral fraud and media bias. 
Politicized Ethnicity 
The ethnicization of politics is many authoritarian countries, especially in 
Africa, is frequently pointed out in the literature. Posner (2005: 97) notes on ethnic 
favoritism that “[f]irst learned during the rule of Zambia's first leader, Kenneth 
Kaunda, the lesson that the President will favor his own ethnic group has become, 
for many Zambians, an axiom of politics”. Posner argues that ethnic-based coalition 
building succeeds inasmuch as voters expect that elected officials favor members 
from their own ethnic group in the distribution of patronage benefits and 
politicians, knowing this, seek to improve their electoral chances by shaping their 
electoral appeals in ethnic terms. Similarly, Chandra (2007) asserts that voters are 
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biased toward ethnic categorization of politics in a limited information situation and 
when other policy appeals are not credible. There is also some evidence on the 
influence of ethnicity on politics in Russia. Turovsky (2005) defines a specific 
culture of “ethnic peripheries” in the electorate that is characterized by a higher 
level of “conformist voting” for “parties of power”. At the same time, Turovsky notes 
that the left-wing orientation (voting for KPRF) of the ethnic peripheries (regions 
with the prevalence of non-Russian population) dominated in the first half of the 
1990s, yet “it was coming to naught proportionally to strengthening of regional 
regimes and establishing their relations with the federal authorities, the 
transformation of the federal authorities themselves, and the Islamic revival 
intrinsic to a number of regions” (p. 178). Such “ethnic voting” is puzzling for two 
reasons. First, it is not a classical ethnic voting so long as voters in the regions do 
not vote for their co-ethnies at the federal level. Second, it is still unclear why the 
ethnic peripheries supported the opposition in the 1990s and then turned to 
supporting Putin and United Russia in the 2000s. 
The most of literature on politicized ethnicity just only states the fact that the 
ethnic cleavage is highly important in many authoritarian countries. However, it 
does not show explicitly how politicized ethnicity, except ethnic cleansing, 
translates into authoritarian practices and how it contributes to the strength of 
authoritarianism. This study looks at ethnicity from a different angle. 
Russia is obviously not the case of classical tribalism where political leaders 
allocate clientelist benefits and voters with elites deliver their support along ethnic 
lines. Putin (as officially asserted) is Russian. An attentive observer cannot notice 
that the government, the State Duma or other state institutions are dominated by 
members of a particular ethnic group. Rather on the contrary, Putin and state-
controlled media often underline that Russia is a multi-ethnic country 
(mnogonatsionalnaya strana) with over than 180 ethnic groups in which any 
expressions of ethnic-based nationalism are unacceptable. Moreover, a multi-ethnic 
character of Russia’s people is enshrined in the preamble and Article 3 of the 
constitution; the creation of ethnic-based parties was prohibited by the electoral law 
in 2001 and this legal prescription is enforced in practice. In this connection, the 
initial expectation of this study was that ethnicity does not play any considerable 
role in sustaining the authoritarian dominance. However, the results show that 
politicized ethnicity plays much greater role than it might have been expected. 
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To understand this role, one should recall the Soviet-style model of 
multicultural state-building that Slezkine (1994) metaphorically called a large 
“communal apartment” in which ethnically-based republics and autonomous 
provinces represented separate rooms and Russia was something like corridor and 
common kitchen where all major decisions were made. The RSFSR remained an 
amorphous “everything else” that incorporated institutions of the USSR, yet it did 
not have major institutions established in other republics, including the local 
communist party, which was founded only in 1990. Such Soviet model of 
multiculturalism did not originate directly from Marxism,14 it was rather inspirited 
by Bolsheviks’ own vision of the national question. The “chronic ethnophilia” of the 
Soviet regime had a purpose to compensate all non-Russians for the long history of 
Russian “great-power chauvinism” by granting them the right of “self-
determination” and, consequently, their own territories, bureaucracies, mother-
tongue education, ethnic intelligentsia, and economic resources. Simply speaking, 
the Bolsheviks intended to do away with historical Russia as a “prison for peoples” 
by transferring power and resources to all non-Russians (natsmeny). 
While the Soviet Union collapsed, the Soviet model of ethnic politics continues 
to persist within Russia, yet not so much for ideological, rather for pragmatic 
reasons – it yields authoritarian support to the regime. The analysis of federal 
transfers in Chapter 5 shows that the ethnic regions (i.e., having the constitutional 
status of republics or autonomous okrugs and containing considerable fractions of 
“titular nationalities” in their ethnic makeup) still continue to receive more benefits 
from the federal center. Furthermore, such economic rewarding is contingent on 
higher levels of the federal presidential incumbent’s vote typically observed in these 
regions in Putin’s era. However, as Chapter 5 reveals, the high levels of the 
incumbent’s vote in the ethnic regions is the outcome of electoral fraud rather than 
sincere vote. Chapter 6 offers an explanation to this phenomenon by showing that, 
first, central transfers tend to be allocated more in favor of elites than voters from 
2000 through 2012, and second, central transfers have a strong positive effect on 
electoral fraud but do not significantly influence sincere vote.  
                                                          
14
 Marx and Engels noted in their Manifesto of the Communist Party: “[n]ational differences and antagonism 
between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom 
of commerce, to the world market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life 
corresponding thereto. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster.” In contrast, the 
Bolsheviks deepened differences between peoples that inhabited the Russian Empire by raising these 
differences from ethnic to the national level. 
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Thus, in this study, I generally argue that politicized ethnicity has had an 
additive aggravating effect on electoral authoritarianism in Russia. It appears to be 
conducive to electoral fraud and other authoritarian practices. At the same time, it 
is important to note that the role of politicized ethnicity under electoral 
authoritarianism cannot be understood independently from distributive politics. In 
the early 1990, when economic resources and political influence of the federal 
center shrank dramatically, Yeltsin offered (primarily ethnic) regions to “take 
sovereignty as much as you can swallow”. The ethnic regions in response began to 
challenge the incumbent in the electoral field and play the card of ethnic 
separatism in order to bargain more benefits from the center (Treisman 1997; 
1999). In the 2000s, when Putin came to power, the ethnic regions were offered 
another deal – political loyalty in exchange for economic benefits – and they 
contributed a lot to the process of consolidation of electoral authoritarianism. 
Hence, politicized ethnicity creates a strong and temporally stable constituency, 
which can be of pro- or anti-incumbent character. The establishing of such a 
distributive scheme in which material rewards are contingent upon political loyalty 
is decisive in whether politicized ethnicity will sustain or undermine 
authoritarianism. 
Distributive Politics, Patronage, and Clientelism 
The last approach discussed in this section but most important for the study, which 
may account for authoritarian survival, refers to distributive politics that manifest 
itself in multiple forms. These forms include pork-barrel politics (Ferejohn 1974; 
Evans 2004; Golden and Picci 2008), patronage (Shefter 1977; Calvo and Murillo 
2004; Smith and Bueno de Mesquita 2009), clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007; Scheiner 2006; Lust 2009; Hicken 2011; Muñoz 2014; Zarazaga 2014), 
private goods provision (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) and can be generally called 
redistributive politics (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987) or 
distributive politics (Blaydes 2011; González and Mamone 2015; Luca and 
Rodríguez-Pose 2015), and sometimes termed “vote buying” (Magaloni 2006; Stokes 
et al. 2013, Nichter 2014; Kramon 2017). The common denominator of these 
studies is a premise that the distribution of material benefits is contingent upon 
political loyalty of its recipients. 
This literature, however, has two shortcomings. First, it does not differentiate 
between the contingent distribution of benefits in democracies and autocracies. In 
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this study, I argue that, unlike democracies, distributive politics in autocracies is 
twofold: not only the allocation of favors is targeted at voters to influence their 
votes, but also authoritarian incumbents deliver benefits to elites in order to secure 
their loyalty. Second and interrelated with the first, the literature does not draw a 
clear distinction between the distribution of goods aimed to secure loyalty of 
political elites and the distribution targeted at voters. Differentiating between these 
two distributive strategies is important since they imply different logics of 
incumbency survival. While the voter-favorable distribution influences survival of 
the incumbent by producing sincere voting and increasing, thereby, the level of 
popular support for the incumbent, the elite-favorable distribution in authoritarian 
settings entails various intrinsically authoritarian practices, such as electoral fraud, 
political repression and the persecution of journalists. Later in this chapter, I return 
to overviewing the literature on patronage/clientelism and discuss these logics of 
authoritarian survival in more detail. Findings of this dissertation suggest that 
elites receive much more benefits from Putin’s regime in Russia than voters. 
Although the allocation of federal transfers to the regions appears to be conditional 
on the level of electoral support of the incumbent (as it might be observed in several 
electoral democracies as well), not voters but primarily regional elites extract profits 
from the transfers. In response, regional elites supply the central incumbent with 
electoral fraud and implement other authoritarian policies that give strength to 
authoritarianism and allow the incumbent to retain power. 
Sources of Incumbency Advantage in Democratic and Authoritarian 
Regimes 
The centrality of informal institutions is asserted to be a distinctive characteristic of 
competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010: 27–28). However, as follows 
from the previous section, many tools of political survival have a mixed usage. 
Gerrymandering and a biased delivery of information by the media, for example, can 
be equally observed in democratic and authoritarian regimes. This section aims to 
delimitate democratic and authoritarian practices. In doing this, it offers a simple 
criterion, namely, that authoritarian practices are typically considered to be illegal. 
It also shows that the combination of practices entailing a bias of the electoral 
playing field and the intensity of their usage vary by type of political regime. This 
differentiation is presented in the section primarily to outline the role of legal and 
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illegal practices (that can be also understood as formal and informal institutions)15 
in electoral authoritarian regimes, the class of regimes to which the object of study 
belongs to. It must be underlined that this section discusses only practices 
associated with the bias of the electoral playing field. In a situation of perfect 
competition, candidates generally draw their electoral advantage from good policy 
performance (economic voting is an example of this kind). By contrast, legal and 
illegal practices of imperfect competition yield incumbency advantage independently 
from policy performance or voter preferences. 
Discussing distinguishing characteristics of vote buying, as opposed to 
distributive politics, Schaffer (2007: 6) points out that “[v]ote buying often runs 
counter to legal norms. While pork and allocational policies are the stuff of lawful 
democratic politics, and patronage has nebulous legal status, vote buying is almost 
always illegal”. At the same time, although authoritarian incumbents do not 
hesitate to resort to various unconstitutional practices or outright abuse of the law 
to bolster their dominance, legislation in most of the authoritarian countries is also 
skewed by design against the opposition.16 However, the set of legal tools that allow 
                                                          
15
 Informal institutions are understood herein not in a traditional sense as unwritten rules or constraints (North 
1990: 36–46). Although informal institutions are in fact unwritten, I suggest that their defining characteristic is 
particularism. Namely, informal institutions are rules that regulate behavior of a particular group of actors on 
specific issue, whereas the behavior of all other actors on this issue is formally regulated by other rules. In a 
sense, informal institutions are status in statu, they establish rules for “chosen ones” within rules for everyone 
else. For example, the first article of the federal law 19-FZ “On Elections of the President of the Russian 
Federation” states that “the President of the Russian Federation is elected by citizens of the Russian Federation 
on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot” – this formal rule is applied to all Russian 
citizens who seeking for presidency. In practice, various types of electoral fraud, as informal institutions, 
subvert this formal rule. Thereby, the interaction between formal and informal institutions creates a “nested 
game” (not exactly in Tsebelis’s (1990) sense): while opposition actors who are not capable of perpetrating 
electoral fraud or are predisposed against this practice for moral reasons have to compete in elections under 
the formal electoral law, the incumbent and the ruling elite create particularistic rules for themselves in order 
to take advantage. These rules differ drastically from the formal prescriptions and stipulate a system of 
exchanges (benefits – loyalty – fraud – benefits), which is examined in more detail in this study. At the same 
time, however, the incumbent and the ruling elite do not rely exclusively upon informal institutions (electoral 
fraud in this example), they have also to play under the formal rules, that is, hold elections, participate in 
electoral campaigning, deliver speeches to voters, etc. 
16
 Consider registration of candidates for regional legislatures to partly describe the situation in Russia. 
Regional elections are mainly held under a mixed electoral system, which combines proportional 
representation for party lists and the majority principle in single member districts (SMDs). The treatment by 
electoral commissions differs dramatically between opposition candidates and those of the ruling party. Out of 
1727 United Russia-backed candidates who applied for registration in SMDs across 83 regional races in the 
period from 2007 to 2012 only 33 or 1.9 percent were denied of registration. Electoral commissions were 
considerably less tolerant of candidates of the three opposition parties that were represented in the State 
Duma (the Communists, LDPR, and Just Russia), which I call “affiliated” with the incumbent opposition: 322 
(8%) out of 4023 were not registered. And in a sharp contrast with United Russia and the affiliated opposition, 
from the total of 4157, 1839 candidates (44.2%) who applied from other parties or as independents (and 
thereby may be referred to as “true opposition”) were not allowed to participate in the elections. It can be 
roughly calculated that the vote share of United Russia’s candidates in SMDs increases by 12.5 percent (from 
79.6% to 92.1%) if the proportion of non-registered true opposition candidates shifts from its minimum of 7.7 
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the electoral playing field to be skewed in favor of the incumbent is employed not 
only in authoritarian regimes, it is also endemic in electoral democracies. The 
typology of legal vis-à-vis illegal incumbent practices is presented in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. Legal and illegal incumbent practices to tilt the electoral playing field  
Institutions/ 
Actors 
Practices 
Legal Illegal 
Elections Restrictive Electoral Code Electoral Fraud 
Parties 
Restrictive Legislation, Biased 
Public Funding,  
Coercion of Businessmen to 
Donate the Incumbent or to 
Forgo Funding the Opposition 
Media 
Media Owners are Affiliated with 
the Incumbent 
Journalists are Bribed, 
Intimidated or Assassinated 
Elites Clientelism, Pork-Barrel Projects Elite Corruption, Bribary 
Voters 
Patronage, Social Spending With 
Partisan Bias 
Vote Buying, Voter Intimidation 
Opposition Co-optation Repression 
Let’s take elections as one of the most important institutions to clarify the use of 
illegal practices in different types of political regimes. I suggest the following 
criteria. In fully competitive democracies electoral fraud is absent. In electoral 
democracies fraud is sporadic and small in quantitative terms (let’s say, not more 
than 5% of the vote). In competitive authoritarian regimes fraud is a common place; 
it is widespread, essential for regime survival but not outcome-changing. In closed 
authoritarian regimes fraud is outcome-changing and electoral competition is 
thereby meaningless.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
percent to its maximum of 88.5 percent (calculated by the author based on the data taken from the official 
website of the Central Electoral Commission: cikrf.ru). There is a question however as to the extent to which 
the electoral commissions’ bias is determined by legal norms. Conventional wisdom suggests that the formal 
requirements for registration are so strict that the status of a candidate can be suspended due to minor errors 
and misprints in collected signatures or other documents. Nevertheless, electoral commissions may arbitrarily 
interpret these norms or outright falsify the expertise as a last resort. 
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At the same time, it should be noted that the amount of fraud and its 
consequences for power-sharing do not necessarily coincide. For example, we may 
consider the case of Ukraine of 2004, an electoral democracy where both sides – 
government and opposition – were engaged in electoral malpractices (Myagkov, 
Ordeshook and Shakin 2005: 116; Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2007: 231) and 
where one candidate won with a slight margin. In such competitive but not 
consolidated regimes, a marginal fraud in the range from 3 to 5 percent can be 
outcome-changing. I consider that in similarly doubtful cases theoretical priority 
should be given to the meaningfulness of electoral competition. Therefore, if in a 
presumed electoral democracy there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the 
election had been stolen by one party, which had resorted to sporadic marginal and 
small-scale fraud, then the regime should be treated as electoral rather than closed 
authoritarian.17  
Legal practices are also used by incumbents for purposes of competition 
restriction in different types of regimes. Addressing the same example of elections, I 
may suggest that excessively restrictive electoral legislation is absent in full 
democracies but considerable in electoral democracies. In competitive authoritarian 
regimes, restrictive laws for participation of opposition forces are as essential and 
widespread as electoral fraud. Finally, in closed authoritarian regimes formal 
restrictions are generally not so prominent as illicit practices, yet they are still 
considerable. Again, it should be noted that the proposed relationship is typical but 
it does not encompass all cases. For instance, in absolute monarchies there is no 
such necessity to resort to illegal tools since they are based on traditional 
legitimacy. Table 1.2 sums up the described combination of incumbent practices to 
bias the electoral playing field by regime type. 
                                                          
17
 Nevertheless, it cannot be defined as an electoral democracy without a flaw. This hybrid resembles 
democracy in its competitiveness but essentially (in terms of who governs) this is authoritarianism. 
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 Table 1.2. The combination of incumbent practices to tilt the electoral playing field 
by type of political regime18 
Practices 
Regime Type 
Full 
Democracy 
Electoral 
Democracy 
Electoral 
Authoritarianism 
Closed 
Authoritarianism 
Legal No Considerable  Widespread Considerable 
Illegal No Sporadic  Widespread Overwhelming 
Several theoretical implications follow from the table. Electoral authoritarianism 
combines a widespread use of legal and illegal practices by incumbents. 
Consequently, electoral authoritarianism cannot be sustained only by means of 
illegal practices such as voter coercion and vote buying since in such a case voter 
preferences would be ultimately neglected and electoral competition would be 
accordingly meaningless. This condition, however, is violated in several studies. 
Correctly highlighting that repression is not decisive for survival of electoral 
autocracies, Magaloni (2006), at the same time, attributes the basis of electoral 
behavior primarily to what she calls “punishment regime” and the “politics of vote 
buying”. Such argumentation is conceptually misleading since it virtually leaves no 
room for sincere voting. Other studies do also exaggerate the role of electoral fraud 
under electoral authoritarianism, even though this exaggeration is more conceptual 
than empirical (see the subsection Clientelism and Vote Buying in this chapter). 
Thus, the legal practices designed to bias the electoral playing field should be 
examined in electoral authoritarian regimes not less attentively than the illegal 
practices and ideally there should be examined a combination of the both. This 
study shows an interaction between formal and informal institutions in Russia, 
specifically, the distributive politics of federal transfers appears to be 
interdependent with the politics of electoral fraud: federal transfers are allocated by 
the central incumbent to the regions using election results as an indicator of loyalty 
of regional elites; and regional elites, in response, supply the incumbent with 
electoral fraud as a substitute of the incumbent’s vote in order to receive larger 
transfers. 
                                                          
18
 In this classification, I rely on the classification proposed by Diamond (2002) with two minor modifications. I 
exclude the category “ambiguous regimes” and classify “hegemonic electoral authoritarian” regime as a less 
competitive sub-type of electoral authoritarianism.  
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What Are and What Are Not Patronage/Clientelism, and How to 
Delimitate Them? 
There is an old tradition of treating clientelism as a kind of distribution of benefits 
contingent on political loyalty (Shefter 1977; Kitschelt 2000; Hicken 2011; Stokes et 
al. 2013). This section, however, argues that the recent literature on clientelism has 
two shortcomings. First, by attributing too much weight to incumbent’s capacity of 
monitoring electoral behavior and stressing the conditionality of a direct exchange 
of the vote for particularistic benefits, the literature virtually equates clientelism to 
voter intimidation and vote buying. I argue that these both informal practices 
pertain to electoral fraud but not clientelism. Second, if formal practices of 
politically contingent distribution are considered, the literature falls short of 
demonstrating a difference in mechanisms and effects of these practices between 
democratic and authoritarian regimes. Inasmuch as various authoritarian 
practices, such as electoral fraud and political repression, are considered 
independently from distributive politics, the reasons for occurrence of these 
practices appear to be unexplained. Put otherwise, one part of the literature is 
focused on voters and interprets clientelism as vote buying (Magaloni 2006; Nichter 
2014), whereas another part of the literature stresses the importance of preferential 
access to state offices and associated spoils by regime insiders (Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1997) and private goods provision toward the winning elite coalition (Bueno 
de Mesquita et al. 2003), yet this literature does not examine the relationship 
between distributive politics and its authoritarian outcomes. In this section, I 
explain that both elite-oriented and mass-oriented distributive strategies are 
substantial for electoral authoritarianism. In the prior section, it was formulated 
that both formal and informal practices are widespread under electoral 
authoritarianism. While vote buying and elite corruption are informal practices, this 
section argues that patronage and clientelism to be formal practices targeted at 
securing mass and elite loyalty, respectively. 
Clientelism, the Nature of the Goods, and Monitoring 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) define patronage as a direct contingent exchange of 
the vote in return for goods of two particular classes – private goods and club goods. 
They also highlight three characteristics of patron-client exchange: contingent 
direct exchange, predictability and monitoring (p. 9). The authors argue that private 
goods facilitate satisfaction of these conditions inasmuch as private goods can be 
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easily granted and withdrawn if voters defect to the opposition. This predictability, 
coupled with monitoring of electoral behavior, binds voters to their commitments. 
Moreover, public goods, according to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 11), can by 
definition not be subject to clientelistic exchange: “[w]hereas the provision of private 
goods through political exchange invariably signals the existence of clientelism, 
public goods that are desired by everyone in society and from whose enjoyment no 
one can be excluded, regardless of whether they contributed to the production of 
the good or not, can by definition not be traded through clientelistic exchange.”  
However, the point of view on the nature of goods as a determinant of clientelism 
has been challenged. Stokes (2009: 11) notes that “just as targeted benefits may be 
programmatic, public goods may be non-programmatic”. In fact, unemployment 
insurance and pensions in modern welfare states are programmatic yet targeted. 
Weitz-Shapiro (2012: 569) points out that “[f]ood stamps are clearly private goods 
by any definition of the term. Yet without knowing how a food stamp program is 
administered, it is impossible to say whether it should be classified as clientelism. 
Recipients may be chosen on the basis of need alone, or they may believe that their 
continued receipt of benefits is contingent on their political behavior”. This counter-
argument can be supplemented by an analogy regarding club goods. Although 
schools, hospitals and roads cannot be targeted at particular voters, their allocation 
can obviously be determined by political interests rather than by concerns of social 
need. Furthermore, even though club goods cannot be targeted at individuals, they 
can be targeted at various geographic localities (such as communes, provinces, 
cantons, counties or states) that vary by their level of political support for the 
incumbent government. 
Even public goods, which are delivered to the entire population, do not 
unambiguously stave off clientelism. First, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 11) give 
examples of public goods that pertain to valence issues (i.e., public opinion is 
heavily skewed rather than divided on these issues): external and internal security, 
macroeconomic growth, full employment, low inflation, and a clean environment. 
Such goods are in fact generally non-excludable in nature. Position issues, in 
contrast, tend to divide the electorate. Therefore, a considerable fraction of voters is 
by definition cut off of eligible recipients of public goods on these issues. One 
example of position issue is free-market versus protectionist policy. Politicians may 
reasonably set various barriers to external competition (tariffs and duties) and 
provide subsidies for a sector of industry or agriculture in order to give it rise and 
become more competitive; they may support agriculture and high-tech industry due 
  
41 
 
to concerns of security – to make the country less dependent on the foreign supply 
of these goods in crucial periods; they may even support small-size agriculture 
(farmers) to promote employment in the rural area. Nevertheless, self-interested 
politicians may also implement these policies in exchange for votes. Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson (2007: 13) give an example of the Fifth Election District in Gunma, Japan 
the local economy of which relies heavily on the yam industry that survives 
primarily because of the government’s 990 percent tariff on imports. Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson note that people in the district have voted overwhelmingly for the Liberal 
Democratic Party, which has offered strong support for the yam industry, and 
define such delivery of a club good (the yam tariff) as a clientelist practice. The 
authors, however, do not specify whether the Fifth Election District in Gunma is an 
exception from the policy of protection of the yam industry or the entire policy is 
designed so to deliver benefits to electorally loyal districts. 
Second, in practice, public goods pertaining to both position and valence issues 
are aggregate outcomes that can be decomposed into several sub-policies associated 
with club or even private goods. Considering the concerns of security, politicians 
may prefer to wage war against the less politically loyal region (the case of 
Chechnya) and allocate larger central transfers to regions demonstrating 
separatism at the margin (Treisman 1996; 1997: 247). In a similar vein, the higher 
local averages of economic growth relatively to the grand average (macroeconomic 
growth) can be purposefully directed to those areas where the level of the 
incumbent’s support is higher – to oil-producing regions by levying relatively lower 
taxes or in electorally supportive regions by channeling larger transfers. The 
national level of unemployment can be decreased by creating jobs in most 
supportive localities; the level of inflation can vary be sector of the economy 
depending on the structure of the electorate in the sector, environmental projects 
can be distributed as pork-barrel projects19 (Dahlberg and Johanson 2002), 
population growth can be provided by means of migrants attracted to less 
supportive of the incumbent areas, and so on. Thus, the nature of goods delivered 
can hardly be a hallmark of clientelism. All types of goods can be distributed 
programmatically and clientelistically as well. In the first case, eligibility of the 
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 Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003: 31) note on this point: “[a]ntipollution policies have a public-goods character 
to them in that everyone breathes the same air or drinks the same water. Yet antipollution policies also have a 
private-goods side. Some businesses or industries bear a heavier burden in literally cleaning up their act than 
do others. This differential burden could be used as a political instrument to punish firms or industries that are 
not supporters of the incumbent while benefiting those that are.” 
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recipient of goods is determined by explicitly formulated rules resulted from party 
political platform; in the second case it is contingent upon political loyalty. 
The role of incumbent’s monitoring of voter choice has been revisited in studies 
stressing the informational effects of clientelism. Muñoz (2014) argues that electoral 
clientelism is widespread in Peru in the absence of a strong political organization 
that could monitor how citizens vote. Based on evidence from focus groups and 
survey data, she shows that voters do generally not believe that monitoring their 
vote choices is feasible. Instead, participants of focus groups reported that 
candidates signal their electoral viability by delivering benefits: “[w]here you find the 
best food, the candidate is the strongest” (p. 94). In his study of electoral brokers in 
Argentina, Zarazaga (2014: 38) makes even a stronger claim: “[a]lthough 22 brokers 
acknowledged that they stole other party ballots from the polling stations, and 12 
even admitted to paying certain clients with illegal drugs, none of them reported 
monitoring individual votes.” It is not monitoring that assures voter compliance but 
the broker’s reliable reputation for accessing resources. If clientelist relationships 
are not a single-shot game (as vote buying), a stable long-lasting delivery of goods 
makes it possible to gain loyalty of clients. As one broker declared, “if you do not fail 
them, they are happy to support you. I have people who come before the election 
asking for the ballot because they want to vote for my candidate. This is because I 
have been helping them for years and they know I will continue to do so” (p. 39). 
Clientelism, Voter Intimidation, and Vote Buying 
Although private goods and monitoring of electoral behavior are not relevant for 
clientelism, they are in fact good preconditions for voter intimidation and vote 
buying. In several studies, these informal practices are used synonymously with the 
term clientelism. Magaloni (2006: 20) argues that a hegemonic party’s mass 
support, besides economic growth, electoral fraud, and repression, depends on a 
“punishment regime” or the autocrat’s threat to exclude opposition voters and 
politicians from the party’s spoils system. Since voters are making their choices 
under the threat of losing an existing benefit, rather than being offered something 
new, this mechanism resembles voter intimidation. This mechanism is also 
supplemented by the “politics of vote buying” (Ch. 4). Other studies explicitly 
narrow down clientelism to vote buying. Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco 
(2013: 7) use vote buying as a sub-type of clientelism, namely, vote buying is 
clientelism directed at voters. Nichter (2014: 316) defines clientelist vote buying, as 
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opposed to legislative, non-excludable, and non-binding vote buying, as “the 
distribution of rewards to individuals or small groups during elections in contingent 
exchange for vote choices”. Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter (2014) distinguish 
four strategies of electoral clientelism (i.e., strategies that exclusively involve the 
distribution of benefits during electoral campaigns) used by clientelist parties (or 
political machines): vote buying, turnout buying, abstention buying, and double 
persuasion. Hidalgo and Nichter (2016: 438) specify that “[s]tudies of clientelism 
should investigate whether rewards are used to induce fraud, lest they misinterpret 
why some machines distribute benefits.” Kramon (2017) equates vote buying to 
“electoral clientelism”.20   
This literature, however, tends to underestimate costs and limitations of vote 
buying as a tool for long-term authoritarian dominance. According to anecdotal and 
empirical (Schedler 2002) evidence, intimidation or the combination of blackmail 
with vote buying, where the provision of goods is strictly dependent on electoral 
outcomes, is perceived negatively by the voters. Muñoz (2014) shows that voter 
intimidation does not have a desired effect in Peru: out of 9.7% of respondents who 
were reportedly threatened with being removed from a job or social program if 
refused to support the candidate, 41.5% answered that they would defect if a 
candidate offered them a benefit in exchange of the vote and 38.5% would reject the 
offer. Zarazaga (2014: 29) shows that even brokers are well aware that clientelism 
in the sense of vote buying is illegitimate and it undermines broker’s reputation: 
“[y]ou have to help the poor but be careful not to make it look like clientelism. 
Nobody likes being used.” Weitz-Shapiro (2012) distinguishes two mechanisms – a 
moral and a self-interested one – that determine rejection of such form of 
clientelism. She argues that apart from the rejection on moral grounds, middle-
class voters might reject election-related handouts inasmuch as it they might view 
them as a negative signal regarding the quality of government.   
For several theoretical reasons, clientelism should be distinguished from vote 
buying. First, as it was noted earlier, vote buying is illegal, whereas patronage and 
clientelism are mainly legal practices (Schaffer 2007: 6). Second, vote buying is 
typically a short-term singular transaction limited in its timing by election 
campaign or by election day alone. By contrast, clientelist exchanges have long-
term character that makes possible forging long-lasting electoral coalitions. As 
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 In particular, Kramon (2017) converts the statement by Schaffer (2007: 16) “Vote buying is still very much a 
black box of comparative politics” into “As a result, electoral clientelism largely remains “a black box of 
comparative politics”” (p. 17). 
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Kitschelt (2011: 7) points out, “equating clientelism with “vote buying” is 
analytically misleading, at least if vote buying is interpreted as a “spot market” 
single-shot contract between a buyer and a seller for the fully operationalized 
transaction of a single vote in a single election, with payment delivered before the 
vote is cast.” In the other place, pointing out that in many systems patrons directly 
purchase clients’ votes in exchange for money, Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 19) 
note that “[m]uch more frequent than single-shot transactions of this nature, 
however, are webs of exchange, obligation, and reciprocity sustained over a longer 
period, in which patrons provide private goods or club goods to their clients.” Third 
and perhaps most important, vote buying implies a strictly contingent exchange of 
the vote for material benefits (see literature overview in Nichter (2014: Fig. 2)), 
therefore, it leaves no room for sincere voting. An earlier quoted confession of 
electoral broker by Zarazaga (2014: 39) shows that the delivery of goods that is not 
strictly conditional on voter choice allows to convince the voter to support the 
candidate rather than vote against preferences. 
If the incumbent is capable of monitoring the electoral choice and the receipt of 
benefits is strictly conditional on the individual’s vote, I treat such cases as vote 
buying or voter intimidation. Both these practices essentially and juristically 
(Donsanto 2008: 22) fit the definition of electoral fraud but not of patronage or 
clientelism.  
Clientelism in Democracies and Autocracies 
It generally follows from the literature that the phenomenon of politically motivated 
distribution is well-studied in both democracies and autocracies, yet the previous 
research has drawn no conclusions concerning the intrinsic difference in the 
distributive politics of democracies vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes (see a literature 
overview in Chapter 5).21 Moreover, so long as the politically motivated distribution 
was initially explored under democratic settings and findings of these studies were 
extrapolated to authoritarian countries afterwards, the evidence presented by 
studies of authoritarianism may seem inconclusive. If the distribution in 
democracies does not differ from the distribution in autocracies, we should observe 
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 As an exception, Magaloni (2006: 68) notes that “[a] key difference between clientelistic practices in 
“competitive” and “noncompetitive” electoral systems, however, is that opposition voters are invariably 
punished when only one party governs for decades.” Then she continues that “[t]he introduction to this book 
makes explicit that noncompetitive systems also exist in democracies” – the Christian Democrats in Italy and 
the Liberal Democrats in Japan. Given the similarity of clientelistic practices, it is puzzling, however, why have 
electoral fraud and political repression not been as widespread in Japan and Italy as in Mexico? 
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that either the distribution in democracies entails the same authoritarian 
outcomes, as described in the literature on authoritarianism, or the distribution in 
autocracies does not create sufficient incumbency advantages to make and 
maintain the regime authoritarian.22  
Figure 1.1. The distributive game in democracies and autocracies 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the crucial distinction exists. In democracies, as shown in Figure 1.1, 
the distributive game is played primarily, if not to say solely, for winning votes. 
Even though political elites in democracies (first of all, legislators) are engaged in 
competition over various pork-barrel projects and they do it on their own incentive 
or as intermediaries on behalf of their party, the final purpose of the distributive 
game is the number of votes gained in particular districts affected by pork-barrel 
projects. Ferejohn (1974: 49–51) distinguishes three reasons why such projects are 
valuable to members of Congress. First, pork-barrel projects as a kind of 
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 There could be an alternative explanation suggesting that distributive politics and authoritarian practices are 
unrelated. In this case, electoral fraud, repression and other authoritarian policies are implemented by political 
elites and local agents for non-material concerns, such as ideology (repression of the class of bourgeoisie by the 
Marxists) or socially irrational behavior in Weberian sense (doctor Josef Mengele under the Nazi). Although 
these explanations are helpful in explaining mass terror in totalitarian regimes, they are largely irrelevant in 
electoral autocracies. 
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constituency service give ground for electoral campaigning. Second and related, 
paying attention to constituents with regard to the projects makes members of 
Congress more competitive compared with their challengers. Third, members of 
Congress can use pork-barrel projects to buy leeway for their activities on more 
important issues in Congress. Evans (2004: 5) summarizes that “pork barrel politics 
occurs because members of Congress believe that district benefits enhance their 
chances for reelection.” 
In autocracies, by contrast, the official incumbent’s vote, apart from some share 
of sincere votes, consists of noticeable portions of forged ballots and generally bears 
the seal of unequal competition. In electoral democracies incumbents may face 
strong challengers emerging from big business, region-level elites (e.g., governors), 
opposition parties and other spheres of society. In electoral autocracies all 
independent forces who dare to put the dominance into question run the risk of 
being exposed to systemic repression, whereas only joining the incumbent’s 
coalition opens the way to power without paying additional costs. Hence, all 
relevant actors are typically swept into the dominant party if the political system is 
party-based or in the incumbent’s “party of power” if the regime is essentially 
personalist, they are co-opted into the executive or affiliated with the incumbent in 
any other way.  
All these intrinsic authoritarian policies are carried out by political elites, not by 
the incumbent personally. However, the authoritarian policies as any kind of policy 
require tapping resources. Besides that, the ruling elite bears a risk of potential 
criminal prosecution, especially if the incumbent will be ousted. The system would 
not work if someone does not pay and the others do not receive benefits of it. In 
particular, Rundlett and Svolik (2016: 181) underline that “the incumbent does not 
engage in fraud directly but instead depends on the illicit collaboration of a large 
number of local agents who must be motivated by the promise of a reward.” Thus, 
by the nature of the regime, authoritarian incumbents have inevitably to deliver 
benefits for the elites in order to buy their loyalty, which is eventually converted 
into electoral fraud, repression of the opposition forces, persecution of the media, 
and refraining from opposing the regime electorally or by any other means. The 
authoritarian distributive game, which is summarized in Figure 1.1, thereby, aims 
not only at the maximization of votes but also at the maximization of authoritarian 
dominance. 
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Patronage and Clientelism or Two Types of Contingent Distribution 
The most of studies use terms of clientelism and patronage interchangeably 
(Kitschelt  and Wilkinson 2007: 7; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) or use 
patronage in a narrower sense as delivering of public jobs in exchange for loyalty 
(Calvo and Murillo 2004; Remmer 2007). Alternatively, distinguishing between 
clientelism and patronage, Erdmann and Engel (2007: 107) note that “[c]lientelism 
implies a dyadic and asymmetric relationship between patron and client, while 
patronage refers to the relationship between an individual and a bigger group.” This 
approach to delimitation of patronage from clientelism is rather rare than common 
in the literature. Notwithstanding, I employ it due to its heuristic value for one 
particular purpose of the study – to differentiate between incumbent strategies 
targeted at securing political loyalty of elites and political support of masses – the 
purpose that was substantiated in the previous subsection. For the sake of clarity, 
these terms can be used in combination throughout the study – mass patronage 
and elite clientelism. I do in no way insist, however, that such delimitation between 
patronage and clientelism should be adopted in different research contexts. 
Patronage and clientelism are two types of legal distribution of benefits that is 
contingent on political loyalty of its recipients. The contingency of distribution 
allows to differentiate patronage and clientelism with programmatic distributive 
politics in which the delivery of goods is determined by publicized explicitly 
formulated rules and it does not depend on electoral behavior or another 
manifestation of political loyalty. At the same time, the provision of goods in the 
case of patronage or clientelism is a legal practice. The legal form of distribution 
allows to distinguish patronage and clientelism from essentially illegal practices – 
electoral fraud and corruption. As it was argued earlier, the nature of goods is not a 
distinctive factor in distributive politics. All types of distributive politics can include 
personal and collective goods being distributed. The classification of types of 
distributive politics is displayed in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3. The types of distributive politics 
Type of 
Distribution 
Form of 
Distribution 
Recipients 
Type of 
Goods 
Name Examples 
 
Legal 
Elites 
Personal 
Program-
matic 
Distribution 
Maintenance of a Royal 
Household 
 Collective 
Right-Wing Taxation 
Policy 
Non-
Contingent 
Voters 
Personal 
Food Stamps, 
Education Grants 
Collective 
Publically Funded 
Education or Medicine 
Contingent 
on Political 
Support and 
Loyalty 
Legal 
Elites 
Personal 
Clientelism 
“Kadyrov’s Palace” a 
Collective High Officials’ Wages 
Voters 
Personal 
Patronage 
Private Good Social 
Programs (Magaloni et 
al. 2007) 
Collective 
Public Good Social 
Programs (Magaloni et 
al. 2007), High Public 
Employees’ Wages 
Illegal 
Elites 
Personal 
Corruption 
Direct Bribery (Cash 
on the Spot) 
Collective 
Misappropriation and 
Embezzlement of 
Public Funds 
Voters 
Personal Electoral 
Fraud 
“Carousel”b 
Collective “Denis Agashin”b 
Note: a. See main text for details. b. See Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 for details. 
For descriptive purposes, the table gives examples for the each type of goods 
distribution, which by no means encompass all the variety of practices. To clarify 
the argument of the previous subsection that the politically contingent distribution 
is targeted primarily or solely at voters but not elites in democracies (the scope of 
elite clientelism is highly limited in democracies), consider the case of Kadyrov’s 
palace. The palace of Ramzan Kadyrov, which is officially called the Residence of the 
Head of the Chechen Republic, with a cost of about 10 billion RUB (an equivalent of 
$320 million) and an area of 260 thousand square meters was put into service in 
2012 (Balashova 2012). Chechnya is one of the most heavily dependent regions on 
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federal transfers. On average, it has annually received 70.0 billion RUB (in constant 
prices of 2012) in the period of 2004–2012 that amounted 89.0% of its total budget 
revenue. Chapter 5 shows that the lion’s share of this non-tax income is determined 
by the region’s high level of the vote for the federal presidential incumbents (94.1%, 
on average in elections of 2004–2012). The Chechen government has two basic 
options how to spend this money. It may invest in the post-war recovery and 
reconstruction of schools, hospitals, roads, the electricity grid, and other publically 
used infrastructure or raise wages to public employees relatively to the private-
sector wages, that is, invest in voters (patronage). Otherwise, it may invest in goods 
consumed primarily by the regional elite (clientelism). The presidential palace of a 
cost of 14.3% of the average annual income from the federal transfers or 12.7% of 
the total average budget revenue is a good example of the clientelist spending. The 
fact that the central authorities allow regional officials to spend public money in 
such wasteful manner indicates nothing else but an intention of the central 
authorities to buy loyalty of regional officials by these means. The regional officials, 
in their turn, buy loyalty of their subordinates in a similar manner – they pay them 
high wages, buy expensive administrative use vehicles, build luxurious official 
residences, etc.  
Presidential residencies definitely exist in democratic countries; it is also cannot 
be excluded that bureaucrats are paid higher wages relatively to the private-sector 
wages. However, the politically contingent delivery of benefits to secure elite loyalty 
has at least three limitations in democracies. First, no democratic party would win 
elections if it publically declared that its preferential policy is supplying top officials 
with luxurious palaces and favoring the bureaucracy in expense of all other tax 
payers, even irrespectively of political loyalty of the recipients. Second, even if the 
real reasons of the distribution are concealed from the public, there is no need to 
buy loyalty of opposition elites if electoral mechanisms allow effectively compete for 
power by appealing to voters in elections. Third, loyalty of political elites has much 
less importance in democracies since their leaders do not have to mitigate the 
threat of coup d’état that comes from discontented elites in autocracies when 
electoral channels of political competition are clamped or closed. Nevertheless, 
Table 1.3 suggests that the non-contingent distribution that is targeted at elites is 
possible in democracies. Such programmatic distribution may take the form of 
maintenance of a royal household (as an example of (almost) personal goods 
provision) or a right-wing taxation policy that is favorable to economic (and political, 
if they overlap) elites. 
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Finally, it is important to note the difference between patronage politics and 
welfare state politics, and between patronage voting and economic voting. In 
essence, patronage is the non-programmatic but politically motivated distribution of 
material goods that is contingent on voter behavior. In welfare states, aims and 
rules of distribution are constructed in the open process of public deliberation and 
actual distribution matches with the declared goals. All eligible recipients receive 
goods according to these rules regardless of their political support of the party in 
power. Patronage politics, to the contrary, routinely violates the officially declared 
rules and factually pursues the goal of distributing benefits to political supporters 
of the incumbent. The difference between patronage voting and economic voting is 
the following. In the case of the unbiased economic voting, voters consider 
themselves personally responsible for their welfare and consider government 
economic policy only as an environment that can be whether favorable or not. In 
the case of patronage voting, by contrast, voters consider the incumbent 
responsible for their own well-being and, therefore, become less susceptible to the 
fluctuations of the economy since their livelihood is “bestowed from above”.  
The argument: Two Perspectives on Authoritarian Survival 
Summarizing the argument developed in the prior sections, authoritarian 
dominance can be basically explained from two perspectives: elite-oriented and 
mass-oriented. Securing loyalty of political elites allows authoritarian incumbents 
to deter elite splits and decrease the probability of a coup d’état. Loyal elites, in 
their turn, may not only refrain from challenging the incumbent but also organize 
electoral fraud, repression of the opposition or media censorship. At the same time, 
incumbents may target the distribution of patronage at voters and use electoral 
support as a counterbalance against elites. It follows therefrom that the argument 
tested in this study is twofold. 
On the one hand, authoritarian incumbents have to invest in elites. Technically, 
this can be done with the help of several tools – legal and illegal as well. Examples 
of the former include contingent public expenditures, such as federal transfers or 
pork barrel projects. The latter includes bribes in the form of direct cash payments 
or more long-term illegal activities that typically referred to as corruption, which 
may take two main forms – using public funds for private gains (i.e., embezzlement 
or misappropriation) and imposing extralegal fees (i.e., kickbacks) on business in 
the private sector of the economy. Loyal elites supply the incumbent with another 
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illicit authoritarian instrument, namely, electoral fraud that may take the forms of 
vote buying, voter intimidation, and deliberate vote miscount. Loyal elites may also 
repress opposition forces to exclude them from public sphere and make them 
politically radical.  
Figure 1.2. Elite-oriented authoritarian equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: solid lines represent incumbent-supporting strategies; dashed lines refer to 
incumbent-threatening strategies. 
Figure 1.2 depicts this elite-oriented authoritarian equilibrium. Such 
equilibrium, however, has one shortcoming. Namely, voters receive no positive 
stimulus to support the incumbent. Consequently, there is no ground for sincere 
voting. In the long run, voters should tend to punish the incumbent at the polls or 
abstain if this option is unavailable. 
On the other hand, the main source of the electoral incumbency advantage in 
authoritarian regimes is mass patronage. Authoritarian incumbents may invest 
intensively in social spending to provide welfare for voters, which is, however, 
conditional on their political loyalty. Figure 1.3 displays the logic of electoral 
authoritarian equilibrium. The incumbent buys voters’ support via patronage. The 
electoral support of autocracy, in its turn, demotivates the opposition to question 
election results, decreasing, thereby, the probability of mass revolts and “color 
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revolutions”. The mass support also discourages the members of the ruling elite in 
their attempts to coalesce with opposition forces and in committing actions to 
violently overthrow the incumbent. Of course, clientelist (elite-oriented) and 
patronage (mass-oriented) strategies are not mutually exclusive. In a stable 
electoral autocracy, they should rather be employed by the incumbent in nearly 
equal proportions. Moreover, the exclusion of mass support from the model makes 
electoral authoritarianism theoretically fragile since the absence of sincere voting 
for the incumbent leaves no room for a meaningful electoral competition. 
Figure 1.3. Mass-oriented authoritarian equilibrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: solid lines represent incumbent-supporting strategies; dashed lines refer to 
incumbent-threatening strategies. 
This argument results into two main competing hypotheses of the study. 
H1: the politically contingent distribution of benefits to elites by the incumbent 
entails electoral fraud, persecution of journalists and other intrinsically authoritarian 
policies. 
H2: the politically contingent distribution of benefits to voters determines sincere 
voting. 
Whereas null hypotheses imply that benefits are distributed to elites and/or 
voters not contingently on their loyalty but on the basis of merit or need; and that 
the politically contingent distribution of benefits to either elites or voters does not 
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induce politically relevant outcomes or factual outcomes run counter to outcomes 
stipulated by H1 and H2 (for example, if elite loyalty is translated into mobilization 
of authentic electoral support by delivering more benefits to voters rather than 
perpetration of electoral fraud). 
To test these hypotheses, the study focuses on monetary transfers allocated 
from the federal center to Russia’s regions. Chapter 5 presents the evidence that, 
although the size of transfers was partially determined by regional economic and 
social needs, the level of the vote for the federal presidential incumbent was also 
crucially important for predicting the amount of transfers in the period of 2000–
2012, especially in the regions that were net recipients of transfers. And this 
relationship turns out to be stronger over time as authoritarianism becomes more 
developed. To disentangle how the federal transfers are consumed in the regions, 
Chapter 6 considers two major directions of spending. One is associated with 
regional elites (the size of the bureaucracy and monetary allocations in its favor), 
while the other accounts for the region’s voters (the size of the spheres of healthcare 
and education and money allocated to these spheres). The results show that 
whereas the transfers were consumed by voters and elites in nearly equal 
proportions in the early 2000s, regional elites began to derive more and more 
benefits from transfers in their favor as authoritarianism proliferated up to 2012. 
The second part of the argument – the outcomes of the contingent distribution – 
is tested primarily by using an original measure of electoral fraud developed in 
Chapter 4. The analysis in Chapter 6 unveils that the regional level of electoral 
fraud is in fact predicted by the amount of transfers received from the center. And 
the effect of transfers on fraud increases over time as regional elites divert more 
transfer funds in their favor, the overall amount of fraud grows, and the regime 
becomes more authoritarian. The central transfers are also positively associated 
with persecution of journalists and negatively – with the regional level of democracy.  
However, the results of the analysis in Chapter 6 do not find confirmation to the 
impact of the politicized transfers on the sincere vote. The sincere incumbent’s vote 
measured as the difference between the official vote and fraud turns out to be 
largely unexplained by the main as well as by control variables. Although the 
amount of fraud was the minimal and federal transfers were more evenly 
distributed between voters and elites in 2000, the transfers did not influence the 
sincere incumbent’s vote even in this election year. Thus, the results of the study 
support H1, yet, contrary to theoretical expectations, reject H2.  
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This partially negative result, nevertheless, is also valuable and has two 
theoretical implications. First, it contributes to the debate on distributional 
consequences of different political regimes (Boix 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2015) by 
revealing the mechanism that leads to higher inequality in authoritarian regimes, 
namely, that authoritarian incumbents have to deliver benefits to political elites in 
order to secure their loyalty, which is subsequently converted into electoral fraud, 
repression, and other authoritarian policies carried out by the elites. Second, it 
implies that popular support for authoritarian incumbents can be poorly explained 
within the rational choice framework, at least by the theories of distributive politics, 
and that this theoretical question requires further examination. As an avenue for 
further research, I offer a possible explanation in Appendix F6 that suggests that 
Putin’s regime derive popular support from extensive use of propaganda in state-
controlled media, which is willingly absorbed by the public due to its attractiveness 
compared with true information. The official propaganda lowers psychological costs 
of perception of reality by presenting the situation in the country through the lens 
of rose-colored glasses – it understates economic problems, exaggerates positive 
achievements, redirects political responsibility from the incumbent to the abroad, 
and always draws good perspectives for the future, whereas an objective vision of 
reality gives much more reasons for pessimism. Because of this, a vast majority of 
citizens stick to the biased sources of information and tend to reject the evidence of 
incumbent’s incompetence, even if they occasionally encounter it.  
It must be noted that this dissertation presents rater a sketch of the full 
argument on authoritarian survival since not all elements of the elite-oriented and 
mass-oriented authoritarian equilibriums are examined in the study. I primarily 
focus the analysis of electoral fraud and its relationship with distributive politics 
inasmuch as fraud is unequivocally a hallmark of electoral authoritarianism and it 
implies a shorter chain of causality compared with repression, for example (see 
Figure 1.2). Repression, co-optation, affiliation, and marginalization of the 
opposition as well as their effects on voters and the incumbent are not explored due 
to limitations imposed by the format of the dissertation. Furthermore, Figure 1.2 
displays a simplified picture. It does not include censorship, persecution and 
bribing of journalists, and propaganda. These authoritarian practices do not have 
the same logic and would complicate the picture. For the same reason, several 
items from the “menu of manipulation”, even those that are overviewed in this 
chapter, are not shown in Figure 1.2 and 1.3. I do also not explore how delivering of 
clientelist benefits to the elite influences the probability of coup d’état, electoral 
defection, anti-incumbent legislative voting, and other forms of challenging the 
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incumbent. As to the mass-oriented authoritarian equilibrium, I do not examine 
whether sincere public support for the incumbent reduces opposition and elite 
activities in the sphere of challenging the incumbent – coups, defections, mass 
protests, and revolutions. Thus, the argument developed in this section is tested 
throughout the study in its minimal version.  
Russia in Comparative Perspective 
The case of Russia was selected owing to several reasons. First, Russia is a typical 
example of electoral (Schedler 2006) or competitive (Levitsky and Way 2010) 
authoritarianism. Allegedly democratic institutions exist and opposition forces, even 
though in a limited extent, are allowed to form political parties and compete in 
elections. At the same time, biased mainstream media, repression of the opposition, 
coercion of voters and other types of electoral fraud so strongly distort the electoral 
playing field that the opposition can only dream about victory. Moreover, electoral 
authoritarianism in Russia is persistent. The regime has already passed the three-
term longevity threshold in 2012 and even the four-term threshold in 2018 applied 
for defining dominant parties by Sartori (1976) and Greene (2007), respectively, and 
it cannot be seen as vulnerable to transition.  
It must be noted, however, that Russia’s political regime is not a party-based 
dictatorship; it can be defined as an authoritarian regime with a dominant party in 
a limited quantitative sense only. Such definition follows from the fact that United 
Russia stays in office since 1999 (or from 2003 if its predecessors are not 
considered) and systematically controls the legislature, even though it does not 
always receive a majority of the vote (Reuter and Remington 2009). In order to 
define a dominant party regime in qualitative terms, other substantive criteria must 
be met. In particular, Huntington and Moore (1970: 30) note: 
“[w]here the authority of the party is strong the top leader will be a product of 
the party and will be a party careerist, having worked his way up through the 
ranks of the party organization. This is the situation in both Mexico and the 
Soviet Union. [...] A second criterion of party strength vis-a-vis the leader is the 
extent to which the party monopolizes the process by which the top leader is 
chosen. [...] Finally, the authority of the party is enhanced to the extent that the 
formal office which the leader occupies is a party office.” 
The case of United Russia meets none of these requirements. Not Vladimir Putin 
has been promoted to his office as a party careerist but rather United Russia has 
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emerged as the “party of power” or, more plainly speaking, as the “party of Putin”. 
The role of United Russia in the process of leadership selection has remained 
marginal at all levels of government. On the eve of the presidential 2008 election, 
Dmitry Medvedev appeared from the unknown as Putin’s hand-picked successor 
(preemnik), not as United Russia’s activist, though his candidacy was formally 
“rubber-stamped” by United Russia. The party membership of the top officials not 
infrequently takes ludicrous forms. For instance, Medvedev was nominated to the 
presidential post at the VIII party congress in 2007. Five years later, after having 
served his presidential term, he received his party ballot and was elected to the post 
of United Russia’s chairman in 2012 (Astahov 2012), not the other way around. His 
biography posted on the party website does not inform that he was nominated to 
the post of prime minister of the Russian government in 2012 (Medvedev 2018), and 
this is true, he was virtually “nominated” by Putin. Putin himself has managed to 
remain nonpartisan, even despite the fact that he was elected at the post of United 
Russia’s chairman at the IX party congress in 2008. Especially for this case, the 
party program was amended: its item 7.1.2. states that “a citizen of the Russian 
Federation who is not a member of the Party can be elected the Chairman of the 
Party”. The temporarily last (but probably not the final) point in this interplay 
between the leader and the party has been put by Putin when he, allegedly due to 
electoral concerns, decided to neglect his party’s support and balloted as 
independent (samovydvizhenets) to the presidential post in 2018 (Azarnovsky and 
Kholmogorova 2017). Along with that, few (if any at all) federal ministers can be 
found whose biographies contain significant traces of party activism in United 
Russia. At the regional level, governors were “forced into joining the party” (Reuter 
2010: 299) rather than strived to receive the party ballot to obtain access to party 
spoils, electoral advantage or other resources associated with the party. 
Russia’s political regime under Putin is quite the opposite of Huntington and 
Moore’s definition – it is a personalist autocracy.23 In their classical work, Bratton 
and Van de Walle (1997: Ch. 2) argue that presidentialism, as an institutional 
framework for personalism, is a key feature of neopatrimonial states, along with 
                                                          
23
 In a more concise yet substantively similar manner, Geddes (1999: 7) notes that “[i]n single-party regimes, 
access to political office and control over policy are dominated by one party, though other parties may legally 
exist and compete in elections. Personalist regimes differ from both military and single party in that access to 
office and the fruits of office depend much more on the discretion of an individual leader.” Building their 
classification of authoritarian regimes upon Geddes (1999), Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) code Russia 
throughout the entire period of 1994–2010 as a personal dictatorship in the Autocratic Regimes Data Set 
(available at: http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/). Contrary to Geddes (1999), Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), 
and Huntington and Moore’s (1970) definition, Reuter and Ghandi (2011) code Russia in 2004 as a dominant 
party regime. 
  
57 
 
clientelism and massive redistribution of public resources. Defining 
neopatrimonialism, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 458) note that “[t]he essence 
of neopatrimonialism is the award by public officials of personal favors, both within 
the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, 
contracts, and projects). In return for material rewards, clients mobilize political 
support and refer all decisions upward as a mark of deference to patrons.” This 
study finds support for Bratton and Van de Walle’s elite-related argument. In 
particular, it shows how, in return for larger central transfers, regional elites, rather 
than mobilizing electoral support, perpetrate electoral fraud for the incumbent, 
persecute journalists and implement similar policies that generally lead to 
progressing of authoritarianism. 
Below, I let myself to quote Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) broadly in those 
particular places that are especially relevant to Russia. They write regarding the 
degree of personal power of the leader and its relationship with the regime: 
“[p]ower is so concentrated that the disposition of the regime is synonymous 
with the personal fate of the supreme ruler. Real political change is unlikely as 
long as the ruler remains, since he has made all the rules. Likewise, opportunity 
for regime change occurs only with the death, deposition, or flight of the 
strongman, which becomes the primary objective of the opposition throughout 
the transition” p. 475.  
Implicitly answering to this primary objective of the opposition, Vyacheslav Volodin, 
the deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, makes even a stronger 
claim: while “there is Putin – there is Russia, there is no Putin – there is no Russia” 
(Rosbalt 2014). Even if this phrase was driven by wishful thinking, it, nevertheless, 
indicates the direction in which the political establishment prefers to manifest its 
views publicly. 
The politics of personalism tends to create a narrow circle of the ruling elite (the 
small size of the winning coalition (W) in Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues’ (2003) 
terms), to such extent narrow that “political leaders may represent no more than a 
tiny coterie of clients” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994: 465). This ruling elite, 
winning coalition or the group of insiders is personally committed to the leader, yet 
its loyalty is primarily based on personal benefits delivered via clientelism:  
“few rulers tolerate dissent; they typically expel potential opponents from 
government jobs, from approved institutions like ruling parties, or even from the 
country itself. Even if most individuals can expect eventually to be forgiven and 
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brought back into the fold, such practices establish a zero-sum, 
nonaccommodative pattern of politics. Whereas insiders enjoy preferential 
access to state offices and associated spoils, outsiders are left to languish in the 
wilderness. The more complete their exclusion from economic opportunity and 
political expression, the more strongly outsiders are motivated to oppose the 
incumbent regime” p. 463. 
Leaders of the personalist regimes bear higher risks of criminal prosecution if 
they were to lose power:  
“[t]he willingness of personal dictators to step down often depends on whether 
they fear prosecution for their egregious abuse of state powers and privileges. 
They tend to cling desperately to power. [...] They believe the opposition's 
promises to prosecute them and, recalling the ignominious exile of Marcos of the 
Philippines or the Shah of Iran, fear they can never be safe” p. 476. 
These rulers’ fears are not groundless under authoritarianism. Furthermore, the 
situation is exacerbated by personalism. Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014: 321) 
show that most leaders of personalist authoritarian regimes (69%) end up with 
exile, imprisonment or death after ouster, whereas only 37% of ousted authoritarian 
dominant-party leaders face such a dramatic fate. A collective rule of party-based 
autocracies diffuses responsibility between numerous members of the Politburo and 
other party functionaries and creates a sense of collective irresponsibility for regime 
crimes. In personal dictatorships, everyone knows who is to blame. In this 
connection, I argue in Chapter 4 that authoritarian incumbents tend to resort to 
electoral fraud even in those cases when it may seem unnecessary. Specifically, 
high costs of electoral failure, which are generally intrinsic to authoritarian regimes, 
aggravated by the high clarity of criminal responsibility intrinsic to personal 
dictatorships, in combination with the authoritarian effect of distributive politics 
examined in Chapter 5 and 6, have determined high levels of electoral fraud in 
Putin’s era.  
The small size of the ruling coalition and the dependence of careers of its 
members on the choice of the leader determine strong cohesion of the ruling elite. 
As a result, 
“the insiders in a patrimonial ruling coalition are unlikely to promote political 
reform. Stultified by years of obeisance to the official party line, they have 
exhausted their own capacity for innovation. Recruited and sustained with 
material inducements, lacking an independent political base, and thoroughly 
compromised by corruption, they are dependent on the survival of the 
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incumbent regime. Insiders typically have risen through the ranks of political 
service and, apart from top leaders who may have invested in private capital 
holdings, derive their livelihood from state or party offices. Because they face the 
prospect of losing all visible means of support in a political transition, they have 
little option but to cling to the regime and to sink or swim with it” p. 464.  
In the aggregate, neopatrimonial regimes, as opposed to party-based regimes,24 
are characterized by the following distinctive traits: 1) an excessive concentration of 
power in hands of the president coupled with no or weak formal institutional 
constraints, 2) a small size of the ruling elite, 3) a high clarity of responsibility for 
regime crimes, and 4) as a result, resistance to political reforms becomes a vital 
value of the rulers. 
In the case of Russia, typically for neopatrimonialism, the parliament and the 
“party of power” do not factually participate in decision making process. “The 
parliament is not a place for discussion” – states the prominent phrase attributed to 
the State Duma chairman Boris Gryzlov. Instead of the discussion over relevant 
policy issues and decision making, many authoritarian legislatures, including the 
State Duma, are rater used for co-optation of moderate opposition activists, 
promotion of economic interests by the businessmen (Sakaeva 2012), and making 
extra-governmental amendments to government bills initiated by the executive  
(Noble Forthcoming). In particular, Noble (Forthcoming) argues that the State Duma 
does not fully meet a classical definition of the “rubber stamp” inasmuch as it, even 
though rarely, postpones and amends bills introduced by the president or the 
government. Notwithstanding, the vast majority of amendments are passed not due 
to an elite-society dialogue but because of the conflict of interests over spending 
commitments between different factions in the executive, such as the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Economic Development. 
To the contrary, all crucial policy decisions are done personally by the 
president, and the locus of decision making process is concentrated around the 
president and the presidential administration. Russia, however, is not entirely ruled 
by decrees and arbitrary decisions of the president as it is described by Bratton and 
Van de Walle (1994) in the cases of neopatrimonial personal dictatorships in Africa 
(Idi Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in Central African Republic, Macias Nguema in 
                                                          
24
 Bratton and Van de Walle (1994) contrast neopatrimonial states to corporatist states in Latin America. This is 
essentially similar to dominant-party, hegemonic-party, and single-party regimes, which I call here by the 
common term – party-based regimes. 
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Equatorial Guinea, Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, and Hastings Banda in Malawi). In 
particular, Treisman (2018: 18–20) differentiates two systems in Russian politics:  
“[t]he first – “normal politics” or “autopilot” – prevails when Putin does not 
personally get involved. Such cases, which constitute the vast majority of more 
mundane state activity, are poorly captured by common images of Russia as a 
centralized dictatorship. [...] The second system – “manual control” (ruchnoe 
upravlenie) occurs when Putin takes a clear stand. It involves a much more top-
down dictation of actions – although the poor preparation of decisions and 
difficulties of implementation mean that the desired outcome is only sometimes 
achieved.”  
Russia is also not an absolute no-party personal dictatorship as Belarus, for 
example, in which 90.7% of elected legislative deputies were independents in 2000–
2012, on average. In this regard, Russia is rather a modernized neopatrimonialism 
– a system in which formal institutions ostensibly perform their functions, yet 
informal institutions substantively prevail over then; actors within the framework of 
formal political institutions can make decisions on issues of minor importance or 
handle routinized affairs only, whereas most important decisions are made by the 
president, the power of which is de facto not limited by formal institutional 
constraints.  
This study, thus, aims to contribute to the class of personalist regimes in which 
dominant parties play a minor role of electoral vehicles designed to curb opposition 
activity in the parliamentary arena but not to seriously participate in the contest for 
power and not for policy decision making. Parties in these systems are not used as 
political machines to deliver patronage to voters. Nor do they deliver considerable 
benefits to political elites (such as career promotion or electoral advantage); though 
forgoing party membership can be associated with additional costs. In the Russian 
case, as well, we do not observe armies of brokers (as an alternative to the 
dominant party patronage network or as an intermediary link between voters and 
the municipality) who distribute patronage before, during and after elections, as in 
the case of Argentina (Auyero 2000; Zarazaga 2014) or Peru (Muñoz 2014). It is, 
consequently, puzzling how do incumbents in such regimes retain power? 
Magaloni (2006: 21–22) claims Russia under Vladimir Putin to be a “self-
destructive authoritarian equilibrium” in which “the party organization is too weak 
to effectively operate a “punishment regime”” (p. 22) and authoritarian survival is, 
therefore, based on the long-term economic growth and the selective use of electoral 
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fraud and repression applied against elite opponents and pro-democracy 
movements. Contrary to her argument, this study shows that distributive politics is 
not meaningless in Putin’s Russia. Although the study does not find strong support 
for the hypothesis that the incumbent delivers patronage benefits to voters in order 
to obtain their electoral support, it provides empirical evidence that regional elites 
are prime beneficiaries of the central transfers, which are allocated based on 
political loyalty of their recipients, and that this loyalty translates into electoral 
fraud, persecution of journalists, and other intrinsically authoritarian policies. I do 
not test in this study another theoretically predicted outcome of elite loyalty – 
refraining from challenging the incumbent – the absence of which can manifest 
itself in three forms: electoral defection, participation in a coup d’état, and 
sponsoring, provoking or taking on leadership in mass anti-incumbent movements.  
While the information on failed attempts of assassination of top officials is 
purposefully kept in secrecy in Russia, the governors’ party membership allows to 
indirectly identify the influence of central transfers on electoral defection by 
governors.25 In three out of four those rare cases where governors were members of 
formally opposition parties from 2008 (when United Russia’s membership has 
virtually become compulsory) through 2017, the average 2008–2016 share of 
central transfers in budgets (STB) of their regions was lower relatively to the 
country’s mean of 32.0%: Vladimir Oblast (governor’s tenure:1997–2013; the STB = 
26.6%), Irkutsk Oblast (2015–; 19.5%), and Smolensk Oblast (2012–; 25.8%). In the 
fourth case, Oryol Oblast (2014–2017), the STB was above the mean by only 0.37 
standard deviations (38.8%). Furthermore, several governors of the ethnic regions 
(whose defection would be more painful to the regime), the budgets of which are 
heavily dependent on federal transfers, occupied or continue to occupy positions in 
the central United Russia party leadership: Adygea (2006–2017; 50.2%), Kabardino-
Balkaria (2005–2013; 54.4%), Kalmykia (2010–; 57.3%), Republic of Altai (2006–; 
73.2%); North Ossetia (2005–2015; 59.2%), Karachay-Cherkessia (2011–; 67.3%), 
Chechnya (2007–; 85.0%), and Ingushetia (2008–; 87.1%). Due to their stronger 
integration into United Russia, they will less likely to defect to an opposition party. 
Finally, there is no evidence on governors’ support of mass opposition movements 
the most prominent of which was the post-electoral protest of 2011–2012. At the 
same time, several regime defectors have in fact leaded the protest process on 
Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. They were Mikhail Kasyanov, Minister of Finance 
                                                          
25
 There were no defections in its direct sense, that it, changing party identification from United Russia to KPRF 
or LDPR.  
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(1999–2000) and Prime Minister of Russia (2000–2004), Alexei Kudrin, Minister of 
Finance from 2000 to 2011, and Boris Nemtsov, governor of Nizhny Novgorod 
Oblast (1991–1997) and Deputy Prime Minister in 1997–1998. These persons lost 
their loyalty to the regime after having lost their access to state spoils and were 
(reasonably) called by regime’s proponents the “party of the former ones” (partiya 
byvshikh). 
To sum up, when loyalty of political elites is secured through clientelism, their 
repression is no longer necessary. Furthermore, loyal elites can respond to the 
incumbent with various forms of fraud and repression applied against opponents of 
the regime. Thus, this dissertation primarily shows that securing loyalty of political 
elites via delivering them clientelist benefits is crucial for regime survival in 
personalist electoral dictatorships.  
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Chapter 2. A Theoretical Framework for Studying Electoral Fraud in the 
Context of Russian Electoral Malpractices 
Introduction 
Electoral fraud is an intrinsic component of the bulk of non-democratic regimes. 
When successful, electoral fraud helps authoritarian incumbents to sustain 
political domination by creating the image of popular support, deterring elite splits 
(Magaloni 2006; Gehlbach and Simpser 2015), preventing opposition protests 
(Simpser 2013), and gaining international legitimacy (Hyde 2011). At the same time, 
the extent of electoral fraud in authoritarian regimes has not been studied properly 
in quantitative terms. Falsification of electoral results is still a sort of latent variable 
that is only implied “as default” in non-democratic regimes; the real value remains 
unknown. Defining competitive authoritarianism Levitsky and Way (2002: 53) write 
that “[a]lthough elections are regularly held and are generally free of massive fraud, 
incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media 
coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases 
manipulate electoral results.” Greene (2007: 34) and Magaloni (2006: 21–23, 258–
259) argue that electoral fraud does not play a decisive role in electoral 
authoritarian regimes; it is rather used as an auxiliary or temporary tool when a 
dominant party’s patronage fund exhausts. Instead scholars insist that large 
margins of authoritarian incumbents’ victories are due to clientelist policy appeals 
(Wantchekon 2003),  politically motivated distribution of municipal funds (Magaloni 
2006), clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), pork-barrel politics (Golden and 
Picci  2008) or political business cycles (Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya 2004; 
Treisman and Gimpelson 2001). However, the actual role of electoral fraud in 
sustaining non-democratic regimes cannot be examined without a quantitative 
estimation of the extent of ballot rigging. 
The second element to be explained is that authoritarian elections are routinely 
characterized by high turnout rates. The classic rational choice theory implies that 
the probability of electoral participation depends on the decisiveness of the vote or, 
in other words, on uncertainty of the electoral outcome (Downs 1957). More recent 
research has also proved that turnout increases with shortening the electoral 
distance between candidates (Franklin 2004) and demonstrated that turnout 
decreases with negative perception of electoral fairness (Birch 2010; Carreras and 
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İrepoğlu 2013; Gerber et al. 2013; Simpser 2013: Ch. 7). Nevertheless, we can 
observe high turnout rates in cases where authoritarian incumbents win unfair 
elections with large margins. Minimax regret strategies (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974) 
cannot explain this fact since the opposition in authoritarian regimes rarely poses a 
real threat to the incumbent. In democratic regimes we may easily imagine a 
motivation to voting related to support for basic democratic freedoms and liberties, 
yet in authoritarian regimes this motivation has no rationale. Therefore, a sense of 
civic duty (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Blais 2000) should barely motivate moderate 
voters to go to the polls. The exception, however, may include ideologically 
committed voters supporting their candidates despite high participation costs and 
the inefficiency of the act of voting. Thus, high turnout rates and the large margins 
of victory enjoyed by authoritarian incumbents remain puzzling without thorough 
examination of the role of electoral fraud in non-democratic regimes. 
Chapter 2, 3, and 4 aim to shed some light on this problem. This chapter, in 
particular, addresses the types of electoral fraud. By grouping the variety 
fraudulent techniques into specific types, it aims to provide an insight into the 
essence of each individual kind of electoral forgery to eventually take these nuances 
into account when electoral fraud will be examined quantitatively in Chapter 4. The 
first section considers definitions and presents a typology of electoral fraud. The 
subsequent sections discuss distinct types of electoral fraud, namely, pressure on 
voters, ballot stuffing, and violations of vote count. Using the data of the Russian 
parliamentary and presidential elections (2011–2012), I demonstrate graphically 
how different types of fraud change the relationship between the absolute vote 
share and the turnout rate. The conclusion summarizes the results. 
A Typology of Electoral Fraud 
There are several approaches to defining electoral fraud that can be classified by 
placing on a narrow-to-broad scale. Hausmann and Rigobon (2011: 7) define fraud 
as “the difference between the voters’ intent and what the electoral system 
registered about their decision.” This definition is empirically useful because of its 
narrowness and precision. However, classification of vote buying according to this 
definition is problematic since the fact of buying the vote virtually creates the 
voters’ intent. An alternative approach on the other side of the spectrum broadly 
defines electoral fraud as a “menu of manipulations” (Schedler 2002) or “election 
rigging” (Calingaert 2006). This approach seems to be of lower reliability since it 
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blurs the line between falsification of elections and the general bias of the electoral 
playing field. The definition of electoral fraud should also not be equal to any 
procedural violation of electoral law26 (Lehoucq and Molina 2002) or to 
inconsistency with international standards of “electoral integrity” or “election 
quality” (Birch 2011a; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Hall and Wang 2008; Hyde 2008; 
Norris 2013b). For instance, I do not consider such violations as the presence of a 
candidate’s posters at the polling station or manipulations with the ballot to 
highlight a candidate of the electoral bid as cases of electoral falsification. This kind 
of violation unequivocally creates an inequality in opportunities between 
candidates, yet it rather coincides with the previous approach in equating electoral 
fraud with the biased field of electoral competition. In addition, it should be 
underlined that not every violation of the electoral code necessarily leads to change 
in the numbers of votes in return sheets. Thus, we should differentiate between 
electoral fraud in a broad sense that should rather be termed as electoral 
malpractice, electoral manipulation, electoral misconduct, and electoral dis-
integrity, which usually encompasses all the processes of the electoral cycle (Norris 
2012b), and electoral fraud in a narrow sense – the external influences that directly 
intervene between the initial choice of voters and the electoral commission’s final 
vote tally. 
Accordingly, I strive to detect the initial, genuine, authentic or sincere 
incumbent’s vote based on the voters’ preferences as if falsification of election 
results had not taken place. Conceptually sincere voting implies that voters cast 
their ballots without fear of punishment or extra benefits in the form of blatant vote 
buying. Although Cox (1997) contrasts sincere voting with strategic voting, in this 
context, I regard strategic voting and minimax regret strategy (Ferejohn and Fiorina 
1974) as particular cases of sincere voting inasmuch as voters adjust their 
preferences to available electoral options based on probabilities of their 
implementation rather than sacrifice their preferences due to coercion or illegal 
material inducements. Electoral fraud, equivalently as falsification of election 
results, is defined as the difference between officially reported vote totals and the 
outcome of sincere voting. 
                                                          
26
 Birch (2012: 12) points out that domestic electoral norms may themselves be “corrupt”.  In fact, not only 
authoritarian regimes but also several well-developed democracies establish too restrictive legislative 
thresholds for entrance and competition of third parties. However, using international standards for 
assessment of quality of elections does not substantially alleviate limitations of this approach. See Chapter 3 
for more discussion on observational data-driven methods of electoral fraud detection. 
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Table 2.1. The types of electoral fraud  
Stage Actors Type of fraud Control Type of goods Example 
Voting 
Voters 
Vote buying 
Yes 
“Club” goods 
“Denis 
Agashin”a  
Private goods “Carousel” a 
No 
“Club” goods Concert 
Private goods Gifts to voters 
Voter 
Intimidation 
Yes 
“Club” goods EUPCb 
Private goods 
Absentee 
ballot 
No 
“Club” goods 
Threat of 
withdrawal  of 
organization’s 
funds 
Private goods 
Threat of 
dismissal 
Actors Type of fraud Period  
Members of 
precinct 
electoral 
commission 
Ballot 
stuffing 
Before voting 
 
During voting 
During vote 
count 
Vote 
Count 
Actors Type of fraud 
Impact on X 
and Yc 
Members of 
precinct 
electoral 
commission 
Vote 
miscount 
Manipulating 
votes 
Manipulating 
turnout and 
votes 
Reporting 
fictitious 
results 
Randomly 
“In a dot” 
“In a line” 
Members of 
territorial 
electoral 
commission 
Re-writing  of 
protocols 
Randomly 
“In a dot” 
“In a line” 
Note: a. See main text for details. b. EUPC refers to enterprises of uninterrupted 
production cycle. c. Here and hereinafter X denotes turnout, Y denotes vote share. 
Although the area of electoral fraud studies has been growing rapidly over the 
last decade, it has been noted that “relatively few authors try to classify and count 
acts of ballot rigging” (Lehoucq 2003: 236). Since then the attempts to classify 
electoral fraud are still meager and rare (Calingaert 2006; Ziblatt 2009; Birch 
2011a; Christensen 2012). This lacuna in the literature is more probably associated 
with the difficulty of encompassing the plenty of illegal practices in different areas: 
the electoral playing field (illicit use of state resources, state repression, and the 
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media bias), voter registration, nomination of parties and candidates, electoral 
campaigning, and formal procedures of voting and vote count. Applying the stricter 
definition of electoral fraud and focusing only on voter manipulation and 
manipulation with voting results allows us to classify types of electoral fraud in a 
more feasible manner.  
The approach applied in this study divides all types of electoral fraud into two 
main groups associated with pressure on voters and the actions of members of 
electoral commissions. This division is theoretically helpful as it could be interesting 
to examine which way of falsification is more widespread and in which type of 
authoritarian regimes. The classification is resented in Table 2.1. Obviously, these 
types of electoral fraud are rather “ideal types”. There is often hard to draw a clear 
distinction between them in practice. Moreover, in reality these types of fraud may 
coexist simultaneously. For instance, vote buying in the form of “club goods” such 
as targeted programs may coincide with threat to withdraw funds (Magaloni 2006). 
Fraud may occur during voting or vote count. At the voting stage, two main 
types of fraud can be distinguished: pressure on voters (including intimidation and 
vote buying) and ballot stuffing. At the vote count stage, voters cannot be involved 
in the process of falsification; for this reason, the only actors are members of 
electoral commissions. 
The types of pressure on voters presented in the table (vote buying and voter 
intimidation) are sometimes viewed as subtypes of clientelism (Stokes et al. 2013; 
Nichter 2014; Kramon 2017) or used with clientelism interchangeably (Magaloni 
2006). I suppose that clientelism differs from vote buying and voter intimidation not 
by its monetary or in-kind character of distributed goods but by the fact that bribed 
or intimidated voters, most likely, do neither vote in accordance with their true 
electoral preferences nor change them. From this standpoint, vote buying and 
intimidation of voters contradict the idea of sincere voting. However, the features of 
clientelism mentioned in the literature such as the character of goods and 
possibility to control the voter’s choice seem heuristically relevant and are therefore 
used in the electoral fraud typology. 
Pressure on Voters 
The most common strategy of pressure on voters is vote buying, that is, the 
provision of tangible goods in exchange of the vote. The Russian State Duma 
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electoral campaign of 2011 demonstrates a lot of such instances. The case under 
the label “Denis Agashin” is a typical example of vote buying, when organizers use 
club goods and can control their distribution depending on election results. In this 
notorious case Denis Agashin, the city-manager (indirectly elected mayor) of Izhevsk 
city, at a meeting with members of veterans’ organizations unambiguously offered 
financial support to the organization in exchange for support for the United Russia. 
If the party in the district were to receive less than 50% of the vote, funding of the 
organization in the area would remain the same; if 51–54% were to vote for the 
party, then each organization would gain an additional ruble equivalent27 of $6,000 
annually; at 55–59% of the vote, the funding increase would amount to $23,000; 
the party results of 60% or more would provide $33,000 of additional funding.28  
The most widespread example of controlled voting with using private goods to 
bribe voters is the so-called “carousel” or “revolving ballot”. The scheme has long 
been used in Mexico and Milošević’s Yugoslavia (Calingaert 2006). In order to 
guarantee voter commitment, the fraudster asks the first voter to enter the polling 
station to cast the ballot he is given by the fraudster and which is already marked 
for the required candidate. At the same time, he is to return the blank ballot he 
received in the station. The blank ballot is then marked and transferred to the next 
voter. Advancements in communication technologies have made this procedure 
obsolete. Practically, venal voters are now expected to photograph their ballots 
marked for the required candidate on a mobile phone in order to receive money for 
vote. In a sense, to falsifiers this scheme may seem old-fashioned and not as 
                                                          
27
 For better accessibility of information, numbers expressed in rubles are converted into U.S. dollars in this 
chapter. The average annual exchange rate in 2011 was 29.4 rubles per one U.S. dollar and 31.1 RUB/USD in 
2012.  
28
 A quote from the speech is instructive. “Today beginning from the top of the [Russian] Federation the 
allocation of money and all resources occurs exactly as follows: those who support now the acting power, and 
United Russia now is the “party of power”, are supplied with money and funds. I have the following offer, 
which I will further bring to the republican officials. And I [discussed] all this in all four raions, which I have 
travelled around, with leaders of the primary organizations and with citizens. I told them one simple thing. If 
the party in your district gets less than 51 percent, nothing changes in financing because I have no grounds to 
talk with the City Duma deputies. They will tell me: what for? If [people] do not support the party that is doing, 
is trying to do, something today – why then financing? It means people don’t need it. If the party in a district 
gets about 51–54 percent, I make a proposal to fund extra 500 thousand rubles per the district branch. If the 
party obtains in the district 55–59 percent – 700 thousand rubles. If the party obtains over 60 percent – 1 
million rubles per the veterans district organization...  In the future we will apply this approach to allocation of 
all financial flows. There, where we are supported, but not so as in Oktiabrsky district where 45% support us. 
Why should they receive the same amount of money as Leninsky district where 60% of the vote [goes to United 
Russia]?” The speech concludes with a whisper from the hall: “Oh, such a horror!” Eventually the Izhevsk city’s 
court adjudged Agashin guilty in illegal campaigning and obliged him to pay a negligible fine of 2000 rubles (64 
U.S. dollars at that-time exchange rate). 
The video with Denis Agashin’s speech is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f2B1r-
iywco&feature=player_embedded#!  or at  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2G3_xxtxBKI  (English 
subtitles). 
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efficient as it might be since one voter still provides only one vote. What is called 
“carousel” in Russian electoral malpractices is more advantageous compared with 
this single-vote buying. “Carousel”, plainly speaking, corresponds to multiple voting 
by the same persons who are conveyed from one polling station to another and who 
receive a ruble equivalent of $15–30 for voting at each station.29 By doing so, one 
voter may vote up to thirty times. The scheme does not stipulate such strict control 
as photographed ballots. However, since the “carousel” voters vote in groups 
organizers may threaten to verify their loyalty by comparing vote totals of the visited 
polling stations with other stations and subsequently punish members of the group 
altogether.  
If organizers do not have the opportunity to control electoral behavior, vote 
buying may take the form of free mass entertainment such as concerts 
accompanied by political agitation or distribution of gifts to voters, which may occur 
on election day as well as during the electoral campaign. This type of non-controlled 
distribution of tangible goods falls beyond the explanatory mechanism proposed in 
several studies (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni and Weingast 2003; Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007; Lehoucq (2007); Schaffer and Schedler 2007; Stokes 2005; Stokes 
et al. 2013) that emphasize the effects of monitoring, punishment, and contingency 
of benefits on the voter choice. However, more recent studies fill this theoretical 
lacuna by underlining an informational role of the non-contingent distribution. 
These studies assert that benefits distributed to individuals non-contingently on 
their electoral support allow brokers to legitimate their roles as reliable neighbors 
with a good reputation for accessing resources rather than vote buyers (Zarazaga 
2014), to signal candidates’ electoral viability (Muñoz 2014), and to convey 
information to voters that promises of the candidate who delivers benefits are 
credible with respect to future provision of resources (Kramon 2017). 
It is worth mentioning that vote-buying mechanisms may not be straightforward. 
Nichter (2008) argues that what he calls “turnout buying” predominantly targets 
passive supporters whereby parties mobilize their own constituencies. Using the 
                                                          
29
 One report on the topic submitted to the Karta Narushenii (The Map of Violations) website of the election 
observation organization GOLOS stated that “Students from St. Petersburg State University in halls of residence 
are offered to make some money on the election (3,200 rubles). On election day, the bus will take the whole 
group of those who consented to polling stations. At each polling station voters have to vote for United Russia. 
Then the bus takes the group to the next station (overall there are 32 polling stations). If the violation is 
detected by authorities, students are offered legal assistance: 10,000 rubles for a legal adviser, 5,000 rubles 
compensation for being detained by the police and 10,000 rubles for caused injury. Those students who 
consented but did not come will pay a fine of 1,500 rubles.” (http://www.kartanarusheniy.org Site visit – 21 
November 2011.) 
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survey data on the 2002 presidential election in Kenya, Cramon (2009) has also 
shown that turnout rates rose by about 14 percentage points among individuals 
who were approached by a vote buyer, while the effect was stronger for the less 
educated persons. In this regard, the non-contingent distribution of private as well 
as public goods can be aimed at activating passive strata in the incumbent’s 
electorate. 
Another theoretical problem is that the non-contingent distribution may seem 
inefficient in terms of vote gains for each unit of expenditure if compared with 
schemes of controlled vote buying. It might be true if candidates used their own 
funds or if they had to engage in fundraising. Yet given that financing is allocated 
legally from the public budget, personal costs for organizers are relatively small. The 
general cost of the non-contingent distribution can be even smaller compared with 
controlled vote buying if political costs of blatant vote buying associated with moral 
rejection of this practice by voters (Weitz-Shapiro 2012: 570–571) are taken into 
account.  
Indeed, since the Soviet era political strategists in Russia tend to organize 
elections so as to make them look like a festive day. Although gifts to voters are 
conventionally recognized as a form of vote rigging, inclusion of concerts in the 
category of vote buying may not seem appropriate. In fact, these concerts are often 
held under the guise of public events aimed to show concern by public officials for 
the cultural life of citizens. However, the crucial difference with public events is 
partisan bias. Saint-Petersburg’s news agency Fontanka.ru reported on the eve of 
the 2012 presidential election that several district administrations in the city were 
preparing five concerts scheduled on election day, March 4, at a total cost of 
$44,600. Several officials denied that the concerts were associated with the election 
and claimed that there was only a coincidence so far as the concerts were dedicated 
to the celebration of spring and aimed at creating a festive mood among the 
citizens. Yet one official stated more plainly that such concerts are always linked to 
elections and that the announcers between the performances will remind people 
about the necessity to come to the polling station and to vote (Aksenov 2012).  
In a similar vein, Zaks.ru reported that all tickets to Saint-Petersburg’s Circus at 
Fontanka had been sold out until the end of the State Duma electoral campaign. 
Following this, residents began to receive invitations to visit the office of deputy 
Evgeny Marchenko to get free tickets to the circus. The performance itself was 
decorated by the party’s emblems and preceded by a speech of a United Russia’s 
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deputy (Rabotnova 2011). It should be noted that mass entertainment organized for 
partisan purposes is conceptually close to patronage: it does not imply voter’s 
coercion and leaves room for sincere voting. The only condition that allows to 
include it in the category of vote buying is the period of its implementation that 
does normally not extend beyond the term of the electoral campaign. If such kind of 
the distribution takes place in a long-term perspective, as described by Zarazaga 
(2014: 28) or Muñoz (2014: 87), it should be rather called patronage or clientelism.  
Quite often pressure on voters occurs without provision of material inducements 
but solely by means of threats and coercion. The credibility of a threat to deprive 
voters of some private good or benefit may be achieved by controlling their vote 
choice. A typical example of this kind of electoral malpractices in Russia is related 
to manipulations with absentee voting certificates. Absentee certificates facilitate 
vote rigging in two ways. First, absentee certificates facilitate control over voters 
since using them makes possible to redirect voters residing in various districts to 
vote at a particular polling station where members of electoral commission are more 
willing to cooperate with fraudsters. This tactic may be employed especially where 
concurrent local and national elections are held. In those cases, local party bosses 
mobilize voters, first of all, for their own victory in the district and only vicariously – 
for their party. Second, if members of electoral commissions are also involved in the 
falsification scheme and do not invalidate absentee certificates after issuing ballots 
to voters, voters then may vote several times by using absentee certificates 
repeatedly. Early voting represents another example when secrecy of the ballot may 
be violated since voters deposit their voted ballots for storage in an envelope signed 
by two members of the commission. For this reason, voting may also be 
controlled.30 However, the cases of early voting are relatively rare in Russia (2.5 
ballots per polling station on average in the 2012 presidential election) and its 
distribution coincides with remote areas.  
With respect to controlled intimidation of voters by threatening to annul any 
previously available club goods, an example may be found if the polling station is 
located at the territory of so-called enterprises with uninterrupted production cycle 
(EUPC). Voting in such polling stations can be easily controlled, and the reduction 
                                                          
30
 A typical report from the Karta Narusheniy website on this type of fraud stated the following: “November 14, 
2011. The director of the kindergarten No. 33 located at: St. Petersburg, the second Murinsky ave., 10, block 2, 
Mescheryakova V.A. has invited employees to visit her individually and under threat of dismissal required 
employees to write a statement on early vote in the upcoming election of the State Duma, and each staff 
member had to vote for the political party United Russia”. (http://www.kartanarusheniy.org Site visit – 21 
November 2011.) 
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of state funding or subsidies for the enterprise may be a serious threat. There are 
also fewer formal restrictions on fraud because the access for electoral observers is 
considerably restricted. Threats to deprive voters of private goods (e.g., employment) 
sometimes are not accompanied by real actions of control in practice. The absence 
of control makes threats less credible. However, intimidation still may have a 
psychological effect.31  
This is implicitly confirmed by Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi (2014) who argue that 
voter mobilization in the workplace is an efficient tool for autocrats to win elections. 
Using survey data collected by the Levada-Center after the Russian parliamentary 
election of 2011, they found that, on average, 25% of employees reported that their 
employers attempted to influence their decision to vote, whereas this proportion 
was the largest between regional and local government (32%) and federal 
government employees (37%).32 However, even if a considerable proportion of 
employees has been exposed to pressure by their employers, this pressure in far 
from all cases resulted into the act of voting. The effect of mobilization on turnout 
reported by the authors in Appendix Table 5 is significant only at p < 0.1 (z-value = 
1.69), whereas the effect of age is significant at p < 0.01 (z-value = 4.0). Hence, the 
probability of turnout for those employees who experienced pressure is by about 5% 
higher compared with the rest of the sample.33  
This approach also overemphasizes the role of employees as independent actors. 
Frye, Reuter and Szakonyi note that the ruling party organizations are weak at the 
grassroots level in many electoral authoritarian regimes, including Russia, and 
                                                          
31
 One example found on the Karta Narusheniy is related to a threat of funding withdrawal from a public 
hospital: “Chief Doctors arrange meetings where they tell that the Regional Health Department has given the 
instructions on required turnout rate and vote result. They ask not to let them [doctors] down and vote as 
described above. If their medical facility fails to meet these expectations staff reductions and other 
organizational sanctions will follow, hinting at the possibility of dismissal”. 
And a similar report was submitted regarding the threat of personal sanctions. “In this election doctors are 
given questionnaires to interview patients for whom they will vote, doctors are strongly recommended to write 
patients’ phone numbers. People are afraid to file complaints because of fear of dismissal”. 
(http://www.kartanarusheniy.org Site visit – 21 November 2011.) 
32
 The authors (on p. 204 and in Appendix 2) refer to Levada-Center’s Courier survey carried out from 
December 16 to December 20. A publically available Levada-Center’s Courier 2011-17 conducted between 
14.12.2011 and 21.12.2011, however, demonstrates another result. Out of 803 employees in the sample, only 
66 (7.7%) reported that they noticed a pressure during the electoral campaign in order to induce them to 
participate in the election or to support a candidate exerted by employees in the workplace;  6.7% reported a 
pressure by the local authorities; 4.2% – a pressure by colleagues at work; 72.9% did not take any notice of 
pressure; and 10.2% did not answer. In the full sample of 1600 respondents, including entrepreneurs, 
managers, students, and pensioners, 103 (6.4%) reported a pressure by employees (see questions q48_1 – 
q48_5, available at: http://sophist.hse.ru/db/oprview.shtml?ID_S=3304&T=m). 
33
 In a comparable model of 2012 in Table 3.4, the marginal effect of age on turnout (if age shifts from 20 to 70 
years) is estimated to be 21.9% (z-value = 3.9), whereas the effect of gender, which is twice less significant (z-
value = 2.1), yields 5.5% of higher probability of turnout for women. See Chapter 3 for details. 
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authoritarian leaders have to rely on employees to compensate this weakness. In 
fact, United Russia’s local structures are not so strong to engage in face-to-face 
canvassing, voter intimidation or vote buying. At the same time, many firm 
directors, school principals, hospital chief doctors and other heads have United 
Russia membership. As follows from Table 3 in the article, director’s support of 
United Russia is one of the strongest predictors (along with firm size) of workplace 
mobilization (i.e., managing political events34 by a director).  
The types of pressure on voters affect the distortion of turnout and vote shares 
for different candidates differently. We may assume two main differences. The first 
one is determined by whether voting is controlled or not. If organizers of fraud have 
an opportunity to control the voters’ choices, one can expect the increase of the vote 
share for the candidate to be proportional to the increase in turnout. If voters are 
bribed by gifts or intimidated by threats of dismissal but control is not tight or 
absent, several voters may dodge the pressure and maintain their initial vote 
decisions. This leads to a weaker relationship between vote share and turnout.  
The second difference is determined by the fact that absentee certificates and 
certificates of temporary registration are often used in “carousel” scheme of vote 
buying. Those voting with absentee certificates or temporary registration certificates 
are enrolled in the additional list of voters. If each additional voter casts a ballot in 
favor of the same candidate (ballot stuffing), the function of the absolute vote share 
calculated as the ratio of the candidate’s votes (  
 ) to the number of eligible 
(registered) voters (  ) depending on turnout (  ) looks as follows:   
          , 
where α is the intercept.35 Meanwhile drawing the additional list of voters makes the 
number of eligible voters not constant but increasing with each additional voter. 
Therefore    and   
    , calculated from extended   , are getting smaller compared 
with the initial   . Since   
     is normally less than   ,   
     will change more than 
  . Consequently, the β-coefficient in the equation will exceed 1, especially at lower 
values of   
     relative to   .  
                                                          
34
 These include the following political activities: endorsing a specific party, inviting workers to join a political 
party, distributing campaign materials, providing meeting space to candidates, or holding campaign events. It 
should be noted that this measure does not necessarily captures “electoral subversion” since all these activities 
can be done on the basis of persuasion but not intimidation, coercion or bribing. 
35
 The absolute vote share (  
    ) should not be confused with the relative (ordinary) vote share (  
    ). The 
latter is calculated as the ratio of the candidate’s votes (  
 ) to the number of valid votes (    and ordinarily 
reported as a candidate’s vote share. However, it is less appropriate for analysis of electoral fraud. See the 
main text for details. 
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To illustrate how the increase in the number of eligible voters leads to a relative 
decrease in turnout and vote share, Table 2.2 offers an example of the Russian 
2012 presidential election in the city of Moscow. The number of eligible voters had 
changed by 127,896 between the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011 
and 2012. Population growth or other natural factors hardly account for this 
impressive change, which had occurred in a three-month period. It more likely 
resulted from the inclusion of non-Moscow residents – who voted using absentee 
certificates – in the voter lists on election day. Keeping in mind that the data of 
2011 might have also been illegally altered, consider this number of votes to have 
been added to eligible, valid, and Putin’s votes. 
Table 2.2. Comparison of vote buying with absentee ballots and without 
 Initial Vote buying “Carousel” 
Eligible voters (  ) 7182 7182 7310 (+128) 
Valid votes (  ) 4032 4160 (+128) 4160 (+128) 
Putin’s votes (  
 
) 1866 1994 (+128) 1994 (+128) 
Turnout (  ) .5614 .5792 (+.0178) .5691 (+.0077) 
Absolute vote share (  
    ) .2599 .2777 (+.0178) .2728 (+.0129) 
Relative vote share (  
    ) .4629 .4794 (+.0165) .4794 (+.0165) 
β =   
     change /    change   1 1.6753 
Note: Numbers are in thousands of people. Changes in relation to the initial numbers are 
in parentheses. Eligible, valid, and Putin’s votes for the “Carousel” model are officially 
reported numbers in Moscow, in the presidential election on 4 March 2012. Eligible number 
of voters for the “Initial” and “Vote buying” models is officially reported number of eligible 
voters in the parliamentary election on 4 December 2011.  
Table 2.2 demonstrates that although vote shares calculated from the valid votes 
increase in both models of fraud in a similar way from 46 to 48 percent, the vote 
shares calculated as a proportion of eligible voters and turnout are smaller in the 
“Carousel” model than in the model of “Vote buying”. Consequently the β-coefficient 
of the “Carousel” model is 1.68 compared with 1 in the “Vote buying” model. In 
other words, one percent of turnout growth produces a 1.68 percent increase in 
  
    . However, in this case all calculations are made for illustrative purposes but 
not for detecting the exact amount of fraud. Unfortunately, without precise 
knowledge of the initial number of eligible voters it is problematic to correctly define 
the scale of fraud of this kind or to differentiate it from other types. 
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During the presidential election of 2012 most of the carousel-type falsifications 
were noticed in Moscow. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the relationship between turnout 
and vote share for two suspicious territorial electoral commissions (TIKs). In both 
plots there is a noticeable group of observations standing out from the center of 
distribution and directed upwards to the right. The left plot also shows that OLS 
estimates in some cases may neglect this group. 
Figure 2.1. Turnout and the absolute vote share for Putin in the territorial electoral 
commission “Chertanovo Yuzhnoye”, Moscow. Presidential election 2012 
 
Nevertheless, pressure on voters remains an inefficient strategy compared with 
fraud committed by members of electoral commissions. For example, consider a 
district with the population-averaged number of eligible voters that is about 2000 
people. Let us assume that the true turnout is 50% or 1000 votes, and 50% or 500 
voters voted for the winner candidate. If 500 bribed voters come to this polling 
station, the number of true and bribed voters is equal. Such large-scale falsification 
is very costly, too conspicuous and easy to detect for observers.  Notwithstanding, it 
would come up with increase of turnout only by 25% and raise of vote share for the 
candidate merely by 16.7% (1000 out of 1500 votes). Thus, pressure on voters 
involves high costs and brings few benefits to falsifiers. Therefore, given the absence 
of observers, fraud with engagement of members of electoral commissions is 
theoretically more feasible. 
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Ballot Stuffing 
The first type of electoral fraud in this category is ballot stuffing. Although, voters 
often cast additional illegal ballots, Table 2.1 indicates that members of electoral 
commissions may also be responsible for ballot stuffing. Ballot stuffing, in fact, is 
technically impossible without their involvement and collaboration. First, according 
to the law, ballots from each polling station must have two signatures of the 
commission members and the stamp of the commission. This is why it is possible to 
acquire access to ballots only with consent of the head of electoral commission. 
Second, ballots cast with the stamp from another polling station or without 
signatures and stamps are void. This is to be detected during the vote count. Third, 
ballot stuffing tends to increase turnout thereby making validation of compliance of 
control values in protocols impossible (the number of issued ballots should fit the 
number of ballots in fixed and mobile ballot boxes). If electoral observers cannot 
check that the ballot box is empty before it has been sealed, stuffing the ballot box 
may happen before voting starts. During voting, electoral fraud is usually performed 
by other people who collaborate with electoral commissions. Ballot stuffing may 
also happen during vote count if members of the electoral commission unnoticeably 
place fictitious ballots in the dump of ballots ejected from the urn before sorting 
through them. 
Figure 2.2. Simulation of a fair election and ballot stuffing  
 
  
77 
 
In any case, ballot stuffing proportionally increases both turnout and the 
candidate’s absolute vote share according to the aforementioned formula:   
     
     . This can be seen in Figure 2.2, which displays ballot stuffing with 
simulated data. On the left-hand graph, the estimated OLS equation is   
     
                  . On average, 200 ballots were randomly stuffed in favor of a 
candidate who initially received 577 votes on average. It raised the candidate’s vote 
share from 60% to 69%; turnout rose from 57% to 72%. Ballot staffing 
substantively changes coefficients of the linear function: on the right-hand graph 
  
                       . The beta-coefficient in this case is pretty close to 1 
and the fitted line is almost parallel to the limit line –   
          . 
Violations of Vote Count 
The next type of electoral fraud committed by the members of electoral commissions 
is violation of vote count procedure. If observers are present, the commission 
members cannot resort to blatant and excessively obvious means of fraud such as 
drawing absolutely fictitious numbers in the return sheets. However, they are left 
with two basic strategies. First, if the overall number of ballots has been calculated 
before the vote count starts, as it is required by the law, members of the 
commission might count opposition’s votes as incumbent’s votes without adding 
eligible non-voters to incumbent’s score. As an illustration for this scenario I use 
the data of copies of the polling station protocols collected by observers during the 
parliamentary election in Russia of 2011 (RuElect 2011). Figure 2.3 shows a sharp 
difference between the distributions based on copies of the polling station protocols 
collected by observers and numbers reported by the Central Electoral Commission 
(CIK). Observations on the right plot are sparsely dispersed on the vertical axis 
leading to the inflated standard deviation of United Russia’s vote share while the 
turnout is kept at a constant level.  
It should be underlined that the distributions are shown only for illustrative 
purposes. Since the official data were altered after the polling station protocols had 
been filled with election results, the falsifiers’ efforts rather were exerted in electoral 
commissions of the higher level. Nevertheless, the same-type falsification 
perpetrated during vote count would produce the similar distributions. The key idea 
illustrated in this section is that different circumstances and preconditions of fraud 
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result in various divergent outcomes that can be identified by analyzing 
distributions of turnout and absolute vote share. 
Figure 2.3. Falsification of protocols randomly by vote share: electoral observers’ 
protocols and the official data. The parliamentary election of 2011
 
Figure 2.4. Falsification of protocols randomly by vote share and turnout: electoral 
observers’ protocols and the official data. The parliamentary election of 2011 
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Second, if the overall number of ballots in ballot boxes is not counted separately 
but calculated by summing up valid and invalid ballots after counting them for all 
candidates, members of the electoral commission have more space for manipulation 
with not only vote share but turnout as well. Figure 2.4 suggests an example of 
simultaneous tampering with turnout and vote share. The official data is 
characterized by the greatly enlarged range of both variables compared with the 
data of electoral observers. Only a small group of cases located in the area near    = 
0.45 and   
     = 0.15 remained unchanged after the election results had been 
officially reported. 
Figure 2.5. Vote miscount and falsification of protocols. The Parliamentary election 
of 2011 
 
Quite often, especially in rural areas electoral observation is absent, or observers 
are insufficiently trained or biased in favor of a given party, which means that 
members of the corresponding electoral commissions are not constrained in 
implementing fraud. If members of the commission do not receive the exact 
numbers of required vote shares and turnout but have the instruction “the more 
the better”, the data are more likely to be falsified randomly. This scenario is 
demonstrated in Figure 2.5. The figure shows that observers were unable to prevent 
fraud. Both cases have significantly inflated standard deviations on the X and Y 
axes and considerably deviating α and β to indicate them as a fair election (see the 
next section for more details). Furthermore, the right-hand graph shows that 
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observations generally shifted toward the extreme values, i.e., upper-level electoral 
commissions have also contributed to falsification of the electoral results. 
Figure 2.6. Reporting fictitious results or rewriting protocols “in a line” and “in a 
dot”. The presidential election of 2012 
 
If members of a precinct electoral commission have exact instructions about the 
“necessary” outcome for their polling station, they might falsify vote share for the 
candidate closer to the required value without changing turnout. Then the 
distribution   
     ~    approximates a line. Turnout may also be adapted to a 
required value. The distribution then becomes point-shaped. At the same time, if 
protocols are rewritten by members of precinct electoral commissions independently 
from each other and without external requirements of the exact expected election 
results such type of fraud should differ from a similar falsification perpetrated by 
the members of TIK since the latter acquires the information on election results 
simultaneously from all (or many) polling stations. Therefore, electoral data 
fabricated at the level of TIKs theoretically should more likely to fall into “a line” or 
“a dot”. Examples of such impudent fraud are shown in Figure 2.6. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has classified and described the main types of electoral fraud; it has 
also graphically shown how different types of electoral fraud affect the distribution 
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of turnout and the incumbent’s vote share. It began by conceptualizing electoral 
fraud as the difference between sincere voting and the result of the official vote 
tally, and then applied this definition to draw a classification of electoral fraud. The 
typology, in particular, clarified that vote buying and voter coercion are sometimes 
mistakenly understood as clientelism in the literature. The crucial theoretical 
difference is, however, that bribed or intimidated voters sacrifice their true 
preferences while patronage normally leads to sincere support of authoritarian 
leaders. The discussion on various types of electoral fraud also reveals that, 
although monitoring of vote choice generally increases the efficiency of vote buying, 
unaccountable public officials still frequently resort to unconditional distribution of 
funds for partisan purposes under the guise of public events. Since the financing of 
such events is allocated legally from the public budget this strategy might be 
employed almost gratuitously by local authorities affiliated with the incumbent for 
mobilizing their passive supporters. However, the least-cost strategy for fraudsters 
given the absence, reluctance or poor training of electoral observers is a deliberate 
vote miscount or forging fictitious numbers in polling stations’ protocols.  
 
  
82 
 
 
  
  
83 
 
Chapter 3. Methods of Electoral Fraud Detection 
Introduction 
Since electoral fraud is an intrinsic prominent feature of authoritarian regimes, 
various studies aim to analyze it. They do it, however, viewing electoral 
manipulations from different angles. As it has been shown in the prior chapter, 
electoral fraud can be defined broadly (as any practice that biases the electoral 
playing field), juristically (as a violation of the electoral code) or narrowly (as the 
difference between voters’ decision and electoral commission’s vote tally). 
Accordingly, one group of studies examines electoral malpractices (Birch 2011a), 
electoral integrity (Norris 2013a; 2013b), and electoral fairness (McAllister and 
White 2011); another group analyzes allegations of fraud submitted for legal 
proceedings (Lehoucq and Minnite 2010; Molina 2002; Ziblatt 2009); several 
heterogeneous studies strive to define the exact proportion of fraudulent votes or 
the true vote share for the incumbent (Enikolopov et al. 2013; Frye et al. 2017; 
Kalinin (Forthcoming); Kobak, Shpilkin and Pshenichnikov 2012). The purpose of 
this chapter is to overview the existing methods of electoral fraud detection and to 
find out one that better matches the (narrow) definition of electoral fraud adopted in 
this study and that can be feasibly used in the analysis. 
The entire pool of methods intended for detecting electoral fraud can be 
conventionally distinguished into two major groups. Observational data-driven 
methods rely on various assessments of fraud such as perceptions of electoral 
fairness expressed by respondents of public opinion surveys or experts of 
international organizations, reports of electoral observers, petitions of individual 
voters, or they are based on assessments of the actual election results as an 
opposite measure of electoral fraud. The second group – electoral data-driven 
methods – is more homogeneous since it employs solely the data reported by 
electoral commissions to quantitatively test electoral anomalies. Although this 
distinction in methods partially overlaps with qualitative-quantitative dichotomy, it 
is not equal to it. Electoral data-driven research indeed applies only quantitative 
techniques, yet perceptual data-driven studies may be either of qualitative or 
quantitative design. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The first section considers observational 
data-driven methods, including expert indices and mass perceptions, allegations of 
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fraud, public surveys, and electoral observation. It shows that observational data 
should be treated cautiously as far as these data are of subjective character. The 
second section discusses electoral data-driven methods (sample-based, digit-based, 
and distribution-based methods). Along with revealing advantages and 
disadvantages of these methods, it aims to define conditions under which, 
specifically distribution-based methods, would perform correctly, and how these 
conditions could be met. The findings are summarized in the conclusion. 
Observational Data-Driven Methods 
Expert Indices and Mass Perceptions of Electoral Fairness 
One way for detecting electoral fraud is to ask persons who are familiar with the 
situation in their country about their perceptions of electoral malpractices. This 
may be done in the form of indices based on expert interviews such as the Freedom 
House’s index of political rights, the Index of Electoral Malpractice based on ESCE 
election observation, and Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov’s coding in the National 
Elections across Democracy and Autocracy. The indices may also be based on 
perceptions drawn from public opinion surveys like the World Values Survey, the 
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, and the International Foundation for 
Electoral Systems, which include batteries of questions about quality of elections 
(see Tables 1 and 3 in Norris (2013a) for a broader list of cross-national surveys and 
expert indices).  
It may be asserted that due to reliance on different sources of data and using 
different methodologies all these measures assess substantively different 
phenomena. Norris (2013a) counter-argues that expert and mass perceptions are 
substantively similar, and this similarity is indeed present between several 
indicators (see Figures 2 and 3 in the article). Notwithstanding, various measures of 
mass perceptions of electoral integrity on average have a small proportion of 
common variance with several expert assessments (R2 = 0.187), while expert indices 
are more consistent with each other (R2 = 0.495) and indices of mass perceptions 
are relatively congruent (R2 = 0.405).36 
                                                          
36
 Numbers represent mean values calculated by author from Tables 6, 4, and 5, respectively, in Norris (2013a). 
Correlations presented in the tables have been firstly squared to obtain R
2
 and then averaged. A simple 
averaging of correlations is less appropriate because of the squaring-related bias. For instance, corr. = 0.8 is 
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This difference between expert and public opinion data is implicitly confirmed by 
relatively high rates of confidence in the electoral process observed in authoritarian 
regimes. The data presented by Birch (2011b) demonstrate that 59.6% of 
respondents expressed a broad confidence in the electoral process in Belarus, 
which is even slightly higher than the level of Lithuania (55.85), although Belarus 
was scored 5 (the most misconduct) and Lithuania was scored 2 (almost the least 
misconduct) on the scale of Electoral Misconduct Index. And to the contrary, 
Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) show that despite the fact that elections in Latin 
America have become significantly cleaner in the last thirty years, countries of the 
region still have paradoxically high rates of broad distrust in the electoral process, 
which vary from 7% and 13% in Uruguay and Chile to 50% and 53% in Paraguay 
and Nicaragua, and have 33.2% on average.  
The low reliability of the perceptual data may appear because of two reasons. 
First, citizens may report their general disaffection with elections caused by their 
dissatisfaction with government, the absence of viable alternatives among 
candidates, the inability of the democratic system to secure economic growth etc., 
instead of assessing the extent of electoral malpractice prevalence during election 
periods. Besides that, citizens as well as experts may be simply not aware of the 
actual extent of fraudulent practices and therefore exaggerate or underestimate the 
quality of elections due to their partisanship or exposure to particular media 
outlets.  
Russian perceptions of electoral fairness are exemplary in this regard. First, the 
proportion of those who thought that the State Duma election took place honestly 
increased from 54% in 1999 to 83%37 in 2007 (McAllister and White 2011), while 
quality of elections has evidently worsened in the 2000s. This discrepancy is partly 
explained by McAllister and White when they point out that “[h]ow Russians view 
the fairness of their elections is, then, very much associated with how they view 
their government as a whole” (p. 677). More precisely, perceptions of electoral 
fairness depend on trust in government and Putin’s approval rate; that is also 
confirmed by Rose and Mishler (2009). Obviously, the vision of those who supported 
the current government was more myopic with respect to electoral fraud. 
Various expert indices based on electoral observation reports also fall short of 
expectations. Although election observation organizations apply their own 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
25% smaller if it is expressed as explained variance (R
2
 = 0.64), whereas twice diminished correlation (0.4) is 
five times smaller if it is expressed as explained variance (R
2
 = 0.16). 
37
 Numbers are calculated excluding the category “Hard to say” from Table 3 in McAllister and White (2011). 
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methodologies, they typically observe the entire period of electoral campaign, 
including the pre-election period that induces them to virtually equate electoral 
fraud with the general bias of the electoral playing field. The qualitative nature of 
observer assessments appears when reports indicate the lack of transparency for 
observers, presence of ballot boxes outside polling stations or similar irregularities 
that do not necessarily lead to change in the number of ballots cast for candidates 
in the result (Hyde 2008: 204). Furthermore, as Hyde states even more plainly: 
“[m]any of their [short-term observers] observations are impressionistic and difficult 
to aggregate. Direct observations of vote buying or voter intimidation do not always 
form part of a larger pattern.” (p. 208). 
Instead of relying on general perceptions of electoral fairness, another stand of 
the literature overtly asks respondents whether they were witnesses of electoral 
fraud, more specifically, vote buying. Stokes (2005) and Nichter (2008) used the 
Argentine survey, which asked respondents whether they were recipients of goods 
distributed by a party during the last electoral campaign. Only about 7 percent of 
the sample acknowledged receipt of goods. Stokes admits that respondents may be 
hesitant to admit to having given in to vote buying because of the illegality or 
immorality of their actions or because they did not want to admit to being so poor 
as to have been attracted by miserable handouts (footnote 20 on p. 321).  
Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. (2012) tried to solve the problem of social desirability 
bias by applying the list experiment technique. Results of the list experiment have 
shown that 24.3% of voters were offered a gift or favor on the eve of Nicaraguan 
municipal elections of 2008, whereas only 2.4% reported receiving personal gifts 
and 17.9% acknowledged neighborhood gifts, when asked directly. However, the 
results of list experiment are questionable for several reasons. First, all three 
measures of vote buying do not demonstrate any consistent pattern in factors 
determining distribution of gifts. Second, all models explaining vote buying have 
very small proportions of explained variance: 0.281 as a maximum and 0.023 on 
average. This leads to the conclusion that material inducements gauged by the list 
experiment or by direct questions are either distributed almost randomly or all 
three measures lack reliability. 
Thus, expert indices and public opinion surveys generally do not measure 
electoral fraud directly but they rather capture the overall bias of the electoral 
playing field. Therefore, they allow answering the question about the role of 
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electoral fraud in competitive authoritarian regimes only to a limited extent and as 
a rough approximation.  
Allegations of Fraud 
Allegations of fraud (usually submitted by opposition parties) are another proxy for 
electoral fraud. Lehoucq (2003) and Lehoucq and Molina (2002) used more than 
1,300 individual accusations of ballot rigging presented in 123 petitions to nullify 
electoral results submitted to Costa Rica’s unicameral Congress between 1901 and 
1948 to identify electoral fraud. In a similar vein Ziblatt (2009) operationalized 
electoral fraud as incidences of parliamentary disputes over election legitimacy 
based on individual voter petitions charging election misconduct in Imperial 
Germany between 1871 and 1912. Similarly to reports on electoral malpractices 
issued by international organizations, this approach captures all violations of the 
electoral code rather than discrepancies between the voter’s intention and official 
results. Moreover, as Lehoucq has noted, such accusations of fraud are presented 
by interested actors and may be intrinsically biased (2003: 234).  
Ziblatt (2009: 8) also recognizes the possibility that bias may take place. To 
account for this, he uses two control variables: the difference in vote shares of the 
first two competitors, and the partisan makeup of the legislature and of the election 
dispute committee. Although these controls may be helpful to some extent, they can 
barely account for “the willingness to protest” since both represent the supply side. 
Petitions, however, are written by ordinary voters. A more proximate approach 
could be to control for partisanship of the petition complainants since voters 
identified with opposition parties are hypothetically more willing to write petitions 
than incumbent’s party sympathizers. Especially in authoritarian regimes it may 
not be sympathizers of any particular party but rather strong opponents of the 
incumbent.  
Meanwhile, allegations of fraud may be a fertile ground for bias even in 
democratic settings. Minnite (2010) examined several case studies of voter fraud 
allegations in the United States and found that spurious allegations played a 
strategic role in party combat. Spurious voter fraud allegations are primarily aimed 
at triggering electoral recounts and disputes to flip election results, but they also 
result in enacting restrictive electoral rules, which make voting harder for certain 
groups. The latter strategy, according to Minnite, is particularly used to keep down 
the black vote. Thus, allegations of fraud are therefore not neutral but rather 
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politically motivated tools that cannot accurately account for a really existing 
amount of fraud. 
Public Surveys 
The next proxy for electoral fraud in non-democratic regimes is the level of political 
support measured via public opinion polls or exit polls. Hausmann and Rigobon 
(2011) analyzed the Venezuelan referendum of 2004. Using exit polls as an 
instrumental variable of the voter’s intent, they calculated that it correlates with the 
official data at 0.91. This approach might arguably be correct in circumstances 
where any kind of pressure on pollsters is absent. On the other hand, in 
consolidated authoritarian regimes exit polls and public opinion polls may also be 
manipulated in favor of the incumbent. For instance, in the aftermath of the 
Russian 2011 parliamentary election exit polls reported 45.5% (FOM 2012) and 
48.5% (VCIOM 2012) of votes for United Russia, having closely approximated to 
49.3% announced by the Central Electoral Commission, whereas independent 
electoral observers who collected copies of polling station protocols reported that 
United Russia gained between 31.2% (Oreshkin, 2011) and 34.3% (RuElect, 2011) 
of the vote. 
Other studies strive to control for social desirability bias that may appear in 
authoritarian context when respondents conceal their true vote intentions due to 
potential threats of punishment (if they prefer the opposition). Using the survey 
data collected by the polling organization Levada-Center before the Russian 2012 
presidential election, Kalinin (Forthcoming) offered a measure of preference 
falsification calculated as a difference between the share of potential voters 
explicitly willing to cast their ballots for Putin and the share of potential Putin 
voters obtained from a list experiment. The average share of those who intended to 
vote for Putin, as measured by the list experiment, was expectedly smaller than 
both the average explicit vote intention and the official vote share for Putin (47%, 
65%, and 64%, respectively). An analogous measure of preference falsification 
regarding turnout came up with a similar result. At the same time, a cross-regional 
analysis has shown a negative effect of preference falsification associated with 
turnout on explicitly intended turnout and various measures of electoral fraud38. 
Since this finding does not fit the theory, the author admitted that it requires 
                                                          
38
 The author used non-parametric regression to fit the models. Even though the coefficients are mainly 
significant, the effects are weak (0 – 5 percent in terms of R-squared): see Figure 5 and 6. 
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additional exploration, or the theory should be revisited. Two explanations can be 
offered for the absence of proper cross-regional correlation between the survey-
based vote share (measured either as explicit vote intention or by the list 
experiment) and the official vote share. First, the Levada-Center sample may be not 
representative at the regional level. Second, the Levada-Center survey may generally 
not reflect true preferences of the respondents. 
In their study of public support for Putin, Frye et al. (2017) ask whether 
suspiciously high Putin approval ratings are inflated because respondents are lying 
to pollsters. Using two Levada-Center’s surveys of the early 2015, the authors found 
that Putin’s popularity measured in a series of list experiments lays within 10-
percentage point interval of that implied by direct questioning. More precisely, the 
average list experiment estimate appeared to be 7.5% smaller than the direct 
approval (87%).39 Thereby, the article leads to the conclusion that Putin’s approval 
ratings largely reflect the attitudes of Russian citizens. However, the research 
question can alternatively be formulated as whether suspiciously high Putin 
approval ratings are inflated because the polling agencies purposefully manipulate 
the data in order to oblige the authoritarian leaders in their attempts to convey the 
image of popularity with more impressive figures of public support.  
Considering this explanation, Frye and colleagues note that “[t]his scenario 
seems unlikely, for while it is true that two of Russia’s main polling agencies – FOM 
and VTsIOM – have close ties with the Kremlin, the third major polling agency in 
Russia – the Levada Center – is widely seen as independent, with a strong 
reputation for integrity and professionalism”40 (p. 3). A similar reasoning is 
                                                          
39
 Calculated from Table 1 in the article as the mean values between surveys of January and March 2015.  
40
 Choosing the most reputable agency could be a good rule of thumb under democracy. However, this can 
hardly be applied in authoritarian settings where the regime aspires to control all public forms of the 
opposition, acting on the principle “If you cannot prohibit them, lead them”. By indirectly controlling the 
opposition, autocrats give voters, citizens, and observers an illusion of choice: they may choose between the 
worst option (the regime as such) and a “better”, yet still bad option (candidates, parties, organizations, public 
opinion leaders, and other notables affiliated with the regime). Examples of this informal practice in Russia vary 
markedly from ostensibly opposition parties – CPRF, LDPR, and Just Russia – that imitate the opposition in the 
State Duma and ordinarily referred to as the “systemic opposition”, to the so-called “non-systemic opposition” 
(also classified as semi-opposition – structural opposition and loyal – semi-loyal opposition (Gelman 2005)) on 
all wings of the political spectrum. On the liberal part of the spectrum, the Echo of Moscow is widely seen as an 
independent radio, which is prone to criticize the regime, in particular, it broadly covers electoral observation 
campaigns and post-electoral protests. The radio also gives the floor to several “non-system” oppositionists, 
including Alexei Navalny, who was described by the Wall Street Journal as “the man Vladimir Putin fears most” 
(Kaminski 2012). Notwithstanding, the Echo of Moscow belongs to the joint-stock company Gazprom-Media 
Holding, which is controlled by Gazprom, one of the largest state-owned enterprises. Along with another media 
channel – NTV, which is much more pro-official but also belongs to the Gazprom-Media Holding, the Echo of 
Moscow conveys slightly alternative (a “liberal”) message from the same regime.  
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presented by Treisman (2011; 2014). Admitting that two out of three major polling 
agencies are affiliated with the Kremlin, the authors, nevertheless, do not see any 
oddity in the fact that “tied with” the Kremlin FOM and VCIOM agencies and the 
“independent” Levada-Center systematically publish quite similar ratings of public 
officials, and that these ratings are consistently close to official election results and 
do not make any “adjustment” for the level of electoral fraud. To justify Levada-
Center’s surveys, Frye and colleagues also note that Putin’s high approval ratings 
are confirmed by polls carried out by Western researchers. They, however, pass over 
the fact that these surveys are done in collaboration with Russian polling agencies. 
Otherwise, it would be a technically difficult task to hire interviewers and manage a 
fully independent regional network of them from abroad. That way New Russia 
Barometer respondents are interviewed by the Levada-Center41, the sixth wave of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The symbiosis between the liberals, the “democratic nationalists” such as Navalny, and the regime became 
especially evident when Navalny – by the recommendation of Sergey Sobyanin, the mayor of Moscow and 
Putin’s protégé – was granted at least 10 votes of United Russia municipal deputies (and 39 of other deputies) 
to be registered (but eventually lose the election) as a candidate at the post of Moscow mayor (Tsibulsky 2013) 
to enhance the regime’s legitimacy, yet at the same time to increase his own popularity from 10% to 27.3% and 
to “become the sole undisputable leader of the opposition” (Gelman 2015: 184).  
The Echo of Moscow also gave multiple opportunities to speak out to another radical oppositionist – 
Vyacheslav Maltsev – who publically called for a “Revolution of 5.11.2017”. Maltsev organized and headed the 
“revolution” from a safe place in Europe because in June 2017 he left (or was allowed by law enforcement 
agencies to leave) Russia after he was accused of "creating an extremist community". Meanwhile, 448 ordinary 
supporters of Maltsev were detained; several of them were eventually prosecuted 
(https://ovdinfo.org/news/2017/11/07/sudy-nad-zaderzhannymi-vo-vremya-akciy-5-noyabrya-2017-goda). It 
was only the regime that derived (and could only derive) benefits from this action. The special services had a 
brilliant opportunity to create personal dossiers on the radical activists, recruit agents of them by threatening 
with criminal prosecution, and to dispel illusions of those who believed in easiness of regime change.  
The popularity of Navalny, Maltsev, and other similar opposition leaders cannot be called an unpredicted or 
unexpected consequence of the regime’s strategy toward the opposition. While such opposition leaders are 
sentenced to suspended or symbolically short prison terms that rather allow them to obtain an image of 
victims of the regime, and the regime and ostensibly anti-regime mainstream media both broadly cover these 
events, the most appealing, challenging, and therefore dangerous opposition leaders are sentenced to long and 
repetitive prison terms (so as colonel Vldimir Kvachkov), live abroad to avoid criminal prosecution for 
“extremism” under Article 282 (as Igor Artemov, the leader of the Russian All-National Union adjudicated to be 
an extremist organization) or they simply “do not exist” because they are not talked about in the mainstream 
media. In other words, based on maximal affinity and minimal potential threats, the regime selects and 
promotes those political activists whom it would like to see as the “opposition” and represses those opposition 
leaders who pose the greatest danger to the regime’s survival. 
The full picture of persons and organizations that collaborate with the regime is too wide to depict it here. It is 
also worth to briefly mention several persons from the left-nationalist spectrum – Nikolai Starikov, the leader 
of the Party of the Great Fatherland; Alexander Dugin, the national Bolshevik in the past, neo-eurasianist in the 
present; and a writer Alexander Prohanov – seeing the salvation of Russia in a person somewhere between 
Stalin and Putin. Thus, before choosing the most reputable person, party or organization positioned under the 
label of “independent”, “opposition”, “liberal”, “nationalist” or whatever else, one ought to make a lot of effort 
to ascertain whether the label matches the actual content. 
41
 Rose (2007: 101) overtly declares that the survey analyzed in his article “is the most recent, New Russia 
Barometer XV, in which a nationwide stratified random sample of 1606 adults was interviewed by the Levada 
Centre between 12 and 23 April 2007 (for full details, see Rose, 2007; www.abdn.ac.uk/cspp/)”. See also: 
http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog1_0.html 
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the World Values Survey was also carried out by the Levada-Center42, and the 
European Social Survey is carried out by the Institute for Comparative Social 
Research43.  
Thus, studying political support in autocracies via public polls, scholars 
primarily see the problem in various aspects of social desirability bias but not in 
quality of surveys as such. Disregarding the obvious conflict of interests between 
polling agencies and the political regime, they do not attempt to investigate fraud in 
public opinion surveys under authoritarianism. This can be partially explained by 
the long history of trustworthy public polls in democratic countries. Researchers 
are disposed to trust in surveys in autocracies as far as they used to deal with high-
quality surveys in democracies. The problem is aggravated in Russia due to change 
in political regime occurred in the 2000s: there is a temptation to believe that 
polling agencies remained as impartial in Putin’s era as they were in the 1990s.  
However, the equal treatment of public polls in democracies and autocracies can 
be misleading. Studying fraud through duplication in public opinion surveys, 
Kuriakose and Robbins (Forthcoming) found that in 10.1% out of 1,008 examined 
publically available surveys, the share of duplicated responses (identical 
observations) exceeds 10%. At the same time, the large proportion of duplicates (≥ 
10%) was detected only in 2.0% of OECD countries (exclusively democracies) but in 
15.3% of non-OECD countries (not necessarily but more probably autocracies). 
Needless to say that fraud in surveys may take multiple forms besides the 
duplication. The vast majority of these types of forgery, especially in authoritarian 
countries, are not examined so far. Unfortunately though, this area for research is 
rather unexplored when compared with electoral fraud studies. 
Electoral Observation 
Estimation of the actual vote share based on reports of electoral observers, 
especially if they are supplemented with copies of polling station protocols, is 
probably the most precise one in the group of observational data-driven methods. It 
allows for estimation of the amount of fraud in percentage units of measurement 
and thereby this kind of estimation is similar to distribution-based methods. 
Enikolopov et al. (2013) have estimated the actual share of United Russia’s vote in 
                                                          
42
 See release notes for Russia at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWV6.jsp 
43
 The institute has its own network of regional interviewers and does not hire subcontractors for the survey – 
was responded by Anna Andreenkova, the director of the ESS project in Russia, on the author’s demand. See 
also: http://www.cessi.ru/index.php?id=142 
  
92 
 
the 2011 parliamentary election to be 10.8 percentage points lower than the official 
vote tally in the city of Moscow (36% instead of 47%).  
Meanwhile, the precision of electoral observers’ reports is crucially dependent on 
the degree of regime permissiveness regarding electoral monitoring and on the level 
of competence of observers. It is no secret that more closed regimes prohibit the 
activity of independent observers and even manage to substitute them with 
obedient ones who are controlled through the party structure and rewarded with 
cash payments or with other tangible benefits. Election monitoring, on the other 
hand, is not a simple mission. Observers must be sufficiently trained and qualified 
to detect fraud during the voting process, for instance, in the moment of stuffing 
the ballot box or during the vote count when, for example, votes in violation of the 
procedure are counted simultaneously for all candidates without demonstrating 
each ballot for checking up. An unprepared or unwilling observer may not even 
notice the full set of fraudulent actions perpetrated by members of the electoral 
commission.  
This might be one of the reasons why Bader and Schmeets (2013) found that the 
presence of electoral observers in the Russian 2012 presidential election helped to 
detect and deter fraud only to a limited extent. The incumbent’s vote share at 
polling stations visited by observers of the OSCE mission during the process of 
voting was 59.1% compared with 60.4% at polling stations without observers, while 
the vote share at polling stations visited during the vote count amounted to 55.6% 
compared with 58.7% without observers. The difference in incumbent’s vote share 
between positively and negatively assessed polling stations during voting does not 
exceed one percentage point. Meanwhile, the qualitative assessment of observers 
who visited polling stations during vote count gives a difference of nearly four 
percentage points. The corresponding estimates for the 2011 parliamentary election 
follow a similar pattern: there is a small difference between polling stations with 
and without observers and these estimates, even considering the fact that the 
sample is biased in favor of the less fraudulent regions, deviate from official vote 
shares by very few percentage points. 
It should be noted that Bader and Schmeets used the very fact of the presence of 
electoral observers at the polling stations but not tallies from polling station 
protocols reported by observers. In a similar vein, Sjoberg (2012) found only a 
modest effect of election observation on incumbent’s vote share in Azerbaijan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Georgia. All these countries vary markedly by type of their political 
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regimes, however, in each case the difference between groups of polling stations 
with and without electoral observers falls within one and two percentage-point 
intervals regarding vote share and turnout, respectively.  
Evidently, political leaders – especially in polities of uncertain type (where it is 
unclear whether they are democratic or authoritarian) – invite international election 
observers and cheat in front of them, in attempt to gain international legitimacy 
(Hyde 2011). For this reason, election observers’ data cannot be fully reliable, yet it 
may be used as one of the instruments in studying electoral fraud. 
Electoral Data-Driven Methods 
Sample-Based Methods 
There is a class of methods that use electoral results in a particular territory, 
specific polling stations or in comparable previous elections, which are assumed not 
to have been exposed to fraud, as the reference category to be compared with 
presumably fraudulent territories, polling stations etc. Sample-based methods, like 
experimental methods, thereby virtually split the sample into a treatment group 
(accused of fraud) and a control group (presumably free and fair). In a simple form 
it may be a comparison of ordinary polling stations and polling stations with 
electronic vote counting machines (Buzin and Lubarev 2008: Ch. 8.5) or a 
comparison of polling stations with high and low levels of invalid ballots (Buzin 
2008). As Buzin shows, electronic vote count considerably decreased incumbent’s 
vote share in the Russian presidential election of 2008 in Moscow, whereas smaller 
proportions of invalid ballots correlated with higher proportions of votes cast for 
Medvedev. Analyzing Russian elections Lukinova, Maygkov and Ordeshook (2011) 
employed a similar approach by splitting the sample into different regions of Russia 
– oblasts and republics. Their analysis reveals that ethnically dominated republics 
are characterized by higher levels of pro-incumbent voting.  
Not always, however, a comparison between several datasets leads to detection 
of fraud due to reasons beyond capacity of the methods but rather due to selection 
of irrelevant cases. Hood and Gillespie (2012) tried to discover the incidence of 
voting by deceased voters during the 2006 general election in Georgia. They 
compared voter information between a voter registration database and a listing of 
decedents in the corresponding counties of Georgia. As a result, 5,225 deceased 
registrants out of more than five million registered voters were detected. 
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Nevertheless, a further exploration revealed that only 66 of them have supposedly 
cast their votes, while 51 of these 66 registrants’ ballots had been returned to the 
county prior to the date of death, in six cases registrants made a request for an 
absentee ballot also prior to the date of their death, four cases were cleared as being 
mistakes, and only five votes remained questionable since the county registrars 
failed to respond to the requests.  
More complex versions of the sample-based approach rely on regression models. 
The analysis by Alvarez and Katz (2008) is focused on the Senate and gubernatorial 
2002 elections in Georgia. To test whether a concern that electronic voting systems 
adopted in the state’s counties worked in favor of Republican candidates is justified, 
the authors constructed two forecasting models in which the Democratic vote in the 
Senate and gubernatorial elections of 1998 is regressed on the past vote in the 1996 
presidential election and on the percentage of county’s non-white population. The 
estimates from 1998 then were used to predict the 2002 Democratic vote. In the 
gubernatorial election, 42 negative errors were detected indicating that the 
Democrats did worse in the election, while all 34 errors in the Senate election were 
positive. Although the results show that the elections of 2002 are systematically 
different from the past elections, the authors argue that the theoretical expectations 
of fraud are not confirmed since the bias has an unexpected direction. However, the 
study has not examined whether the outliers represent counties with electronic 
voting systems or not. It should be also remarked that for method-building and 
method-testing purposes, highly suspected of fraud cases should be preferred over 
ambivalent cases. In this regard, electoral autocracies are a better training field for 
testing the methods of electoral fraud detection than electoral democracies. 
Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin (2005; 2007; 2008; 2009) offered an “ecological 
method” for investigating the “flow of votes” between elections. They assumed that 
vote share received by a party or a candidate from another party or candidate as the 
result of changes in voters’ preferences between elections cannot be lower than 0% 
and higher than 100%. In case of fraud this rule is violated. Generally the authors 
found that coefficients of the flow of votes to United Russia and Putin exceeded 1 in 
the elections of the 2000s. In Ukraine the flow of votes to both the incumbent and 
the opposition has suspicious coefficients (2009: 160). However, applying this 
method to the Moscow State Duma election of 2003–2005 and to the election of 
Novosibirsk city legislature of 2003–2005 the authors found relatively small amount 
of fraud compared with simulated data (2009: Ch. 2.7). This method has also been 
applied to the Venezuelan referenda of 2007–2009. In this case the overall 
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coefficients of the flow of votes from supported yes and no alternatives to the 
corresponding options between the referenda were about 1, with several exceptions 
such as the Pedernales municipality of Delta Amacuro where the proportion of the 
2007 yes share received by the yes alternative in 2009 was equal to 146 percent 
(Levin et al. 2009).  
Several points should be outlined in relation to this approach. First, the authors 
establish equal conditions for the flow of votes from one candidate to another and 
for the flow of votes of the same candidate between elections. In the first case the 
established interval [0, 1] is reasonable, while in the case of flow of votes to the 
same candidate an expected equation would be the following:             , i.e., 
the candidate should receive almost the same proportion of votes plus or minus 
some   , which ordinarily approximates the change in the vote share between 
elections at the national level. In particular, Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 
(2005: 109) wonder that Putin in 2004 received 114% of the votes cast for United 
Russia in 2003 and attribute it to forgery. However, given the fact that Putin’s and 
United Russia’s electorate is almost a single entity, the    = 1.14 should rather be 
interpreted so that the most supportive United Russia’s electorate of 2003 became a 
bit (14%) more supportive when it voted for Putin in 2004. Second, strongly 
negative coefficients of the flow of votes of the same candidate from one election to 
another may not necessarily result from fraud. The negative coefficient may appear 
if a candidate loses his strong constituency, which may, for instance, be tied by 
ethnic identity. In this case those who were the most supportive in the past election 
will be the least supportive in the present, and the contrary is true for his opponent 
who takes over the support of the core constituency. Third, the method does not 
allow for estimating quantitatively the number of falsified votes. Finally, the flow of 
votes may make little sense if comparing two fraudulent elections. 
Another kind of ecological approach has been presented by Leemann and 
Bochsler (2014). They analyze the Swiss referendum of 2011 where 30 
municipalities irregularly destroyed the ballots and found that these municipalities 
reported 0.2–1.4% fewer blank ballots than other municipalities. Considering that 
the tie-break question was decisive for defining the referendum’s outcome, illegal 
converting of blank ballots into the “Parliament bill” or “People’s amendment” votes 
could have altered the election. However, lost ballots are statistically non-significant 
in predicting the referendum results for these variables (see Table 4 on p. 44 in the 
article). 
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Nevertheless, even if the correlation between blank ballots and votes for one of 
the referendum’s alternatives existed, one question would still remain salient. 
Applying sample-based approaches does not protect us against the risk of spurious 
correlations caused by the absence of important variables in the model's 
specification. For example, we may assume that invalid ballots44 are systematically 
counted as Putin’s ballots. This looks plausible since the OLS model predicting 
Putin’s vote share in 2012 depending on the number of invalid ballots has R-
squared = 0.126, constant = 0.706, beta = -0.0043, and standard error = 0.000037; 
N of observations = 95,412. Hence, if the number of invalid ballots is shifted from 
the 5th percentile (0) to the 95th percentile (27) Putin loses 11.60–11.62% of the 
votes. Indeed, in relatively fraud-free Vladimirskaya Oblast the median number of 
invalid ballots equals 7 and Putin’s vote share equals a moderate 55.76%; in 
Chechnya the median number of invalid ballots descends to 1 and Putin’s vote 
share bumps up to an incredible 99.94%. This conclusion is obviously misleading. 
Even 27 blank ballots (the 95th percentile) illegally assigned to Putin cannot 
increase his vote share by 11.6%. Since the median number of Putin’s votes equals 
417 and the median number of valid votes equals 641, 27 additional ballots may 
yield only a 1.4 percentage-point increase in the vote45, on average. Evidently, in 
this case, other variables (types of fraud) intervene and impact Putin’s vote share. 
Invalid ballots are merely collinear to these more influential types of fraud. 
Electronic voting seems to be reasonably used for subsampling in a sample-
based approach (Kobak, Shpilkin and Pshenichnikov 2012: 4). It may even be 
advocated as a toolkit against fraud. On the other hand, electronic voting systems 
raise serious security concerns (Kohno et al. 2004; Bannet et al. 2004; Wolchok et 
al. 2010). On this premise, electronic voting in authoritarian context may also 
contribute to legitimizing successfully falsified elections. To demonstrate this, Table 
3.1 shows the difference between polling stations with and without electronic vote 
count for the Russian presidential election of 2012. As follows from the table, 
electronic vote count indicated by Optical Scan Voting Systems (KOIBs) and 
Electronic Voting Systems (KEGs)46 indeed comes up with Putin’s vote share that is 
by 4.5% smaller than indicated by the overall vote count. The turnout rate is also 
                                                          
44
 Invalid ballots in Russia include blank ballots and ballots where more than one candidate is chosen; the 
separate count of blank ballots is not performed. 
45
 Calculated as the difference between the average vote share (417 / 641 = 65.1%) and the vote share altered 
by 27 ballots ((417 + 27) / (641 + 27) = 66.5%). 
46
 For more details of functioning of KOIBs and KEGs see presentation of the Russian Center for Training in 
Election Technologies under the CEC of Russia (in Russian): http://www.rcoit.ru/shk_uik/presentation/7_1.swf 
  
97 
 
smaller in polling stations with electronic vote count by 5.5%. This supports the 
hypothesis that electronic vote count counteracts fraud.  
It might be argued, however, that the results are biased since electronic vote 
count may not be randomly distributed across polling stations.47 To control for this, 
Table 3.1 also reports statistics for other polling stations (with the ordinary 
procedure of vote count) within the same territorial electoral commissions (TIKs) 
having precinct electoral commissions (UIKs) with KOIBs and KEGs. The difference 
in the average vote share and turnout between UIKs with electronic vote count and 
other UIKs within the same TIKs is even larger – 9.2% and 5.9%, respectively. In 
other words, UIKs with electronic vote count were rather located in TIKs the level of 
Putin’s vote (or fraud) in which was even higher than the average (see also Appendix 
C1 for the region-level statistics). Hence, we may suppose that if the level of Putin’s 
vote (or fraud) in TIKs with electronic vote count had been the same as the average, 
KOIBs and KEGs would have registered even a more modest result for Putin. 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for polling stations with electronic vote count and 
without from the Russian presidential election of 2012 
 
Overall KOIBs & KEGs 
Other UIKs in TIKs 
with KOIBs & KEGs 
 
Putin   
     Turnout Putin   
     Turnout Putin   
     Turnout 
Averagea 63.28 67.82 58.86 62.34 68.02 68.19 
Std. Deviationb 9.16 9.0 9.75 9.92 11.76 10.71 
5th Percentileb 47.94 58.83 48.45 55.6 48.96 55.27 
95th Percentileb 83.3 89.8 81.42 87.05 92.26 91.42 
N of UIKs 95413 95414 4970 4971 22665 22665 
Note: a. Average values represent the ratios of total votes expressed in percentage points. 
For example, Putin   
     in KOIBs and KEGS is calculated as a ratio of Putin’s votes in the 
group (3,106,583) to the number of valid votes in the group (5,277,856). b. The statistics 
represent cross-regional variation (in %). The number of cases in the Overall group is equal 
to 83; N in the other two groups is equal to 71 (the number of regions in which electronic 
voting systems were installed). KOIB denotes Optical Scan Voting System, KEG denotes 
Electronic Voting System. KOIBs and KEGs are merged since only 268 KEGs were used in 
                                                          
47
 It can be also hypothesized that more electronic vote counting machines are installed in regions where 
Putin’s vote is typically higher to artificially inflate the average. I dwell on this question in Appendix C1, which 
shows that KOIBs and KEGs are distributed randomly regarding the number of UIKs and the number of eligible 
voters in TIKs. However, the proportion of UIKs with electronic vote count in TIKs tends to decrease as the 
share of incumbent’s vote increases, i.e., TIKs include too few UIKs with electronic vote count in areas where 
fraud is more probable (6% in Bashkortostan, 7% in Ingushetia, 9% in Dagestan, 11% in Tatarstan, whereas the 
national average is equal to 28%).  
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the election. Data on KOIBs and KEGs are available at: 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0AiFMnUnpIlridDRUck03WVBKOEp6UFVm
ZVRvOUNXUGc. 
Despite the general difference between polling stations with and without 
electronic vote count, tallies from KOIBs and KEGs from several regions with 
strongly manipulated elections do not differ substantively from tallies of precincts 
within the same TIKs but without electronic voting (see Appendix C1). In Tatarstan, 
this difference in Putin’s vote share is equal to 0.4% and the average vote share in 
both types of polling stations is too high to bee trustworthy (94.8% in UIKs with 
electronic vote count and 95.2% in UIKs without electronic vote count within the 
same TIKs). In Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Karachay-Cherkessia, the difference is 
larger (9.2%, 11.7%, and 9.7%, respectively) but the vote shares in UIKs with 
electronic voting are still too high (84.4%, 80.8%, and 82.4%, respectively). The fact 
is that electronic vote count may inhibit fraud but cannot eliminate it completely. 
Moreover, ballots can be stuffed in a KOIB just as they might in a standard ballot 
box (although, in the first case ballots cannot be inserted by a pile in one stroke). 
One person can vote for several voters by using various barcodes for a KEG. And, 
finally, members of the polling station commission may report fictitious numbers to 
the upper-level electoral commission that, in its turn, may also be engaged in 
manipulation with numbers. 
To sum up, sample-based methods have a common shortcoming since they are 
based on the assumption that the subsample used as the reference category is not 
impacted by fraud. This assumption, however, does not hold if elections are forged 
systematically. Therefore, without having definite knowledge about the distribution 
of fraud in data, the application of a sample-based approach may result in a split 
on highly fraudulent and less (but still) fraudulent observations with all the 
consequences that it entails.  
Digit-Based Methods 
The method of electoral fraud forensics that has recently attracted scholars’ 
attention is based on Benford’s law of the distribution of digits in numbers. The 
method utilizes human bias in generating numbers and assumes that intervening 
in the voting process causes numbers to deviate from the theoretically expected 
distribution. Real-world probabilities, according to Benford’s law, take the shape of 
the inverse logarithmic function that for the first digit (j = 1, 2, 3,... 9) has the 
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following values: 0.301, 0.176, 0.125, 0.97, 0.79, 0.67, 0.58, 0.51, 0.46. For the 
second digit (j = 0, 1, 2,... 9), the probabilities are the following: 0.120, 0.114, 
0.109, 0.104, 0.100, 0.097, 0.093, 0.090, 0.088, 0.085. For the third and 
subsequent digits, the predicted probabilities are close to the probabilities of the 
last digit, for which the distribution is uniform with probability 0.1 for each j = 0, 1, 
2,... 9. The model fit for a single number could be estimated by a non-parametric 
chi-square test or by using an AVOVA test for a set of numbers. Another approach 
is to model the fit of the observed mean value and its predicted probability. 
According to Benford’s law, the predicted probability for the mean of the first digit 
equals 3.440 and that for the second digit is 4.187. If data originate from a natural 
process and have not been exposed to fraud, the observed and predicted 
probabilities should not deviate significantly. 
Scholars have applied this method to elections in Afghanistan (Weidmann and 
Callen 2013), Argentina (Cantú and Saiegh 2011), Russia (Mebane and Kalinin 
2009, 2010; Mack and Shikano 2013; Skovoroda and Lankina 2017), Sweden, 
Senegal and Nigeria (Beber and Scacco 2012), the United States (Mebane 2006; 
2008), the U.S., Puerto Rico and Venezuela (Pericchi and Torres 2011), and 
Venezuela (Levin, Cohn, Ordeshook and Alvarez 2009). Yet several studies have 
come to conclusion that the discrepancy of data with Benford’s law does not allow 
to verify fraud with certainty. Using simulated data, Deckert et al. (2011) have 
shown that the mean values of second digits vary in between theoretical 
expectations of Benford’s law for the 2nd significant digit (2BL) and Benford’s law for 
the last digit (LBL). Out of the 36 means, fourteen appeared to be closer to the 
expected mean of the LBL (4.5), thirteen fell below the 2BL requirement (4.187) and 
three were less than 4.0. Moreover, means were sensitive to the precinct’s 
population and the candidate’s vote share. In the end the authors categorically 
concluded that “Benford’s Law is wholly irrelevant to assessing an election’s 
conformity with good democratic practice”. Applying 2BL to allegedly fraud-free 
elections in France and suspected fraudulent elections in Russia, Mack and 
Shikano (2013: 16) came to the straightforward conclusion that “2BL test is 
inappropriate for detection of election frauds”. Although 2BL statistics for both 
Russian elections exceeded critical values,    statistics for two candidates in the 
2012 French presidential election, namely Le Pen and Bayrou, were also above the 
level of tolerance. Mebane (2010: 26) was more moderate in his conclusions 
regarding performance of the 2BL tests: “tests can sometimes distinguish the effects 
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of coercion – where votes are cast regardless of preferences – from the effects of 
strategic voting and gerrymanders”.48  
The failures of the digit tests applied to the first (and similarly to the second) 
significant digit can be explained by at least two reasons. First, any data can be 
expected to fit Benford’s law for the first (and second) significant digit only if a 
higher probability of number 1 is causally determined along with a decreasing 
probability of each subsequent number in consecutive order. For example, we may 
expect the order of clicks in a search engine to be distributed according to Benford’s 
law since the first link is located closer to the search box, the second link is more 
                                                          
48
 Several other studies are positive regarding applicability of Benford’s law to the first digit (1BL) and 2BL for 
detecting vote irregularities. However, these studies are generally inconclusive. The studies of Cantú and 
Saiegh (2011) and Montgomery et al. (2015) are built upon a combination of digit-based and sample-based 
methods. Although the authors resort to substantively different reference datasets, the key assumption of 
sample-based methods (that the reference dataset is free of fraud or defines fraud with certainty) is violated in 
both cases. Cantú and Saiegh (2011) used a simulated dataset to train a naive Bayes classifier and then apply it 
to Buenos Aires’ elections of 1931–1941. The training dataset includes vote counts of parties A and B 
generated based on Benford’s law probabilities and fraudulent vote counts for these imagined parties. 
Disregarding a human bias in number generating process, the number of stolen votes was defined as a product 
of party A’s votes and a constant of 0.3; the observations affected by fraud were also selected at random by 
random generation of the binomial distribution (see Appendix 1 in the article). As if follows from Figure 2 and 
4, the probability of number 1 (0.44) increased in the falsified compared with the initial distribution (0.29) and 
the 1BL (0.3) and the first-digit mean shifted toward the first number (0.27) compared with the initial 
distribution (0.34) and the 1BL (0.34). This change, however, occurred only occasionally when the mean N of 
party B’s (the beneficiary of fraud) votes enlarged to about 1500 from the initial 1200 in the result of simulated 
fraud, thereby having magnified the N of observations starting with 1 by allowing several observations with 
party B’s votes < 1000 to pass this threshold. Appealing to the historical wisdom regarding the quality of 
elections in the Argentina’s “infamous decade”, Cantú and Saiegh assert that their method better predicts (in 
binary terms: whether fraudulent or not) the outcomes of the four elections in Buenos Aires than other fraud 
detection techniques. This assertion evidently overemphasizes the quality of the historical electoral 
observation as a proxy to fraud and overstates appropriateness of the sample of elections as a ground for 
comparison. Furthermore, the probability of number 1 in supposedly fraudulent Buenos Aires’ partidos (0.39) 
appeared to be unexpectedly lower than the probability in the cases where no irregularities were uncovered 
(0.44) and both considerably exceed the 1BL expectation (0.3); the first-digit means in the fraud-alleged (3.12) 
and fraud-free (3.61) cases also diverge from the 1BL expectation (3.44).  
Montgomery et al. (2015) used qualitative assessments of electoral quality from National Elections Across 
Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset in seventy countries over six decades as an explicit measure of 
likely fraud to diagnose fraud by deploying a Bayesian additive regression trees (BART) model, which includes 
forensic indicators of anomalous vote count distributions (the 2BL and LBL chi-squared statistic, the mean of 
the second digit, and the mean distance between the last pair of digits) and contextual risk factors (economic 
inequality, ethnic fractionalization, urbanization, district magnitude, turnout, regime type, and others) as 
predictors. The results of the BART analysis show that variation of the measure of fraud derived from NELDA 
dataset is better explained by a combination of both forensic indicators and contextual risk factors. However, 
BART is a nonparametric Bayesian regression that does not estimate coefficients and their significance levels (a 
rational of using BART instead of other regression models conventionally used in such cases is not discussed by 
the authors). Figures 3 and 4 in the article rather indicate that most variables’ effects are either ambiguous or 
insignificant, at any rate, the effects are small. This fact underlines a distinction between observational and 
electoral data-driven methods of electoral fraud detection and stresses the importance of the main assumption 
of sample-based methods: the training dataset should ideally differentiate cases of electoral fraud with 
certainty or to maximize the probability of this distinction by all possible means (yet only 23 cases out of 586 in 
the sample are coded as autocracies based on Polity IV score that decreases a theoretical probability of fraud 
to merely 4%), otherwise robustness of the method inevitably suffers.  
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distant, and there are very few (if any) of those who want to see the links on the last 
page of a search output. Put bluntly, we do not have such theoretical expectations 
for electoral data. Second, the number of votes received by a candidate (and 
consequently its leading digit) depends on the number of eligible voters and on the 
level of electoral support of the candidate. For instance, the distribution of a 
candidate’s votes who received 50% of the vote in a ward with the mean number of 
eligible voters = 3,000 and 67% of turnout rate is more likely to match Benford’s 
law, since the mean number of the candidate’s votes is concentrated around 1,000 
(having the leading digit = 1, on average). In contrast, a ward with the average of 
2,000 eligible voters, 50% of turnout rate, and 50% of a candidate’s vote share 
would have the average leading digit equal to 5, therefore indicating a sharp 
deviation from the predicted probabilities. Thus, first-digit and second-digit 
Benford’s law is hardly appropriate for electoral fraud forensics (see also Diekmann 
2007). 
Meanwhile, the application of Benford’s law to the last digit is more promising. 
Scholars proved that zeros in Nigerian and Senegalese electoral data (Beber and 
Scacco 2012) as well as zeros and fives in Russian election returns (Mebane and 
Kalinin 2009) are observed too frequently in the last-digit distributions to be 
considered as the result of a fair electoral process. Christensen (2012) has modified 
the method of Beber and Scacco. He used the share of factors of 10 (10, 20, 30…) 
for the last digit as an indicator of fraud in the Afghani presidential election of 
2009. The application of the LBL to a more competitive environment expectedly 
produced modest results. As Leemann and Bochsler (2014: 44) showed, the 
hypothesis of fraud is confirmed only in one out of six tests of voting in the Swiss 
referendum of 2011. The absence of empirical confirmation of theoretical 
expectations impelled the authors to question whether the test is valid. 
Since theoretical expectations regarding the distribution of digits are not always 
clear (whether a uniform of an inversed logistic), Meyersson (2015) presented a 
combination of digit-based and sample-based approaches. He compared the last 
digit distributions of vote counts for the major Turkish parties between two Turkish 
general elections conducted in June and November 2015. He found that for all 
parties, except the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), last digit 
distributions statistically differ between two elections; that the distribution of digits 
for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is statistically indistinguishable 
between the elections in stronghold provinces of the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP); and that only Peoples Democratic Party’s (HDP) distribution of digits is 
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statistically different between the elections in the five most populous provinces. 
Discussing this result, Meyersson points out that validity of the tests is based on 
the assumption that the election of June 2015 was not affected by fraud. It should 
be added that, commonly to all digit-based methods, the relationship between 
statistical and substantive significance is not obvious. Even having a statistically 
significant result, there is not a simple task (if resolvable at all) to define whether 
the detected forgery altered the election outcome (as in the case of AKP’s gain of 
votes, for example) or changed vote proportions just slightly. 
This limitation appears from two shortcomings of digit-based methods. First, as 
discussed earlier, the predicted probabilities of digits do not necessarily (neither 
theoretically nor empirically) match Benford’s law probabilities; there is no solid 
ground to consider that they should be uniformly distributed also. Second, studies 
typically report chi-squared statistic for digit tests that is not informative in 
quantitative terms, i.e., it is not comparable with percentage points – the units of 
measurement of votes. Medzihorsky (2015) tries to solve these problems by offering 
two measures allowing to estimate the share of deviating observations (the π* 
mixture index of fit and the ∆ dissimilarity index) and by employing log-linear 
models for comparing several subsets of the data in order to relax distributional 
assumptions. While the π* mixture index of fit measures the distance between the 
least digit’s probability and 0.1, and therefore is not reliable due to the dependence 
on a single the most deviating digit, the ∆ dissimilarity index is more promising 
since it accounts for the sum of absolute deviations of the observed densities from 
0.1 divided by a doubled number of digits (i.e., by 20).  
Using the data of Beber and Scacco (2012), Medzihorsky estimated that under 
the relaxed distributional assumption only one percent of observations (with regard 
to the ∆ dissimilarity index) need to be reallocated for perfect fit between two 
Senegalese presidential elections of 2000 and 2007. This finding puzzled the author 
because high prevalence of fraud was reported by observers in the second case but 
not in the first. One suggested answer was that “the distribution of last digits is not 
informative with regard to the presence of fraud” (p. 515) “since digits can easily be 
distributed the same way in fraudulent and fraud-free results even if the fraudsters 
do not deliberately attempt this” (p. 516). This conclusion evidently comes from 
disregarding the prime assumption of sample-based methods, namely, that the 
reference subsets in the data must be free of fraud, and from undue reliance on 
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electoral observation as a method for detection of electoral fraud49. Therefore, the 
second proposed explanation seems more feasible: “the relaxed distributional 
assumption is inadequate” (p. 516).  
It should be noted that performance of Medzihorsky’s ∆ dissimilarity index as 
well as of other digit tests may be dependent on the number of cases. Analyses of 
digits are ordinarily implemented at the national level, yet few studies that carried 
out the analysis by several jurisdictions (Beber and Scacco 2012; Leemann and 
Bochsler 2014: Appendix; Meyersson 2015) show that the distribution of digits 
tends to be more dispersed (i.e., to a larger degree deviating from predicted 
probabilities in both directions) at lower levels of data. This may occur for two 
reasons. First, the deviation of digits naturally increases as the sample size is 
getting smaller. Second, the deviation of digits may decrease in the result of 
aggregation of even fraudulent data if human bias affects frequencies of digits at 
random throughout lower-level jurisdictions.50 To disentangle whether this larger 
variance at lower levels of data comes from a smaller number of cases or from 
electoral fraud, Table 3.2 reports last-digit frequencies of the Social Democratic 
Party (SAP) vote count in 25 Swedish counties (län) from the 2002 parliamentary 
election. Following Beber and Scacco (2012), I suppose that this election was free of 
fraud and that only the number of cases can influence the deviation of last digits by 
counties51. 
                                                          
49
 Shortcomings of electoral observation techniques were discussed earlier in the section “Electoral 
Observation”. It can be added that the Russian presidential election of 2008 was more qualitatively and 
quantitatively fraudulent than the election of 2012. Nevertheless, the regime was stronger in 2008, few 
independent observers monitored the election, incumbent’s dominance was not in doubt and all interested 
actors generally accepted the outcome of the election. Incumbent’s position was not so stable in 2012. For this 
reason, much more observers were engaged in the electoral process, more powers tried to put the election 
outcome under question by appealing to electoral monitoring. Therefore, the evidence of fraud became widely 
available and created a very unclean image to the election of 2012, though the election of 2008 would have 
looked much more “dirty” if these actors had been as active in 2008 as they were in 2012. 
50
 Appendix C2 shows that this statement is not confirmed in the case of the Russian 2012 presidential election, 
while the relationship between the standard deviation of the last digit and the number of observations is 
strong and exponential at the regional level. 
51
 This solution is only partial. For better controlling for electoral fraud, more elections (both expectedly 
fraudulent and fraud-free) should be considered with modelling the relationship between the number of 
observations and chi-squared or similar statistic in different types of elections. See also Appendix C2 for last-
digit distributions of Putin’s vote count and vote share in Russia’s regions from the 2012 presidential election as 
a case of fraudulent election. 
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Table 3.2. Last-digit frequencies of the SAP vote count in 25 Swedish counties from 
the 2002 parliamentary election compared with Benford’s law 
Län 
Last Digit 
Total 
SD, 
% 
∆, %     
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 102 124 111 118 114 106 113 85 90 113 1076 1.1 .44 12.5 
3 14 21 23 20 14 22 16 14 17 19 180 1.9 .83 6.0 
4 24 14 18 17 20 10 9 23 13 17 165 3.1 1.21 14.0 
5 27 26 35 24 34 18 31 30 30 23 278 1.9 .76 8.9 
6 21 20 22 26 23 29 23 19 29 28 240 1.6 .67 5.3 
7 13 17 17 19 13 12 16 12 13 15 147 1.7 .71 3.7 
8 23 15 22 17 18 18 13 12 21 19 178 2.1 .8 6.8 
9 2 4 4 3 1 8 6 6 3 2 39 5.6 2.18 11.0 
10 12 11 13 6 9 7 14 6 10 11 99 2.9 1.17 7.4 
12 78 74 74 86 75 85 62 74 77 54 739 1.3 .43 11.3 
13 17 20 20 18 13 17 16 12 20 15 168 1.7 .67 4.4 
14 102 78 104 94 119 96 112 108 104 92 1009 1.1 .43 11.9 
17 20 18 27 16 29 21 25 19 19 22 216 1.9 .77 7.2 
18 29 22 20 20 11 16 20 17 21 26 202 2.5 .85 11.3 
19 13 15 7 17 15 14 22 13 16 21 153 2.8 .97 10.6 
20 19 17 27 17 10 21 23 21 19 22 196 2.3 .82 9.3 
21 21 10 22 16 24 13 22 24 18 21 191 2.5 1.02 10.6 
22 18 17 12 19 15 26 17 18 14 22 178 2.2 .79 8.1 
23 11 17 6 9 11 10 16 14 14 9 117 3.0 1.21 9.2 
24 19 25 20 22 17 9 16 17 15 15 175 2.5 .91 9.9 
25 27 26 20 24 22 19 25 21 24 22 230 1.1 .48 2.7 
Med. 20 18 20 19 17 18 20 18 19 21 20 2.1 .8 9.2 
Tot. 612 591 624 608 607 577 617 565 587 588 5976 .3 .13 5.4 
Note: SD is the standard deviation of probabilities (frequencies are converted into 
probabilities for this statistic). ∆ denotes the ∆ dissimilarity index (Medzihorsky 2015). The 
SD and the ∆ index are expressed in percentages (i.e., multiplied by 100).     
  denotes chi-
squared statistic for the last digit, where all digits’ expected probability, according to 
Benford’s law, is equal to 0.1. Data source: Beber and Scacco (2012); available at: 
http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17151. All chi-squared statistics do not reach even 10%-level 
of significance (14.68 at 9 degrees of freedom). 
As appears from Table 3.2, fraud is not detected in any county: chi-squared 
statistics are insignificant in all cases. At the same time, we can notice a 1.7-fold 
difference between the median    (9.2) among 25 counties and  
   at total (5.4). However, there is no substantive relationship between chi-squared 
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statistic and the number of observations: a positive correlation (.399, significant at 
.07) appears mainly from three cases where N > 700. The situation is different with 
Medzihorsky’s ∆ dissimilarity index. Not only the median ∆ index (0.8%) is nearly six 
times larger than the ∆ index at total (0.13%), but also the ∆ index is strongly and 
negatively dependent on the number of observations (Pearson correlation coefficient 
(-0.575) is significant at 0.006). This is especially evident looking at counties with 
the largest and smallest number of observations. The largest share of fraud (2.18%) 
is detected in the 9th county (39 observations), 10th (1.17%, 99), and 23rd (1.21%, 
117) counties, respectively. In counties (1st, 12th, and 14th) with the largest number 
of observations (1076, 739, and 1009) the share of fraudulent observations does not 
reach even half a percent (0.44, 0.43, and 0.43 percent, respectively). In this regard, 
the ∆ dissimilarity index is substantively similar to the standard deviation (SD) of 
digit probabilities. The SD indicates that distributions of digits at the level of 
counties are 6.5 times more dispersed (2.1%) compared with the distribution of the 
pooled data (0.3%). The correlation between the SD and the number of observations 
is also negative (-0.553, significant at 0.009).  
Hence, last-digit distributions in fact tend to be larger at lower levels of data. 
Chi-squared statistic adequately treats this relationship by taking the number of 
observations into account, yet the cost of this adjustment is a binary assessment of 
election data (whether the election is fraudulent or not at a conventional level of 
statistical significance) with fundamental impossibility of quantitative estimation of 
the amount of fraud since the same size of deviations from predicted probabilities 
produces different statistic depending on the number of observations. The ∆ 
dissimilarity index (in absolute values) and the SD (based in squared deviations) 
measure the share of fraudulent observations, however, potential utility of these 
and similar measures is greatly deprecated by variability of last-digit probabilities 
caused by factors beyond electoral fraud. The next section also shows that even if 
the share of fraudulent polling stations is correctly estimated, an attempt to convert 
it into the number or share of fraudulent votes stumbles upon several 
insurmountable obstacles. 
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Figure 3.1. Distributions of the last digit in the Russian presidential election of 
2012 compared with Benford’s law 
 
Note: Second digit is used as the last digit for fractions since percentages are rounded 
(for example, Putin   
     = 616/1010 = 0.6099009901 -> 61%). The last digit for raw votes is 
empirically observed digit; theoretical distribution is fixed at the third digit since the average 
last digit equals 3.26 and 2.94 for valid votes and Putin’s votes, respectively. 
Another problem with the applicability of Benford’s law to elections may be 
associated with the fact that scholars conventionally apply the test to distributions 
of the raw numbers of votes (vote counts) but not vote shares (percentages of 
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votes)52. Figure 3.1 shows that this difference can be of crucial importance. Visibly, 
the last-digit distributions of valid votes and Putin’s votes are much more congruent 
with Benford’s law theoretical expectations than the corresponding distributions of 
turnout and Putin’s vote share in the presidential election of 2012.  
This result may seem counterintuitive but it becomes plausible if we consider 
the logic of fraud. The deviation of vote counts from Benford’s law probabilities is 
more likely to occur if members of electoral commissions do not have clear 
indications regarding the level of fraud but are rather guided by an abstract rule: 
“the more the better but not too much”.  The deviation of percentages is more likely 
to appear if members of electoral commissions are instructed by their superiors that 
“the result of candidate A should be approximately ... percent of the vote”.53 In other 
words, percentage points are a more universal indication for fraudsters by their 
superiors than variable by the number of eligible voters and turnout vote counts. 
Meanwhile, percentages are interdependent with raw votes and there is a question 
how do falsifiers manage to distort (in terms of Benford’s law) vote shares without 
impacting vote counts? One answer to this question is that falsifiers are aware that 
a multitude of zeroes and fives looks suspicious and therefore, as suggested by 
Medzihorsky (2015: 508), they may use simple tools such as dice or random 
number generators for producing vote counts. According to the second explanation, 
as was witnessed by the author in the role of electoral observer, fraudsters can 
falsify only the first or first two digits in vote counts leaving the last digit 
unamended (Appendix C3 shows that this type of fraud occurs in nearly one third 
of cases where a discrepancy between the official results and the corresponding vote 
counts from copies of polling station protocols is detected in the 2011 State Duma 
election). The third answer is more trivial. Since precincts vary by the number of 
eligible voters, the same percent of the vote translates into various vote counts. 
Given that the number of eligible voters obtained from the real world satisfies 
Benford’s law, its derivatives should be also in conformity with Benford’s law 
theoretical expectations. Therefore, if fraudsters manipulate with percentages of the 
vote in the first place and subsequently convert percentages into vote counts, the 
                                                          
52
 Fraction-based methods described in the next subsection are designed to explore the deviations in vote 
proportions. However, this group of literature is primarily focused on the distribution of only two digits (zeroes 
and fives) rather than applying Benford’s law to the distribution of all digits in vote proportions. 
53
 See the rewriting of protocols “in a line” and “in a dot” described in Chapter 2 as specific cases of such 
electoral forgery. 
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latter will match Benford’s law expectations even if digit frequencies in percentages 
of the vote are generated not at random.54 
Table 3.3. Probabilities of the last digit in the four Russian elections compared 
with Benford’s law 
Raw votes: Valid votes Putin/Medvedev/United Russia’s votes 
Digit 
3BL 
prob. 
2012 2011 2008 2007 2012 2011 2008 2007 
0 .10178 .1054 .1053 .1089 .1043 .1018 .1019 .1038 .1031 
1 .10138 .1001 .1008 .1013 .0992 .1011 .1012 .0993 .0985 
2 .10097 .1006 .0981 .0987 .1008 .0999 .101 .0997 .0973 
3 .10057 .1006 .0998 .0988 .0983 .0983 .098 .0993 .1009 
4 .10018 .0976 .0981 .0992 .0997 .1011 .1007 .0973 .0996 
5 .09979 .1012 .0995 .103 .1 .1008 .0999 .102 .1025 
6 .0994 .0987 .0986 .097 .0996 .099 .1005 .1003 .0999 
7 .09902 .0981 .0994 .0995 .0985 .0981 .0999 .1013 .0986 
8 .09864 .0988 .1005 .0973 .1003 .0998 .0989 .0995 .0987 
9 .09827 .0989 .1 .0963 .0993 .1 .0981 .0976 .101 
    
  
 
23.58* 31.17** 78.7*** 19.57 13.13 8.560 31.1** 37.43*** 
    
  42.79*** 36.87*** 117.7*** 42.45*** 13.16 14.85 32.86** 29.48** 
Percentages: Turnout Putin/Medvedev/United Russia   
     
Digit 
2BL 
prob. 
2012 2011 2008 2007 2012 2011 2008 2007 
0 .11968 .1209 .1214 .1352 .1278 .1067 .105 .1026 .1066 
1 .11389 .0918 .0942 .0908 .0958 .0981 .0986 .0996 .0977 
2 .10882 .0946 .0932 .0913 .0969 .0979 .0973 .0975 .0975 
3 .10433 .0962 .0941 .0919 .0917 .0972 .0982 .0968 .097 
4 .10031 .0941 .0939 .0935 .0921 .0975 .0964 .0951 .0957 
5 .09668 .0995 .0972 .098 .0947 .1025 .104 .1014 .0996 
6 .09337 .0966 .0963 .0933 .0938 .1009 .1011 .1024 .1007 
7 .09035 .0978 .0982 .0955 .0969 .0998 .0987 .0996 .0986 
8 .08757 .1033 .1017 .1019 .0996 .1012 .0993 .103 .1018 
9 .085 .1053 .1098 .1087 .1107 .0982 .1014 .102 .1048 
     
  
 
1493*** 1650*** 2002*** 1623*** 1082*** 1168*** 1389*** 1343*** 
     
  606.2*** 696.9*** 1573*** 1066*** 74.8*** 68.2*** 64.9*** 105.9*** 
Note: Probabilities Z-values of which exceed 3.26 (that equals to p = 0.01 since the level 
of significance is reduced with each of the nine comparisons) are shown in bold. Simple bold 
indicates a flow toward the digit, bold combined with italics indicates an outflow from the 
digit. Z-scores for each individual probabilities are calculated by the formula:  
                                                          
54
 The third explanation is seemingly the most relevant in accounting for the fact that last-digit distributions of 
vote counts are in conformity with Benford’s law even in the most notorious regional cases of electoral 
malpractices in Russia (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and others), while last-digit 
distributions of percentages of the vote indicate excessive fraud in these cases. See Appendix C2 for details. 
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, where p(k) and b(k) are respectively the observed and the Benford’s law 
probabilities of digit k, and N is the number of observations; the Benford’s law probabilities 
are of the last digit for the test (i.e., all digits’ p = 0.1). The overall chi-squared statistic 
calculated by the formula     ∑
( (    (    
 (  
 
    is reported for the second (2BL), the third 
(3BL), and the last digit (LBL, all digits’ p = 0.1). Significant at: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.001, ***p < 
0.0001. 
In a more detailed way, Table 3.3 reports probabilities of the last-digit 
distributions for the Russian national elections of 2007–2012. In each of the four 
elections, last digits of the raw votes (vote counts) are distributed much closer to 
Benford’s law probabilities compared with percentages55. Since Figure 3.1 shows 
not only a discrepancy but also an inconsistency between the observed values and 
the Benford’s law probabilities (the observed values do not decrease gradually in the 
bottom plots), Table 3.3 reports chi-squared statistic for the last digit (LBL) 
additionally to the second (2BL) and the third digit (3BL). The distributions of the 
last digit of raw votes for Putin and United Russia in elections of the 2011–2012 
electoral cycle pass both (3BL and LBL) tests. The distribution of valid votes of 2007 
passes only 3BL test, which generally appears to be more favorable to vote count 
distributions than the LBL. Nevertheless, all elections under consideration are 
affected by fraud to a small degree only, if we draw inferences from the raw votes. 
This also follows from few significant deviations of the individual probabilities from 
the LBL indicated by bold in the table. Only zeroes are observed systematically 
more often (the exceptions are election years of 2011 and 2012), zeroes exceed the 
level of 0.1 by 0.043 on average between all distributions of vote counts.  
By contrast, last digit’s distributions of percentages are much more biased that 
is indicated both by chi-squared statistics and by the quantity of significant 
deviations of the individual probabilities from the LBL. Although percentages in my 
coding consist of only two digits,      
  is almost three times smaller on average 
                                                          
55
 This discrepancy, in particular, may account for a weak association between the indicator of last-digit fraud in 
turnout counts (valid votes) and the election monitoring organization Golos’s reports of election-day 
misconduct revealed by Skovoroda and Lankina (2017). In their study of the Russian 2012 presidential election, 
the likelihood ratio statistic for last-digit zeroes in turnout counts (the main explanatory variable) adds only 1% 
to the variance of pre-election reports of misconduct explained by other variables (the difference between M4 
and M5 in Table 6). The effect of the likelihood ratio statistic for last-digit numbers from 1 through 9 in turnout 
counts is insignificant in all models. Although citizen’s reports on electoral malpractices not necessarily account 
for the exact extent of electoral fraud, the effect of electoral fraud measured via the last-digit frequencies on 
the election-day reports of fraud should be stronger. This is implicitly confirmed in Appendix C2, which shows 
that chi-squared statistics for the last-digit frequencies of Putin’s 2012 vote counts are significant at 0.05 level 
in only 5 regions, while chi-squared statistics for the vote percentages are significant in 26 regions at 0.05 level. 
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(532.0) than      
  (1468.8). These numbers, however, exceed the average chi-
squared statistics of the raw vote distribution tests manyfold (    
  = 41.3 and  
    
  = 30.4). This is strong evidence that scholars should focus more on application 
of digit tests to percentages rather than to raw vote counts. If differentiate between 
turnout (valid votes) and incumbent’s vote share (incumbent’s votes), it appears 
that turnout (valid votes) is unexpectedly more biased. This result cannot be 
explained during the exploratory analysis and requires further research. In any 
case, zeroes in the distributions of turnout prevail (having the average probability of 
.1266) over ones (.0932 on average), twos (.094 on average), threes (.0935 on 
average), and fours (.0934 on average). Nines also occur more frequently (1086 on 
average). Contrary to Rundlett and Svolik (2016) and Rozenas (2017) who assert the 
presence of many multiples of five (i.e., not only 65, 75, 85... but also 60, 70, 80... 
percent) in Russian electoral data, we do not find a confirmation of the prevalence 
of fives in Table 3.3. The deviations of the observed probabilities of five from the LBL 
are either insignificant or differently directed (in 2007 and 2011). However, not fives 
but zeroes in the last digit of vote share distributions are in fact observed more 
frequently than it should be under the uniformity hypothesis in election years 2007, 
2011, and 2012. Zeroes are also overabundant in turnout distributions throughout 
all years. 
In the aggregate, digit-based methods rather than estimating the precise amount 
of electoral fraud in percentage points, allow only to detect fraud in binary terms, 
i.e., to define whether or not electoral data are affected by fraud at a conventional 
level of statistical significance. Since types of fraud may vary, the extent to which 
statistics obtained from digit tests correlate with the amount of fraud in 
percentages is questionable. First objection is that members of electoral 
commissions, being aware that rounding of falsified votes or vote shares to ten or 
five is suspicious, may refrain from using these coarse numbers. Second, human 
biases in number generating process were revealed in experiments when subjects 
were asked to produce large-N sets of digits (see Beber and Scacco (2012: 218–220) 
for literature overview). These biases can be directly attributed to fraudsters at the 
national, state or county levels who deal with a large number of precincts. However, 
the extent to which these biases can be intrinsic to thousands of members of 
electoral commissions who are supposed to manipulate with vote counts at the 
lowest level in their own precincts only is uncertain. Third, all fraudulent practices 
occurring before the vote count – vote buying, voter intimidation and ballot stuffing 
– have almost no chance for reaching any predefined number or percent, whether it 
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be a round number or not. These fraudulent techniques rather add some random 
quantity of fictitious votes to existing votes without distorting frequencies of digits, 
thereby making Benford’s law tests irrelevant. For the sake of justice, it should be 
mentioned that digit-based methods rely on univariate analysis of vote counts and 
consequently require no assumptions regarding auxiliary variables, such as quality 
of turnout data (for example, Beber and Scacco (2012: 225) note that 30–40% of 
eligible voters were prevented from registering in Nigeria prior to the 2003 elections) 
or districting of lower-level jurisdictions in order to guarantee data homogeneity. 
Digit-based methods can be used in a complex analysis of electoral fraud or as an 
auxiliary tool to another more reliable method of electoral forensics. In particular, 
the analysis of electoral fraud in the Russian presidential elections of 2000–2012 in 
Chapter 4 utilizes chi-squared statistic for the deviation of the last-digit frequencies 
in the incumbent’s vote share from Benford’s law (     
 ) along with other measures 
of fraud to create an adjustment for the estimate of the initial (i.e., not affected by 
fraud) incumbent’s vote share. 
Fraction-Based Methods 
Although scholars do not attempt to analyze the distribution of digits in vote shares 
with respect to Benford’s law, observers noticed that spikes at round numbers (i.e., 
0.5, 0.55, 0.6, 0.65 etc.) are overwhelming in distributions of vote shares if electoral 
quality is under question. Therefore, fraction-based methods aimed to gauge the 
irregular quantity of round numbers in vote shares can be alternatively called an 
“analysis of spikes”. Besides detecting by the last digit probabilities of a vote share, 
the prevalence of round numbers can be easily depicted on linear plots. Figure 3.2 
shows the phenomenon called “Churov’s saw” in honor of Vladimir Churov, the 
chairman of the Central Electoral Commission of the Russian Federation from 27 
March 2007 to 27 March 2016.56 While the left tail of all distributions of 
incumbent’s vote shares in the Russian presidential and parliamentary elections in 
2007–2012 resembles the normal distribution, the right-hand side of distributions 
is littered with spikes at round numbers especially for vote shares higher than 0.75. 
On the each graph, the sharpest peak is located in the range within 97–100% of 
                                                          
56
 The idea and the title have been borrowed from user “nik_vik” at: 
http://podmoskovnik.livejournal.com/143958.html?thread=1127254#t1127254. Formerly the coincidence of 
local maximums with round numbers was mentioned by Buzin and Lubarev (2008: 197). Unusually sharp peaks 
at round numbers in distributions of United Russia’s (2011) and Putin’s (2012) votes have also pointed out by 
Kobak, Shpilkin and Pshenichnikov (2012: 2). Turnout distributions follow the similar pattern as vote shares but 
spikes not so regularly appear at round numbers. Due to space limits turnout distributions are not shown. 
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votes. The effect, however, is rather feeble. This is visible in the top right graph 
where the central point of United Russia’s distribution, which follows after the 
unbiased left tail, is located at about 0.35 (recall that electoral observers also 
reported slightly over 30 percent of the vote), while the official vote share is reported 
to be 0.49. The distorted tail is characterized by spikes, which look even more 
aggressively than saw teeth. Kobak et al. (2012: 2) estimated that these unusual 
peaks account for approximately 1.4 million ballots for United Russia (in 2011) and 
1.3 million ballots for Putin (in 2012). This is, of course, a sizeable number of votes 
but vote shares adjusted for these anomalous votes become smaller by no more 
than one percent leaving this estimate far from the actual amount of fraud.  
Figure 3.2. The “Churov’s saw”: Density distributions of incumbent’s vote shares 
in four Russian elections 
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Note: The data are binned at 0.001 and summed for each bin. Lines represent locally 
weighted (for each ten bins) non-parametric regression (LOESS). Count denotes the number 
of polling stations in one bin. 
In a similar vein, Rundlett and Svolik (2016) used a difference between the 
actual distribution of Putin’s vote share in the election of 2012 and its kernel 
density estimate (as a smoothed line that summarizes the distribution) to obtain a 
measure of “ruggedness” of the distribution. They then regressed this measure of 
ruggedness on Putin’s vote share and, having found a positive relationship, 
concluded that local agents tend to oversupply fraud when the genuine popularity 
of the incumbent is high, and vice versa. Although the measure of ruggedness is 
generally an appropriate tool for detecting the uncommon spikes57, the authors 
made a crucial mistake on the other side of the equation, namely, they gave the 
official incumbent’s vote the status of genuine electoral support (i.e., they regressed 
their measure of fraud on electoral fraud plus true vote, which is treated as an error 
in this case). However, the official incumbent’s vote is largely a product of electoral 
fraud. Looking ahead, my measure of electoral fraud developed in Chapter 4 (the 
percentage of fraudulent votes by region) has 75.9% of common variance with the 
official Putin’s vote share in 2012. Meanwhile, Putin’s sincere vote (the official vote 
subtracted by fraud) has little in common with electoral fraud (R-squared = 10.1%) 
and this result appears primarily due to outliers (the regions with extreme fraud). 
Once the variable of electoral fraud is ranked, the correlation almost disappears (R-
squared = 2.8%). In the elections of 2000–2008, this relationship is also negligible: 
R-squared = 4.9%, 7.2%, and 0.0%, respectively. Contrary to Rundlett and Svolik’s 
theory, this indicates that fraud does not increase with level of the incumbent’s 
genuine vote58. 
Building upon the method proposed by Rundlett and Svolik, Rozenas (2017) 
points out that highly suspicious spikes in vote share distributions not necessarily 
result from fraud, they can be naturally determined by a small precinct size also. 
Based on the distribution of precinct-level vote shares of United Russia, the author 
demonstrates that spikes occur not only at multiples of five (e.g., 0.5, 0.55) but also 
at specific fractions with low denominator (such as 1/3, 2/5, 1/2, 3/5, and 2/3), 
which he calls “low-order fractions”. The low-order fractions are more common in 
small precincts. For example, if an electorate consists of nine voters, the vote share 
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 The question is, however, appears regarding heterogeneity of the data. The analysis is performed at the 
aggregate level. The region-level distributions may be much more rugged (see Figure 3.4, for example). 
58
 The presence of correlation would rather indicate that the measure of fraud is not independent from the 
official vote, which also consists of fraud in a large proportion, and therefore is not reliable.  
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1/2 can occur when turnout is equal to 2, 4, 6, and 8, whereas higher-order 
fractions are less probable and several of them (such as 568/931) can occur only 
when precinct size is sufficiently large.  
To control for the likelihood of low-order vote shares, Rozenas offered a 
resampled kernel density (RKD) method and applied it to United Russia’s (2003–
2011), Putin’s (2012), Canadian Conservative Party’s (2011) vote shares, and to 
several simulated datasets. While the RKD estimates indicated no fraud in the 
Canadian case and correctly gauged the amount of fraud in the simulated data59, 
fraudulent results were detected merely in 0.97% of polling stations (as maximum 
in the election of 2012). If we assume that the number of eligible voters and other 
characteristics do not considerably deviate from the election’s average values and 
take the median number of Putin’s votes in a polling station (417), we can calculate 
that the size of fraud in 0.97% out of 95,415 polling stations amounts to 385.9 
thousand votes out of 45.6 million of Putin’s officially reported votes and that this 
proportion of fraudulent votes accounts for a decrease in Putin’s official vote share 
by 0.2% (63.6% – ((45,602.1 – 385.9) / (71,701.7 – 385.9))).60 This number is much 
smaller than 1.3 million estimated by Kobak et al. (2012: 2) in their analysis of 
spikes. Furthermore, these calculations are based on the premise that all votes in 
the suspicious polling stations are forged. A more realistic assumption is that some 
quantity of voters actually voted at those polling stations that reported round 
numbers in their vote count protocols. This number of actual voters varies from 
region to region as well as the probability of reporting round numbers is not 
constant but tend to coincide with other types of fraud, and therefore be higher in 
regions with excessive fraud where the genuine outcome of voters’ choices is 
undefinable. Uncertainty regarding this parameter results in rough overestimation 
of the number of fictitious votes drawn from analysis of spikes or from digit tests. I 
will not dwell on technical details of Rozenas’s method. Even if we suppose that it 
correctly filters naturally originated spikes, analysis of spikes generally exhibits a 
small potential for detecting electoral fraud since it detects only a specific outcome 
of electoral forgery – spikes at round vote shares – and has similar drawbacks to 
digit-based methods. 
                                                          
59
 Rozenas, however, does not offer the reader to compare the RKD estimates with non-adjusted by 
probabilities of low-order fractions ordinary kernel density estimates offered by Rundlett and Svolik (2016), 
which should presumably exaggerate the amount of fraud in the simulated data. 
60
 This calculation is positively biased since it uses the median number of officially reported Putin’s votes in a 
polling station. However, the median number of true Putin’s votes is unknown. Moreover, not exactly the 
median number of true Putin’s votes is necessary for a precise calculation but rather the median number of 
officially reported Putin’s votes subtracted by the number of fraudulent votes resulted from all types of fraud 
but those that have determined the “spikes”. 
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Distribution-Based Methods 
Apparently one of the most useful methods of electoral fraud detection has been 
offered by Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky (1993). The authors assumed that in the case 
of fair election turnout and vote share received by any candidate are uncorrelated. 
In a more concise manner it has been stated by Lukinova et al. (2011: 606):  
“Briefly, if we estimate the regression V/E = α + βT, where T denotes turnout, V 
is the number of votes officially recorded for a candidate and E is the number of 
eligible (registered) voters, then in a free and fair contest where, once again, the 
data are homogeneous, in that there are no unobserved variables intervening 
between T and a candidate’s strength of support, β should approximately equal 
the candidate’s share of the vote and α should equal 0.0”. 
It should be noted that   
     substantively differs from   
    . The latter is the 
relative (ordinary, reported everywhere) vote share calculated as the ratio of a 
candidate’s raw votes to the number of valid ballots. The absolute vote share (  
    ) 
is the ratio of a candidate’s votes to the number of eligible voters.   
     should be 
preferred to make the test more sensitive to ballot stuffing. Since each stuffed ballot 
raises turnout (the number of candidate’s votes and the number of valid ballots 
increase simultaneously),   
     becomes less reliable. 
It also follows that since ballots are usually stuffed in favor of one candidate and 
each stuffed ballot adds +1 to turnout, the function of ballot stuffing is   
       
   , more precisely, the fit line for ballot stuffing is parallel to   
           (see 
Figure 2.2 for illustration). Beta-coefficients may even exceed 1 if votes of one or 
several candidates are illegally transferred in favor of another candidate. Both 
statements are valid if the number of observations exposed to fraud is sufficiently 
large to tilt the regression line up to the defined values.  
This method has been repeatedly applied later, including elections in Russia 
(Buzin and Lubarev (2008); Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2005, 2009; Shpilkin 
2011; Lukinova, Maygkov and Ordeshook 2011), and has been subject to several 
theoretical critiques.  
Data Homogeneity 
First of all, an important precondition of the correct performance of the method is 
the internal homogeneity of data, i.e., there should be no independent groups inside 
the overall array having their own values α and β. The vulnerability of ordinary 
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linear estimates to data heterogeneity is displayed in Figure 3.3. The simulated data 
presents three different groups of cases not subjected to fraud and having different 
turnout and vote shares received by hypothetical candidates. The distribution in 
general creates an illusion of fraud: the Y-interception point of the fit line at total is 
far below 0 and β exceeds 1, although each group’s α is close to zero and β 
approximately equals the candidate’s vote share. 
Figure 3.3. The ecological inference problem: Vulnerability of linear estimates to 
data heterogeneity 
 
Inclusion of the internally heterogeneous data in the analysis was the main 
reason for criticism of Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky’s method by Myagkov, Ordeshook 
and Shakin (2009: 32–42). The problem of data heterogeneity may be solved in two 
ways. One of the solutions implies using a multilevel model allowing α and β to vary 
by region or by census variables (Levin, Cohn, Ordeshook and Alvarez 2009). 
Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin (2009) used a semi-parametric model estimating 
coefficients within similar regions and then constructing a weighted average.  
Chapter 4 develops a similar approach. Firstly, the electoral data of precinct 
electoral commissions (UIKs) are analyzed separately for each territorial electoral 
commission (TIK) – the first level of aggregation. Then, coefficients are weighted by 
population and nationally averaged to obtain the overall result. Performing the 
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analysis by TIKs (the first level of aggregation) instead of regions (the second level of 
aggregation) allows to reduce the likelihood of heterogeneity. Since the average 
number of UIKs in a TIK is about 50 in the federal Russian elections – a TIK usually 
encompasses a set of villages within an administrative district (raion), a small city 
or a big city’s ward – the difference in demographic characteristics and levels of 
political support should be minimal. 
Turnout and Candidate Votes are Assumed to Be Independent 
A second critique questions the assumption that turnout and candidates’ votes are 
independent of each other. This assumption may be violated if intervening variables 
simultaneously affects turnout and vote share for one of candidates. For instance, 
Hansford and Gomez (2010: 270) point out that while U.S. voters tend to be better 
educated, wealthier, and older than non-voters, the same social factors have also 
been fairly stable predictors of support for the Republican Party and its candidates. 
DeNardo (1980: 409) also note: “[d]emocratic identifiers are thought to be poorer, 
less educated, more “ethnic,” and more urban than their Republican opposite 
numbers, and therefore the more “marginal” or “peripheral” voters.” Consequently, 
the Democrats should receive more votes when more peripheral voters (i.e., those 
who vote occasionally) come to the polls.  
However, an increase in turnout may affect vote choice in different ways. 
Studying U.S. congressional voting in the period from the late 1930s through the 
middle 1960s, DeNardo (1980) revealed that signs of the slopes tend to be positive 
where the Republicans were a majority and negative where the Democrats 
dominated. Trying to explain this finding, DeNardo presumed that rates of defection 
are higher among peripheral voters, in contrast to core voters whose party 
preferences are more stable. It follows therefrom that only the minority party (either 
the Democrats or the Republicans) should benefit from high turnout. This 
proposition has been tasted later based on the U.S. congressional county-level data 
from 1948 through 2000 by Hansford and Gomez (2010). Using election day rainfall 
as an instrumental variable for voter choice to account for possible endogeneity 
between turnout and electoral choice, they found a positive effect of turnout on the 
Democratic vote but only in Republican counties. Nevertheless, the two-effect 
theory of DeNardo was not confirmed by Godbout (2013) who also employed an 
instrumental variable approach but used the mean statewide turnout rate outside a 
specific congressional district as an instrument instead of the level of rainfall. He 
supposed that the influence of turnout on the incumbent vote share is conditional 
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on the presidential vote in the district. This supposition was confirmed, however, 
higher turnout in marginal Democratic districts (where the same party presidential 
support was low) did not appear to increase the Democratic vote share, and high 
turnout in strong Democratic districts was not favorable to the Republicans. 
DeNardo’s hypothesis was also rejected by Martinez and Gill (2005) who used 
individual-level data of the 1960–2000 American National Election Studies to 
simulate electoral effects of turnout by adding or removing the respondents with the 
lowest or the highest probability of abstaining. By changing turnout in this wise, 
they found that the defection rate was nearly constant as the simulated turnout 
increased in the presidential elections of 1960–1976. The results of the following 
election years were more favorable to DeNardo’s model but Martinez and Gill found 
no instance of Republicans being advantaged by high turnout when they were the 
minority party.61  
Grofman, Owen and Collet (1999) put forward a third explanation of the effect of 
turnout on the vote. High turnout rate in hard times may indicate an intention of 
peripheral voters to unseat the incumbent at the polls. Hansford and Gomez (2010: 
280) found a confirmation for this hypothesis: turnout exerts a positive effect on 
Democratic vote share for 95% of the observations in which there is a Republican 
incumbent and a pro-Republican effect in very Democratic counties when there is a 
Democratic incumbent. Hansford and Gomez (2010) also argue that high turnout 
makes electoral outcomes less predictable. Hence, the effect of turnout on the vote 
is not straightforward. Only the first explanation (if those who are more likely to 
vote share common social and demographic characteristics with incumbent voters) 
coincides with the positive relationship predicted by the electoral fraud theory. In 
several other cases the effect of high turnout can arguably be negative for the 
incumbent vote and therefore cannot be attributed to electoral fraud. For better 
understanding of the relationship between turnout and the vote, this subsection 
focuses on possible intervening variables that may influence both variables and 
examines their potential effects relatively to effects of electoral fraud. 
In different national contexts, scholars have demonstrated that turnout is 
influenced by such institutional variables as district magnitude, type of electoral 
system and type of elections – parliamentary or presidential (Jackman and Miller 
                                                          
61
 Martinez and Gill (2005: 1251) also underline the most essential weakness of DeNardo’s argument:  it 
assumes that both weak partisans defect at similar rates (for example, 50/50) but provides no theoretical 
ground for this assumption. Indeed, it is unclear why electoral preferences among peripheral voters should 
necessarily differ from voter preferences of core voters as such (i.e., if no other variables such as demographic 
characteristics play a role). 
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1995; Blais 2000). In our case, these variables are of little interest since they are 
constants rather than variables in the Russian context. The literature shows that 
there is no well-marked relationship between turnout and such socioeconomic 
variables as level of urbanization and economic development since the direction of 
relationship changes under the influence of other variables and in different national 
contexts (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Fornos, Power and Garand 2004; 
Kuenzi, Lambright 2007).  
The most important variables in our case, which can vary from one polling 
station to another, are age and education. It has been proven that both variables 
have a positive relationship with turnout (Blais 2000; Milligan, Moretti and 
Oreopoulos 2004; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Yet studies have shown that the 
proportion of pensioners and people with higher education can explain only a small 
share of the variance of turnout in Russia’s regions (Moraski 2002; Reisinger and 
Moraski 2008). It is also considered that the anticipation of close electoral outcomes 
increases turnout (Franklin 2004). Nevertheless, in the case of national elections it 
should be assumed that the perception of vote decisiveness does not vary between 
polling stations since voters are likely to assess the candidates’ chances of success 
throughout the country in general rather than at a particular polling station. To 
clarify the influence of the variables under consideration on turnout, I run five 
logistic regression models using survey data on the Russian presidential elections 
between 1996 and 2012.62  
Table 3.4 shows that the explanatory variables have the theoretically predicted 
signs. Age appears to be the strongest predictor of turnout; it is significant in all 
election-year models. At the personal level, keeping all other variables at their 
means, the predicted probability of turnout (as of 2012) for a young person (20 
years) is by 21.9% smaller than for an old person (70 years): 64.8% versus 86.7%, 
respectively. The variable of education follows second. Its significance decreases 
over time. The effect reached its maximum in 1996 when the predicted probability 
of turnout for the most educated respondents was by 11.0% larger than for the less 
                                                          
62
 The analysis employs the data of the Courier – a series of repeated surveys on general social issues carried 
out beginning from 1992 onwards. The survey of 1996 (Courier 1996-18) was carried out by the Russian Public 
Opinion Research Center (VCIOM) in the period between the first and second round of the presidential election 
(25.06.1996 – 27.06.1996). The fieldwork of all other surveys took place soon after the presidential elections of 
2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 were held. Courier 2000-14 was done by VCIOM (31.03.2000 – 03.04.2000). All 
subsequent surveys were performed by the Levada-Center: Courier 2004-5 (18.03.2004 – 23.03.2004), Courier 
2008-4 (14.03.2008 – 18.03.2008), and Courier 2012-5 (16.03.2012 – 19.03.2012). The data were kindly 
provided by the Joint Economic and Social Data Archive (available at: 
http://sophist.hse.ru/db/oprosy.shtml?ts=6&en=0). 
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educated ones. Our main variables of interest (trust in incumbent candidates and 
trust in the major opponent Gennady Zyuganov)63 do not show stable effects over 
time: the effect is positive for Zyuganov in 1996 and 2000 and positive for both 
Zyuganov and Putin in 2008 and 2012. This may hastily be interpreted as 
counterevidence against the assumption of Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky’s method 
since stronger trust in a candidate leads to higher probability of turnout and, more 
likely, to actual voting for this candidate, too.  
Table 3.4. Explanation of turnout in the five Russian presidential elections: Logistic 
regression models 
DV: Turnout 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Constant 
.263* 
(-2.21) 
.365* 
(-2.15) 
.047*** 
(-6.26) 
.089*** 
(-4.28) 
.268** 
(-2.83) 
Gender (female) 
-.0082 
(-.46) 
.0032 
(.15) 
-.0162 
(-.77) 
.0389 
(1.68) 
.0546* 
(2.09) 
Age  
.0039*** 
(5.53) 
.0048*** 
(5.29) 
.0118*** 
(11.97) 
.0041*** 
(4.44) 
.0044*** 
(3.93) 
Education (higher)b 
.0584*** 
(4.02) 
.0331*** 
(3.65) 
.0216*** 
(3.51) 
.0143* 
(2.34) 
.0122 
(1.65) 
Things in the Country Go in the 
Right Direction 
.0494* 
(2.38) 
.0429 
(1.77) 
.0383 
(1.65) 
.0584* 
(2.11) 
.1031*** 
(3.51) 
Personal Income (rubles) 
2.3e-5 
(.81) 
8.6e-7 
(.06) 
-8.2e-6 
(-1.48) 
-5.2e-6* 
(-2.31) 
-1.3e-6  
(-.79) 
Last-Year Change in Personal 
Material Conditions (better) 
.0062 
(.63) 
n.a.a n.a.a 
.0423** 
(2.83) 
-.003 
(-.23) 
Pensioner 
-.0186 
(-.73) 
-.0315 
(-.86) 
-.0794 
(-1.89) 
-.0323 
(-.76) 
-.0157 
(-.34) 
Trust in Zyuganov 
.1111*** 
(3.91) 
.063* 
(2.04) 
.099 
(1.57) 
.1843*** 
(3.88) 
.1363** 
(3.11) 
Trust in Yeltsin (1996) / Putin 
(2000–2012)c 
.021 
(.89) 
.0309 
(1.17) 
.0151 
(.6) 
.1067*** 
(4.05) 
.1091** 
(3.45) 
Trust No One 
-.1132*** 
(-5.0) 
-.1325*** 
(-4.47) 
-.0492 
(-1.47) 
.0041 
(.1) 
-.0493  
(-1.33) 
Rural Aread n.a.a n.a.a 
-.0199 
(-.85) 
.0705* 
(2.48) 
-.0563 
(-1.93) 
Number of obs.e 1197 1175 1098 1106 1091 
Log likelihood -417.61 -504.76 -446.15 -514.27 -557.15 
Pseudo R-squared .13 .098 .226 .093 .089 
Note: Entries, except the constant that is odds ratio, are conditional marginal effects 
(CMEs) with z-values in parentheses. The CMEs can be roughly interpreted as β-coefficients 
in the OLS models, i.e., as a change in the dependent variable, which is the probability of 
                                                          
63
 Trust in a candidate is used as a proxy for his electoral support. The direct measure of the electoral choice 
would imply using multinomial logistic regression, yet it would make testing our alternative explanation of 
turnout as a product of diffuse support for elections problematic. Besides that, trust in a candidate partially 
helps to overcome the endogeneity problem so far as the relationship between the level of trust and turnout is 
of the less simultaneous nature than the relationship between candidate vote and turnout. 
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turnout, resulted from one-unit change in the predictor variable64. a. Indicates that the 
question had not been asked in the survey. b. The variable of education has 3 ranks in 
1996, 6 ranks in 2000, and 8 ranks in 2004–2012. c. Even though Medvedev was formally 
the incumbent in 2008, I use trust in Putin to predict turnout in 2008 inasmuch as 
Medvedev’s legitimacy is derived from Putin’s legitimacy. Using trust in Medvedev does not 
substantively change the results. d. The variable of rural area is coded 1 if the responded 
lives in the village and 0 if residence is the city of any size. e. The number of observations is 
smaller than the average sample’s size (1600) due to the filtered responses “do not know” 
and “no answer”. Significant at: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
However, we should more correctly infer from the table that it rather confirms 
findings of the previous studies suggesting that turnout is an outcome of trust in 
electoral process (Birch 2010; Carreras and İrepoğlu 2013; Gerber et al. 2013; 
Simpser 2013: Ch. 7) or even of such broader phenomenon as general political 
trust, which includes trust in political institutions, trust in political actors, 
satisfaction with government, and satisfaction with democracy (Dalton 2004: Ch. 8; 
Grönlund and Setälä 2007; Wang 2016). To support this assertion, I include the 
variable of trust no one in the models.65 It is strongly significant in election years 
1996 and 2000 and accounts for a decrease in the probability of turnout by 11.3% 
and 13.3%, respectively. The absence of significance in the subsequent years, 
however, does not indicate the absence of the effect in these years. It should be 
understood that trust in politicians and trust no one are two competing and to a 
considerable extent mutually exclusive explanations. While the former is associated 
with both specific and diffuse political support, the latter refers only to diffuse 
support for elections (Easton 1975). Namely, those respondents who trust in one of 
the major candidates, besides this specific political support, tend also to trust in 
elections as a political institution inasmuch as their most-trusted candidates 
participate in electoral contest. Those who trust no one have more incentives to 
distrust the entire electoral process so far as they do not see any candidate who 
                                                          
64
 I tried running analogous multilevel logistic regression models with coefficients varying by region. The results 
appeared to be pretty similar to those reported in the table (throughout all models, individual z-values did not 
deviate by more than 1.03 unit, the median absolute deviation of z-values between the models amounted to 
0.16). Unfortunately, conditional marginal effects cannot be obtained from the multilevel model (the estimated 
coefficients and odds ratios are much less informative) and the multilevel model does not show a goodness of 
fit (pseudo R-squared). For these reasons, Table 3.4 presents the ordinary logistic regression models. 
65
 The questionnaire contains a long list of the most relevant politicians for each year (from the minimum of 37 
in 2000 to the maximum of 55 in 2008). The question asks to select five or six most-trusted politicians 
(therefore, a simultaneous selection of the incumbent and the competitor is possible, yet this proportion is 
small and varies from the minimum of 0.7% in 1996 to the maximum of 7.8% in 2000). At the end of the list, the 
respondent is offered an option “trust no one” or “there are no such [politicians]”. The share of trusted no one 
was 13.6% in 1996, 17.0% in 2000, 13.5% in 2004, 9.1% in 2008, and 13.7% in 2012, i.e., it was the third major 
candidate throughout 1996–2012. 
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might represent them. Therefore, due to the lack of diffuse support for elections as 
a political institution, they less likely come to the polls. In other words, the 
skepticism toward elections prevailed in determining turnout in 1996 and 2000, 
then the pattern has changed and the positive motivation to political participation 
became more important. It should be noted that if these competing explanations 
were entered in the models independently, they would not mutually suppress each 
other and their explanatory power would rise.66  
A similar conclusion can be made regarding the variable of general social 
satisfaction – a positive response to the statement that things in the country go in 
the right direction. The variable is strongly significant in 2012, weakly significant in 
1996 and 2008, and insignificant in 2000 and 2004. This relatively small level of 
significance is again due to the fact that the variable measures a particular type of 
social support, and therefore it competes with the variables of political support. If 
the variables of trust in politicians and trust no one were excluded, the level of 
significance of the general social satisfaction would accordingly increase.67 Since 
the general social satisfaction is a product of all policies in the county, this fact also 
confirms the assertion that turnout is an outcome of various types of political 
support. 
Other variables in the models do not reach a sufficient level of statistical 
significance. The probability of turnout for women is by 5.5% larger, yet this 
estimate is significant only in 2012. Contrary to Reisinger and Moraski (2008), who 
relied on statistical cross-regional data, our models do not find confirmation for the 
proposition that pensioners more likely participate in elections. Once the variable of 
age is controlled for, we do not need to know whether the respondent is pensioner 
or not to predict the propensity to vote. The level of personal income and the last-
year change in personal welfare do generally not impact the probability of turnout. 
Perhaps the most unexpected finding is that urbanization demonstrates no 
consistent effect on turnout. It is a well-known fact that officially reported electoral 
data show higher levels of turnout in the rural area, even in the 1990s (Moraski 
2002) when electoral fraud was not so widespread.68 Nevertheless, respondents who 
                                                          
66
 I ran analogous logistic models as in Table 5 but without the variables of trust in Yeltsin / Putin and Zyuganov. 
The effect of trust no one was always significant and negative with the smallest z-value = 2.09 and the average 
z-value = 4.34. If the variable of trust no one is excluded from the models, the effects of trust in Yeltsin / Putin 
and Zyuganov are enhanced: they become significant, except the election year 2004; the average Zyuganov z-
value increases to 3.6 and the average Yeltsin / Putin z-value increases to 3.11. 
67
 The average z-value between 1996 and 2012 would be equal 3.14 in this case. 
68
 It is common wisdom that incumbent vote shares and turnout rates are also higher in the regions with 
republican status, i.e., in predominantly non-Russian regions. Unfortunately, out of our five surveys, only the 
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lived in the rural area more probably participated only in the election of 2008, their 
predicted probability is by 7.1% larger compared with those who lived in the city; 
the effects of 2004 and 2012 are negative and insignificant. 
Joining all findings together, we may conclude that 1) the positive relationship 
between trust in a candidate (as opposed to trust no one) and turnout reflects 
diffuse support for elections as a political institution; and 2) even if the relationship 
between trust in a candidate and turnout exists, it is positive for both incumbent 
and opposition candidates, it is not negative for opposition candidates as in most 
cases of electoral fraud (Lukinova, Maygkov and Ordeshook 2011; Myagkov, 
Ordeshook and Shakin 2009: Ch. 3). Furthermore, the explanatory power of the 
models is small (the average R-squared = 12.7%) and the effects described above 
exist at the personal level. If we are realists, we should admit that no two regions, 
territories or polling stations exist where the average age, as well as any other 
variable, ranges within the same minimal and maximal values as in the national 
surveys (i.e., from 18 to > 70, as age ranges). The differences between regions or 
polling stations are much more moderate than the ranges at the personal level. 
Therefore, according to the results from Table 3.4, we cannot expect to empirically 
observe that a 20-percent increase in trust in the incumbent would translate into 
nearly the same increase in turnout as follows from Figure 2.4, for example.69  
The prior analysis examined the possible explanations of turnout, including 
trust in candidates as a proxy for their electoral support. The second question is to 
what extent potentially intervening variables can account for incumbent’s vote.70 To 
answer this question, Table 3.5 presents the vote for the incumbent being explained 
by the same set predictors as in Table 3.4, excluding the variables of trust. It 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
survey of 2000 asks the respondents about their ethnicity (whether they are Russians, members of indigenous 
nationality of the republic, half-Russians or of other ethnic origin). I included the variable of ethnicity in the 
model (as in Table 3.4) as a factor with Russians specified as the reference category. None of other ethnic 
groups appeared to be significantly different relatively to Russians with regard to their probability of turnout. 
This result persisted in various model specifications. For the reasons of parsimony and because the variable of 
ethnicity is not available for other election years, I do not use it in the main analysis.  
69
 Consider the most influential variable – age. Keeping all other variables at their means, shifting the median 
regional age in the sample of 2012 from its minimum of 39 (Stavropol Krai and Altai Krai) to the maximum of 51 
(Lipetskaya Oblast and Kostromskaya Oblast) translates into an increase in the predicted probability of turnout 
from 74.8 to 80.1 percent. Alternatively, we may use the data of Rosstat (2013a) on the population 
composition. In this case, all else being equal, a shift from the 5
th
 percentile (32.2 years, the level of Dagestan) 
to the 95
th
 percentile (41.7 years, the level of Pskov Oblast) increases the probability of turnout from 71.5 to 
76.1 percent. Although the demographical statistic is not available at lower levels, one may reasonably suppose 
that these effects are much smaller between municipalities and absent or infinitesimal between two adjacent 
polling stations. 
70
 I use incumbent’s vote as the dependent variable because the main question is about the independence of 
the vote share from turnout. However, if the variable of trust in incumbent is used instead, the results would 
be very much similar to those presented in the main text. 
  
124 
 
follows from the table that the probability to vote for the incumbent is primarily 
explained by a single variable of the general social satisfaction.71 If respondents 
agree that things in the country go in the right direction, their propensity to vote for 
the incumbent increases by 43.0% on average between 1996 and 2012. It might 
have been a key intervening variable between turnout and incumbent’s vote, yet its 
effect on turnout is much weaker and insignificant in 2000 and 2004 as indicated 
in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.5. Explanation of incumbent’s vote in the five Russian presidential 
elections: Logistic regression models 
DV: Voted for the Incumbent 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Constant 
.0649*** 
(-4.96) 
.2428*** 
(-3.89) 
.1507*** 
(-5.26) 
.1439** 
(-2.94) 
.0303*** 
(-7.37) 
Gender (female) 
.0527 
(1.44) 
.0429 
(1.36) 
.1219*** 
(3.98) 
.1142*** 
(3.99) 
.1382*** 
(3.8) 
Age  
-.0015 
(-.99) 
.0029* 
(2.09) 
.0028** 
(2.18) 
-.0019 
(-1.61) 
.0058*** 
(3.82) 
Education (higher) 
.0033 
(.12) 
-1.1e-5 
(-.0) 
.0048 
(.58) 
.0021 
(.28) 
.0022 
(.21) 
Things in the Country Go in the 
Right Direction 
.5996*** 
(15.59) 
.3851*** 
(11.88) 
.3532*** 
(11.13) 
.2676*** 
(8.73) 
.5452*** 
(13.62) 
Personal Income (rubles) 
-1.2e-5 
(-.36) 
-5.1e-5* 
(-2.08) 
-3.3e-8 
(-.0) 
4.5e-6 
(1.16) 
-5.5e-6* 
(-2.02) 
Last-Year Change in Personal 
Material Conditions (better) 
.0516* 
(2.45) 
n.a. n.a. 
.0559** 
(3.13) 
.0208 
(1.09) 
Pensioner 
.0261 
(.49) 
-.0715 
(-1.38) 
-.0365 
(-.78) 
-.0045 
(-.1) 
-.0491 
(-.83) 
Rural Area n.a. n.a. 
-.0311 
(-.92) 
.0558 
(1.69) 
.0614 
(1.49) 
Number of obs. 1132 1171 1210 .875 1026 
Log likelihood -494.5 -727.9 -749.4 -402.2 -575.8 
Pseudo R-squared .284 .099 .093 .164 .189 
Note: Entries, except the constant that is odds ratio, are conditional marginal effects 
with z-values in parentheses. See notes to Table 3.4 for more details. Significant at: *p < 
0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
The effects of the other variables are generally incommensurable with those in 
Table 3.4. Women appear to vote for Putin and Medvedev by 11.4 to 13.8 percent 
more but this holds true only in 2004–2012. Age exerts a strong impact on 
incumbent’s vote, commensurable with its effect on turnout in Table 3.4, but only 
in 2012; the effect is twice smaller in 2000 and 2004 and insignificant in 1996 and 
                                                          
71
 I tried to run the models without the variable of general social satisfaction. Significance of other variables 
slightly increased, without a change in the overall pattern, yet explanatory power of the models expressed as 
pseudo R-squared dropped to 3.4 percent on average between 1996 and 2012. 
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2008. The variables associated with personal welfare are rather sporadically 
significant. In contrast to Table 3.4, education does not determine vote for the 
incumbent in any year. The status of pensioner and urbanization are insignificant 
as well.  
In the aggregate, the vote for incumbent is predicted by the same factors that 
determine turnout in a very limited extent only. Drawing inferences from Table 3.5 
additionally to Table 3.4, we cannot again conclude that a 20-percent increase in 
any potentially intervening variable would translate into a similar increase in the 
incumbent’s vote share as it may occur in the case of electoral fraud. In fact, no 
such effect was found even in the United States where the similarity of demographic 
profile between core voters and Republican voters is more evident.72 Thus, the 
simultaneous impact of potentially intervening variables on turnout and 
incumbent’s vote is much less influential than electoral fraud and, therefore, not 
essential for further research.  
The Normality of Distribution 
Third, the conventionally recognized assertion is that having not been exposed to 
fraud, turnout takes the shape of a normal distribution and ballot stuffing causes 
the distribution to become bimodal (Myagkov and Ordeshook 2008; Myagkov, 
Ordeshook and Shakin 2005, 2009; Lukinova, Maygkov and Ordeshook 2011). The 
distribution of turnout can indeed be bimodal if ballot stuffing takes place at 
several polling stations. Yet if ballots were stuffed at all or almost all polling stations 
irrespective of the type of stuffing – “directively” (approximately the same percent at 
all stations) or randomly – the turnout distribution may still remain normal. 
Moreover, as Figure 2.3 shows, falsification may affect only the vote share without 
impacting turnout thereby allowing it to remain normally shaped. The exception 
here may again be attributed to heterogeneity in the pooled data.  
                                                          
72
 Martinez and Gill (2005) estimated that a 40-percnt increase in turnout (from 51.2% to 91.2%) in the election 
of 1960 (when the relationship between turnout and the Democratic vote was the strongest) would have 
added 5.8% to Kennedy’s vote. The estimated effect in the subsequent election years amounted to 5.3% in 
1964, 3.6% in 1976, 3.7% in 1984, and 0.8% in 2000. Put otherwise, one unit change in turnout yields from 6.9 
to 50 times smaller change in in the vote. Similarly, based on their simulation, Hansford and Gomez (2010: 284) 
inferred that “a 4% swing in turnout leads to an average change in Democratic vote share at the national level 
of just less than one percentage point.” Following from Figure 4 in their article, a 40-percent increase in 
turnout (from 40% to 80%) raises the predicted Democratic vote share in an average county from about 40% to 
50%, and this holds true in cases with a Republican incumbent. If there is a Democratic incumbent (Figure 5), 
the effect of a 40-percent increase in turnout is negative, the Democratic vote share decreases from about 54% 
to 50%. 
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Shpilkin (2011), examining the distribution of the sum of raw votes in one-
percent turnout intervals in the elections of the 2007–2008 electoral cycle in 
Russia, found that votes for the incumbent candidates decreased at a slower rate 
on the right tail of the distribution and even continued to grow in the range near 
100%, while votes of the opposition candidates were more consistent with normal 
distribution. Then he created an algorithm to cut off the anomalous tail of the 
incumbent’s distribution of votes and calculated that the discrepancy between the 
official and predicted turnout in the Duma election was 13%, while the discrepancy 
of the United Russia votes was 8.42%; in the presidential election the turnout 
discrepancy was 13.77% and the discrepancy of votes for Medvedev was 7.32%.  
As stated earlier, the assumption of internal data homogeneity is an important 
condition for the validity of such tests. In Shpilkin’s analysis this requirement is not 
met. As a result, false relationships could be estimated as fraud. Figure 3.4 
replicates Shpilkin’s analysis for the presidential election of 2012. The number of 
anomalous votes for the pooled data is beginning to grow when turnout transcends 
60%. The 12 million anomalous votes overall account for 7.2% of the official vote 
share of Putin. In the more recent paper, Shpilkin with colleagues implemented a 
more accurate calculation performed separately for urban and rural territories and 
for nine republics, which yields a much smaller amount – about 7 million (4 %) of 
anomalous votes for Putin (Kobak, Shpilkin and Pshenichnikov 2012: 4).  
However, applying the method to region-level data gives rise to several 
difficulties. If the left tail of the distribution is normal-shaped then defining the first 
local maximum is a simple task but it can be undefinable for heavily distorted 
distributions. In Dagestan, for example, fitting votes of all other candidates to the 
highest peak of Putin’s votes produces a negative estimate of anomalous votes that 
slightly increases the official vote share from 93.2 to 93.5 percent. Although 
distributions of votes in Tatarstan and Mordovia have nothing in common with 
normality, the left tails allow fitting the votes line for all the other candidates to the 
one of Putin. The official vote shares for Putin substantively stand out from the 
“corrected” vote shares: 83 versus 73 percent in Tatarstan and 88 versus 71 
percent in Mordovia, respectively. What do not look trustworthy are the unusually 
small turnout rates – 51% in Tatarstan and 37% in Mordovia – estimated given the 
number of anomalous votes. The fallacy of the method is that it treats votes cast for 
opposition candidates as a benchmark. A common feature of blatantly falsified 
elections, however, is that opposition votes are counted for the incumbent or there 
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may be no vote count at all but artificial numbers can be drawn in return sheets in 
a haphazard way instead. 
Figure 3.4. Shpilkin’s method in application to the pooled data and three Russia’s 
regions  
 
Note: All other’s votes are the sum of votes cast for all candidates except Putin (equal to 
valid votes subtracted by Putin’s votes). The multiplicative coefficients were defined after 
fitting lines of all other’s votes with Putin’s votes. Anomalous votes are the difference 
between Putin’s votes and all other’s votes multiplied by the coefficient. 
Klimek, Yegorov, Hanel and Thurner (2012) proposed another distribution-based 
method for election irregularities detection that assumes normality of distribution. 
They estimated a measure of incremental fraud based on the difference between 
theoretically modeled and empirically observed analogues of the mean (the first 
local maximum) and a left(right)-sided standard deviation from the mean (  
    
  . 
As the authors show, standard measures of skewness and kurtosis for turnout and 
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vote share are not distinguishable between fraud-alleged and fraud-free elections 
(both statistically deviate from normality), while the measures of incremental and 
extreme fraud strongly exceed zero for elections in Russia and Uganda.  
Mebane, Egami, Klaver and Wall (2014) and Mebane (2016) found several 
statistical shortcomings in Klimek’s method and modified it. Using different 
approaches to fitting models (based on chi-squared and finite mixture model 
estimated via EM algorithm), they found that the estimates of incremental fraud (  ), 
extreme fraud (  ), and the parameter α differ largely between these three types of 
fitting. For example, the estimated probability of incremental fraud in California for 
the 2008 presidential election from the original model is equal to 0.996 (i.e., almost 
all votes are falsified), the chi-squared model’s estimate is equal to 0.88, and the 
finite mixture model’s estimate indicates nearly no fraud (0.0006) (Mebane et al. 
2014: Table 1). For the Russian 2011 parliamentary election (at the precinct level), 
the original estimate of    signalizes fraud with the probability of 0.998 (Klimek et 
al. (2012: 16472), however, estimated it at 0.64), chi-squared-based    = 0.238, and 
finite mixture-based    = 0.429. To demonstrate that the modified method 
outperforms the original version, the authors, in particular, predict the incidence of 
various post-electoral complaints in the 2009 German election by   ,   , α, and the 
interaction between them. While the original model’s terms are significant only in 
predicting two types of complaints, the chi-squared model’s terms are significant in 
predicting all six types of complaints. Nevertheless, out of these six models, main 
and interaction effects are never simultaneously significant at least at 0.05 level,73 
signs of the effects are multidirectional between the models, thereby inconsistently 
indicating that in some cases the effects of the measures of fraud on post-electoral 
complaints are negative, and the number of individual type complaints is too small 
to build several models instead pooling all complaints into one.74 In any case, the 
discrepancy between estimates of chi-squared and finite mixture models is far from 
reasonable and rather casts doubt on the modified version of Klimek’s method. 
Although    and    are probabilities with which each type of fraud occurs (i.e., 
units of measurement that can hardly be converted into vote shares), Mebane 
(2016: Table 1) presents the estimated vote shares for the Russian presidential and 
                                                          
73
 In “Campaigning” model, the interaction term is significant at 0.10 level. In other cases, at least one variable 
is completely insignificant. 
74
 “Polling Place”, “Party List”, and “Campaigning” are exceptions (17.1%, 13.4%, and 9.2% of reported 
complaints per the number of observations, respectively), the percentages of other complaint types are too 
small: “Statistics” – 4.9%, “Counting” – 3.7%, and “Criminal” – 1.8%. See: Mebane et al. (2014: Table 3). A 
model with pooled complaints as well as one without the interaction term is not reported. 
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parliamentary elections. These estimates are, however, non-realistic – the amount 
of fraud is small and the estimates sometimes exceed the official incumbent’s vote: 
0.1% in 2004, –1.7% in 2007 (predicted = 66%, official = 64.3%), 1.2% in 2008, 
1.3% in 2011, and –1.7% in 2012 (predicted = 66%, official = 63.3%). Even in the 
“worst election ever in Russia” the difference between the official and predicted 
United Russia’s vote share amounts to 5.2% (Kalinin and Mebane 2016: Table 2). 
Finally, Klimek et al. (2012) and the following papers do not account for 
heterogeneity of the data. Klimek and colleagues argue that their method is not 
vulnerable to the level of data – precincts, territories or regions (Table S3). To the 
contrary, Mebane et al. (2014: Table 1) show that the original and modified 
estimates of fraud vary widely between the levels of data. This can be explained by 
the fact that although a deviation from normality may be present in the pooled data, 
the distribution within lower-level territorial units can be nearly normal (see the 
distribution of votes in Dagestan in Figure 3.4, for example).  
Thus, among the distribution-based methods, Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky’s 
(1993) method seems to be the most relevant. It does not depend so crucially on the 
distribution of all other candidates’ votes as Shpilkin’s method (2011) and much 
simpler and unambiguous compared with Klimek and colleagues’ method (2012). It 
should be stressed, however, that in the application of all three distribution-based 
methods the authors do not control for data heterogeneity (a partial exception is 
Kobak, Shpilkin and Pshenichnikov 2012). As it was underlined earlier, meeting 
data homogeneity assumption is decisively important for the validity of distribution-
based methods. Therefore, any method from this set should be applied individually 
to each group of observations (ideally, at the first level of aggregation – TIKs in 
Russia) that can be deemed internally homogeneous.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed methods of electoral fraud detection with the focus on 
observational data-driven and electoral data-driven methods. It has provided 
arguments that observational data-driven methods can hardly be applied for 
estimating the exact amount of fraud; they rather capture the overall bias of the 
electoral playing field. Furthermore, perceptual data, from which various indices of 
electoral quality are constructed, may be inherently biased. Perceptions of the 
ordinary citizens may reflect a general dissatisfaction with the government rather 
than quality of elections, or citizens as well as experts may simply not be aware of 
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the exact extent of fraudulent practices. The allegations of fraud are ordinarily 
submitted by competing parties and therefore they are also potentially biased. 
Public opinion polls and exit polls are rather a poor alternative measure of the true 
vote since public surveys, equally as elections, can be subject to fraud in 
authoritarian regimes. While reports of electoral observers, especially if they are 
supplemented with copies of polling station protocols, are probably the most precise 
method in this group, their precision is crucially dependent on the degree of regime 
permissiveness regarding electoral monitoring and on the level of competence of 
observers. 
Electoral data-driven methods also have their limitations. However, they seem 
more advantageous at least because they require fewer resources (the only 
requirement is availability of the official electoral data at the precinct level). Sample-
based methods have an intrinsic deficiency related to the necessity of a priori 
accurate knowledge on the absence of fraud in the reference group. This 
requirement by no means always met. Although the analysis of the distribution of 
last digits reveals that vote percentages outperform raw numbers of votes 
conventionally tested by scholars for detecting fraud, the general verdict for digit-
based methods is that they do not allow estimating the overall number of falsified 
votes but rather capture a limited spectrum of electoral fraud. In particular, digit-
based methods do not detect fraudulent practices that occur before the vote count 
(vote buying, intimidation of voters, and ballot stuffing). Moreover, performance of 
digit-based methods can be decreased as a result of fraudsters’ awareness of 
inadmissibility of round numbers or human-generated numbers: they may use 
random number generators, change only the first or the first two digits but not the 
last one, they may also take numbers from the real world (numbers of their houses, 
rooms or anything of this kind) to fill them in polling stations protocols.  
Distribution-based methods are also not without limitations. In particular, 
validity of this group of methods is based on two assumptions: 1) the data are 
internally homogenous and 2) turnout and candidate votes are independent of each 
other. However, I have argued that these obstacles are surmountable primarily by 
analyzing precinct-level data separately for each territorial electoral commission 
(the first level of aggregation) – an approach that resembles hierarchical (multilevel) 
modeling. 
Finally, apart from performance of methods reviewed in this chapter, the 
question on authoritarian adaptation deserves at least a brief consideration. 
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Researchers noticed that studies on electoral fraud and types of electoral fraud 
perpetrated by dictators may be to some degree interrelated. Sjoberg (2013) argues 
that web cameras were used strategically in the 2008 parliamentary election in 
Azerbaijan in order to create an image of electoral transparency. Specifically, 
turnout was by 7% lower in polling stations where web cameras were installed, 
while incumbent’s vote share did not statistically differ between polling stations 
with and without online broadcast of the election process. Given than last-digit 
tests statistically indicate no fraud in polling stations without web cameras and a 
significant deviation from Benford’s law probabilities in polling stations with web 
cameras, Sjoberg inferred that fraudsters have simply used different types of fraud: 
they relied more on ballot stuffing in polling stations without online broadcasting 
and, in polling stations with web cameras, compensated the reduction in fictitious 
votes by tampering with vote count after the broadcast was over. The vulnerability 
of digit-based election forensics method is apprehended by Medzihorsky (2015: 515) 
when he notes that the method “can be invalidated by deliberate behavior on the 
part of the fraudsters. In case they would deem it worth the costs, the fraudsters 
can adopt a variety of simple tools that will allow them to fabricate numbers with 
any digit distribution they desire”. 
Such concerns are not groundless. Even if fraudsters do not read the literature 
on election forensics (that is highly probable), they have their own criminal wisdom 
and the ability of empirical learning from election to election. At any rate, all 
relevant sources of public awareness of fraud are monitored by authoritarian 
leaders, and if methods of election forensics appear among these sources, they will 
be learned and counteracted after a while. From an existential point of view, this is 
a controversy that will ever exist until the world leith in evil. The purpose for 
researchers, observers and all people of good will interested in detection and 
prevention of electoral fraud is to be at least one step ahead of those who perpetrate 
it. This implies not only the elaboration of new methods of election forensics but 
also viewing and studying electoral fraud from different angles. While fraudsters 
can adapt to one or few methods of detection of electoral anomalies, they can hardly 
manipulate electoral process so that the manipulation could be undetectable by all 
methods reviewed in this chapter. In this regard, electoral data-driven methods 
should necessarily be supplemented by impartial electoral observation, trustworthy 
public opinion polls, and the taking information gained from participants of 
electoral process into consideration. 
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Chapter 4. Boosting Up the Victory: Electoral Fraud in the Russian 
2000–2012 Presidential Elections 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to obtain robust region-level estimates of the initial 
(i.e., non-affected by fraud) vote shares for the incumbent presidents from 2000 to 
2012 that will be used for the analysis in Chapter 6. The nation-level vote share is 
also important, yet it is of minor interest. As has been shown in the previous 
chapter, distribution-based methods are more reliable than the others. As has also 
been pointed out, too, heterogeneity may be present at the higher levels of 
aggregation and cause biased estimates. Thus, the method developed in this section 
is essentially an extension of Sobyanin and Sukhovolsky’s (1993) approach applied 
separately to each territorial electoral commission (TIK), the first level of data 
aggregation, to avoid heterogeneity-related errors. 
As a point of departure, I suggest separating the estimation procedure into two 
parts corresponding to two theoretically and mathematically different types of 
estimators. The first estimator for the initial (i.e., non-fraudulent) election outcome 
yields a candidate’s vote share estimate based on quantile regression, or  
QR estimate. If subtracted from the officially reported vote share, the estimate 
transforms into the quantitatively estimated amount of fraud (in percentage points). 
The estimators of the second set correspond to the extent of deviation of the 
observed from the theoretically expected distribution of the vote, and they account, 
thereby, for qualitative assessment of fraud. For this purpose, I suggest using four 
measures of electoral fraud described later: QR fraud, the median absolute deviation 
of turnout and residuals (MADT and MADR, respectively), and chi-squared statistic 
for the deviation of the last-digit frequencies in the incumbent’s vote share from 
Benford’s law (     
 ).  
At the first glance, this variety of electoral fraud indicators may seem 
superfluous since the quantitative amount of fraud as the percentage-point 
difference between the official vote and the real electoral result is likely to be 
correlated with the general distortion of electoral data measured in abstract units. 
At the same time, both quantitative and qualitative magnitudes of fraud should not 
correlate with the vote share estimate (i.e., with the level of true vote). However, if 
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electoral data are extremely fraudulent, any quantitative vote share estimate 
intrinsically tends to be biased. As it was discussed in Chapter 2, electoral fraud 
may take multiple forms, including the most drastic of them – filling fictitious 
numbers in polling station protocols. A combination of these malicious practices is 
a common place in authoritarian elections: election day at an individual polling 
station may begin with some quantity of ballots already stuffed in the ballot box 
before voting process started, an additional amount of forged ballots can be stuffed 
in the result of “carousel” voting, ballots then can be deliberately miscounted, the 
members of polling station electoral commission can even “prettify” the reality by 
reporting a larger (also fictitious) number of incumbent’s votes to the territorial 
electoral commission (TIK), the members of TIK’s electoral commission can “adjust” 
the number before inputting it into the national electronic voting system (GAS 
“Vibory” in Russia), and finally there is no warranty that electoral data will not be 
manipulated in the electronic system. With each action of such forgery, electoral 
data diverge farther and farther from theoretically unbiased distribution that 
hampers drawing the formal inference regarding the initial (non-fraudulent) election 
result. 
Put differently, the bias in the vote share estimate increases with the amount of 
fraud. When electoral fraud is absent, the data are distributed in conformity with 
theoretical expectations and the vote share estimate demonstrates its maximal 
precision – it coincides with the official vote share. In the case of minor electoral 
malpractices, the data slightly diverges from theoretical expectations and there is 
relatively easy to “clean” it of fraud. This task becomes harder at considerable levels 
of fraud. And after some moment (in such cases where nearly all votes are counted 
as incumbent’s votes), any procedure for estimating the incumbent’s authentic vote 
share produces unreliable results. In this connection, having various qualitative 
measures of electoral fraud allows us to take this bias into account in two ways. 
First, the most unreliable observations with extreme levels of electoral data 
distortion can be filtered. This chapter uses cluster analysis for this purpose. 
Second, if the vote share estimate correlates with the qualitative measures of fraud, 
indicating thereby that bias exists, it can be detrended of this correlation. For this 
purpose, I regress the QR estimate on the four measures of fraud and other 
variables that are expected not to correlate with the vote share estimate and create 
an adjustment based on fitted values of the model. 
The results of the study confirm validity of this approach. First, on average 
between elections of 2000–2012, 145.5 out of 1936.3 TIKs have been attributed to 
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the 4th cluster in the result of cluster analysis. This cluster includes observations 
with extreme levels of fraud (the incumbent’s vote share is equal to 90.0%, on 
average between elections) the genuine share of the vote in which cannot be reliably 
estimated. The cluster is characterized by the minimal mixing probability, that is, it 
apparently the most distinct cluster. Second, as expected, the estimated 
incumbent’s vote share is dependent on the amount of fraud measured by the four 
qualitative variables of fraud and on two auxiliary variables. The models explain 
54.9%, 55.4%, 43.8%, and 27.4% of the QR estimate’s variance in 2012, 2008, 
2004, and 2000, respectively. As Appendix D6 show, this relationship varies by 
cluster: it is modest (R-squared = 16.1%, on average in 2000–2012) in the 1st 
cluster (the cluster of the least fraud) and increases to its maximum (R-squared = 
56.6%, on average in 2000–2012) in the 3rd cluster (the cluster of widespread 
fraud). The results of the analysis show the following ranking of the presidential 
elections according to the scope of electoral fraud: 1 – 2000, 2 – 2004, 3 – 2012, 
and 4 – 2008, whereas the largest difference is detected between the election of 
2000 and all subsequent elections. 
This chapter unfolds as follows. The first section develops a method for 
estimating the initial (i.e., non-falsified) incumbent’s vote share based on quantile 
regression. The second and third sections introduce three qualitative measures of 
electoral fraud. I do not dwell specifically on the description of the fourth measure 
of fraud (     
 ) since this was done in Chapter 3. In two subsequent sections, these 
measures are used in cluster analysis and in regression modeling to make an 
adjustment for the quantile regression estimate of the incumbent’s vote share. 
Since the algorithm for estimating electoral fraud is identical between elections, I 
use electoral data of the recent presidential election of 2012 in the main text and 
report the results of the analysis for the elections of 2008, 2004, and 2000 in 
Appendix D3, D4, and D5, respectively. The penultimate section presents a 
comparison between the elections of 2000–2012 based on the elaborated measures 
of fraud to trace the dynamics of electoral fraud throughout the period of study. 
Finally, findings of the chapter, including theoretical implications regarding the role 
of electoral fraud in electoral authoritarian regimes, are summarized in the 
conclusion. 
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QR Estimate 
It was remarked in the previous chapter that in a fraud-free electoral contest, given 
the estimated equation   
          , β should approximately equal the 
candidate’s vote share and α should equal zero. On this basis, the β-coefficient is a 
straightforward measure of the estimated vote share. Electoral fraud, however, 
causes α to deviate from zero and β to exceed the share of the candidate’s vote. The 
idea of robust estimation is to find a measure that allows us to estimate the 
equation at that level of the conditional distribution where α approaches zero. This 
condition may be met inasmuch as not all observations are typically exposed to 
fraud. To cope with this task statistically, the analysis relies on quantile regression. 
In brief, quantile regression is a method to study the relationship between 
variables at different levels of their conditional distribution (Koenker 2005; Davino, 
Furno and Vistocco 2013). Applications of quantile regression are well known in 
many quantitative fields of research including economics and econometrics, 
medicine, ecology, biology and environmental studies, yet not in political science 
and sociology (Hao and Lingxin 2007).  
This methodological lag seems quite unexpected given that the quantile 
regression approach is advantageous at least for two reasons. First, quantile 
regression substantially outperforms traditional least squares regression over a 
wide class of moderately skewed distributions with outliers, which particularly 
appear in fraudulent electoral data. Low robustness of the OLS estimator to outliers 
and its poor performance in many non-Gaussian, especially long-tailed, 
distributions has been a rationale for introducing “regression quantiles” (Koenker 
and Basset 1978). While the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator minimizes the 
sum of squared deviations thereby attributing disproportional weight to outlying 
observations, the quantile regression (QR) estimator avoids the problem related to 
squaring by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations.  
Second, quantile regression makes possible to obtain estimates varying by levels 
(quantiles) of the conditional distribution when the homoscedasticity assumption is 
not met. In particular, this tool can be especially useful for distinguishing between 
fraudulent and non-fraudulent observations in electoral data. Specifically, different 
types of electoral fraud commonly lead to an upward shift of the affected 
observations on the scale of turnout or the vote share or on both, whereas non-
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affected observations remain located at lower levels and can be tapped by 
corresponding (lower) regression quantiles.  
Thus, the QR estimate of the initial (i.e., not-affected by fraud) vote share is 
computed according to the following algorithm applied to each group of cases  , 
which is a territorial electoral commission (TIK), where the cases (i.e., the units of 
analysis) are precinct electoral commissions (UIKs):75 
i) The set of QR models76   
           is estimated at τ = 0.05, 0.1, 
0.15,..., 0.5,77 where tau denotes regression quantile,   
  denotes the 
number of votes cast for the incumbent candidate I,     denotes the 
number of eligible voters, hence   
     signifies the absolute vote share of 
the incumbent and    refers to turnout.78  
ii) The model having the closest to zero intercept, or equivalently  
QR model at tau|α->0, is chosen from this set of ten models. 
iii) Given the model’s parameter estimates, the estimated share of 
incumbent’s votes   
  in valid votes   , or QR estimate, is defined by the 
formula:       ̂  (    ̅  (     ̅ 79, where   ̅ is the mean of turnout. 
Consider, for example, the presidential election of 2012 in Voronezh Oblast (see 
Figure 4.1). The population-weighted means of α = -0.076, β = 0.658 (see the dot-
dash line), and turnout = 0.671. Firstly, we calculate the predicted absolute share 
of Putin’s votes (the right-hand side of the equation in step iii):  
                                                          
75
 In the Russian 2012 presidential election, the number of UIKs (excluding the territory abroad the country) 
amounted to 95,039, the number of TIKs was equal to 2,742, and these were subordinate to 83 regional 
electoral commissions. In other federal elections these numbers are slightly different. 
76
 For computation details see Koenker (2006), Appendix A in Davino et al. (2013), and Appendix D2 in this 
dissertation. 
77
 In this simple version described hereafter, the candidate is presumably a beneficiary of rigged votes, hence 
using tau at higher levels is unreasonable. A more complex approach in more uncertain circumstances would 
be testing probabilities of fraud between several candidates, involving the full range of quantiles. 
78
 To avoid a bias related to small number of cases in the model, only TIKs having twenty and more UIKs are 
included in the analysis. Since QR assumes variability in conditional quantiles, TIKs having zero standard 
deviations of the absolute vote share (that usually corresponds to 100% of the vote in all precincts) have also 
been filtered. Applying these criteria to the presidential election of 2012 gives 85,905 valid cases out of total 
95,424 UIKs grouped into 2,047 TIKs (out of the overall 2,744 TIKs) and accountable for 100,323,739 eligible 
voters in the election (out of the total 109,860,331 voters). 
79
  Note: since the QR model is based on the absolute vote share [  
    ], the notation (    ̅  transforms 
  
     estimate obtained at the given level of turnout [     ̅] into the ordinary vote share [  
    ]. A simpler 
approach for obtaining   
     would be a summation of α and β at     . However, the former approach is 
preferable since the estimate obtained at the central point of the turnout distribution is more robust than the 
marginal estimate in cases where α deviates from zero. 
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      ̂                          . Then we define the relative (ordinary) vote 
share:       ̂  (                     or 54.6 percent. 
QR Fraud 
Having obtained QR model parameter estimates at tau = 0.5, we may proceed to 
defining the first qualitative measure of electoral fraud that is hereinafter denoted 
by QR fraud. It was shown in Chapter 2 that the function of ballot stuffing is 
  
          , while values of β higher than one indicate rewriting of electoral 
commissions’ protocols with transferring votes from one candidate to another. 
Hence, the idea behind QR fraud is to measure the extent to which the parameters 
of quantile regression correspond to this empirical prediction by using the ratio of 
Y-intercepts at      and      obtained from QR model   
           at τ = 0.5. 
Thus, QR fraud is defined as follows: 
     
 
  (    
 
QR fraud takes negative values if the candidate benefited from fraud and 
positive values if fraud ended up with vote loss, whereas zero value indicates the 
absence of fraud. In quantitative terms, QR fraud is easily interpretable: varying 
within the interval [-1, 1], it may be understood as the share of polling stations 
impacted by ballot stuffing. In case of extending beyond this interval, it implies the 
share of polling stations where, additionally to pervasive ballot stuffing, votes of one 
or several candidates were counted as another candidate’s votes. For example, if  
α = -0.23 and β = 0.98 then the share of polling stations that have been exposed to 
falsification commensurable to ballot stuffing equals 0.23 / (1 – (-0.23 + 0.98)) =  
-0.92 or 92 percent. Surely, QR fraud may take values extending beyond the 
interval [-2, 2]. However, such cases couldn’t have a proper quantitative 
interpretation, the interpretation should rather be qualitative, namely, that the 
published election results are absolutely fictitious.80  
                                                          
80
 It must be clarified that even though the electoral data are strongly manipulated, the actual election result, 
theoretically, may coincide with the official numbers. Nonetheless, the official data in this case are so highly 
distorted that any drawn inference is utterly unreliable.  
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Figure 4.1. Performance of quantile regression estimates at various tau 
 
Note: Lines represent fitted values obtained from OLS and quantile regression models. 
QR parameter estimates were firstly obtained at the level of TIKs and then averaged for 
regions by calculating means weighted by number of eligible voters. QR tau|α->0 implies 
that the only QR model having closest to zero intercept was chosen from the set of ten QR 
models at tau = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15,... 0.5. Additionally to this condition, QR tau|α->0 &  
QRfr. [-1, 1] adds the restriction that QR fraud falls into the interval [-1, 1]. Since the latter 
condition is too strict for Mordovia, whereby selecting no cases, only QR tau|α->0 line is 
shown. For Unbiased TIKs only QR tau|α->0 & QRfr. [-1, 1] is shown since it coincides with 
QR tau|α->0 having intercepts = 0.0082, 0.0081 and coefficients = 0.5159, 0.5158, 
respectively.  
To show the difference between several kinds of estimates, Figure 4.1 presents 
fit lines for OLS and QR estimates at various tau and with additional conditions 
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imposed by tau selection and QR fraud. Four types of elections varying by the 
extent of electoral fraud have been chosen for this purpose. Unbiased TIKs have 
been chosen by ocular detection as TIKs where the following condition is met: 
        
    . Voronezh oblast represents slightly distorted data, Bashkortostan 
represents highly distorted data, and Mordovia is the case of extreme fraud. Figure 
4.1 generally suggests that QR estimates at τ -> 0 combined with the restriction 
imposed by QR fraud performs at an acceptable level even if electoral data are 
substantially distorted. It also shows that the fit line of QR estimates at τ -> 0 falls 
even below the fit line of 10th quantile at      if the data are strongly distorted. The 
fact that the QR model at tau|α->0 visibly provides more correct estimates than QR 
model at any other tau implicitly confirms that it is not lower regression quantiles 
that matter as such but only particular quantiles the intercepts of which are closer 
to zero, as theory predicts.  
For unbiased TIKs, the distinction between OLS and QR estimates is small. In 
this case, the OLS estimate (56.1%) is almost identical with the official vote share 
(56.0%), while the QR estimate is three percentage points smaller (53.0%).81 
Electoral data from Voronezh Oblast are moderately distorted, QR fraud indicates 
that about 37%82 of precincts experienced a falsification commensurable to ballot 
stuffing. These two groups of observations are clearly visible in the graph. The QR 
fitted line at tau|α->0 and QR fraud [-1, 1] passes nearly through the center of non-
distorted observations, while OLS line is deflected upward under the influence of 
the deviating cases. Quantitatively, there is a 10-percent difference between the QR 
estimate (52.4%) and the official result (62%).  
The data of Bashkortostan are distorted to an even greater extent. As QR fraud 
indicates (-1.27), attaining such result solely by means of ballot stuffing is 
improbable, hence a sizable amount of the competitors’ votes has been simply 
counted as incumbent’s votes. This is well noticeable in Bashkiria’s graph that the 
electoral data are heterogeneous. The urban area is predominantly located in the 
range of turnout smaller than seventy percent; the incumbent’s vote is relatively 
constant throughout the whole range of turnout in this group, whereas the 
incumbent’s vote tends to increase together with turnout in the rural area. 
                                                          
81
 QLS and QR estimates are calculated by the formula       ̂  (      (       for each TIK and then 
averaged using the mean weighted by number of eligible voters. The sameness of the OLS estimate and the 
official vote share is explained by the fact that the OLS line naturally passes through the mean points of both 
variables (i.e., the OLS estimate at the level of mean    equals the mean   
    ). 
82
 Since many QR fraud distributions are highly skewed, median values weighted by the number of eligible 
voters are reported. 
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Although the former group is obviously characterized by a lesser degree of fraud, it 
cannot be used as a perfect benchmark for a non-fraudulent election since the 
intercept of QR fit line at tau|α->0 even with the restriction of QR fraud [-1, 1] does 
not approach zero so closely as in the two previous graphs that makes the 
estimation slightly less reliable. Nevertheless, the QR estimate (64.8%) is 
considerably smaller than the electoral commission’s result (75.9%).  
Mordovia gives an example of highly adulterated election where the initial vote 
share cannot be reliably estimated. The QR estimate for this region is 82.3%, which 
is somewhat smaller than the official number of 87.6%. Nevertheless, QR fraud is 
enormous – -5.9. Moreover, all values of QR fraud in each of the 21 TIKs in the 
region are negative, where the value of minimally distorted TIK equals -1.3 and 
reaches an astonishing -53.2 at the most fraudulent TIK, thereby signifying that the 
election result is fully untrustworthy. 
MADT and MADR 
Two additional indicators are used in the analysis to tap fraudulent electoral data 
more efficiently. It has been shown in Chapter 2 that electoral fraud predominantly 
leads to larger ranges and standard deviations on X and Y axes. Two particular 
types of fraud – “in a line” and “in a dot”, on the contrary, lead to extremely small 
standard deviations. Oversized standard deviations (SDs) have also been pointed 
out as an alternative metrics of election anomalies by Kobak, Shpilkin and 
Pshenichnikov (2012: 3-4) and Klimek et al. (2012). However, using SDs as a 
measure of fraud entails at least three problems. First, standard deviations of the 
vote share tend to become larger with the growth of the overall vote share as the 
slope of the regression line becomes higher (see Figure 3.3, for example). Second, 
the type of falsification “in a line” cannot be detected only by the standard deviation 
of vote share. Consequently, the relationship between X and Y should be 
considered. And third, the SD is virtually the mean squared deviation from the 
data’s mean and therefore it has the same shortcomings caused by squaring as the 
OLS estimator, namely, hypersensitivity to outliers and poor performance on 
skewed distributions.  
To overcome these difficulties, I suggest using two measures of fraud for X and Y 
axes based on the median absolute deviation. Thus, the median absolute deviation 
of turnout, or MADT, at the level of territorial electoral commission (TIK)   is defined 
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as the median    of absolute deviations of turnout   at each precinct (UIK)   from 
the data's median   (   , so that: 
         ( |     (   | ) 
Analogously, the median absolute deviation of residuals, MADR, is defined by 
the formula: 
         ( |     (   | ), 
where    is the residual term obtained from the QR model   
            
at τ = 0.5. 
As with the SD, enlarged MADT signifies that turnout has been artificially 
inflated, more likely, in the result of ballot stuffing or forging of polling station 
protocols at the precinct level (i.e., if electoral fraud is not managed from a single 
place when electoral data on several polling stations are available). Unnaturally 
small values of MADT correspond to falsification “in a dot”. MADR is interpreted like 
the mean squared error from an OLS model: the greater the MADR, the greater the 
distance of the median observation from the fitted line. Thus, the greater values of 
MADR are typical for cases where the opposition’s votes are counted as incumbent’s 
votes and given simultaneously enlarged MADT they indicate ballot stuffing. 
Extraordinarily small values of MADR, in its turn, indicate falsification “in a line”. 
Since any theoretical predictions on allowable values of MADT and MADR are 
absent, one approach could be using upper and lower percentiles of MADT and 
MADR obtained from unbiased polling stations as empirical benchmarks for a non-
fraudulent election. Descriptive statistics for these variables in unbiased TIKs are 
reported in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Characteristics of unbiased territorial electoral commissions, 
presidential election of 2012 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
5th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
Skewness Kurtosis 
N of UIKs in TIK 100 51 27.82 26.1 123.1 1.87 4.92 
MADT 10574487 .0532 .0171 .0308 .0843 .786 .088 
MADR 10574487 .0187 .0058 .0115 .0272 1.631 4.639 
QR fraud 10574487 -.0342 .1918 -.2944 .1709 -2.995 14.359 
QR estimate at 
tau | α -> 0 
10574487 .5301 .0471 .4546 .6184 .376 .113 
Putin   
     10574487 .5600 .0448 .4985 .6522 .576 .461 
Note: N of UIKs in TIK is the number of precincts in a territorial electoral commission. 
For computation of all other statistics, cases are weighted by eligible number of voters. For 
this reason, the number of observations (N) increased in the corresponding cells. MADT and 
MADR denote median absolute deviations of turnout and residuals of the QR model Putin 
  
         at tau=.5, respectively. Putin   
     is the ordinary vote share calculated as ratio of 
the candidate’s votes to valid votes.  
The table suggests that QR fraud does not detect a substantively significant 
distortion of the election results in the selected TIKs. Putin’s official vote share and 
its QR estimate relying on the values of skewness and kurtosis are distributed 
closely to normal distribution that also indirectly indicates non-biasness of the 
electoral data. The mean values of MADT (0.053) and MADR (0.019) indicate that, 
among the unbiased TIKs, the reasonable range of turnout does not exceed 21.1% 
(1.98 MADT to the left and to the right from the mean at 95-percent level) and that 
the reasonable range of the conditional distribution of the vote share on turnout is 
equal to 7.4% (at 95-percent level). However, the table also shows that MADR is 
strongly skewed, which makes establishing empirical benchmarks problematic. 
Moreover, the benchmark-based approach has a disadvantage related to ambiguity 
of interpretation of values falling outside the allowable thresholds. Theoretically we 
may assume a uniform effect of exceeding values on the extent of fraud, for 
instance, that doubled MADT or MADR indicates that all observations randomly 
shifted from their initial positions. Yet uniformity of the effect in relation to values 
falling beyond the lower boundary is not so obvious. Imagine a number of TIKs 
having the initial vote shares and turnout rates about 60% and varying by degree of 
falsification “in a dot”, where the target point for falsifiers is located closely to 95% 
of turnout and vote share. In this case, MADT and MADR should firstly increase 
due to enlarged ranges of the distributions and only when the data of more than a 
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half of UIKs within the TIK are altered, MADT and MADR should begin to shrink 
directionally to zero.  
Cluster Analysis 
Another empirical approach is to define clusters in electoral data based on our 
measures of fraud. Gaussian mixture modeling fitted via the Expectation-
Maximization algorithm for model-based clustering that applies Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) to identify the most likely model and number of clusters 
is used for this purpose (for more details see: Fraley, Raftery, Murphy and Scrucca 
2012). The maximal number of clusters has been set up at 4 since the bigger 
number of clusters makes interpretation unnecessarily complicated. The model 
includes five variables: the incumbent’s official vote share, QR fraud, MADT, MADR, 
and chi-squared statistic for the deviation of the last-digit frequencies in the 
incumbent’s vote share from Benford’s law (     
 ), which is described in Chapter 3. 
Putin’s vote share is involved since the focal point is not to define clusters in 
various estimates of fraud but to define clusters in the electoral data conditionally 
on the extent and types of fraud specified by the measures of electoral distortion.  
Thus, this section presents the cluster analysis of the incumbent’s vote and four 
measures of electoral fraud for the presidential election of 2012 in order to classify 
the incumbent’s vote according to the degree of distortion of the data under the 
impact of fraud into four groups: 1) no-fraud or nearly unaffected by fraud 
observations, 2) moderately affected by fraud observations, 3) strongly affected by 
fraud observations, and 4) the observations of extreme fraud in which the QR 
estimate is not reliable and the incumbent’s authentic vote share is virtually 
undetectable. QR estimates of the vote in the first three groups can be adjusted 
according to the level of fraud, while observations of the fourth group can only be 
filtered (these tasks are performed in the next section). So long as our four 
measures of fraud are summarized in the cluster analysis, I do not allocate 
individual election-specific sections for them. Instead, election-specific results of the 
cluster analysis and of the adjustment for the QR estimate for the presidential 
elections of 2000–2008 are presented in Appendix D3–D5. This section examines 
the presidential election of 2012. 
All four variables of fraud are skewed due to multiple outliers. In 30 or 1.5 % of 
cases, QR fraud takes negative or positive values extending beyond the interval  
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[-50, 50], 5.5% of cases fall beyond the interval [-10, 10], and 9.8% of cases extend 
beyond [-4, 4]; 39 cases (1.9%) of MADT exceed 0.15 reaching the maximum of 
0.25; 15 cases (0.7%) of MADR are greater than 0.10, with the maximum of 0.41; 
and 20 cases (1%) of      
  have values greater than 150, with the maximum of 405. 
These extreme values fall beyond any reasonable intervals, moreover, they entail a 
bias in clustering since heterogeneity within main groups of observations becomes 
less pronounced due to the inflated variances caused by outliers. For this reason, 
the variables have been censored and their extreme values have been recoded into 
values defined by more reasonable limits.  
Fitting Gaussian mixture modeling for the presidential election of 2012 yields 
four clusters in Putin’s share of the vote varying by degree and type of electoral 
fraud. The results are graphically shown in Figure 4.2. As to QR fraud, the 
standard deviations (SDs) of the clusters indicated by ellipses do almost not 
overlap. The clusters are also distinct if Putin’s vote is plotted against three other 
variables of fraud, yet in varying degrees. The most distinct is the 4th cluster (the 
clusters are ranked in ascending order based on Putin’s vote). It contains extremely 
positive and extremely negative observations on QR fraud scale, observations      
  
values of which are high and significant (at p < 0.01 if chi-squared is over 21.67), 
and multiple observations < 0.2 on MADT scale and < 0.1 on MADR scale. These are 
the observations of extreme fraud, fraud that highly likely takes the form of 
rewriting of polling station protocols with forging the incumbent’s vote and turnout 
in very narrow ranges – the types of falsification that I call “in a line” and “in a dot”. 
The SDs of the 1st cluster do also not overlap with the SDs of other clusters, even 
though the 1st cluster is not as distinct as the 4th cluster. The SDs of the 2nd and 3rd 
cluster overlap on the scales of three variables of fraud, yet the clusters are distinct 
enough.  
In a more formal way, the degree of distinctiveness between the clusters is 
indicated by mixing probabilities reported in Table 4.2, where higher mixing 
probability (MP) is associated with higher uncertainty and smaller distinctiveness. 
Observations of the 4th cluster are apparently the most unique (MP = 0.0766), the 
model shows the highest uncertainty regarding the 2nd cluster (MP = 0.4714), and 
the 1st together with the 3rd cluster are moderately and similarly distinct (MP = 
0.2244 and 0.2276, respectively). 
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Figure 4.2. The measures of electoral fraud versus the official vote share marked 
by clusters, 2012 
 
Note: Ellipses indicate means (centers) and standard deviations by cluster.  
As follows from Table 4.2, 94 out of the 100 unbiased TIKs are grouped in the 1st 
cluster, which may also be referred to as the cluster of unbiased TIKs. The 
difference between the average official and the average estimated Putin’s vote share 
amounts to 2.9% (0.5638 versus 0.5349, respectively) in this cluster. The variable 
of QR fraud is skewed, as the discrepancy between its mean and median indicates, 
nevertheless, QR fraud shows that not more than 8.2% of polling stations have been 
exposed to fraud commensurable to ballot stuffing. This group of the relatively free-
of-fraud TIKs includes 467 (22.8%) of cases. 
  
147 
 
In the 2nd cluster, the difference between the official and the estimated 
incumbent’s vote is larger – 5.4%. QR fraud indicates that about a half of the 
observations have been affected by an analogue of ballot stuffing. This is 
alternatively confirmed by nearly doubled MADT and MADR – recall that turnout 
and the candidate’s vote share increase simultaneously as a result of ballot stuffing. 
This cluster contains nearly a half of all cases – 1013 (49.5%). 
Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics for the official incumbent’s vote share, QR 
estimate, and the measures of fraud by cluster, 2012 
Clus-
ter 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Putin 
  
     
QR 
Esti-
mate 
QR 
Fraud 
[-4, 1] 
MADT 
[0,0.15] 
MADR 
[0,0.1] 
     
  
[0,150] 
Mixing 
Prob-s 
N 
N  of 
Unbiased 
TIKs 
1 
Mean .5638 .5349 -.0820 .0479 .0199 16.5 
.2244 467 94 Median .5605 .5298 -.0428 .0462 .0193 15.3 
St. Dev. .0645 .0679 .2253 .0162 .0058 6.9 
2 
Mean .6612 .6072 -.5360 .0779 .0414 11.6 
.4714 1013 6 Median .6618 .6075 -.4910 .0754 .0403 11.2 
St. Dev. .0538 .0677 .4714 .0246 .0116 3.7 
3 
Mean .7439 .6762 -2.333 .0801 .0508 13.6 
.2276 413 0 Median .7462 .6723 -2.14 .0772 .0478 12.5 
St. Dev. .0940 .1164 1.309 .0330 .0184 6.0 
4 
Mean .9072 .8910 -2.164 .0262 .0184 60.0 
.0766 154 0 Median .9377 .9358 -3.63 .0184 .0143 45.1 
St. Dev. .0957 .1249 2.048 .0280 .0193 44.0 
Note: The statistics are reported for the variables used in the cluster analysis where 
outliers have been recoded into values indicated in the limits of the variables’ titles. The 
statistics of non-recoded variables do not deviate substantively from those presented in the 
table except the means of QR fraud of the 3rd and 4th clusters.      
  denotes chi-squared 
statistic for the deviation of the last-digit frequencies in Putin’s vote share from Benford’s 
law, where all digits’ expected probability, according to Benford’s law, is equal to 0.1. 
Significance levels: 14.69 – p < 0.1, 16.92 – p < 0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01, 27.88 – p < 0.001. 
As we turn to the 3rd cluster, the difference between Putin’s vote and the QR 
estimate increases to the maximum of 7.4%. The average QR fraud exceeds two, 
indicating thereby that the official incumbent’s vote share (74.4%), especially if 
compared with the vote share of the 1st cluster (56.4%), is unlikely to be reached 
only by means of ballot stuffing; in many of these TIKs (especially in those 233 
where QR fraud > 2) opposition candidates’ votes were transferred to the 
incumbent. This group of blatant fraud includes 413 (20.2%) of cases. 
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Figure 4.3. Four typical “fingerprints” of fraud: The most empirically representative 
TIKs by cluster, 2012 
 
Finally, the 4th cluster consists of 154 (7.5%) cases of extreme fraud. Electoral 
data are affected by fraud so heavily that the QR estimate is smaller only by about 
one percent than the official vote share in this group. As expected, the QR estimate 
becomes not sensitive to fraud after some threshold. Using the lower quantiles of 
the data allows to define the real vote share if at least some quantity (say, 10–30% 
depending on the number of observations) of polling stations is not affected by 
fraud. However, if election results in all or nearly all polling stations are fictitious, 
the probability of valid estimation of the initial vote share approaches zero. The 
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artificiality of electoral data in the 4th cluster is also confirmed by an unnaturally 
small MADT (if compared with the 1st cluster) and by the great average value of 
     
 , which is significant only in this cluster. 
For illustrative purposes, Figure 4.3 displays four most typical “fingerprints” of 
electoral fraud in the presidential election of 2012; each TIK of them is the best 
empirical representative of its own cluster. The TIKs are selected based on the least 
absolute total deviation of the variables in analysis from their cluster-specific 
medians presented in Table 4.2 (see Appendix D2 for details). Looking ahead, plots 
in Figure 4.3 show lines for the adjusted QR estimate, which is developed in the 
next section. In the 1st cluster, the QR estimate (52.7%) passes through the lower 
part of the conditional distribution and somewhat underestimates the real vote 
share. The adjusted QR estimate, which passes through the center of the 
distribution, corrects this bias. It makes the estimate (57.6%) almost equal to the 
official vote share (57.7%). This is quite reasonable given that QR fraud (0.0015) 
indicates no fraud at the TIK. 
In the 2nd cluster, there is heterogeneity of the distribution: nine observations 
are distinctly located in the area of low turnout and vote share (turnout < 0.6,  
Putin   
     < 0.3). However, the QR estimate does not detect this group (probably, 
because of the relatively small number of observations); the intercept of the QR fit 
line deviates considerably from zero (-.14). Nevertheless, the adjusted QR estimate 
passes through this group of observations and shows the estimated vote share 
(58.3%) by 5.6% smaller than the official vote share (63.9%).  
In the 3rd cluster, electoral fraud took place at all polling stations, including 
counting of opposition votes as incumbent votes (QR fraud = -1.89). Although the 
QR fit line passes through the lowest quantile (τ = 0.05), its intercept is again 
stands far from zero (-.12). Consequently, even though the QR estimate (67.0%) is 
smaller than the official vote share (73.9%), it cannot be deemed unbiased. The 
adjusted QR estimate takes the relationship between the QR estimate and various 
measures of fraud into account and shows that a more adequate level of the 
incumbent’s vote should be equal to 58.7%, even though this estimate is beyond 
the empirical range of observations.  
In the 4th cluster, the data are so heavily manipulated that any adjustment 
would be irrelevant. QR fraud (-1.69) shows that all UIKs have been exposed to 
fraud. MADT (0.0243) is almost two times smaller than the average MADT of the 1st 
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cluster (0.0479) that in combination with the large value of      
  (45.3) 
substantiates the hypothesis about the type of falsification “in a dot” at this TIK. 
More specifically, 13 out of 32 (40.6%) numbers in the last digit of the incumbent’s 
vote appear to be fives (i.e., numbers corresponding to Putin   
    = 95%), as well as 
10 (31.3%) last-digit numbers in the turnout rate are twos (turnout = 92%), 
whereas Benford’s law predicts uniform probabilities for each number equal to 10%. 
Adjusted QR Estimate 
As the cluster analysis has shown, the electoral data vary considerably by the 
extent of fraud. The reliability of the QR estimate also varies by cluster: it is fully 
reliable for the 1st cluster, less reliable for the 2nd and the 3rd cluster, whereas any 
estimates for the 4th cluster are untrustworthy. To cope with this variability, this 
section introduces an adjustment for the QR estimate that takes into account the 
relationship between the QR estimate and the four measures of fraud plus two 
additional variables that should presumably not correlate with the QR estimate –
regression quantile (tau) from the regression model used for obtaining the QR 
estimate and turnout.  
Before proceeding to elaborating of the adjustment for the QR estimate, consider 
the main assumption that underlies it. The QR estimate of the initial, authentic or 
sincere incumbent’s vote should theoretically be independent of fraud: it should 
neither increase nor decrease with the level of any measure of fraud. This 
assumption should intuitively be valid. However, Rundlett and Svolik (2016) 
challenge it by arguing that local agents as perpetrators of fraud are more prone to 
engage in this risky affair in a situation of the least potential costs, that is, when 
the incumbent is genuinely popular and the probability of criminal prosecution by 
the challenger if the incumbent loses the election is small. I dwell on a more 
detailed consideration of this argument in the concluding chapter when I discuss 
the reasons of resorting to fraud by authoritarian leaders. For the purpose of this 
chapter, I briefly summarize the main counterarguments.  
First, in the cross-regional context of the national elections, there is no obvious 
reason for elites of a region where the level of the incumbent’s vote is genuinely high 
(suppose Tatarstan, for example) to perceive the probability of post-electoral 
criminal prosecution if the challenger were to win the election lower than for elites 
of a region where the level of the incumbent’s vote is genuinely low (in Belgorod 
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Oblast, for example) so long as if the incumbent will be defeated, he will be defeated 
nationwide and the most notorious cases of electoral fraud will be investigated first. 
Therefore, elites of genuinely pro-incumbent regions have few incentives for 
perpetrating fraud: they will less likely be punished for “the lack of political 
solidarity” if the incumbent will stay in power and they do not need to incur 
excessive risks associated with fraud if the challenger will win. To the contrary, 
elites of the less supportive regions have more incentives to orchestrate fraud in 
order to evade punishment by the incumbent for the failure to demonstrate massive 
electoral support for autocracy. Thus, if regional elites are primarily motivated by 
perceived potential costs of fraud associated with the level of the incumbent’s 
genuine popularity, in the cross-regional context, theoretical expectations should be 
opposite to those presented by Rundlett and Svolik (2016).  
Second, this does not mean, however, that the relationship between the sincere 
incumbent’s vote and the level of fraud exists, even though this relationship is 
negative, because other factors extending beyond the risk assessment do also 
determine electoral fraud. As the following analysis in Chapter 5 and 6 shows, 
electoral fraud is interrelated with distributive politics. In order to stay in power, the 
central-level incumbents strive to secure loyalty of regional elites and instigate them 
to implement various authoritarian policies, including electoral fraud, by allocating 
larger central transfers to regions with higher levels of the incumbent’s vote. 
Regional elites, thereby, are materially interested in larger vote rates for the 
incumbent and they seek to perpetrate fraud (as a simplest “booster” of the vote) 
due to this material incentive. 
Third, the degree of freedom of local agents is largely exaggerated in Rundlett 
and Svolik’s model. Authoritarian leaders can exercise control over their agents in 
several ways. They can decrease funding, transfers, and the flow of other favors; 
they can remove disobedient agents from office; inspire criminal litigations; and 
resort to blackmail or assassination if the prior tools appear to be ineffective. 
Therefore, local agents cannot deliberately undersupply or oversupply fraud 
completely at their own discretion.  
Thus, the assumption, which underlies the idea of the adjustment for the QR 
estimate, that the initial, authentic or sincere incumbent’s vote does not correlate 
with the level of fraud is realistic. Consequently, if the QR estimate does not 
correlate with the measures of fraud, the estimate is correct. The presence of 
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correlation implies that the estimate has lost its precision under the influence of 
fraud and should be adjusted. 
Table 4.3 displays the relationship between the QR estimate, the four measures 
of fraud, the regression quantile (tau), turnout, and several interaction effects. It 
should be mentioned that observations of the 4th cluster are excluded from the 
model. For the purpose of creating of the adjustment for the QR estimate, there is 
no need to interpret each individual coefficient, especially inasmuch as the model 
includes multiple interaction terms. The rationale of including the interactions is to 
allow the effects of some variables to be different at various levels of other variables 
and to increase, thereby, the deterministic power of the model for the adjustment. 
The high significance levels of the interactions show that the main effects are 
indeed conditional on levels of other variables. The model has relatively high 
explanatory power (R2 = 54.9%) indicating that the QR estimate tends to change 
under the influence of fraud.  
Table 4.3. The best OLS interaction effects model of the QR estimate on four 
measures of fraud, regression quantile, and turnout; 2012 
DV: QR Estimate Coefficient Std. Error t-value 
(Intercept) .1085 .0427 2.54* 
QR fraud [-4, 1] .0875 .0116 7.57*** 
MADT [0, 0.15] 1.464 .4633 3.16** 
MADR [0, 0.1] 5.409 .7676 7.05*** 
     
 
 [0, 150] -.0011 .0003 -4.10*** 
Tau .0011 .0015 .77 
Turnout .6476 .0709 9.14*** 
QR fraud [-4, 1] × MADT [0, 0.15] -.1262 .0546 -2.31* 
QR fraud [-4, 1] × MADR [0, 0.1] .1709 .1039 1.65 
QR fraud [-4, 1] × Tau -.0023 .0005 -5.14*** 
QR fraud [-4, 1] × Turnout -.1295 .0139 -9.32*** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × MADR [0, 0.1] -12.54 3.4320 -3.66*** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × Tau .0580 .0182 3.19** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × Turnout -1.115 .7569 -1.47 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Tau .1151 .0319 3.61*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Turnout -7.812 1.1050 -7.07*** 
R-squared .5486 
1893 N 
Note: The model includes the same recoded variables that are used in the cluster 
analysis; their limits are indicated in squared parentheses. Observations of the 4th cluster 
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have been excluded from the sample. The best model is selected by using a stepwise 
algorithm with “both” direction of search based on minimizing of Akaike's information 
criterion (AIC). Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
Specifically, if all variables are fixed at their means of the 1st cluster, the model 
predicts QR estimate = 55.3%; the fitted values for the 2nd and the 3rd cluster are 
equal 60.4% and 66.4%, respectively. Hence, correct estimates of the 2nd cluster 
should be by 5.1% smaller and 3rd-cluster estimates should be by 11.1% smaller 
compared with the 1st cluster, on average. Thus, using the 1st cluster as a reference 
category (i.e., as a nearly no-fraud cluster), the adjustment for the QR estimate,   , 
can be formally defined as follows: 
   {
                         
                
  
where Fitted refers to fitted values from the from the model in Table 4.3, 0.5525 is 
the mean fitted value of the 1st cluster, and N/A denotes a missing value.  
Once this rule is applied, the average adjustment weighted by the number of 
eligible voters appears equal to -0.0321. The relationship between the QR estimate 
and the adjustment by cluster is compared between the presidential elections of 
2000–2012 in Appendix D6. To demonstrate the difference between the adjusted 
and non-adjusted estimates, Figure 4.4 shows distributions of the both estimates 
and officially reported share of Putin’s votes. The difference between the official vote 
and vote estimates is obvious. Similarly to the results demonstrated by methods 
developed by Shpilkin (2011) and Klimek et al. (2012), the abnormally huge right 
tail of the official vote distribution is slightly “normalized” in the distribution of the 
QR estimate with the excluded 4th cluster. The difference in the distributions of QR 
estimates with and without the 4th cluster shows that the QR estimate becomes not 
sensitive to fraud at high values of the variables where electoral data are extremely 
distorted: the variables are beginning to diverge after Putin   
     exceeds the 85-
percent threshold and the QR estimate with the 4th cluster fully converges with the 
official vote share after the 95-percent threshold. The difference determined by the 
4th cluster is better visible in the non-weighted by the number of eligible voters 
distributions (see Appendix D7). 
In this regard, the adjusted QR estimate performs much better. Its right tail as 
well as the left tail reflects the normal distribution with high accuracy. 
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Furthermore, while Shpilkin’s and Klimek’s methods assume that the left tail of the 
official vote distribution is not exposed to fraud and virtually treat the first local 
maximum as the mean of the candidate’s vote share, Figure 4.4 shows that the first 
local maximums of all QR estimate distributions are substantively smaller than the 
first local maximum of the official vote distribution and that their left tails are 
generally distinct. The distributions of adjusted and non-adjusted estimates are 
distinct mainly in their right tails.  
Figure 4.4. The distributions of Putin’s QR-based estimates and the official vote 
share 
  
Note: For the adjusted QR estimate and the QR estimate without the 4th cluster, non-
weighted N = 1893, for both other distributions non-weighted N = 2047. N denotes the 
number of TIKs.  
To summarize the results of the analysis of electoral fraud in the presidential 
election of 2012, Table D1 presents the regionally aggregated official incumbent’s 
vote share, the adjusted QR estimate, all measures of fraud, and the incumbent’s 
vote share taken from polling station protocols collected by electoral observers. The 
table generally suggests that the average adjusted QR estimate of Putin’s vote share 
(55.5%) and the vote share reported by observers (51.5%) are smaller than the 
official share of the vote (64.4%). The largest regional differences between the 
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electoral commission’s tallies and observers’ reports are observed in Tatarstan 
(17.0%), Primorsky Krai (15.9%), and Kemerovo Oblast (11.9%). The top list of 
regions with respect to the largest quantitative amount of fraud, with respect to the 
adjusted QR estimate, includes Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug (28.2%, the 
average cluster = 3.3), Dagestan (27.5%, cl. = 3.8), Tuva (27.1%, cl. = 3.0), Mordovia 
(25.0%, cl. = 3.4), Tatarstan (23.3%, cl. = 3.3), and Bashkortostan (19.2%, cl. = 2.9). 
Among the regions that have not been marred by electoral forgery, can be 
mentioned Moscow (-0.8%, cl. = 1.2), Vladimir Oblast (-0.7%, cl. = 1.2), Perm Krai 
(1.0%, cl. = 1.4), Sverdlovsk Oblast (2.1%, cl. = 1.3), Karelia (2.3%, cl. = 1.3), and 
Kostroma Oblast (2.4%, cl. = 1.3). The regional dimention of electoral fraud, 
thereby, demonstrates a wast variety of regions ranging from electoral democracies, 
in which electoral fraud is sporadic and quantitatively small, to closed authoritarian 
regimes, where electoral fraud is extreme and electoral competition is meaningless. 
Figure 4.5 displays the relationship between electoral fraud and the level of regional 
democracy for all election years from 2000 through 2012.  
Figure 4.5. Electoral fraud and the level of regional democracy by election year 
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Note: The variable of electoral fraud (%) is ranked to provide linearity. The rating of the 
democratic quality of regions is developed by experts of the Moscow Carnegie Center (Petrov 
and Titkov 2013). 
Although vote shares from observers’ reports are similar to QR estimates  
(R2 = 0.538), the former might be of less reliability. First, electoral observers’ reports 
are biased in favor of the urban area, especially toward Moscow and Saint-
Petersburg. The coverage in small towns or in the rural area is sporadic or absent. 
This bias sometimes reveals itself in smaller average vote shares of observers’ 
reports compared with QR estimates. For instance, in Omsk Oblast and Primorky 
Krai (the regions with the largest discrepancy – 6.0% and 6.4%, respectively), all 
observers’ reports came from their capital cities – Omsk and Vladivostok. However, 
if take the average QR estimate values of only those TIKs from which the reports 
have come, the difference in Putin’s vote share between observer’s data and the QR 
estimate becomes negligible – -1.0% in Omsk and 0.4% in Vladivostok. Second, the 
coverage by observers is also biased toward the regions with more competitive 
polities, accordingly, observers are under- or not represented in the regions with 
high levels of electoral fraud. Third, polling station protocols gathered by observers 
contain the artefacts of all types of fraud that occur during the processes of voting 
and vote count.  
The proportion of TIKs in analysis (i.e., the quantity of available QR estimates in 
the region) tends to decrease with the level of electoral fraud measured as the 
average cluster, though the relationship is not strong (correlation = -0.465). For this 
reason, vote share estimates are not defined in three regions (the mean cluster = 4): 
Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya. The QR estimate is also 
undefined for Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, yet the region was not included into 
analysis since the number of UIKs within TIKs is smaller than 20. In four regions, 
the number of TIKs in analysis is one or two. In six regions, the number of TIKs in 
analysis is between three and five. On the whole, the adjusted QR estimate is 
available for 69% of all TIKs.  
The Dynamics of Electoral Fraud in 2000–2012 
In this section, I summarize the results of the analysis of electoral fraud for the 
presidential elections of 2000–2012. Table 4.4 reports descriptive statistics for the 
main variables in analysis. When Vladimir Putin first time took power in 2000, the 
official incumbent’s vote share slightly exceeded fifty percent (0.534). Then it 
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stabilized at the level of 71–72% in 2004–2008 and decreased to 64.4% in 2012 
when the opposition has managed to arrange a large-scale electoral observation 
campaign followed by a raging wave of post-electoral protest. 
Table 4.4. Descriptive statistics for the official incumbent’s vote share, the 
adjusted QR estimate, and the measures of fraud by election year 
Year 
Clus-
ter 
Incum-
bent   
     
Adjusted 
QR Esti-
mate 
Diffe-
rence 
(Fraud)c 
QR 
Fraud 
MADT MADR      
  
Clus-
ter, µ 
2012 
1 .5638 .5464 .0174 -.0820 .0479 .0199 16.5 
2.36/
2.52d 
2 .6612 .5671 .0941 -.5360 .0779 .0414 11.6 
3 .7439 .5763 .1676 -2.333 .0801 .0508 13.6 
4 .9072  n.a.  n.a. -2.164 .0262 .0184 60.0 
Totalb .6435a .5548 .0887 -.6744 .0628 .0322 19.3 1.88 
2008 
1 .6422 .6206 .0215 -.1048 .0431 .0161 24.7 
2.22/
2.50d 
2 .6866 .6289 .0578 -.4834 .0907 .0440 13.9 
3 .7883 .6523 .1360 -2.6157 .0646 .0475 21.0 
4 .9391  n.a.  n.a. -3.7369 .0129 .0153 59.2 
Totalb .7122a .6324 .0798 -.8596 .0659 .0297 25.8 1.94 
2004 
1 .6824 .6387 .0437 -.0431 .0475 .0183 18.9 
2.22/
2.43d 
2 .6969 .6499 .0469 -.4130 .0965 .0485 13.5 
3 .7748 .6577 .1171 -2.6157 .0673 .0509 24.2 
4 .9678  n.a.  n.a. -3.9096 .0155 .0114 73.1 
Totalb .7192a .6443 .0749 -.6054 .0654 .0294 24.4 1.75 
2000 
1 .4992 .4619 .0373 .0340 .0455 .0192 16.8 
2.60/
2.85d 
2 .5227 .4727 .0500 -.0032 .0809 .0606 10.5 
3 .5772 .4834 .0939 -.7129 .0810 .0688 15.0 
4 .7836  n.a.  n.a. -4.2087 .0626 .0658 15.3 
Totalb .5340a .4733 .0607 -.2176 .0604 .0368 16.0 1.68 
Note: a. The official vote share is calculated as the ratio of summed incumbent’s votes to 
summed valid votes. b. Entries in the row, except Incumbent   
    , are the means calculated 
with weighting cases by the number of eligible voters. Other statistics are simple means. c. 
Denotes the difference between Incumbent   
     and Adjusted QR Estimate. d. Entries indicate 
the mean cluster weighted by MADT or / MADR calculated by the following formula (for 
MADR analogously):       ∑ (                         ∑     
 
 
 
 . QR fraud, 
MADT, MADR, and      
  are limited variables. See Table 4.2, D5, D7, and D9 for details. 
Significance levels for      
 : 14.69 – p < 0.1, 16.92 – p < 0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01,  
27.88 – p < 0.001. 
Our qualitative measures of fraud indicate a slightly different but still similar 
picture: electoral fraud proliferated from 2000 to 2008 and in 2012 it returned to its 
intermediate level of 2004–2008. This trend is, first of all, depicted by the mean 
election-specific cluster – an indicator that summarizes all four qualitative 
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measures of fraud. Its minimal values of 2000 (1.68) has never been even 
approximately repeated in future. Although the official share of the vote established 
at the constant level in 2004 and 2008, the mean cluster shows that electoral fraud 
has become more widespread from 2004 (1.75) to 2008 (1.94). It means that the 
genuine level of incumbent support began to decline in 2008 when the 
authoritarian regime was seemingly at the apex of its strength and nothing 
foreshadowed the electoral slump of 2012. The opportunities for perpetrating fraud 
have become less favorable in 2012 due to the electoral observation campaign. We 
do not know whether the interested actors made more, less or same effort for 
perpetrating fraud in 201283 but the mean cluster (1.88) indicates that, due to or 
contrary to the elite’s effort, the extent of electoral fraud diminished in the election.  
The amount of electoral fraud is estimated in more explicit unites of 
measurement by QR fraud. The indicator shows that 21.7% of polling stations were 
exposed to fraud commensurable to ballot stuffing in 2000. This considerable 
proportion has nearly tripled in 2004 (60.5%) then reached its maximum of 86.0% 
in 2008 and rolled back to 67.4% in 2012. This shift from considerable and more 
than sporadic to widespread electoral fraud corresponds to the transformation of 
the political regime from a nascent electoral autocracy where opposition candidates 
are disadvantaged but can challenge the incumbent effectively to a nearly 
hegemonic authoritarianism, in which the opposition has only the “right of whisper” 
during electoral campaigns and especially between them. 
The average chi-squared statistic is consistent with the general temporal pattern 
of fraud. It is marginally significant at p = 0.067 in 2000, highly significant in 2004 
and 2008 (p = 0.0037 and p = 0.0022, respectively), and less significant in 2012  
(p = 0.023). The average values of MADT and MADR are very similar between 
elections, yet they do not have such straightforward interpretation. The indicators 
tend to gradually enlarge with the amount of fraud determined by ballot stuffing 
and miscounting of candidates’ votes, yet after some tipping point they tent to 
shrink inasmuch as at its extreme levels fraud takes the form of rewriting of polling 
station protocols and reporting of absolutely fictitious numbers of votes. If 
fraudsters act independently of each other (at the level of UIK) and they do not have 
“recommendations” from their superiors regarding the “preferable” election result, 
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 They could probably try to make more effort since the decline in public support was evident from the results 
of the State Duma election of 2011. On the other hand, an excessive blatant fraud could reinforce the popular 
protest that emerged after the parliamentary election. For this reason, authoritarian leaders were more 
interested in perpetrating fraud at the margin. 
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they augment incumbent’s and valid votes randomly that results in huge standard 
deviations of turnout and the vote share observed in the 2nd and 3rd cluster. If 
fraudsters act at the level of TIK and consequently have more discretion over 
electoral data of many polling stations simultaneously, they typically “recode” vote 
shares of all polling stations in almost a single value of in a very narrow range of 
values (i.e., types of fraud named “in a line” and “in a dot”). As a result, 
observations with unnaturally small deviations of turnout and the vote share are 
included in the 4th cluster. 
To find the tipping point at which MADT or MADR finishes to increase and 
begins to decline, I use the mean cluster weighted by MADT / MADR, which is 
presented in Table 4.4. If the distribution of MADT or MADR is normal or uniform, 
the mean cluster equals 2.5. Skewness in the distribution by cluster shifts it 
upward or downward. The smaller the value of the tipping point, the sooner (i.e., 
closer to the 1st cluster) comes the threshold of turning to extreme fraud. The 
tipping points of MADT / MADR (2.6 / 2.85) are farthest from the center of 2.5 
toward the 4th cluster in the election of 2000. Furthermore, the average values of 
MADT and MADR in the 4th cluster do not demonstrate such contrasting decline as 
they do in other election years; these values rather approximate to the average 
values of the 3rd cluster between the subsequent elections. The tipping points in the 
election of 2004 (2.22/2.43) are similar to the tipping points in the election of 2008 
(2.22/2.50) and both, especially the means of MADT, are located below the center. 
The means in the election of 2012 are slightly higher 2.36/2.52. From these facts, 
we cannot make a clear distinction between elections of 2004 and 2008 regarding 
the level of electoral fraud, yet it is certain that the election of 2000 is less 
fraudulent than all other elections and that the election of 2012 is slightly less 
fraudulent than elections of 2004 and 2008. 
As we turn to quantitative estimates of fraud by election years, the temporal 
pattern of fraud revealed by the qualitative measures of fraud seems distorted. The 
estimated amount of fraud as the difference between the official incumbent’s vote 
share and the adjusted QR estimate is equal to 6.1% in 2000, 7.5% in 2004, 8.0% 
in 2008, and 8.9% in 2012. However, this result should be interpreted cautiously. 
First, as Appendix D6 show, the average size of the adjustment is not constant 
between elections. It is equal, respectively, to 1.2%, 1.7%, 1.6% and 3.2% in 2000–
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2012.84 If the average adjustment had been constant between elections, the 
temporal pattern of fraud indicated by the adjusted QR estimate would have been 
similar to that indicated by the four qualitative measures of fraud. Second, models 
presented in Table 4.3, D6, D8, and D10 show that the QR estimate varies 
markedly under the influence of variables associated with fraud. The adjustment for 
the QR estimate built upon these models takes this relationship into account. 
However, such adjustment is absent at the national level. So long as types and the 
scope of fraud vary between elections, election-averaged QR estimates are biased 
differently and cannot be simply comparable at the national level. Nevertheless, the 
nation-level vote share estimates are of minor interest in the current research. The 
study is primarily focused on region-level vote share estimates that can be used in 
the subsequent cross-sectional analysis. In this connection, the adjusted QR 
estimate can be deemed unbiased at the regional level since the adjustment 
corrects its deviations determined by fraud. 
However, the quantitative amount of fraud between elections can be estimated 
regardless of the bias in the QR estimate at the national level. For this purpose, the 
adjusted QR estimate is regressed on the official incumbent’s vote share. The level 
of similarity between variables is indicated by the following R-squared statistic from 
2000 to 2012: 84.0%, 65.1%, 25.6%, and 55.1%. It appears that the variables are 
the most similar in 2000. Then the level of similarity decreases sharply to the 
election of 2008 and it almost returns to the level of 2004 in 2012. The statistic for 
the election year of 2008 seems exaggerated since it follows that the official vote 
share consists of fraud by nearly seventy five percent. In fact, this result turns out 
to be primarily due to extremely high values of the incumbent’s vote. If both 
variables are ranked to neutralize the effect of outliers, R-squared statistic looks 
more feasible but it still repeats the temporal pattern of electoral fraud from 2000 to 
2012: 87.0%, 80.4%, 43.2%, and 72.0%. Thus, both qualitative and quantitative 
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 It follows from Figure D7 that the discrepancy between zero and the mean of the adjustment is determined 
by two factors – the amount of fraud, the amount of fraud in the 1
st
 cluster, and the interaction between them. 
If the amount of fraud is small (generally and in the 1
st
 cluster), as in the election of 2000, the mean is close to 
zero. If the general amount of fraud is large but observations of the 1
st
 cluster are not exposed to fraud, as in 
the election of 2012, the difference between zero and the mean is large. In this case, the difference between 
the mean of fitted values and the mean of fitted values in the 1
st
 cluster is greatest and the adjustment 
calculated as the mean fitted value of the 1
st
 cluster subtracted by fitted values appears to be negative. If the 
amount of fraud is large and observations of the 1
st
 cluster are affected by fraud, as in the elections of 2004 
and 2008, the mean of fitted values and the mean of fitted values in the 1
st
 cluster do not differ much and the 
mean adjustment tends to be small. A larger or smaller mean of the adjustment does not have a substantial 
impact on the QR estimate at the regional level (all estimates become uniformly smaller or larger when the 
adjustment is applied). However, a problem appears at the national level when different adjustments with 
different means are applied between elections hindering, thereby, year-to-year comparison. 
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measures of fraud are congruent. They consistently indicate that electoral fraud 
proliferated in the Russian presidential elections from 2000 to 2008 and then 
decreased to an intermediate level of 2004–2008 in 2012. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the amount of fraud in the Russian presidential 
elections of 2000–2012. For this purpose, the theoretical findings of Chapter 2 and 
3 have been formalized to develop a new approach to electoral fraud forensics. The 
novelty of the approach is a separation of the estimation procedure into two parts. 
Firstly, the initial (i.e., not affected by fraud) share of a candidate’s vote is estimated 
based on quantile regression parameter estimates. Then, to account for the 
reliability of the obtained QR estimate conditionally on the degree of distortion of 
electoral data, I use four qualitative measures of electoral fraud. QR fraud gauges 
the deviation from the theoretically predicted relationship between turnout and the 
absolute vote share. MADT and MADR are designed to tap anomalously large and 
small distributions of turnout and vote share that result from various types of vote 
rigging. And chi-squared statistic for the deviation of the last-digit frequencies in 
the candidate’s vote share from Benford’s law (     
 ) detects anomalies in the last-
digit frequencies resulted from human bias if electoral data have been manipulated. 
The qualitative measures of electoral fraud are used in cluster analysis to group 
electoral data of the Russian presidential elections of 2000-2012 into four clusters 
depending on the extent and types of fraud. Most cases have been defined in 
clusters of moderate fraud. The 4th cluster appeared to be the most distinct one 
(i.e., having the least mixing probabilities) in all elections throughout the period of 
study. Observations of this cluster are characterized by excessively high 
incumbent’s vote shares and turnout rates (90.0% and 93.3% on average between 
elections, respectively), and by extreme values of all qualitative variables of fraud. 
For this reason, observations of this cluster have been excluded from further 
analysis.  
The difference between the QR estimate and the official share of the incumbent’s 
vote togeather with interaction effects models have shown that, as expected, the QR 
estimate varies under the influence of electoral fraud. The estimate is close to the 
level of the official vote share in the 1st cluster where the amount of fraud is 
minimal, then it its average values are smaller than the official vote share but still 
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higher than the level of the 1st cluster, and the QR estimate converges with the 
official vote share in the 4th cluster. The adjustment developed for the QR estimate 
takes this variability into account by detrending the QR estimate of correlation with 
the qualitative variables of fraud and two auxiliary variables – turnout and 
regression quantile. As a result, the adjusted QR estimate’s difference between the 
means of the 3rd and the 1st clusters decreased to 2.6% compared with the 
difference of the non-adjusted estimate (7.8%) – on average between elections. And 
this difference is greatest in highly fraudulent elections of 2008 and 2012, 
respectively: 3.2% and 3.0% for the adjusted QR estimate and 10.9% and 14.1% for 
the non-adjusted QR estimate. Put differently, the adjustment allows to efficiently 
correct the QR estimate when high values of electoral fraud entail its bias. 
The adjustment, however is not applied at the aggregated level (i.e., between 
elections), therefore, election-specific estimates of the incumbent’s vote are not fully 
comparable. Notwithstanding, the strength of relationship between the official 
incumbent’s vote share and the adjusted QR estimate (measured as R-squared 
statistic), consistently with the qualitative measures of fraud, indicate that the 
amount of fraud has been the least in the presidential election of 2000. Then the 
scale of electoral forgery has grown and reached its maximum in the election of 
2008. In 2012, the amount of fraud declined as a result of the electoral observation 
campaign and the post-electoral protest triggered by mass public awareness of 
fraud after the parliamentary election of 2011. 
In quantitative terms, even though these results should be interpreted 
cautiously, the analysis has shown that the incumbent has derived a benefit of 
fraud of 7.6% of the vote, on average between elections. This amount has hardly 
exceeded a 10-percent threshold in any particular election. However, it should not 
be disregarded that the scope of fraud varies greatly by region and it is much larger 
in several regions. In particular, the average amount of fraud between 2000 and 
2012 is estimated as high as 22.2% in Dagestan, 22.1% in Mordovia, and 18.2% in 
Tatarstan, whereas the minimal rates of fraud are estimated in Vladimir Oblast, 
Kostroma Oblast, and Perm Krai: 1.7%, 2.5%, and 3.0%, respectively. It is also 
worth mentioning that, qualitatively, even the maximal levels of fraud in regions like 
Dagestan do not create a complete picture. In practice, not only share of the vote 
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but turnout is also manipulated. As a result, the number of fictitious votes can be 
commensurable with the number of authentic votes.85  
Furthermore, our qualitative measures of fraud allow to look at the picture from 
a different angle. QR fraud indicates that, on average between elections, 58.9% of 
all polling stations have experienced a falsification analogous to ballot stuffing. In 
18.7% of observations grouped in the 3rd cluster, fraud has been not limited to 
counting non-voters as incumbent’s voters but a multitude of opposition’s votes 
were also counted as incumbent’s votes (QR fraud = 2.1). In this cluster, MADT is 
1.6 times larger than MADT in the 1st cluster and MADR 3.0 times exceeds the level 
of the 1st cluster. In other words, under the influence of fraud, observations in the 
3rd cluster are 1.6 times more scattered on X axis and 3.0 times more scattered on 
Y axis compared with the 1st cluster – the cluster of rare occurrences of fraud. 
Finally, in 7.5% of observations grouped in the 4th cluster, electoral data are 
completely artificial. 
Jointly, electoral fraud in the Russian presidential elections 2000–2012 has 
played a typical role that is ascribed to fraud in electoral authoritarian regimes. It 
was not outcome-changing as occurs in closed authoritarian regimes and it was not 
sporadic as in electoral democracies but it was rather employed as a primary tool 
for creating a sense of incumbent invincibility. In fact, Vladimir Putin and his 
successor Dmitry Medvedev would have won without resorting to fraud. Why is then 
electoral fraud so pervasive intrinsic and inextricable element of the Russian 
presidential elections? And is there any reason for fraud besides creating the image 
of strength or invincibility for authoritarian leaders? 
The answer to the first question probably lies in the results of the election of 
2000 – the time of nascence of authoritarianism when the media was not so 
restricted, repression of the opposition was not so harsh and other authoritarian 
incumbency advantages, including electoral fraud, were not as obvious as they 
turned out to be in future. Vladimir Putin has officially gained 52.9% of the vote. 
The official vote share in the 1st cluster is equal to 49.9% and the estimated vote 
share in the election is equal to 47.3%. The latter two results are hardly acceptable 
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 Consider, for instance, a polling station at which the number of eligible votes is equal to 1000, the number of 
genuine valid votes = 600 (i.e., turnout = 60%), and the number of genuine incumbent’s votes = 360 (the 
incumbent’s vote share = 60%). If turnout is artificially inflated by 20%, then the number of valid votes 
increases to 800. If the incumbent’s vote share is also increased by 20% then the number of incumbent’s votes 
= 640 (i.e., 80% of the inflated valid votes). Thus, if turnout and the share of the vote are both fraudulently 
enlarged by 20%, the number of fictitious votes (640 – 360 = 280) amounts to 78% relatively to the number of 
genuine votes (360). And this proportion increases as the genuine vote share and turnout are getting smaller.  
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from the point of view of electoral authoritarianism since the absence of a majority 
of the vote, according to the electoral code, entails a second round of the election 
and, accordingly, a more equal (too equal for electoral authoritarianism) competition 
between candidates. Simply speaking, if authoritarian incumbents refrain from 
using their hyper-incumbency advantages, they will lose elections. This cannot 
happen instantly if the level of popular support is high but the electoral failure of 
the incumbency will unavoidably occur later, especially in times of economic and 
political crises. Authoritarian institutions, as any institutions, have their own logic 
and inertia. Therefore, authoritarian leaders cannot “switch” them off in good times 
and resume their functioning when popular support will have decreased.  
Furthermore, as I show in Chapter 5 and 6, electoral fraud is interdependent 
with distributive politics. Authoritarian leaders distribute central transfers and 
other valuable resources to their local agents (or regional elites who are responsible 
for perpetrating fraud) on the basis of political loyalty. Namely, regional elites are 
mainly required to refrain from challenging the incumbent, suppress various forms 
of the opposition that can be hazardous to the regime, and demonstrate high 
electoral results for the incumbent in their regions, that is, implement various 
authoritarian policies. However, the system of authoritarian exchanges is built so 
that regional elites can derive benefits from their offices primarily by supplying 
central autocrats with the required authoritarian policy outcomes, including 
electoral fraud. Consequently, authoritarian incumbents cannot cease authoritarian 
practices without losing elite loyalty followed by a system-wide disintegration of 
authoritarianism. 
A possible answer to the second question is partly interrelated with the answer 
to the first one. Authoritarian leaders may in fact use electoral fraud to convey a 
message to the opposition, elites and voters that the incumbent is genuinely 
popular or that he possesses sufficient resources to pay for loyalty and to repress 
dissenters. However, this is done exactly for the same reason for which 
authoritarian leaders do intrinsically not tolerate a fair electoral competition – they 
apprehend that they will lose elections. The cost of losing authoritarian elections is a 
crucial determinant of inevitability of fraud under authoritarianism.  More precisely, 
costs of electoral failure under authoritarianism are much higher than under 
democratic rule due to the ubiquitous prevalence of informal institutions that tie 
actors by illegal practices and, thereby, make their income, property, and official 
status conditional on maintaining the political hegemony. In order to win elections, 
authoritarian leaders resort to various illegal forms of “doping”, such as fraud and 
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repression, and build up a system of authoritarian institutions that supplies 
cadres, resources, and informal rules for “doping”. Achieving an electoral victory 
through such illegal means, they, however, dramatically raise costs of electoral (and 
non-electoral) failure.86 For fear of criminal prosecution, they seek to stay in power 
at any cost and by any means. These means ordinarily imply more fraud and 
repression. This self-reinforcing logic of authoritarianism sometimes continues to 
have an effect when authoritarian leaders rig elections even without an obvious 
necessity for fraud. 
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 Goemans (2000: 569) shows that when dictators lose wars moderately, they more likely remain in office (in 
63% of cases) than their democratic counterparts (in 14% of cases). At the same time, 83% of dictators, who 
lost power after moderately losing a war, were eventually punished in the form of exile, imprisonment or 
death, whereas only 33% of democratic leaders were punished, accordingly.  
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Chapter 5. The Distributive Game: Politically Motivated Allocation of 
the Federal Transfers in Russia 
Introduction 
Numerous studies assert that authoritarian leaders routinely abuse state resources 
to reward loyal supporters or to appease contesting elites (Greene 2006; Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson 2007; Levitsky and Way 2010; Magaloni 2006; Schedler 2006). There 
is a consensus in the literature that private goods are more targetable than public 
goods and ipso facto are more appropriate for clientelist politics. Nevertheless, 
central transfers to subordinate levels of government represent an example of 
public and formally legal distribution that challenges this assertion. Although it is 
impossible in practice to politically target public hospitals, schools, roads and other 
public goods at particular voters, transfers allow manipulating with the average 
regional levels of the available public goods, thereby, making the distribution 
targetable by nature.  
This chapter examines the determinants of the allocation of federal grants to 
regional budgets in Russia to test whether the interbudgetary payments are used as 
a politically neutral tool with welfare equalizing goals or pursue various political 
aims of self-interested actors. Using panel data multilevel modeling it shows that, 
along with equity and efficiency considerations, electoral interests played a 
considerable role in distributive politics under Putin’s rule in the period from 2000 
to 2012. 
Russia’s regional finances are considerably dependent on federal transfers. On 
average, 16.8% of the total regional budget revenues consisted of the federal 
remittances in the period of 2000–2012. The dependence of regional budgets on the 
central payments is larger if it is measured as the ratio of federal transfers to taxes 
levied by regional budgets: transfers amounted to 22.3% of the average regional 
fiscal capacity.87 The numbers, however, look larger from the elite perspective. If the 
national averages were not considered but the median values of the regional ratios 
(non-weighted by population medians) were calculated, the median governor 
between 2000 and 2012 had to deal with a budget that was at 25.7% funded from 
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 Population-weighted means that are equivalent to ratios of the nation-total sums of money are reported.  
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the federal center and the federal remittances amounted to 36.6% relative to tax 
revenues of the median regional budget.88 
As it appears in Figure 5.1, the history of Russian regional finances is strictly 
divided during the period under study: before 2008 and after. The total regional 
budget revenue grew from 2000 to 2008. The total amount of the federal transfers 
as well as the share of transfers in the budget (STB), except for the years 2001 and 
2002, increased more or less proportionally with the regional budget revenue in the 
period. After the Great Recession hit Russia in 2008 the growth of total revenue was 
replaced with a cutback and up to 2016 the situation nearly returned to the 
starting point. The economic crisis affected transfers to a greater extent than it did 
to total revenue. After a one-year lag, the share of transfers in regional budgets 
decreased from 27 percent at the apex in 2009 to 16 percent in 2016. Based on the 
graph we cannot conclude, however, that electoral concerns played any role in 
distribution of the overall sums of transfer money. No clear pattern appears before, 
after, or during the election years 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. 
Figure 5.1. Regional budget revenues and transfers over time 
 
Note: STB denotes the share of transfers in the budget. Budget revenues and transfers 
are inflation-adjusted country totals in constant prices of 2012. 
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 The discrepancy between weighted and non-weighted means comes from the fact that smaller regions 
receive larger transfers than their more populous counterparts. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
STB, left axis, % Budget Revenue, trillion RUB Transfers, trillion RUB
  
169 
 
The spatial variation of transfers has remained markedly large throughout the 
history of fiscal federalism in Russia. It has been pointed out that Dagestan 
received seventy times as much per capita in central subventions in 1992 as 
neighboring Stavropolsky Krai (Treisman 1996). Twenty years later in the election 
year 2012 the minimal value of central remittances (measured as the share of total 
transfers in the regional budget) was observed in the largest oil-producing region, 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug (5%), while the maximal value (86%) was 
recorded in Ingushetia, a Caucasian region with a very modest industrial output. 
However, it remains unclear why a middle-income central-Russian region having 
255,297 rubles (RUB) of gross regional product (GRP) per capita – Yaroslavl Oblast 
– received a nearly five times smaller amount of transfers relatively to its budget 
(15%) than Dagestan (72%), whose GRP per capita was only two times smaller 
(128,639.7 RUB); and why the largest Russian diamond producer Sakha (Yakutia) 
Republic received nearly three times more transfers (42%) than Komi Republic 
(15%) given roughly equal regional per capita income (565,449.8 RUB and 
543,089.8 RUB, respectively).89  
The literature diverges in explaining the reasons for such variation. In his 
pioneering study Treisman (1996) found that the federal transfers were distributed 
in accordance with bargaining power of regions, namely, a region’s declaration of 
sovereignty by 1991 and the number of man-days lost to strikes were conducive to 
receiving larger central remittances while Yeltsin’s vote in 1991 was negatively 
associated with the transfers. The negative relationship between the electoral 
objectives and the federal payments has been also confirmed in later studies 
(Treisman 1998a, 1998b, 1999). McAuley (1997) challenged Treisman’s findings by 
arguing that the level of federal support for regions can be largely explained by 
indicators of social need. However, he did not control for political variables in 
analysis. Popov (2004), using a different model specification than Treisman, found 
that the share of Yeltsin’s vote in 1991 was positively linked with per capita 
transfers in 1992 and 1993; the vote for democratic parties in 1999 had a positive 
and a negative relationship with the transfers in 2000 and 2001, respectively (both 
significant); the associations for other election years were negative.  
More recent studies on the politics of federal transfers in the 2000s are also in 
disaccord over determinants of the federal spending. Contrary to Popov’s mixed 
results and Treisman’s findings, Jarocińska (2010) shows that the vote for the pro-
                                                          
89
 The average annual exchange rate in 2012 was 31.1 rubles per one U.S. dollar.  
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incumbent party or presidential candidate is significant and positive predictor of 
transfers in the fixed effects model for the years 1995–1999, as well as in the model 
for the year 1997. Nevertheless, none of political variables appeared to be 
sufficiently significant in the models of years 2000 and 2000–2004. Marques, 
Yakovlev and Nazrullaeva (2016) argue that national level politicians may allocate 
money to both types of regions – most supportive (core) and those in which electoral 
competition is tough (swing) – based on the level of regional economic growth: in 
core regions, central politicians compensate slow growth by increasing transfers 
and withdraw funds in times when the economies experience faster growth; in 
swing regions, transfers are increased in times of economic growth and decreased in 
times of decline. However, as it will be shown later, the results of their analysis are 
crucially dependent on at least two outliers – Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and 
Magadan Oblast. Sharafutdinova and Turovsky (2017) assert that the lobbying 
capacity of governors along with their administrative capacity in delivering the vote 
for United Russia and mobilizing voter turnout play decisive role in contests over 
federal transfers. Analyzing the allocation of transfers in 2002–2012, they show that 
the number of official federal visits to the regions and voter turnout allow to attract 
larger transfers.90 The relationship between federal officials’ visits to the regions and 
regional administrative capacity is unclear though. Why do federal officials visit 
specific regions and neglect the others? And what does motivate federal officials to 
grant money to the visited regions (alternatively, they could penalize governors for 
poor performance on an investigated affair)?91   
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 These effects are, however, small. If the number of federal visits increases by 4 standard deviations, the 
share of politically sensitive transfers (PST) in the budget enlarges by 2.0%; an increase from the minimum (0) 
to the maximum (18) yields 3.6% (in all models in Table 1). An increase by 4 standard deviations in voter 
turnout translates into 4.8-percent increase in the share of PST (in Model 3). The moderate levels of 
significance of these variables (at p < 0.05 and p < 0.1, respectively) primarily come from relatively large 
number of observations (880). Besides this, the variable of the number of federal officials’ visits raises concerns 
about skewness of its distribution since a downward shift by 1.98 standard deviations (1.98 × 2.55) relatively to 
the mean (2.13) produces negative values that should not occur with zero/positive variables if the distribution 
is normal. 
91
 The authors decline the interpretation of the vote for the party of power and turnout as proxies for regional 
political loyalty and support for the Kremlin. Instead they argue that these are indicators of regional 
administrative capacity to mobilize voters (electoral fraud via exerting pressure on voters in my terminology). 
“[S]uch mobilization requires a concerted effort by the regional administrative team – the same team that is 
likely responsible for preparing all the ground and paperwork required in the process of competing for federal 
grants and subsidies” (p. 171). In other words, regional elites exert pressure on federal officials in a similar way 
as they exert it on voters. Hence, the federal officials’ visits and voter turnout or the incumbent’s vote are two 
independent measures of bargaining power of regions. In this dissertation, I argue that such unilateral 
ultimatum-like bargaining by regions has become inadmissible in Putin’s era when the Kremlin initiated the 
process of political recentralization. In these settings, federal transfers are distributed based on loyalty of 
regional elites to the regimes indicated by the vote for federal incumbents. Visits of federal officials to the 
regions play rather an auxiliary role (to negotiate details but bot principles of allocation of transfers). 
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This chapter continues this discussion by exploring the data on federal transfers 
in the period from 2000 through 2016. It shows that, controlling for alternative 
explanations, electoral interests played statistically and substantially significant 
role in determining the allocation of the federal transfers to regions. More 
specifically, transfer politics benefited the core constituency that was more 
supportive of the federal presidential incumbents, whereas the incumbent’s core 
constituency appers to be predominantly comprised of the “ethnic regions”, that is, 
regions with large proportions on non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox 
population. Other variables associated with political objectives such as the 
governor’s tenure in office and the number of United Russia representatives in the 
State Duma demonstrated weak or inconsistent effects on transfers.  
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses the main 
theoretical approaches in the literature to the allocation of intergovernmental 
transfers. After that follows the description of variables, data sources, and 
hypotheses of the study. The analysis begins with exploratory OLS regression 
models for year 2013 and after examining basic relationships and possible 
obstacles to a panel data model it proceeds with multilevel models that take the 
effects of year and budget type into account. The models of changes in transfers 
and causality issues are considered afterwards. The penultimate section examines 
the role of ethnic regions in forging the incumbent’s clientelist coalition by the 
means of federal transfers. Lastly, the findings of this chapter are summarized in 
the conclusion. 
Theoretical Approaches to Allocation of Intergovernmental Transfers  
The literature on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers can be roughly 
divided into five groups.92 
Normative Theory 
Normative theory (Buchanan 1950; Oates 1972) stresses the principles of equity 
and efficiency in allocation of central receipts to lower-level areas. The equity 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Empirically, this logic implies an interaction effect between the number of federal officials’ visits and the 
incumbent’s vote. However, I do not examine this effect in the main analysis due to small explanatory power of 
the variable of visits in Sharafutdinova and Turovsky’s model. 
92
 I classify the literature by relying on the most relevant findings, though alternative explanations may be 
controlled for and results may be mixed. 
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principle is construed as necessity to compensate for inter-regional disparities in 
fiscal capacity, thereby guaranteeing more equal access to public services across 
regions. In other words, “[a]n intergovernmental transfer system can be worked out 
which would allow state units originally unequal in fiscal capacity to provide equal 
services at equal rates of taxation” (Buchanan 1950: 586). The efficiency principle, 
in its turn, implies creating a more level playing field for interjurisdictional 
competition to promote economic growth in economically disadvantaged areas 
(Oates 1999: 1128). 
These idealistic prescriptions are, however, not always fulfilled in practice. 
Wright (1974) analyzed New Deal spending and found that per capita outlays were 
positively correlated with the Democratic percentage of the presidential vote, the 
standard deviation of the vote, and the index of political productivity. Later on, 
Wallis (1996) revisited New Deal spending. The pooled data and exclusion of Nevada 
from analysis appeared to crucially impact the results. Nevertheless, the standard 
deviation of the vote remained significant in all models. Extension of the period of 
study up to 1982 muted the effects of political variables but the relationship of the 
real per capita local and state expenditures with per capita grants turned out to be 
unexpectedly positive.  
The positive effect of the Democratic presidential vote together with turnout on 
distribution of federal assistance programs was also detected for the period 1984–
1990 (Levitt and Snyder 1995). Martin (2003) shows that turnout in House or 
Senate elections better explains bi-annual changes in per capita federal grant 
expenditures than the incumbent’s vote share or the competitiveness of elections. 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) used county-level data from 1957 to 1997. They 
found that counties with the highest vote share for the ruling party receive larger 
transfers, while the alternation of parties in power shifts the distribution toward 
supporters of the new party, and that increased spending in a county increases 
turnout in subsequent elections. A positive association between election returns 
and centrally allocated funds was also discovered in Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 
2004), Argentina, Brazil, and Columbia (González and Mamone 2015), and Turkey 
(Luca and Rodríguez-Pose 2015). 
Conversely, studying the distribution of appropriations bills of fiscal year 2008, 
transportation reauthorization (1998) and academic earmarked grants (1993–2000) 
Lazarus (2009) demonstrates that constituencies with a smaller share of the 
majority party vote in the U.S House of Representatives received more spending. 
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Thereby, Lazarus argues, the majority leadership protected its more vulnerable 
members. It was also shown that the difference in vote shares between the first and 
second party at the municipal level is negatively associated with per capita grants 
in the period from 1979 to 2002 in Portugal (Veiga and Pinho 2007) as well as the 
higher share of votes for the Social Democrats decreases the probability of grant 
recipience by the Swedish municipalities (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002), and that 
per capita central grants of Ghana were larger in districts where vote margins of the 
ruling party in the previous presidential election were smaller (Banuf 2011). 
Public Choice Theory 
Two competing approaches within public choice literature are designed to account 
for this difference.93 Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) assert that in two-party systems 
both parties should favor those groups of voters whose party preferences are weak, 
i.e., “marginal” or “swing” voters: “[s]ince the marginal utility of consumption by 
assumption is decreasing, the per capita transfer to a group is a decreasing 
function of the absolute value of the expected party bias in the group” (p. 279). In 
other words, the salience of consumption issue, i.e., the value of material benefits 
being delivered via transfers, declines as the salience of ideological issue (the “party 
bias”) becomes stronger. 
To the contrary, Cox and McCubbins (1986) endeavor to explain stability of 
electoral coalitions. They argue that candidate strategies are stabilizing when 
candidates invest mostly in their support groups, somewhat less in swing voters, 
and very little or nothing at all in opposition groups. Assuming that candidates are 
risk-averse, they should prefer core supporters over swing voters even though swing 
voters are more responsive to material inducements: they are indeed more 
responsive but equally responsive to the offers of both candidates and therefore are 
a riskier investment. 
Dixit and Londregan (1996) stipulate conditions under which both distributive 
strategies could be successful. They argue that if the parties are equal in their 
abilities to allocate benefits then they prefer targeting moderate or swing voters. If 
one party possesses an advantage in access to its core group then it will distribute 
benefits within its core constituency. As an example of such an advantage the 
authors refer to the urban political machines that were in touch with their 
                                                          
93
 See also literature classification by the two competing distributive strategies in Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno 
and Brusco (2013: 139–141). 
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constituency and provided their core supporters with “personal services”. However, 
an advantage in distribution of patronage benefits does not necessarily originate 
from the personal contact. Calvo and Murillo (2004) demonstrate that the Peronist 
Party in Argentina managed to extract political support from public sector jobs, 
while public employees were rather indifferent toward the opposition Radical Civic 
Union. This was primarily because the Peronist constituency consisted of low-
income and low-educated groups (the relative characteristics of public workers in 
Argentina), whereas the opposition’s core supporters were more educated and better 
off economically and therefore more likely to be private-sector workers.  
However, there could be several limitations to favoring swing voters in 
authoritarian regimes. Weinstein (2011) theorizes that unlike democracies, where 
the main purpose is to win a minimal electoral coalition, authoritarian regimes 
strive to bolster their dominance by demonstrating large margins of victory over the 
opposition candidates. This phenomenon is referred to as the “image of invincibility” 
by Magaloni (2006: 9). Therefore, delivering benefits to swing voters, which is more 
suitable for electoral democracies, is not appropriate for creating a stable support 
group in electoral authoritarian regimes.   
In fact, swing voters are a rare species in Russian authoritarian settings. The 
incumbent’s smallest margin of victory varied within 24–35 percent during election 
years 2004–2012. Never did an opposition candidate come first at the polls ahead of 
Putin or Medvedev at the regional level. Even more dramatically, opposition 
candidates won only in 453, 477, and 1,146 out of more than 95,000 precincts in 
the presidential elections of 2012, 2008, and 2004, respectively. These numbers 
diverge essentially from the election year of 2000, the time when authoritarianism 
was only beginning to be established. Opposition votes outnumbered Putin’s votes 
in 18,055 out of 91,437 precincts. Putin was defeated with the margin of 27% by 
Aman Tuleev, the governor of Kemerovo oblast, in his home region. Putin also lost 
in four other regions to the communist Gennady Zyuganov with a margin of 3–7%. 
However, it can be asserted that even in 2000 the swing voter was rather a rare 
marginal phenomenon in Russian politics. 
Besides that, by favoring swing constituencies, the incumbent runs the risk of 
losing his core supporters, especially if their support is based on material 
inducements rather than on ideological preferences, or if the core supporters’ group 
is tied together by ethnic or religious identities. Meanwhile, the material largess 
allows the incumbent to credibly commit to his promises of being the best 
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representative of this group. In an authoritarian context, the distributive game is 
played not only for winning votes but also for securing the loyalty of region-level 
elites. If the central government is beginning to allocate greater transfers to more 
competitive areas it signalizes to the elites that their loyalty is not encouraged. 
Eventually, it may result in diminishing rates of electoral fraud, opposition 
repression and/or in forging anti-incumbent coalitions (defection with or without 
democratization). Moreover, withdrawing funds aimed at appeasement of rebellious 
social groups is more likely to trigger a “defrosting process” of existing social 
conflicts. 
The literature on authoritarian regimes finds support for the proposition that 
self-interested politicians provide benefits for strong supporters rather than for 
swing voters in authoritarian settings. In her famous study of the dominant party 
regime in Mexico, Magaloni (2006) argues that the Revolutionary Institutional Party 
(PRI) withdrew poverty-alleviation funds of the National Solidarity Program 
(PRONASOL) from municipalities where it was the strongest and redistributed them 
to swing constituencies. She inferred this from the fact that “the coefficient for 
mun*pri88 is negative and statistically significant” (p. 137). Nevertheless, neither 
the main effects variables of the municipal election year and the PRI’s 1988 vote 
share were centered to put a straightforward interpretation on the interaction 
coefficient’s sign nor significant to pay any attention to this interaction effect, 
especially given that N = 9,879.  
The logic of distribution of the PRONASOL funds was, however, revisited in the 
later work (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni 2016); the PRI appeared to target 
the funds primarily at its core supporters. Personally targeted goods aimed to 
account for “clientelism”, which amounted to 29 percent of PRONASOL 
expenditures, was demonstrated to be positively related to the PRI’s vote share and 
negatively associated with the effective number of parties (Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros 
and Estevez 2007). Also in line with expectations of the core voter approach, Diaz-
Cayeros (2006) found that deviation from proportionality with respect to the 
population of the federal investment in Mexico was strongly associated with larger 
vote shares of the PRI; the PRI’s vote was, however, not significant in predicting per 
capita revenue-sharing transfers. Blaydes (2011) uncovered that the Egyptian 
government under Mubarak rewarded the most loyal constituencies. The more votes 
were cast for the oppositional Wafd-Brotherhood alliance in the 1984 parliamentary 
election, the less the corresponding governorates were provided with water and 
sewerage. Studying not an authoritarian but a hegemonic party system in Tanzania, 
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Weinstein (2011) presents the evidence that the ruling party Chama Cha 
Mapinduzu disproportionately granted benefits to the most loyal supporters. 
Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev (2016) argue that the rewarding strategy 
(toward core or swing groups) depends on the level of economic growth. Based on 
the data of Russian Regions from 2000 through 2008, they found an interaction 
effect between United Russia’s margin of victory and regional economic growth on 
year-to-year changes in per capita transfers. However, as Appendix E9 uncovers, 
this effect is primarily determined by two outliers – Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
the differences in transfers of which 6.1 times exceed the variable’s standard 
deviation (on average between 2000–2008), and Magadan Oblast (3.1 times in 
2008)94. Once this outlier is deleted or ranked variables are used instead those 
having multiple strong outliers, the interaction effect as well as main effects of 
United Russia’s margin of victory and economic growth become insignificant.  
Apart from statistical critique, Marques and colleagues’ argument deserves 
theoretical consideration. Its general statement is worthwhile: in their attempt to 
maximize votes, incumbents may save resources by cutting spending in cases 
where it is superfluous (in economically growing core regions) and where it has no 
or weak impact on the vote (in slumping swing regions). Yet this assertion assumes 
a strong and direct effect of the economy on the vote, and this assumption does not 
hold in the wide range of authoritarian regimes. First, the effect of deteriorating 
economy on anti-incumbent voting is muted by the biased media that do not deliver 
objective information on economic indicators but rather strive to manipulate public 
opinion by misinterpreting facts, reporting false information or diverting public 
attention to other (frequently minor) issues. Second, the manifestation of economic 
dissatisfaction is limited on the electoral supply side. Since authoritarian leaders 
repress or co-opt viable opposition activists and ban or subvert potentially 
competitive parties, the available political challengers appear to be political radicals 
who are out of step with the median voter (Greene 2007) or loyalists (Lust-Okar 
2004), regime collaborators (Bunce and Wolchik 2010), and other affiliated with the 
incumbent candidates who are also unattractive to voters due to their connections 
with the regime. Third, voter economic perceptions are not directly translated into 
economic voting because of voter intimidation, vote buying and other practices of 
                                                          
94
 These two are the most influential outliers yet the full list contains 4 negative values, which exceed two 
standard deviations, and 10 similarly positive outliers, including Yakutia 2000 and 2001 (2.9 > SD), Sakhalin 
2008 (2.6 > SD), Kamchatka 2007 (2.5 > SD) and Tatarstan (2.3 > SD). 
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electoral fraud.95 Hence, using transfers as a compensatory mechanism for 
economic voting, while economic voting is influenced by various authoritarian 
practices, is inconsistent. 
Regardless of which group of voters receives benefits from distributive politics, 
the causal relationship between monetary flows and election results may 
reasonably be deemed to be unclear. Weinstein (2011: 43) points out concerning the 
endogeneity problem that studying the effect of past elections on future 
expenditures can be complicated by the fact that financial allocations may influence 
voters’ decisions. Nevertheless, the effect of transfers on the vote is not as obvious 
as it may seem. Using survey data Larcinese, Snyder and Testa (2013) found no 
evidence that the U.S. federal spending influences vote decisions. In fact, 
information is a key precondition for voters’ rationality in decision making. Without 
specially elaborated political campaigns ordinary voters may be unaware of 
spending patterns in their home regions as well as in regions located outside their 
residence.  
Nevertheless, the absence of information does not entail the absence of any 
effect of transfers. Voters anyway consume transfers indirectly in the form of public 
services or in the form of economic growth and general prosperity when large public 
sectors of regional economies receive monetary injections from the federal level of 
government. The muted effect of transfers attributed to these factors may be single 
out by diminishing the gross regional product by the size of the transfer inflow and 
including both variables in the equation. However, I do not argue that transfers are 
used in the Russian context as a tool primarily designed to buy voters. Election 
results in this regard rather serve as an indicator of the regional elites’ loyalty to the 
regime. As Chapter 6 shows, not only voters but rather elites are benefited by the 
incumbent with larger transfers for creating a “favorable political climate” in their 
regions.  
                                                          
95
 The Russian presidential election of 2012 in Moscow is a contrasting example of such disconnectedness of 
the economy and the vote. This example shows that when effects of the intervening variables are mitigated 
(influential alternative media are disposed in Moscow, post-2011 electoral protest and electoral observation 
campaign were supported by the “liberal” part of the elite having strengthened thereby the opposition, and 
electoral fraud was limited), one of the richest regions (the average wage in 2012 was equal 50.6 thousand 
rubles, the 5th place after the four mineral-producing regions) voted the less for Putin (47.9%, followed by 
53.2% in Kaliningrad Oblast). By contrast, five regions listed last in the ranking – Dagestan, Kalmykia, Mordovia, 
Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia – with the average wage of 15.1 thousand rubles demonstrated 
highest levels of support for Putin (82.8%, on average). In these cases, the intervening variables obviously also 
influenced the relationship between the economy and the vote. 
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Political Alignment Theory 
The political alignment literature asserts that districts – the local party, governors 
or mayors of which are aligned with the party that controls the central legislature or 
with presidential party – receive larger central remittances.  Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-
Navarro (2008) have found the evidence supporting the proposition that Spanish 
municipalities aligned with upper-level government (i.e. controlled by the same 
party) are granted more than others. This effect is reinforced when the aligned 
governments are single-party governments at both levels. Tekeli and Kaplan (2007) 
assert that being the mayor and the coalition government in the same party 
increases the amount of grants to municipalities in Turkey. Timmons and Broid 
(2013) found that the amount of transfers reported by Mexican municipalities 
considerably deviated from the amount given by the state formula in the period 
from 2002 to 2007. More specifically, if the mayor and the governor were affiliated 
with the PRI the deviation from the formula was larger. Based on the data of Indian 
states from 1974 to 1997 Arulampalam et al. (2009) conclude that swing and 
simultaneously aligned with the central incumbent states received more per capita 
grants. A positive effect of alignment on intergovernmental transfers was also 
detected in Italy by Padovano (2012). In the case of Russia under Putin, as well as 
in other authoritarian countries, the relevance of this theory is questionable due to 
the lack of variance of the dependent variable. Very few governors and regional 
legislatures were alligned with the opposition in the 2000s. 
Political Representation Theory 
The political representation literature considers the bargaining activities of public 
representatives to be crucial in defining the amount of centrally distributed grants. 
Grossman (1994) examined the allocation of federal grants to state and local 
governments in the U.S. and estimated that each percentage point increase in the 
share of seats held by the Democrats in the state legislature increased per capita 
grants by 0.75 to 5.08 dollars. Using a comprehensive dataset on the federal U.S. 
spending over 24-year period at county level Berry et al. (2010) show that districts 
and counties receive approximately 4-5% more funds when they are represented by 
members of the president’s party in Congress. A better representation in the House 
and Senate committees was shown to be positively associated with federal grant 
allocations to states even though the effect varies from program to program (Rich 
1989). However, controversially, a negative relationship between the number of 
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federal seats, the proportion of federal seats decided on preferences and transfers 
was found by Worthington and Dollery (1998) in the Australian case. 
Besides that, Atlas et al. (1995) have demonstrated the dependence of the U.S. 
federal net spending on overrepresentation (indicated by high levels of 
representatives per capita) in the Senate and House of Representatives. The 
variables of deputies and senators per capita were also crucial in explaining the 
allocation of transfers in Argentina’s provinces (Porto and Sanguinetti 2001). In 
Norway, as well, the number of parliamentary seats per voter positively influenced 
the amount of central grants to municipalities and counties (Sørensen 2003). 
It is worth mentioning that in the Russian case the number of State Duma 
deputies may presumably account for larger remittances in favor of the 
overrepresented regions. At the same time, the affiliation of governors with the 
dominant or an opposition party is unlikely to be associated with the distribution of 
transfers under Putin’s rule. The formal governors’ membership in United Russia 
strongly varied over time and was primarily linked to canceling direct gubernatorial 
elections in September 2004 when “Russia’s governors were essentially forced into 
joining the party” (Reuter 2010: 299). In March 2003 only 9% of governors held 
membership in United Russia; by the moment direct elections were cancelled, this 
proportion rose to 26%; and nearly all (94%) governors had joined the party by 
November 2008.96 Hence, membership in the “party of power” in the earlier period 
rather demonstrated a governor’s weakness and after some moment it has virtually 
become compulsory and therefore non-indicative. Besides that, in the early 2000s 
the bulk of the gubernatorial corps consisted of independents; following the 
tradition of substantially personalist politics formed in the 1990s,97 governors 
preferred not to affiliate with whatever party, so that eight major parties managed to 
nominate 85 candidates in the 183 gubernatorial races during 1995–2003, and only 
six out of these party-backed candidates won governorship afterwards (Hale 2006: 
135). 
                                                          
96
 Calculations based on Reuter (2010). 
97
 In any case, the fact is that political parties were not influential in Russian politics in the 1990s, especially at 
the regional level. Pointing out in this regard that the average share of party nominees in regional legislative 
assemblies dropped from 21.8% in the second half of the 1990s to 14.2% in the first half of the 2000s, Golosov 
(2011: 627) concludes that “political parties in the regions were on the edge of extinction”. 
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Political Appeasement Theory 
The political appeasement literature emphasizes the role of transfers as a tool used 
to pacify rebellious elites or ethnic minorities. Using the Spanish regional data in 
the period 1986–2006, Reino and Alcalde (2011) show that the bargaining power of 
the nationalist Catalonian party measured by the Banzhaf voting power index has 
been a significant predictor of growth in various financial benefits allocated to 
regions. Caldera (2011) considers that ethnically fractionalized and swing 
communes in Senegal, a country that also has to deal with a violent separatist 
movement in the southern region of the Casamance, receive larger transfers. In 
their study of intergovernmental transfers in China Wan, Ma and Zhang (2015) 
remark that the central government allocates more transfers to provinces with high 
proportions of ethnic minorities. 
In the case of Russia, Treisman (1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) revealed that the 
transfer system in the 1990s worked to appease those regions that declared state 
sovereignty, threatened the central leadership with obstruction induced by mass 
strikes or voted against Yeltsin and pro-government parties. Stewart (1997) also 
examined the allocation of central transfers in Russia in the years 1993, 1994, and 
1995. The results indicated that regions having special status received more per 
capita receipts. The analysis also employed variables of republican status, the 
number of workers on strike, and support for Yeltsin in the referendum of 1993, yet 
these interesting variables were included only in the model with tax retentions as 
the dependent variable and turned out to be insignificant. This study reexamines 
the findings of political appeasement literature in the new historical period of 
Putin’s rule when the federal center became much stronger vis-à-vis the regions. 
The results show that the regions were rewarded for political loyalty to the regime 
rather than appeased for various manifestations of disobedience. At the same time, 
the alternation of the ethnic regions’ position toward the federal center from 
opposition in the 1990s to loyalty in the 2000s has played a crucial role in the 
process of bargaining for the federal transfers. 
  
181 
 
Data, Variables, and Hypotheses 
The data for analysis mainly come from statistical yearbooks issued by the Federal 
State Statistics Service (Rosstat)98 and the United Interdepartmental Information 
and Statistical System (EMISS)99. The minor data sources and more precise 
references are given in footnotes. It should be noted that the number of Russia’s 
regions was changing over time due to the process of unification of the hierarchical 
regions.100 The sample includes 83 regions, which remained after the process of 
unification.101 Rosstat more frequently reports the overall number for the upper-
level region and the numbers for the lower-level regions. To make the data 
consistent I subtract the numbers of the lower-level regions from the upper-level 
region.102 If the numbers are reported independently for the hierarchically unified 
regions, the procedure goes the other way around: I add numbers of the lower-level 
regions to the upper-level region. Since other variables intervene when percentage 
indictors are calculated, I use only values of the upper-level regions for the unified 
ones. In fact, the population of autonomous okrugs is much smaller compared to 
oblasts, therefore, taking percentage indicators’ values of the latter does not 
considerably change the pattern.  
The Dependent Variable  
There could be several measures allowing us to gauge federal transfers. Per capita 
monetary remittances is apparently the most commonly used one. The per capita 
measure, however, assumes a priori a deterministic relationship between the 
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 Regions of Russia. Social-Economic Indicators [Regioni Rossii. Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskie Pokazateli]. Moscow: 
Rosstat. Available at: 
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/catalog/doc_113862350
6156 
99
 Available at: https://www.fedstat.ru/ 
100
 The following regions were unified: Komi-Perm Autonomous Okrug and Perm Oblast were unified and 
renamed into Perm Krai on 1 December 2005; Taimyr (Dolgan-Nenets) and Evenki Autonomous Okrugs were 
merged with Krasnoyarsk Krai on 1 January 2007; the unification of Kamchatka Oblast and Koryak Autonomous 
Okrug into Kamchatka Krai occurred on 1 July 2007; Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug was merged with 
Irkutsk Oblast on 1 January 2008; finally, Chita Oblast and Agin-Buryat Autonomous Okrug have formed 
Zabaykalsky Krai on 1 March 2008. Thus, the number of regions has decreased to 83. 
101
 This chapter examines only federal-regional transfers though the total number of levels is defined by the 
administrative structure of the country. Additionally, transfers allocated from regions to cities and raions, and 
from raions to rural settlements may be examined in a more profound study. 
102
 Take an example of non-unified hierarchical region, which has not been unified due to an obvious reason. 
Tyumen Oblast includes two major oil-producing okrugs in the country – Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug and 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. The Rosstat’s numbers for them are 4,618,711.0, 2,686,074.8, and 
1,192,229.6 million rubles, respectively. Since the first number includes the two subsequent, I diminish it by 
them to obtain the GRP value only for Tyumen Oblast without okrugs that is 740,406.6 million rubles – 
considerably smaller than the GRPs of the two formally lower-level okrugs subordinated to the oblast. 
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monetary flow and the number of persons in jurisdictions though this may not be 
the case in practice. Weinsten (2011) points out that districts with large populations 
require less financing due to economies of scale and the fixed costs associated with 
the delivery of public services. In fact, economists have long discovered that 
production costs grow with the number of goods being produced, while 
administrative, promotion and similar costs are relatively fixed (Moore 1959; Giora 
1975). Therefore, sparsely populated jurisdictions such as Chukotka or Kamchatka 
may require larger transfers just to maintain the functioning of minimally sufficient 
administrative bodies.103 For this reason the negative correlation between per capita 
transfers and population that has been found in the literature (Grossman 1994: 
298104; Levitt and Snyder 1995; Calvo and Murillo 2004) may be substantively 
spurious. The measure of transfers in the absolute numbers of currency controlled 
by population in regression analysis allows us to take into account a possibly 
probabilistic nature of the relationship between transfers and population and to 
avoid the bias.  
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006), in a slightly different manner, employed 
county per capita transfers relative to state per capita transfers. This approach 
might have been used as a tool to control for regional idiosyncrasies if all 
explanatory variables had been similarly measured. However, it does not help to 
overcome the general oddity of per capita measurement resulting from economies of 
scale. 
The group of per capita indicators also includes net per capita transfers (i.e., the 
central payments to regions diminished by taxes paid in the federal budget) 
Treisman 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1999). Although a theoretical rationale underlies the 
net transfers – how much a region receives in the net remainder – it is hardly 
convenient for using from a statistical point of view, inasmuch as diminishing by 
federal taxes provides a skewed distribution with multiple outliers on the both tails 
of the variable. As with the net per capita transfers in 2012, the variable’s 
distribution is so strongly skewed that even after zero-skewness log-transformation 
is applied, the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality rejects the hypothesis that the data 
                                                          
103
 For instance, if we simply extrapolate the Moscow’s ratio of the number of ministerial portfolios (62) over 
the region’s population (12.1 million) to Kamchatka, whose population is slightly bigger than three hundred 
thousand, then we predict that only four ministers instead of 25 acting top officials in the government should 
serve the region’s needs. 
104
 Grossman argues that remitting greater transfers to small states is beneficial since the number of recipients 
is small while the costs are spread across all taxpayers. 
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are distributed normally with p < 0.000.105 Therefore, I refrain from using this 
variable in analysis.106 Nevertheless, I find the idea of considering not only the 
federal payments but also monetary remittances back to the center useful. The 
relationships between variables in the allocation of federal transfers may 
presumably vary by budget type. To control for this, I introduce a dummy variable 
coded 0 (Donor) if the region pays more taxes into the federal budget than it 
receives money in the form of transfers, and 1 (Recipient) otherwise. 
Another indicator is the share of transfers in the region’s budget (STB). Calvo 
and Murillo (2004) employed both – the share of federal transfers in Argentina’s 
provincial expenditures and the province’s share of federal transfers in total 
national amount of federal transfers over its population ratio to national 
population107 – and found substantively similar results regardless of the measures 
being used: the Peronist Party’s vote share was positively associated with transfers.  
In the current analysis I rely on three measures of transfers: the share of 
transfers in the budget, per capita transfers, and raw transfers measured in 
rubles.108 The STB is expected to be the main and the most indicative among them: 
the larger is the share of transfers in the regional budget, the more the region is 
dependent on the federal remittances. The other two variables are employed more 
for purposes of robustness checks. I also use the share of total transfers (STT) – the 
region’s share of transfers in the total federal amount of transfers – to avoid the 
impact of inflation and year-to-year fluctuations in the total size of the transfer fund 
for tracing change in transfers over time. 
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 Three observations over 4.8 times as the standard deviation (163,831.3 RUB) lay below the mean (-28,287.1 
RUB) but these observations 68.4 times more than the median absolute deviation (11,914) lay below the 
median (3,455.1 RUB). On the right tail there are no outliers if we infer from the standard deviation. However, 
the standard deviation is not a robust estimator of dispersion for skewed distributions. The median absolute 
deviation, which fits the latter condition, shows that the maximal value belonging to Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (109,007.4 RUB) exceeded the median by 8.9 times. Overall, seventeen observations outlie over two 
median absolute deviations below the median, and ten outliers are located above. 
106
 For exploratory purposes, I tried to run a model with net per capita transfers in 2012 as the dependent 
variable. In regions that were net recipients of transfers the effect of the incumbent’s vote was very similar to 
that presented in the main text, yet the effect of regional taxes was with an unexpected positive sign. The 
White test for heteroscedasticity of residuals applied to the best model indicated that the residual term is not 
with random variance at p = 0.086. Two other models, which include regions that were net donors of transfers, 
and all observations, did not pass the White test at all. I also tried using a ranked variable of net per capita 
transfers. The results were similar to the results shown in the main text with one exception, namely, that 
regional taxes were again positively related to transfers among donor regions. A model that included all cases 
nevertheless did not pass the White test due to reasons discussed in the text below. 
107
 The latter measure called as “Relative Revenue Sharing Ratio” is virtually transfers per capita relative to its 
sample’s average. 
108
 The total amount of transfers is used for constructing the variables. Alternatively, Appendix E2 examines the 
allocation of various subtypes of transfers. 
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Equalizing Regional Budgets 
Ideally, federal transfers are aimed at leveling cross-regional income disparities and 
alleviating social need. Although these two goals look similar, it would be better to 
differentiate between them inasmuch as equalizing politics considers only the 
region’s tax revenue without regarding the actual region’s need in external 
assistance. In fact, between two regions with a similar tax base one may be needier 
than the other because its fixed assets are more depreciated (dilapidated dwellings, 
crumbling roads, etc.) or the structure of its economy allows more unemployed and 
destitute people. Thus, two variables associated with equalizing cross-regional 
disparities are used in the analysis. I expect that regions with higher gross regional 
product (GRP) per capita and larger tax base measured as the total amount of levied 
regional taxes per capita109 should receive smaller federal remittances. These 
indicators can be found in several formulas employed by the central government for 
allocating transfers and presumably should strongly impact the distributional 
pattern.  
Alleviating Social Need 
Percentage of unemployment and percentage of population with income below the 
living minimum are expected to directly measure the extent of a region’s need from 
social perspective. From an economic perspective, I create two indices measuring 
the degree of development and condition of the regional infrastructure. An earlier 
study has shown that contrary to expectations the index of regional infrastructure 
development, which includes telephones per hundred of urban residents, doctors 
per thousand residents, housing space per capita, and hospital beds per thousand 
residents, is positively related to transfers (Treisman 1996: 299–335). The author 
came to conclusion that “the poorer the provision of housing, medical and 
education services in a region, the less it seemed to receive in subsidies, grants, 
credits and privileges” (p.323). However, regions with more developed 
infrastructure, without having their own funds, may receive more transfers merely 
                                                          
109
 Regional taxes denote the total amount of tax money collected in regional budgets (the Russian tax system 
differentiates taxes on those paid only in the federal budget, paid only in regional budgets, and taxes shared in 
various proportions between the center and regions). Since the data are available only for 2006 and onwards, 
the missing values of 2000 and 2004 have been predicted based on median annual changes (MAC). The MAC 
approach guarantees more precision then the forecast based on ARIMA model due to the monotonic and 
heavily trended budget revenue process. In this case ARIMA produces 62 negative and hence irrelevant 
predictions for 2000 while all MAC predictions are positive and generally consistent with the data. After having 
been forecasted the data were inflation adjusted, i.e., returned to the constant prices of 2012. Source: EMISS, 
at https://fedstat.ru/indicator/42547 
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to maintain their large infrastructure in a proper condition but not to invest in 
construction of new infrastructural objects.  
To draw a more detailed picture, I introduce a similar index of infrastructure 
development along with an index of the infrastructure condition. I do not have any 
clear expectations about the first index but expect that in accordance with the 
equity principle regions whose infrastructure is in worse condition should receive 
larger transfers. The indices are based on standardized z-scores and defined as 
follows:  
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where μ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation.110 
                                                          
110
 Note: Variables with skewed distributions have been log-transformed before constructing the indices (see 
transformation details in Appendix E8). After constructing the indices as defined by the formulas the indices 
have been again standardized, i.e., differenced by their means and divided by standard deviations (due to 
combination of the three variables the standard deviations of the initially calculated indices exceeded 1). I did 
not use factor analysis since the number of variables is small and it would be better to know their meaning on 
average without adding more weight to particular variables. 
The data on the Share of Regional and Municipal Roads Meeting the Requirements (Roads Condition) are taken 
from EMISS, at http://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/data.do?id=50215&referrerType=0&referrerId=1293268. 
Inasmuch as the data on the Roads Condition are available on the annual basis only beginning from 2007, the 
values for years 2000 and 2004 have been predicted using auto.arima (package “forecast” in R), which returns 
best ARIMA model according to either AIC, AICc or BIC value. In three cases the values of 2000 were predicted 
beyond the reasonable bounds (> 100 or < 0). In two these cases predictions of 2004 have been used instead. 
In Chechnya however even prediction for 2004 appeared to be lower than zero; the predictions for 2000 and 
2004 have been substituted by the value of 2007. ARIMA (back)forecasting is more suitable compared to 
average (median) annual changes approach for time series that do not have stable trends but rather exhibit 
changing patterns over time. Roughly speaking, ARIMA attributes more weight to the tail of time series, which 
is closer to the forecasting period, then to the overall trend. For the Roads Condition, the forecast of 2000 
based on the median annual changes produces five predictions falling beyond the interval [0, 100] and 
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Political Objectives 
The vote share for the incumbent president or party is seemingly the most widely 
used indicator of political interests in the allocation of the central grants. It may, 
however, be reasonably argued that the official incumbent’s vote in autocracies 
contains essential portions of fictitious votes resulted from electoral manipulations. 
In fact, the findings of the previous chapter indicate a strong exposure of the 
Russian electoral data to various types of electoral fraud. Nevertheless, high-level 
authoritarian officials judge about performance of their lower-level counterparts not 
from the true vote but from the official vote sheets. The forged vote in this case is 
not deemed as a “defective vote” or something intrinsically negative; in the 
authoritarian system, electoral fraud is rather encouraged. From this standpoint, 
the fictitious vote is at least as valuable under authoritarianism as the sincere vote. 
The fictitious vote may equally demonstrate strength of the leader since a lot of 
political resources is needed to effectively perpetrate fraud.111 Therefore, I do not 
differentiate here between the fraudulent vote and the true vote and treat them as a 
single variable. Namely, the incumbent’s vote in the federal presidential elections is 
used to account for the major political interest in the area. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
predictions are generally less relevant to the observed data than predictions by ARIMA model. Spline 
prediction also performed poorer compared with ARIMA. 
Roads Density (RD) denotes meters of roads per the product of population and area measured as follows: 
    √
  
  
 
  
  
, where R refers to the total length (in meters) of roads in ith region, P to population (residents), 
and A to the area (km
2
). The indicator based on the geometric mean of population and area in the denominator 
performs much better in densely populated or underpopulated regions compared with the ordinary indicator 
(roads per area). It follows from the fact that in sparsely populated large regions having the same length of 
roads as in densely populated large regions is not necessary while having the a similar road length is reasonable 
in small but densely populated and in large but sparsely populated regions. For instance, in 2012 the difference 
in roads per area between the first and the last regions in the ranking has been more than two thousand times 
larger (2,156 m/km
2
 in Saint Petersburg and 0.9 m/km
2
 in Chukotka Autonomous Okrug); and Saint-Petersburg 
stood out 5.5 standard deviations above the mean (246.3 m/km
2
). Once population is taken into account the 
gap in provision of roads between Saint Petersburg and Chukotka decreases to eleven times (36.1 m/capita-
km
2
 in Saint Petersburg and  3.4 m/capita-km
2
 in Chukotka); and Saint Petersburg appears to be normally 
provided with roads relative to the national average (34.9 m/capita-km
2
).  
The data on the other variables come from Rosstat. 
111
 Kalinin and Mebane (2012) argue that electoral fraud is used in Russia to signal loyalty by governors to the 
federal center in order to receive more transfers. Controlling for the incumbent’s vote and turnout rate, they 
found that higher levels of last-digit proportions of zeroes and fives in the distributions of turnout in the 
presidential elections are associated with larger post-electoral per capita transfers in 2004 and 2008. 
Empirically, however, this result may depend on model specification. Theoretically, there is counter-intuitive to 
expect that central-level politicians require electoral fraud as an indicator of governors’ loyalty rather than 
something that [not necessarily is but at least] can be presented as a result of the popular voting. Therefore, I 
assume that regional elites strive to receive larger transfers by delivering more impressive electoral results to 
central incumbents and central incumbents willingly reward regional elites for their loyalty, whereas both 
actors admit that the electoral game is unfair and the electoral system is permissive of fraud, yet at the same 
time, fraudulent votes should necessarily be presented to the general public under the guise of real votes. 
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The relationship between transfers and the vote may, however, appear in both 
directions. Treisman (1998a: 904) points out that contrary to the straightforward 
political logic, “[r]egions that voted most strongly against the main pro-reform or 
pro-government blocs in 1993 and 1995 received larger net central transfers per 
capita in subsequent years. And regions whose governor took up the political 
banner of the central “party of power”, agreeing to run on Chernomyrdin's Our 
Home is Russia electoral list, were “rewarded” for such loyalty with lower net 
allocations”. Nevertheless, I suppose that the situation changed in the 2000s. When 
Putin came to power the new agreements on the delimitation of powers between 
regions and the federal center, widely practiced under Yeltsin, ceased to be signed. 
Out of 42 agreements with 46 regions, constituted between 1994 and 1998, 33 
terminated up to May 2003 and almost all agreements expired by the end of 2005 
(Chertkov and Kistrinova 2014). The last agreement, which rather had a symbolic 
character,112 was signed with Tatarstan in 2007 and was valid up to 2017 
(Samohina 2017). The concurrent process of bringing the regional legislation in 
compliance with the federal law, which was also initiated by Putin, was over in June 
2009 when the parliament of Yakutia, the last after those who declared state 
sovereignty in the early 1990s, eliminated the word “sovereignty” from the 
republican constitution (Rybin 2009). Correspondingly I expect that the politics of 
fiscal appeasement has turned to the politics of fiscal rewarding when the most 
loyal regions are more cheerfully granted with federal money than their less 
supportive counterparts.   
Treisman (1996) also found that the strongest explanatory variable that predicts 
the distribution of transfers appeared to be a dummy whether the region declared 
sovereignty113 by January 1991.114 He also noted that neither the titular nationality 
                                                          
112
 The first agreement of 1994 stipulated that Tatarstan may issue its own currency, levy taxes, the mineral 
resources were declared an exclusive property of the Tatar people whereas the agreement of 2007 allowed the 
Tatars only having the Russian passport with an inset on the Tatar language; candidates for the post of the 
head of the republic should speak both – Russian and Tatar – state languages. 
113
 I use the Treisman’s coding of the sovereignty declarations (1998a: 203) with several exceptions. Checheno-
Ingush Republic divided into Chechnya and Ingushetia afterwards. I coded both regions as declared 
sovereignty. Komi-Perm Autonomous Okrug, which declared sovereignty in 1990, in December 2005 merged 
with Perm Oblast in Perm Krai as well as Koryak Autonomous Okrug declared sovereignty and merged with 
Kamchatka Oblast in Kamchatka Krai in July 2007. I code the regions emerged after the unification as declared 
sovereignty. Finally, Tuva Republic is absent among the declarants in Treisman’s database, however On 
December 12, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Tuva ASSR adopted the Declaration on the State Sovereignty 
of the Soviet Republic of Tuva (see: http://www.tuva.asia/journal/issue_14/4816-ondar.html). I code Tuva as 
declared sovereignty as well. 
114
 Another strongly significant variable from Treisman’s analysis associated with bargaining power of regions 
however became irrelevant in the 2000s: in 2012 about 500 people from six organizations participated in 
strikes in five regions. In other years the numbers were also small. In 2010 there were no registered strikes at 
all. Strikes therefore are not used to operationalize the bargaining power of regions. 
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variable nor the non-Russian population variable was significant when added in the 
model simultaneously with the sovereignty declarations. I question this finding and 
argue that the propensity to declare state sovereignty as well as the probability of 
receiving transfers are largely impacted by ethnic and religious composition of the 
regions. To account for this, I use the share of non-Russian population and the 
share of non-Orthodox Christians, i.e., all other religions and denominations that do 
not belong to the Russian Orthodox Church (atheists are not counted).115  
Alternatively, the bargaining power of regions may be indicated by the number of 
years a governor holds office116 and by the number of the State Duma MPs per one 
million of population representing the region.117 Although strikes and mass 
                                                          
115
 The data come from The Atlas of Religions and Nationalities of Russia (Available at: http://sreda.org/arena). 
The sample of the survey conducted in 2012 includes 56,900 respondents in 79 regions with 500 to 800 
respondents per each region. The missing values were treated as follows: Nenets and Chukotka autonomous 
districts were defined as mainly pagan and their shares of non-Orthodox Christians were set at 95
th
 percentile 
of paganism among other regions. Chechnya and Ingushetia were defined as Muslim regions and their shares of 
non-Orthodox Christians were set at 95
th
 percentile of Islam among other regions. The data on ethnic 
composition were taken from The General Census of 2010 at: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm. I preferred using The Atlas of 
Religions and Nationalities of Russia over the general census because the census does not contain the 
information on religious identification. 
116
 Source: The list of of heads of subjects of the Russian Federation. Available at: 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BA_%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0
%D0%B2_%D1%81%D1%83%D0%B1%D1%8A%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%BE%D0%B2_%D0%A0%D0%BE%
D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%A4%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1
%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8 
117
 It is a difficult task to identify whom the State Duma deputies really represent. The regional affiliation, which 
is given on the official Duma website (http://www.duma.gov.ru/about/history/convocations/6/), is misleading 
for several reasons. First, about 37% of deputies represent more than one region. Second, their regional 
affiliation is often dubious so long as many deputies never lived in their regions of representation for any 
considerable period of time. This situation follows from the fact that the majority part of the mixed majority-
proportional electoral system, which was adopted since 1995, was canceled in 2007. Single member districts, 
however, were reintroduced in 2016, yet the negative effect of proportionality continued to apply to the half of 
deputies as it occurred before. Not only small regions have less than one representative due to proportional 
distribution of mandates across population, all State Duma parties used to include in election lists such 
candidates who have no contact with regions that they represent. For instance, Andey Andreev, the 
Communist Party’s representative of Komi Republic and Arkhangelsk Oblast in the State Duma of the sixth 
convocation, was born in Tomsk brought up in Udmurtia graduated in Moscow in 1999 and since then he 
permanently lives in the capital city. A Komi newspaper Krasnoe Znamya points out that this practice resembles 
Stalin’s times when the first North Pole pilot Mikhail Babushkin became a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR from the Syktyvkar electoral district in 1937. The pilot’s name is now assigned to a street in Syktyvkar, the 
capital city of Komi Republic, though neither in Syktyvkar nor in the Komi ASSR this remarkable pilot had ever 
flown (Sumarokov 2014). To control for these discrepancies I adjust regional affiliation of deputies by their 
biographies. A deputy is attributed to that particular region where he or she before taking the mandate 1) 
resided for considerably long period of time, 2) held elected or executive office, 3) had or has business. In any 
case the most recent affiliation is considered. If a deputy, for instance, is an incumbent, who each new term is 
elected in different regions, his regional affiliation is attributed to Moscow. Thus, due to prevalence of the 
nation-level artists, sportsmen, businessmen, and incumbents the number of deputies affiliated with Moscow 
increases to 131 compared with 26.5 as it officially declared (the number is not integer since multiple 
affiliations have been divided by the number of regions being represented). Out of 447 deputies each region 
was represented by 5.4 on average, yet three and less deputies served the social interests in 49 regions, 8 
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demonstrations have nearly come to naught in the 2000s the scope of terrorism 
remained remarkably stable. The number of terrorist attacks in the presidential 
election years and in three preceding years amounted to 32 in 2000 and 2004, 16 
in 2008, and 47 in 2012.118 Overall, 127 terrorist attacks in 18 regions were 
committed during 16 years or 7.9 annually with the maximal number recorded in 
Dagestan – 28. Since the variable’s distribution is strongly skewed I use a dummy 
indicating whether any number of terrorist attacks has taken place (coded 1) or not 
(coded 0). This measure may help to account for appeasement strategy in allocation 
of transfers. I also use a dummy variable based on reports of the Network for 
Ethnological Monitoring and Early Warning of Conflicts (EAWARN) (Tishkov and 
Stepanov 2014: 359; Tishkov and Stepanov 2011: 243; Tishkov and Stepanov 2004: 
253) indicating whether a conflict situation is present in the region. The variable is 
coded 1 if “notable conflicts” or “conflict situation” was reported; “weak tension” and 
“stable situation” are coded 0. This variable is supposed to tap more precisely the 
appeasement strategy of the incumbent toward regions engaged in ethnic conflicts. 
All four variables are expected to have a positive association with the transfers.  
Other Variables 
The federal transfers may hypothetically be allocated with a bias in favor of more 
authoritarian regions. It may occur either due to stronger bargaining power of such 
regions or because of their similarity with the central government: it may be a kind 
of alignment effect when the central autocrats promote local autocracies by 
donating more resources for their functioning. More precisely, central transfers may 
be used for buying loyalty of regional elites who presumably then respond with 
more suppression of political and civil freedoms in their regions. I use two proxies 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regions had no representatives at all. I experimented with several measures of regional representation – 
biographically adjusted MPs, non-adjusted MPs, United Russia’s MPs – performance of the first variable 
appeared to be the best (see Table E4 in Appendix E2). 
118
 Source: The list of terrorist attacks in Russia. Available at: 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82%D1%8B,_%D1%81%D0%BE
%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%88%D1%91%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5_%D0%B2_%D0%A0%D0%BE%
D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8 
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to gauge this effect. Namely, the index of Press Freedom119 and the Media 
Persecution index120 are expected to be positively associated with the transfers.  
Exploratory Analysis 
The data on the dependent variables – the share of transfers in the budget, per 
capita transfers, and raw transfers measured in rubles – are taken for 2001, 2005, 
2009, and 2013 – the years following the presidential elections. The rationale 
behind this is that budget is voted a year before its implementation. Therefore, all 
explanatory variables follow with one-year lag relatively to transfers and coincide 
with election years. I forgo including the lagged dependent variable (LDV) – as, for 
instance, Arellano and Bond (1991) – in the analysis since the LDVs generally don’t 
have a clear causal interpretation. Moreover, they change coefficients (from time to 
time, in the opposite direction) and suppress significance levels of substantively 
important variables whereas the bias increases with the degree of serial correlation 
(Achen 2000).121  
Later on, the arguments of Achen were revisited by Keele and Kelly (2006). Using 
Monte Carlo experiments with simulated time-series data, they found that the LDV 
models lead to much stronger bias than ARMA models if the dependent and 
explanatory variables are autocorrelated. The section Taking Time into Account 
                                                          
119
 The expert index is developed by the Glasnost Defence Foundation. For the year 2010, the scale includes 
four ranks where 1 indicates “free” (0 cases), 2 denotes “relatively free” (16 cases), 3 denotes “relatively 
unfree” (44 cases), and 4 states for “unfree” (22 cases). I reversed this scale so that 4 is recoded into 1, 3 is 
recoded into 2, and 2 is recoded into 3. Available at: http://www.gdf.ru/map/list/2010. 
120
 Since many expert indices are inherently biased, I alternatively employ a more objective measure based on 
reports about media conflicts made by journalists. All reports in the database “Russia: Mediaconflicts”, which 
are brief summaries of incidents occurred with journalists, were grouped into three categories in ascending 
order of pressure: 1 includes intimidation and censorship; 2 includes attack on/blocking of website, detention, 
withdrawal of issue, assault, employee layoff, and legal prosecution; and the most repressive incidents of the 
category 3 include assassinations of journalists. All incidents reported between 2007 and 2012 are then 
summed by regions with using geometrically increasing weights, so that the incidents on category 1 (N = 529) 
are summed without a weight, the number of incidents in the category 2 (N = 1,110) is multiplied by three, and 
assassinations (N = 20) receive nine times more weight than intimidation and censorship. Then the index’s 
score is divided by the region’s population (in millions) to more proportionally represent the number of 
reported attacks on journalists. The database is available at: http://www.mediaconflicts.org. 
121
 I tried to run the full model from Table 5.1 having additionally included the STB2012 to the set of predictors. 
The result is that out of the full set of predictors only the proportion of population with income blow the living 
minimum was significant at 0.043 along with the STB2012 (0.000). In qualitative terms, keeping all other 
variables at their means, the increase of the STB2012 from its 5th to 95th percentile increases the STB2013 from 5 
to 83 percent while the corresponding increase of the proportion of population with income below the living 
minimum just slightly deviate the STB2013 from its mean by changing its value from 28 to 33 percent. The result 
is expectable due to strong correlation between the STBt and the STBt – 1: since the STB2012 account for 95% of 
the STB2013’s variance, all other explanatory variables have a very little chance to reveal their explanatory 
power. 
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examines the effect of time by using changes in the share of total transfers being 
explained by changes in the predictor variables instead the LDV. It must also be 
noted that all variables with strongly skewed distributions have been log-
transformed in order to solve the problems of non-linearity and heteroscedasticity, 
and to ensure that regression coefficients being derived are the best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE). See Appendix E8 for details. 
Table 5.1. OLS models explaining the allocation of transfers in 2013 
DV: Share of Transfers in the 
Budget 
Full 
Model 
Equalizi
ng  
Social 
Need 
Political 
Objectives 
Best 
Model 
Constant 
-6.92 
(-.426) 
76.06*** 
(11.963) 
-21.11***  
(-3.271) 
-35.83**      
(-2.606) 
-4.629 
(.758) 
Log Regional Taxes Per Capita  
-.000* 
(-1.701) 
-.000* 
(-1.715)   
-.000*** 
(-6.053) 
Log GRP Per Capita 
-.000 
(-.516) 
-.000 
(-1.015)   
 
Log Unemployment (%) 
.526 
(.672) 
 
3.984***  
(4.485)  
 
Population with Income Below the 
Living Minimum (%) 
1.197*** 
(2.944) 
 
1.576***   
(3.148)  
1.334*** 
(3.887) 
Infrastructure Is More Developed 
5.692*** 
(2.696) 
 
.809  
(-.350)  
5.12** 
(2.491) 
Infrastructure Is in Worse 
Condition 
-5.74*** 
(-2.678) 
 
-3.220  
(-1.107)  
-5.475** 
(-2.619) 
Putin’s Vote (%), 2012 
.577*** 
(3.494) 
 
 
.766*** 
(3.763) 
.586*** 
(3.646) 
Declared Sovereignty in the Early 
1990s 
7.867** 
(2.48) 
 
 
9.56** 
(2.248) 
8.702*** 
(2.874) 
Terrorist Attacks 2009–2012 
[Attacked] 
4.912 
(1.391) 
 
 
8.267* 
(1.718)  
Log Media Persecution Index 
2007–2012 
.064 
(1.604) 
 
 
.132** 
(2.405) 
.072** 
(1.889) 
Log Years Governor in Office up 
to 2012 
.561** 
(2.661) 
 
 
.817*** 
(2.736) 
.562*** 
(2.693) 
Log MPs Per 1 mln. pop. 
-2.251* 
(-1.892) 
  
-2.722* 
(-1.747) 
-2.232* 
(-1.968) 
R-squared .768 .460 .476 .457 .760 
White’s heteroscedasticity test .434 .000*** .001*** .338 .131 
N 83 83 83 83 83 
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Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values indicated in parentheses. 
Here and hereinafter H(0) for White test: residuals are homoscedastic. Hence, significant p-
values indicate heteroscedasticity of residuals. Variables of the best model are selected by 
maximizing variance explained under the condition of fewer wasted degrees of freedom. 
Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Results of the regression models in Table 5.1, first of all, indicate that a roughly 
equal share of variance is explained by the models of equalizing regional budgets, 
alleviating social need, and political objectives – about 45%. A similar conclusion 
follows from the full and the best models: the allocation pattern of transfers is 
neither determined by impartiality reasons only, nor by exclusively political 
concerns, but it rather represents a combination of them. All variables have the 
expected signs with the exception for two. As in the best model, a better 
representation in the federal parliament is negatively associated with the central 
monetary remittances.  
As it was noted, I do not have clear expectations about the index of 
infrastructure development, however, its positive sign in combination with a 
negative sign of the index of infrastructure condition should rather be interpreted 
such that regions with better infrastructure received more federal transfers. 
Nevertheless, I do not draw final conclusions from these models so far as Equalizing 
and Social Need models do not pass the White test for heteroscedasticity of 
residuals and the best model is close to the crucial 10-percent level of significance.  
Figure 5.2 aims to account for the models’ failure in the White test. The 
residuals were diagnosed as not having random variance because two groups of 
observations evidently exist in the data, namely, regions that were net donors of the 
federal taxes and regions that were net recipients of the federal transfers. When the 
share of transfers in the budget is regressed on the Putin’s vote the relationship 
between them appears only in the group of recipients (R2 = 0.44), while the donor 
regions show no association between transfers and the vote (R2 = 0.0). This may 
possibly occur due to a threshold effect. On the scatterplot, this threshold is located 
at about 20% – the value separating donors from recipients. The association 
between transfers and the vote may presumably by weak or absent in the donor 
regions because the federal center treats them differently from the recipient regions: 
the regional economies of the donors are self-sufficient, their average share of 
transfers in the budget is small therefore tranches of transfers are much less 
relevant for them than to the recipients. The supposition that the federal center 
treats regions differently based on their ratio of paid federal taxes to received 
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transfers is confirmed by the fact that heterogeneity of residuals is detected by the 
White test in the Equalizing and the Social Need models. Thus, the overall estimate 
is inconsistent since it violates the basic assumption of regression analysis on data 
homogeneity. 
Figure 5.2. The inconsistency between the overall OLS estimate and within-group 
estimates in predicting transfers 
 
To delimitate donor and recipient regions, Table 5.2 reports results of regression 
analysis separately for these two groups. As expected, the overall pattern of the 
allocation of transfers is strongly dependent on whether the region is net donor of 
federal taxes or net recipient of federal transfers. Nearly all associations are 
statistically insignificant for the donors. Only the level of unemployment and per 
capita taxes levied by the region’s budget defined the federal receipts in this group. 
In contrast, the relationships are stronger for the recipients even compared with the 
models in Table 5.1. Out of all politically neutral predictors only the region’s own 
per capita tax revenue and the proportion of indigent people are associated with the 
transfers. The indices of infrastructure development and infrastructure condition as 
well as the percentage of unemployed perform poorly among the other variables to 
be included in the best model.  
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Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values indicated in parentheses. 
Variables of the best model are selected by maximizing variance explained under the 
condition of fewer wasted degrees of freedom. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
On the other hand, four out of six variables of political objectives turn out to be 
significant in the Political Objectives and the Best models. Apparently the higher 
was the share of Putin’s votes in a region, the longer its governor held office, the 
more its journalists were persecuted, especially if the region declared state 
sovereignty in the early 1990s, the larger was the share of transfers in its budget in 
2013.  
Terrorist attacks and representation in the State Duma nonetheless do not 
demonstrate any impact on allocation of transfers. As to the terrorist threat, one 
explanation might be that there is no obvious responsible actor to be appeased by 
means of transfers in this case. Another explanation implies that this finding is 
favorable to the basic argument about the distributive logic based on political 
loyalty. The Kremlin, as noted earlier, has successfully thwarted attempts of signing 
new agreements on delimitation of powers between the federal center and the 
regions, it was also done away with the attributes of sovereignty in the regional 
legislation. Thereby governors’ attempts to promote terrorism for the purpose of 
bargaining more federal money would come to a bad end. The insignificance of the 
parliamentary representation in all models may be accounted for by two 
interdependent facts. First, this is the federal government that defines the rules and 
implements the allocation of transfers. Second, the State Duma is a strictly 
(formally and informally) subordinate institution in the Russian political system. 
The recent research shows that the State Duma amended only about 0.1% of the 
average federal spending on transfers in 2011–2016, and these amendments were 
more likely initiated by the executive (Noble 2017: 511). Therefore, the Russian 
parliament may hardly intervene in the process of disbursement of the federal 
transfers. 
It should be mentioned that all models pass the White test with exception of the 
Equalizing model in both donor and recipient regions. The problem with the model 
is also implicitly indicated by the relatively high R-squared while all variables in the 
model are insignificant, a problem that is usually attributed to multicollinearity. In 
fact, regional taxes per capita and GRP per capita have 89% of the common 
variance. I dwell on more detailed examination of this problem in Appendix E3, 
which shows that there is no direct effect of GRP on the STB but that the 
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relationship between gross regional product and transfers is mediated by regional 
taxes. I use only the mediator variable for purposes of further analysis. 
Another finding from our models also requires more scrutiny. The variable of 
sovereignty declarations appeared to be significant enough in all model 
specifications among the recipients. This persistence of the effect of sovereignty 
declarations in the early 1990s on allocation of the federal transfers in 2013 seems 
surprising when more than twenty years have passed since then. However, it would 
be unreasonable to assume that the federal officials still keep in mind those 
declarations voted by the regional parliaments in the early 1990s. It is more 
plausibly that other factors, which have affected the adoption of the sovereignty 
declarations then, continue to have an impact on federal-regional politics 
nowadays.  
Table 5.3. OLS models explaining the allocation of transfers, recipients122 
DV: Share of Transfers in the Budget  Mod. 1 Mod. 2  Mod. 3  Mod. 4 
Constant 
35.41***  
(10.918) 
37.58***  
(17.229) 
36.02***  
(13.128) 
36.88***  
(10.320) 
Declared Sovereignty in the Early 1990s 
6.657  
(.902) 
 
13.686**  
(2.611) 
.12.072 
(1.581) 
Log Non-Russians (%), Centereda 
.111 
(.679) 
.217*  
(1.889)  
.253* 
(1.878) 
Log Non-Orthodox Christians (%), Centereda 
.444**  
(2.269) 
.427**  
(2.200) 
.471***  
(3.008) 
 
Interaction: Log Non-Russians × Log Non-
Orthodox 
.009**  
(2.583) 
.010***  
(3.115)  
 
R-squared .580 .572 .514 .457 
White heteroscedasticity test .57 .677 .471 .488 
N 47 47 47 47 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values indicated in parentheses. a. 
In the result of centering by subtracting the means of independent variables the coefficient 
of X or Z can be interpreted as the effect of that variable on Y at the mean level of the other 
independent variable, while a non-centered variable indicate the effect of that variable on Y 
when the value of the other independent variable is zero (see, for example, Gelman 2006: 
55). Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Table 5.3 shows that not the sovereignty declarations as such but rather a 
region’s ethnic and religious composition determines the allocation of transfers. The 
variable of sovereignty declarations is only significant in Model 3, which additionally 
includes the proportion of other religions than Orthodox Christians, and its 
significance level is lower. The comparison between Model 1 and Model 2 indicates 
                                                          
122
 I ran the models with all cases yet the White test indicated heteroscedasticity of residuals among all of 
them.  
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that inclusion of the variable accountable for the sovereignty declarations adds only 
0.8% to the variance explained by the variables of religion and ethnicity, and the 
interaction between them.123 Furthermore, the probability of declaring the state 
sovereignty itself is pretty well explained only by a single variable – the proportion of 
non-Russians in the region’s population (see Appendix E4). In fact, all 18 regions 
having more than 35% of non-Russians have declared state sovereignty and none of 
33 regions declared sovereignty whose proportion of non-Russians was less than 
9%. 
It follows from the positive sign of the interaction term in Models 1 and 2 that 
religion and ethnicity mutually reinforce each other in determining transfers. Figure 
5.3 depicts this interaction effect. We can see on the left plot that the effect of non-
Russian population on the allocation of transfers is nearly absent among regions 
with 10th-percentile level of non-Christian Orthodox; the share of transfers in 
budgets of those regions vary around 30% regardless of their ethnic composition. To 
the contrary, ethnicity makes a crucial impact on transfers in the structure of 
budgets in regions with 90th-percentile level of non-Christian Orthodox: shifting 
from the 10th percentile of non-Russians to the 90th percentile increases the STB 
from 30.9% to 64.4%. However, this finding is rather theoretical. Due to high 
correlation between variables of ethnicity and religion we cannot find a region with 
large proportion of non-Christian Orthodox population and small proportion of non-
Russians. It should rather be interpreted so as what would have happened if it had 
been possible in practice. At any rate, the interaction effect indicates that both 
factors should be present to take an advantage, a large proportion of non-Russians 
only or solely large percentage of non-Christian Orthodox do not add substantively 
to the region’s share of transfers in the budget.124 
                                                          
123
 However, when these variables are included in the full model they become insignificant. Therefore I did not 
use them in the main analysis until now and I oppose them here to their main alternative – the sovereignty 
declarations, but not to the full set of alternative predictors. 
124
 Although there is virtually no Russian and at the same time not Christian Orthodox regions as well as 
Russians are typically absent in dominantly non-Christian Orthodox regions, there are several subjects of Russia 
whose scores on the non-Orthodox scale are much lower than on the non-Russian scale. These examples 
among the others include Chuvashia with 74% of not Russian population and only 7% of not the Christian 
Orthodox (on not log-transformed scales); Chukotka – 48% and 12%; Mordovia – 35% and 7%; and Karelia with 
18% and 3% of non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox population. The share of transfers in budgets of these 
regions only slightly deviate from the mean (41.5% among the recipients) or falls even below it: 35.2% in 
Chuvashia, 29.5% in Chukotka, 44.5% in Mordovia, and 27.5% in Karelia. That is much less than it might be 
expected if these regions were correspondingly non-Christian Orthodox. 
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Figure 5.3. The interaction effect between religion and ethnicity on predicting 
transfers  
 
Note: Based on Model 2 in Table 5.3 with exception that variables are not centered. On 
the left plot, 10th and 90th percentiles equal 20.8, 95.5 for Non-Russians, and 35.7, 77.3 for 
Non-Orthodox, respectively. On the right plot, the effect of Non-Russians on the STB was 
estimated conditionally on the full range from the minimal through the maximal values of 
non-Orthodox Christians, i.e., [0: 86] percent. 
However, by the nature of regression analysis the effects of ethnicity, religion, 
and the interaction between them are muted when all three variables are entered 
into the equation against the set of alternative explanations accounted for by single 
variables. To give the variables associated with ethno-religious concerns a more 
equal chance I construct an index of them, which is based on averaged 
unstandardized b-coefficients obtained from the set of thirteen regression models 
identical to Model 2 in Table 5.3 but including years 2000, 2001,... 2012. The 
results of regression analysis, however, appeared to be mixed and shown in 
Appendix E5 with more discussion. Generally speaking, it cannot be concluded that 
either ethno-religious concerns or electoral interests prevail. There is rather a 
combination of ethno-religious concerns’ effect on the share of transfers in the 
budget mediated by the incumbent’s vote with the main effect of ethno-religious 
concerns on transfers. Since the variables of religion and ethnicity are time 
constants due to absence of appropriate data for the defined periods and very small 
variability over time, they are not used in the multilevel analysis afterwards. 
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Multilevel Models to Examine the Determinants of Transfers 
This section expands the scope of analysis beyond 2013. However, not only the 
effect of year but, as it was discussed in the prior section, the effect of budget type 
(i.e., whether a region is net recipient of federal transfers or net donor of federal 
taxes) should be regarded when the allocation of transfers is being explained. Thus, 
for the purposes of analysis the most appropriate appears to be a nested random 
effects model where observations are firstly grouped into years and type of regional 
budgets is then nested within years that formally suggests the following equation:125  
     (       )  (       )      (       )       (       )          ,  
where      refers to transfers received by ith region in year y with budget type t;   , 
  ,   , and    denote respectively the fixed effects of the intercept and the set of 
explanatory variables (  ,   ,...    ;      denotes the intercept;     ,     ,...      
denote the slope random effects of budget type nested within year; and      denotes 
the error term.126 
I restrict the model to the most relevant variables. GRP is omitted so long as its 
effect on transfers is mediated by regional taxes. Time-constant variables are 
excluded as well. As in the previous models, the dependent variables include the 
                                                          
125
 Using only a random intercepts model equivalently as using dummies for groups of regions is substantively 
meaningless and misleading since not only intercepts but also coefficients are very much variable and often 
have opposite signs (see Figure 3 and Table E6 in Appendix E6).  
126
 Computation details: models were estimated by using glmmPQL function in the R’s package MASS that a fits 
generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) with multivariate normal random effects using Penalized Quasi-
Likelihood and uses nlme as the underlying fitting engine. It appeared to be the only working function for fitting 
a multilevel model with a random term consisting of intercepts and coefficients varying by two groups and a 
pretty large number of variables. Two most widely used R’s functions for multilevel analysis resulted in 
unresolvable problems related to fitting the full models. The function lmer in the package lme4 produces 
unrealistically large standard errors, therefore making nearly all variables completely insignificant. The nlme’s 
function lme is more helpful in this regard, yet it comes up with problems of convergence when the number of 
parameters in the random term is large. Another alternative in R could be using a generalized additive mixed 
model (the gamm function in mgcv package) but it preforms even slower than the previous two functions. 
Computing random effects with Stata’s xtmixed command in its turn comes up with two faults. On the one 
hand, using the independent (the default), exchangeable or identity variance-covariance structure of the 
random effects makes the convergence process easier but the random effects in this case become insufficiently 
variable (random coefficients diverge only slightly from the fixed effects). On the other hand, setting the 
unstructured variance-covariance structure of the random effects, which is presumably more suitable for the 
purposes of analysis, makes the convergence problem unresolvable for the full models. Even if a reduced 
model is successfully run, the output shows an error if random effects are requested.  
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data on the post-election years while all explanatory variables follow with a one year 
lag.127  
Table 5.4. Multilevel models explaining the allocation of transfers in 2001–2013 
Dependent Variable: 
Share of Transfers 
in the Budget 
Log Transfers Per 
Capita (RUB)c 
Log Transfers 
(million RUB)c 
Fixed Effects 
Full 
Model 
Best 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Best 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Best 
Model 
Constant 
-9.255 
(-.88) 
-3.37 
(-.33) 
-17895* 
(-1.82) 
-15517* 
(-1.8) 
-11215** 
(-2.26) 
-12352** 
(-2.14) 
Log Population     
4.8e-3*** 
(2.98) 
6.1e-3*** 
(4.43) 
Log Regional Taxes Per 
Capitaa,c  
-1.9e-
4***  
(-4.3) 
-2.1e-
4*** 
(-4.8) 
.204*** 
(3.06) 
.176*** 
(3.03) 
6.5e-8* 
(1.91) 
4.5e-8* 
(1.7) 
Log Unemployment (%) 
1.818*** 
(4.85) 
1.724*** 
(5.0) 
1466** 
(2.48) 
1562** 
(2.49) 
418.5* 
(1.8) 
446.2** 
(2.21) 
Population with Income 
Below the Living 
Minimum (%) 
.625*** 
(3.17) 
.553*** 
(3.09) 
363.4** 
(2.48) 
248.4* 
(1.87) 
287.9*** 
(2.96) 
262.98** 
(2.35) 
Infrastructure Is More 
Developed 
1.704 
(1.57) 
 
2422** 
(2.39) 
2428** 
(2.42) 
-26.3 
(-.06) 
 
Infrastructure Is in 
Worse Condition 
.394 
(.46) 
 
-194.4 
(-.3) 
 
-519.8 
(-.68) 
 
Incumbent’s Vote (%) 
.215* 
(1.81) 
.219** 
(2.38) 
216.8** 
(2.19) 
228.6** 
(2.42) 
148.9** 
(2.34) 
175.9*** 
(3.0) 
Years Governor in Office 
.282 
(1.35) 
 
68.67 
(.42) 
 
111.2 
(.8) 
 
Terrorist Attacks 
[Attacked] 
.45 
(.2) 
 
-556.1 
(-.37) 
 
9.4 
(.01) 
 
Conflict Situation 
4.181* 
(1.91) 
3.336* 
(1.84) 
494 
(.27) 
 
1960 
(1.33) 
 
R-squared by random  
and (fixed) effectsd 
.669 
(.191) 
.608 
(.241) 
.434 
(-1.05) 
.351 
(-.892) 
.624 
(-.177) 
.543 
(-.152) 
Estimated RE 
coefficients for 
Incumbent’s Voteb 
Type 
Year 
2001 2005 2009 2013 
Share of Transfers in the 
Budget 
Donor .015 .106 .127 .06 
Recipient .055 .244 .531 .615 
Log Transfers Per Capita 
Donor -1.87 60.2 251.6 334.2 
Recipient 86.2 139.2 432.0 527.2 
Log Transfers 
Donor 75.5 103.2 295.2 190.1 
Recipient 87.8 124.3 305.7 225.3 
Number of observations 
by Group 
Group 
Variable 
N of 
Groups 
Observations per Group 
Minimum 
Avera-
ge 
Maximum 
Year 4 83 83.0 83 
Type 2 24 41.5 59 
Total N of obs. 332 
                                                          
127
 Insofar as the data on transfers are available on an annual basis, one alternative could be including all these 
years in the model by extrapolating election results between election years. However, due to high serial 
correlation of transfers (see Table 5.8) such a step would have been statistically and essentially imprudent. 
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Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. Models fit by 
maximizing penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) with general positive-definite covariance 
structure for the random effects, Log-Cholesky parametrization. The random term consists 
of intercepts and each variable’s slopes varying by Year and Type. The best models are 
defined by backward elimination. a. For the models with Log Transfers explanatory variable 
is present in its units of measurement (rubles) without dividing by population, the variable 
of population is included instead. b. Random effects coefficients obtained from the best 
models. See the full table of random effects in Appendix E6. c. Variables measured in rubles 
are in constant 2012 prices. d. To compare the models I use an analogue of R-squared, the 
proportion of variance explained, calculated between groups (  ) and within groups (   
 ), 
measured in squared deviations by the following formulas:  
     (∑   
  
     ∑ (     ̅ 
  
   ⁄ ) and    
  (∑    (  (∑     
    
     ∑ (      ̅  )
    
   ⁄ ))     )   , 
where    refers to the model’s fixed effects residuals,    to the dependent variable,  ̅ to the 
dependent variable’s grand mean, and   refers to the total number of observations; for the 
within-group formula, these indicators are grouped by budget type t nested within year y. 
That is,     is the number of observations,      and  ̅   are the dependent variable and its 
mean in ith region in year y with budget type t, whereas      denotes random effects 
residuals. That is,    
  is the average of all eight groups’ R-squared weighted by the size of 
each group. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
The fixed effects presented in Table 5.4 are generally consistent with findings of 
the preliminary analysis. The allocation of central transfers is determined by a 
combination of electoral concerns and regional needs. The effect of the incumbent’s 
vote is positive and significant in all models. If all other variables are fixed at their 
means, a shift of the incumbent’s vote from the 5th percentile (54.1%) to the 95th 
percentile (86.2%), according to the Share of Transfers in the Budget model, 
translates into a 7.1% increase in the STB from 28.6% to 35.7%. The corresponding 
change in the incumbent’s vote also results into a 7,336.3 ruble growth in per 
capita transfers and yields an additional 5.6 billion rubles of transfers to the 
regional budget. 
The effect of regional taxes between several models is troublesome: it is negative 
in the STB model but unexpectedly positive in two other models. Under otherwise 
equal conditions, the STB model estimates that the share of transfers in the budget 
should decrease by 14.2% if the level of per capita taxes increases from the 5th to 
the 95th percentile. To the contrary, the Log Transfers Per Capita model predicts 
that regions with 95th-percentile level of taxes levied to their budgets are granted 
11,812.4 rubles more in per capita transfers than their 5th-percentile level 
counterparts as well as the Log Transfers model determines that the most self-
sufficient regions received 7.1 billion rubles more from the federal center than 
regions with the lowest own tax revenue. Nevertheless, this positive relationship 
should be viewed with caution since it is not robust to different model specifications 
and appears only when other variables are controlled for. If choosing between the 
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STB and the two other models, the first one should be preferred to due to its higher 
reliability.128 The two other models, at the same time, show that not everything is 
clear with the equalizing explanation of federal transfers. 
Among the indicators of regional social need, unemployment and the share of 
people with income below the living minimum have expected and consistent effect 
between all models, while the indices of infrastructure are not consistently 
significant. All else being equal, shifting the level of unemployment from the 5th 
percentile (8.9%) to the 95th percentile (19.2%) increases the STB by 17.8% from 
23.6% to 41.4%. Analogously, it creates an advantage of 16,163.6 rubles in per 
capita transfers and 4.6 billion rubles of transfers in budget. As the share of 
population with income below the living minimum grows from the 5th (13.0%) to the 
95th percentile (40.4%), the share of transfers in the budget is correspondingly 
getting larger by 15.2% from 24.9% to 40.1%. It also leads to a 6,806.3 ruble 
increase in per capita transfers and to a disbursement that contributes 7.2 billion 
rubles more to the budget of regions with high proportion of the destitute people. 
These results, however, are not as optimistic to the ordinary citizens as it may 
seem. Even though regions with high levels of unemployed and destitute people are 
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 To examine possible reasons of the difference in the effect of regional taxes on transfers measured by three 
alternative variables I ran several auxiliary multilevel models: 1. regional taxes are a single predictor of 
transfers, coefficients vary by year and type; 2. regional taxes are a single predictor of transfers, coefficients 
vary only by year; 3. based on the best model, all variables’ coefficients vary only by year; 4. based on the best 
model, coefficients of regional taxes vary only by year, while other variables’ coefficients vary by year and type. 
The fixed effects of regional taxes on the STB were negative and significant in all these models. The STB model 
is therefore the most reliable. The effect of regional taxes was much more vulnerable to presence of other 
variables and level specification in models using two alternative variables of transfers In the Log Transfers Per 
Capita model, regional taxes demonstrated no effect on transfers in specification 1 (t-value = 0.73), significant 
and negative effect in specification 2 (t = -3.1), and positive effects in the best model specifications 3 (t = 2.54) 
and 4 (t = 2.92). In a similar controversy regional taxes showed negative and significant effects in specifications 
1 (t = -2.21) and 2 (t = -4.33) but not significant effects in specifications 3 (t = -0.04) and 4 (t = 1.59) of the Log 
Transfers model. Hence, regional taxes change the sign of its (rather negative) effect on transfers under the 
influence of other variables in the equation. I also ran the best models without the variable of regional taxes. 
The results appeared to be similar to those presented in Table 5.4, with exception that unemployment was 
insignificant in the Log Transfers Per Capita and Log Transfers models. The negative fixed-effects R-squared in 
the Log Transfers and Log Transfers Per Capita models also results chiefly from the biased coefficients of 
regional taxes: if the real relationship is negative yet the estimated effect is positive then the grand mean is a 
much better predictor than the estimate. 
Another oddity with regional taxes comes from the fact that this variable is the prime contributor to the 
heteroscedasticity of models’ residuals. I applied an analogue of the White test for heteroscedasticity of 
residuals to the multilevel models. On the left-hand side of the equation was located the model’s residual term 
and the same multilevel model’s specification from the right-hand side was located on the right. The variable of 
regional taxes was strongly significant in all model specifications, yet to a smaller degree in the STB models. In 
other words, errors tend to be larger as the level or regional taxes increases. I tried using a ranked variable of 
regional taxes but it did not mitigate this problem. Finally, I decided not to exclude the variable from analysis 
since it is associated with one of the most influential explanations but I recommend viewing the positive effects 
of regional taxes on transfers appearing in the Log Transfers Per Capita and Log Transfers models with some 
reasonable degree of scepticism. At any rate, the best STB model has generally passed the analogue of White 
test (see Appendix E6 on postestimation of the multilevel models).  
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actually provided with more federal aid, transfers being received from the center are 
not necessarily used by regional authorities for the purposes of alleviating social 
needs. I show later in Chapter 6 that the federal remittances in transfers-dependent 
regions are largely consumed by bloated state bureaucracy. 
Some support for political appeasement strategy is found only in the STB model. 
The presence of conflict situation129 is positively related to transfers: regions with 
ongoing ethnic conflicts dispose 3.3 percent more transfers in their budgets than 
regions with a stable situation. Nevertheless, this finding is not supported by other 
models and, similarly to the significance of infrastructure development in the 
Transfers Per Capita model only, can be attributed to eventuality. Terrorist attacks 
and governor’s tenure in office appear to be insignificant at all. 
The aforementioned marginal effects at means may seem relatively small. 
Nevertheless, there are only effects of single variables. In practice regions whose 
share of transfers in the budget exceeds 50% typically combine poor economies with 
ostensibly loyal polities. Their high levels of the STB are therefore predicted by the 
effects of several variables simultaneously. It should be also underlined that the 
calculated marginal effects represent only rough approximations taken on average 
between all years and budget types. Precise predictions in multilevel modeling are 
based on random effects. 
As follows from the random effects of the incumbent’s vote presented in the 
lower panel of Table 5.4, the difference between donor and recipient regions is 
crucially important. In the best model with the STB as the dependent variable, the 
average coefficient for recipients is nearly five times larger than for donors.130 This 
difference is considerable in the Log Transfers Per Capita model: recipients’ 
coefficients are 1.8 times larger on average. The difference is, however, less 
pronounced in the Log Transfers model where the averaged recipients’ coefficients 
                                                          
129
 It may be asserted that splitting the dataset on donors and recipients crucially affects the distribution of 
dummy variables so that, for instance, the number of regions with a conflict situation is larger in the recipient 
regions therefore the relationship between transfers and civil conflicts exist within the whole range of regions 
but it does not exist within the groups of regions defined by the budget type. Hence, the relationship may be 
artificially suppressed by splitting the dataset. I ran models with random terms varying only by year and did not 
find evidence in favor of this assertion. The dummy variables as well as the other predictors followed similar 
patterns to those that observed in models of Table 5.4. Nevertheless, two noticeable differences include the 
following: the index of development of the regional infrastructure was significant in the full and reduced 
models with the STB as the dependent variable; in the model with Log Transfers, population was about one 
third as more significant, leading to a decrease in t-values of the regional taxes and unemployment to 
insignificant levels. The incumbent’s vote was significant in all models.    
130
 Calculated as the ratio of coefficients: (0.055 + 0.244 + 0.531 + 0.615) / (0.015 + 0.106 + 0.127 + 0.06) = 4.69. 
The ratio is calculated analogously for the other models.  
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exceeded the donors’ coefficients by 1.2 times. It should be noted that this inherent 
bias in favor of the recipients is attributed only to the incumbent’s vote. As appears 
in the full table of random effects (see Table E7 in Appendix E6), coefficients of any 
other variable are not prone to be systematically larger or smaller between two 
groups of the budget type.131 This finding proves that federal officials indeed treat 
donor and recipient regions differently. At the same time, the random effects show 
that the relationship between the incumbent’s vote and transfers is getting stronger 
over time. One-percent increase in the incumbent’s vote increases the STB by 
merely 0.06 percent in 2001, then, the effect strengthens to 0.24 in 2005, 0.53 in 
2009, and 0.62 in 2013 among the recipients. A similar tendency is observed when 
per capita transfers are used as the dependent variable; transfers controlled for 
population show a perceptible but not strong decline of the increasing trend in 
2013. In other words, electoral interests in the process of allocation of transfers are 
beginning to play a more prominent role as authoritarianism progresses over time. 
Taking Time into Account 
The bulk of the literature is focused on cross-sectional variation in 
intergovernmental transfers, controlling for time trends or including dummy 
variables for years to account for temporal fixed effects. Meanwhile, the hypothesis 
about tactical distribution (Dixit and Londregan 1996) stipulates that the change in 
levels of political indicators determines the change in levels of public finances in 
specific territories. However, in those rare cases when dynamic models have been 
tested by scholars, the effects of political variables appeared to be either small or 
controversial. 
In his pioneering study, Wright (1974) regressed the change of the Democratic 
vote on the change of the federal New Deal spending, other forms of the federal aid, 
and a set of control variables. He found only a modest effect of the federal spending 
on the vote. In particular, the variable of changes in spending was at all 
insignificant; changes in work relief programs were negatively associated with the 
Democratic vote. Likewise, Ansolabehere et al. (2002) found that changes in the 
relative (legislative) representation index (RRI) from 1960 to 1980 accounted for 
growth of changes in per capita intergovernmental transfers at county level in the 
                                                          
131
 The only exception of this kind is regional taxes, yet the ratio of average coefficients is dependent on the 
model. In the STB model, the donors’ coefficients are 1.4 times larger than the recipient’s coefficients. The 
donors’ coefficients are however 1.2 and 4.5 times smaller in the Log Transfers Per Capita and Log Transfers 
models, respectively. Other variables’ coefficients vary by donors and recipients almost at random. 
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United States, even though the effect in the dynamic model was twice as weak (R-
squared in bivariate model = 0.16) as in the cross-sectional model (0.33).  
At the same time, when the analysis was done at the state level with using the 
mean, the standard deviation, and the range of the RRI, the effects of changes in 
the state-level derivatives of the RRI on change in transfers per capita did not reach 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Examining the patterns of government 
expenditures in Tanzanian districts Weinstein (2011) uncovered that the ruling 
Chama Cha Mapinduzu targeted expenditures toward the districts with the largest 
margin for victory the party. Although this finding was consistent between two 
major models using per capita expenditures and change in per capita expenditures, 
the explanatory power of the model of levels (R-squared = 0.665) considerably 
overweighed the explanatory power of the model of changes (R-squared = 0.14).  
This may happen for at least two reasons. First, self-interested politicians do 
unlikely calculate small-percentage differences in vote shares between 
constituencies with diligence. Rather they respond to considerable changes, for 
instance, when a stronghold constituency attempts to defect to the opposition or 
vice versa. However, such landslide changes rarely happen in practice.132 Second, 
politicians with a strong and stable constituency may prefer to distribute disposable 
resources strategically, but not tactically, by having elaborated such rules of 
distribution that would permanently benefit their constituency regardless of 
periodical fluctuations in the vote.133  
In this section, I test the hypothesis on tactical distribution of the central grants 
by dynamic modeling of the changes in transfers over time periods in order to verify 
whether transfers were allocated tactically or strategically throughout 2000–2016. 
Variables of changes, however, create several intrinsic problems. First, since the 
electoral data follow with four-year periods, other variables have to be averaged in 
                                                          
132
 The statistical result of this is that a plenty of small insignificant variations overweight few but important 
changes when a continuous dependent variable is applied in regression. Multinomial logistic regression in 
which the dependent variable takes value zero for all small variations up to some threshold, one – if the 
incumbent loses votes dramatically, and two – if support of the incumbent increases strikingly in the area might 
be useful in this case. However, my data shows that there is no outliers systematically scattered in favor of this 
suggestion. If outliers exist, they are scattered at random. 
133
 Dixit and Londregan (1996) differentiate between grand or programmatic redistribution and tactical 
redistribution also labelled as “pork barrel”. The former is associated with long-term redistributive programs 
and the general social welfare systems, which change only when major ideological shifts occur. To the contrary, 
tactical redistribution “goes on continuously even while a given policy of grand redistribution remains 
unchanged” (p. 1133). Since long-term redistributive patterns can be not only programmatic but also (and in 
authoritarian regimes more frequently) clientelist, I prefer contrasting short-term tactical redistribution to 
long-term strategic redistribution. 
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the corresponding periods so that changes would reflect not occasional year-to-year 
fluctuations but four-year trends. This problem is complicated by the need of duly 
measuring the variables having a temporal trend.134 For the dependent variable, I 
handle these difficulties by employing the share of total transfers percent change 
(STTPC), i.e., the share of each region’s transfers in the total national amount of 
transfers. The share of total transfers (STT) is preferred to the STB so long as the 
STB is dependent on the size of regional budget that is variable from year to year. 
Besides that, the STT is stationary over time. The indicator of transfers is then 
averaged within four-year periods by using unstandardized b-coefficients from OLS 
models that regress the STT on time in each region, where years are substituted by 
values 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thereby the average annual change (AAC) is obtained. I use 
this kind of indicator for all variables having annual observations. Moreover, the 
size of transfers and regional taxes is strongly dependent on population. But 
instead of using per capita terms, which leads to a bias that was discussed earlier, I 
rely on percentage change (PC) in transfers and regional taxes predicted by the AAC 
over the median value of the first year (y) of the period and two adjacent years (y - 1 
and y + 1), so that:135 
      (
     
       (                    )
)       
 Second, in the dataset, several variables of changes have multiple strong 
outliers. I solve this problem by ranking these variables. The ranked variable is 
created as follows: the minimal value is assigned rank 1, the next value is assigned 
rank 2…, and the maximal value is assigned rank 83. The ranked variable is 
essentially a discrete ordinal variable where each next individual value (i + 1) is 
bigger than the preceding one (i) but the difference between them is not necessarily 
equal to the difference between other adjacent values in the range. The remaining 
variables are not ranked because their distributions do not include outliers and are 
not skewed.136  
Once variables are defined for analysis, a proper type of dynamic model should 
be chosen. One approach could be to use changes in the dependent variable at time 
t being explained by concurrent changes in predictors. Yet this widely-used 
                                                          
134
 Transfer money and regional taxes are naturally exposed to this bias due to their growth over time or 
inflation as well as other non-stationary variables. When four-year regional averages are calculated based on a 
variable with a growing national average, more weight is attributed to years with a higher national average. 
135
 Regional Taxes Percent Change is calculated analogously. 
136
 Ranking all variables in the model produces very similar results to those presented below. 
  
207 
 
approach has a shortcoming related to causality. A causally determined 
relationship ordinarily implies a change in the predictor variable that translates into 
response of the dependent variable occurring with some lag.137 Indeed, if an effect of 
the vote on transfers is presumed, change in the vote should occur prior to change 
in transfers. Likewise the other variables: changes in social and economic 
conditions should precede the amendments in allocation of transfer money. Hence, 
a dynamic model with lagged set of independent variables makes a claim to more 
appropriately address causal relationships. The causality issue is broad in fact, 
since the relationship between transfers and the incumbent’s vote may go in both 
directions. Appendix E7 examines this issue by applying the Granger causality test 
and shows the evidence that the influence of the incumbent’s vote on the allocation 
of transfers is much more probable though bilateral causality cannot be rejected 
with absolute certainty. Thus, the dynamic model of changes is specified as 
follows:138 
                                       
where     refers to the STTPC;   ,   ,   , and    denote the intercept and the slopes 
the set of differenced explanatory variables (   ,    ,...      that follow with one 
temporal lag of four years (t – 1), and    denotes the error term. 
The results of the dynamic models are presented in Table 5.5. The general 
finding is that no variable is significant across all models. The lagged variable of 
changes turned out to be significant in only two periods – 2004–2008 and 2012–
2016. Since the dependent variable and its lag are measured in the same units, it 
may be asserted that 21 and 27 percent of changes (Model 2 and 6, respectively) 
were of volatile nature: if the share of total transfers increased in a region by some 
value, it about twenty percent as probable to correspondingly decrease in the next 
period or it correspondingly increase if it decreased before. The effect of the 
incumbent’s vote is controversial. It is negative in the first period: shifting from the 
5th percentile of changes in the vote between 2000 and 2004 (4.5%) to the 95th 
percentile (31.8%) translates into decrease in the share of total transfers percent 
                                                          
137
 In reality, however, many causally dependent processes come almost concurrently. Wheels, for instance, 
instantly follow the road’s surface when a vehicle is moving until the moment when an obstacle that cannot be 
handled by the suspension is met. Due to this reason I ran models analogous to those in Table 5.5 but without a 
lag. The results revealed fewer significant effects and a smaller proportion of explained variance by the models. 
This indicates that variables, which appeared to be significant in Table 5.5, are casually determined rather than 
simply correlated. 
138
 Even though the data are not time-series, I call the model “dynamic”, i.e., examining the process over time, 
as opposed to static models, which do not take time into consideration. 
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change by 22.6 ranks (Model 2). Just the opposite effect is produced by analogous 
shifting from the smaller (-9.3%) to the larger (10.7%) changes of the vote in the 
period of 2004–2008: the STTPC increases by 24.6 ranks (Model 4). The variable of 
changes in the incumbent’s vote appeared to be insignificant in the next period.  
Changes in transfers in the period of 2004–2008 were also well determined by 
two variables of social need. The marginal growth in the proportion of destitute 
people and in development of regional infrastructure correspondingly account for 
21.2-rank growth and 19.1-rank decline in the STTPC (Model 2). One variable of 
social need is also significant in the last period: the marginal change in transfers 
between 2012 and 2016 constituted 20.3 ranks in those regions whose 
infrastructure condition improved in 2008–2012. Although the variable of regional 
taxes performed well in cross-sectional analysis of levels, changes in regional taxes 
appeared only marginally significant in the period of 2004–2008, and its marginal 
effect amounted to 12.9-rank change in transfers. Generally speaking, changes in 
transfers between 2004 and 2008 were determined by social needs, the changes 
between 2008 and 2012 were primarily determined by electoral interests, and the 
changes in the last period between 2012 and 2016 rather occurred due to 
contingent factors. 
Table 5.5. The dynamic OLS models to explain the ranked changes in transfers 
over time periods 
DV: Share of Total Transfers  
Percent Change, Ranked 
2004–2008 2008–2012 2012–2016 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 
65.92***  
(6.27) 
61.9***  
(6.17) 
42.45***  
(5.06) 
36.51***  
(7.2) 
59.19***  
(6.34) 
53.38*** 
(10.61) 
STTPCt-1, Ranked 
-.195**  
(-2.1) 
-.212  
(-2.33)** 
-.172  
(-1.62) 
 
-.309***  
(-2.85) 
-.271**  
(-2.61) 
Δ Incumbent's Vote (%)t-1 
-.929***  
(3.16) 
-.088*** 
(-3.05) 
1.23***  
(2.8) 
1.31***  
(3.04) 
.205  
(.44) 
 
Regional Taxes Percent 
Changet-1a 
-.161*  
(-1.68)  
-.17*  
(-1.74) 
-.047  
(-.47) 
 
-.17 
(-1.01) 
 
Unemployment AACt-1, 
Ranked 
-.119  
(-1.25) 
 
.16  
(1.5) 
.176*  
(1.67) 
.019  
(.17) 
 
Population with Income 
Below the Living Minimum 
AACt-1, Ranked 
.301***  
(3.07) 
.28***  
(2.92) 
.072  
(.66) 
 
-.078  
(-.69) 
 
Δ Infrastructure More 
Developedt-1 
-24.91**  
(-2.43) 
-22.95**  
(-2.27) 
-8.63  
(-1.17) 
 
-9.92  
(-1.61) 
 
Δ Infrastructure in Worse 
Conditiont-1 
1.81  
(.48) 
 
-2.66  
(-.5) 
 
8.08*  
(1.73) 
10.47**  
(2.39) 
R-squared .404 .40 .175 .123 .177 .135 
White heteroscedasticity 
test 
.105 .029 .326 .088 .235 .584 
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 
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Note: All predictors follow with four-year lag relatively to the dependent variable, i.e., the 
incumbent’s vote change in 2000–2004 corresponds to change of the STTPC in 2004–2008. 
Variables marked by the delta do not have intermediate values within the typical four-year 
period; they correspond to a mere difference between two years. a. The variable of regional 
taxes is ranked only for the period of 2000–2004 when it has several strong outliers. Entries 
are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
While the previous models answer the question how changes in predictor 
variables affect changes in transfers, the next question that appears is at what 
levels of other variables the changes in transfers more likely to occur. A semi-
dynamic model is designed to answer this question. It is based on the following 
similar equation that also includes changes in transfers on the left-hand side but 
includes levels instead changes on its right-hand side:  
                                    
The results appear in Table 5.6. The first notable finding from the best models is 
that the level of transfers measured as the share of transfers in the budget 
significantly and negatively influences the changes in transfers. On the one hand, 
the STB approaches some natural threshold in regions that heavily dependent on 
the federal remittances thereby slowing down and deterring the subsequent growth 
of transfers. On the other hand, in conjunction with some degree of volatility in 
transfers indicated by the previous models the negative coefficients of the STB 
imply that transfers after a temporary increase are ordinarily amended downwards. 
Although all other variables have expected signs, none of them is systematically 
significant throughout all models. The level of the incumbent’s vote is positive and 
strong predictor of the changes in transfers only in the period of 2008–2012. If we 
travelled in 2008 from one of the regions less supportive of Medvedev (the 5th 
percentile (61.8%) or the level of Ryazan Oblast) to one of the most supportive 
regions (the 95th percentile (90.6%) or the level of Karachay-Cherkess Republic) we 
might expect that the difference in the STTPC between them will amount 35.4 ranks 
in the four subsequent years. All else being equal, Ryazan Oblast would have to 
receive 15.1% fewer transfers (30.9 rank of the STTPC) while Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic would be donated 19.5% more transfers (66.3 rank of the STTPC). The set 
of explanatory variables additionally includes population. The hypothesis behind 
this variable is that self-interested officials may be motivated in nipping off small 
imperceptible bits of transfers from large regions to distribute them to small regions 
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for which these portions are more valuable. This variable is, however, only 
marginally significant in the best model of the STTPC in 2000–2004. 
Table 5.6. The semi-dynamic OLS models to explain the ranked changes in 
transfers over time periods 
DV: Share of Total Transfers  
Percent Change, Ranked 
Full Models 
2000–2004 2004–2008 2008–2012 2012–2016 
Constant 
72.92* 
(1.68) 
77.47** 
(2.11) 
26.23 
(.54) 
85.41* 
(1.76) 
STB (%) 
-.591*** 
(-2.94) 
-1.11*** 
(-6.29) 
-.795*** 
(-2.91) 
-.397 
(-1.19) 
Incumbent's Vote (%) 
-.158 
(.59) 
.091 
(.38) 
1.44*** 
(4.15) 
-.234 
(-.61) 
Log Regional Taxes Per Capita 
(RUB) 
-.0003 
(-1.51) 
-.0001 
(-.68) 
-.0003 
(-1.58) 
-.0004 
(-1.56) 
Log Unemployment (%) 
1.18 
(.81) 
-.425 
(-.46) 
-2.23 
(-1.41) 
2.62 
(1.05) 
Population with Income Below the 
Living Minimum (%) 
.218 
(.78) 
.358 
(1.26) 
.9 
(1.29) 
-.57 
(-.63) 
Infrastructure Is More Developed 
-2.99 
(-.92) 
-4.83* 
(-1.72) 
-1.78 
(-.56) 
-.76 
(-1.09) 
Infrastructure Is in Worse 
Condition 
-.57 
(-.2) 
1.55 
(.8) 
-2.85 
(-1.07) 
5.05* 
(1.75) 
Log Population  
-2.6e-6 
(-1.45) 
-1.5e-6 
(-1.04) 
-3.9e-6* 
(-1.96) 
-3.7e-7 
(-.17) 
R-squared .183 .562 .251 .157 
White heteroscedasticity test .31 .035 .405 .031 
 Best Models 
Constant 
101.49*** 
(5.34) 
52.73*** 
(10.06) 
-33.1 
(1.52) 
85.24 
(4.59) 
STB (%) 
-.479*** 
(-2.83) 
-.933*** 
(-8.43) 
-.361** 
(-2.62) 
-.36* 
(-1.83) 
Incumbent's Vote (%)   
1.23*** 
(3.74) 
 
Log Regional Taxes Per Capita 
(RUB) 
-.0004** 
(-2.56) 
  
-.0005** 
(-2.36) 
Population with Income Below the 
Living Minimum (%) 
 
.442* 
(1.87) 
  
Infrastructure Is More Developed 
-5.51** 
(-2.1) 
   
Infrastructure Is in Worse 
Condition 
   
5.4** 
(2.1) 
Log Population 
-3.1e-6* 
(-1.98) 
   
R-squared .166 .537 .16 .114 
White heteroscedasticity test .123 .031 .351 .01 
N 83 83 83 83 
Note: All predictor variables correspond to the initial years of the periods. For instance, 
the STTPC 2000–2004 is determined by the STB 2000. Entries are unstandardized 
coefficients with t-values indicated in parentheses. H0 for White test: residuals are 
homoscedastic. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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To summarize the results of the dynamic and semi-dynamic models, the 
explanatory power of all models is expectedly smaller if compared with cross-
sectional models and fewer variables turned out to be significant. However, we 
cannot infer from these models that political interests and politically-neutral 
motivations play no causal or tactical role at all in the politics of allocation of 
transfers. The models rather show that minor adjustments determined by these 
reasons occur in the regional shares of transfers on a time-to-time basis, while the 
general pattern of allocation is established and it is not subject to radical 
transformations. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis about tactical distribution and 
accept that the pattern of distribution is strategic. The remaining question is in 
what sequence and why this pattern appeared or how the regime’s clientelist 
coalition has been forged in the nascent Putin’s autocracy of the early 2000s. 
From Tactical Opponents to Regime Supporters: the Trajectory of 
Political Transformation of the Ethnic Regions in the Early 2000s 
During the 2000s, we may observe a stable incumbent’s constituency composed 
of ethnic republics, especially in the North Caucasus, that persistently votes (or 
falsifies votes) for Putin and systematically receives larger federal transfers. 
However, the very same group of regions had been in opposition to the central 
government during the 1990s under Yeltsin’s rule. The literature on distributive 
politics gives us an answer why the ethnic regions received larger transfers in the 
1990s (they were politically appeased thereby (Treisman 1998a)) and why they were 
also privileged in the 2000s (were rewarded for support (Cox and McCubbins 1986)), 
yet existing theories do not allow to account for the change that occurred in 
Russian transfer politics in the early 2000s when Putin came to power. In 
particular, why did the regime make a decision to deliver benefits for the group of 
non-Russian regions in the early 2000s; they were in opposition to the federal 
center, which set a course for political recentralization? And why did these 
confrontational regions change their strategy toward the federal center from 
opposition to loyalty? This section endeavors to answer these questions by offering 
an extension to Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) theory and arguing that a candidate’s 
strategy toward a group of the electorate depends not only on the level of electoral 
support by this group but also on issue salience and issue positioning of the group 
relatively to the candidate. 
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Basically, there are two obstacles to understanding the transformation of 
Russian federal-regional relations in general and distributive politics in particular 
that took place in the early 2000s. First, a high level of candidate’s share of the vote 
is ordinarily used as a proxy to core supporters (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006; 
Martin 2003; Weinstein 2011), and a small difference in vote shares (closeness) 
between first two candidates is considered as an indicator of swing voters (Berry et 
al. 2010; Veiga and Pinho 2007; an exception is Dahlberg and Johansson 2002). 
This operationalization assumes a direct relationship between voter preferences and 
voting results, and therefore neglects strategic voting and other non-preference-
based (i.e., tactical) types of electoral behavior. Drawing upon this approach, we 
shod classify the separatist ethnic regions, which voted against Yeltsin and pro-
government parties, declared state sovereignty and implemented other secessionist 
policies in the 1990s, as core opponents of the incumbent. Thereby we encounter 
with no theoretical ground for converting this group into a support group since 
opposition groups are hardly paid any attention by self-interested candidates in 
both models by Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).  
Second and interrelated with the first, speaking about “core and other 
supporters”, Cox and McCubbins (1986: 379) do not define explicitly “other” 
support groups and do not differentiate them from core supporters. However, voters 
may support their candidates not only based on their ideological affinity on policy 
position issues but also due to more tactical concerns, such as delivering general 
wealth (economic voting) or particularistic goods (patronage voting), the 
entrenchment of law and order, and other concerns that generally pertain to 
valence issues as they are defined by Stokes (1963). Put otherwise, core supporters’ 
support originates from proximity with their candidates on policy position issues, 
while position issues are rather non-salient for tactical supporters and their 
support originates primarily from positive evaluation of their candidates on valence 
issues.139  
                                                          
139
 This statement goes contrary to Dixit and Londregan (1996: 1134) who assert that “[a] party's core 
constituencies need not prefer its issue position. It is the party's advantage over its competitors at swaying 
voters in a group with offers of particularistic benefits that makes the group core”. This assertion is rather 
counter-factual. Even a party's advantage in delivering benefits would yield smaller electoral returns in case of 
investment in the opposition's ideological supporters compared with ideologically unattached swing voters or 
ideologically proximate core voters. For example, consider a case of raising pensions by the incumbent 
government of Yeltsin. In this case, the incumbent has an advantage over the opposition since only 
government can raise pensions. If pensioners do not prefer the incumbent’s issue position (assume that they 
are uniformly communists), then their responsiveness to the delivered benefits in the form of higher pensions 
will be obviously lesser than in the case when pensioners are ideologically moderate or liberal. A party’s 
advantage in the access to its constituency (as any advantage) enhances chances for obtaining support among 
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Table 5.7. The types of electoral constituencies 
 
Group of Electorate 
Previous Electoral Behavior Support Swing Opposition 
Issue Proximity – Non-
Salience – Remoteness  
Core Tactical Tactical Tactical Core 
 
Relying on this approach to definition of core and tactical supporters, Table 5.7 
classifies various groups of the electorate, including opposition groups. Following 
Cox and McCubbins (1986: 376), I define support, swing, and opposition groups 
depending on their previous electoral behavior: support groups are those who 
consistently supported the candidate in the past, swing groups have been neither 
consistently supportive nor consistently hostile, and opposition groups have 
consistently opposed in the previous elections. A key distinction suggested in Table 
5.7 is that support and opposition groups are divided into core and tactical 
subgroups. Core supporters as well as core opponents are strongly motivated by 
ideological commitments. They support their candidates due to proximity on salient 
position issues. As maximum, the utility of consumption and the salience of other 
valence issues are as high for them as the salience of position issues, yet for the 
most of core supporters position issues prevail over valence issues.  For the tactical 
groups, main policy position issues are not salient. They support candidates or 
oppose them according to their assessments of the candidates on valence issues. 
Swing voters are by definition unattached. Position issues are not salient for them 
and their assessments of different candidates on valence issues are roughly the 
same that makes them hesitant in choosing between two leading candidates.140 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
this group but does not convert supporters (all the more opponents) from this group into core supporters. Cox 
and McCubbins (1986: 378) are even more sceptical regarding the successfulness of distributive politics when 
voters do not prefer a candidate’s issue position (if they are ideological opponents): “[w]ould conservative 
groups in Massachusetts respond as much as would liberal groups to benefits – even actually delivered benefits 
– that came their way through Ted Kennedy's good offices? Possibly, but it seems more likely that they would 
just chalk these benefits up to imperfections in Kennedy's control of policy, which had not allowed him fine 
enough control over the distribution of benefits to exclude them”. 
 
140
 There is unlikely that swing voters take moderate positions on position issues. There is more plausible that 
these issues are not salient for them inasmuch as there is problematic (if impossible at all) to take a position in 
the middle between two important contrast and mutually exclusive alternatives. Such alternatives as to build 
capitalism or communism, communism or fascism, and whether to participate in a war or not. These 
alternatives are not discussed from election to election in normal times though. Keeping a central position on 
relatively unimportant (non-salient) and not mutually exclusive (allowing for a balance between the 
alternatives) issues is more typical. Such examples may include preferences concerning investment in 
healthcare or in the police, favoring public or private education, public or private roads construction, etc. Other 
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The main position issue in Russia in the 1990s was whether to continue radical 
liberal market reforms initiated by Yegor Gaidar, Anatoli Chubais, and other 
Yeltsin’s appointees or to postpone these reforms, make them more gradual and 
socially-oriented as it was advocated by the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (KPRF) (McFaul 1997; Meleshkina 2000).141 Nevertheless, this cleavage 
was rather of secondary importance in non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox 
regions so long as the main impetus in the politics of these regions was ethnic 
separatism driven by concerns of strengthening regional elites’ hold on power 
(Gorenburg 1999)142 and instrumental benefits of separatist activism – lower central 
taxes and higher central transfers, rights over natural resources, freedom to export 
with fewer restrictions, etc. (Treisman 1997). In this connection, the ethnic regions 
have neither been KPRF’s core supporters nor Yeltsin’s core opponents. Elites of 
these regions opposed Yeltsin tactically for instrumental reasons of extracting more 
benefits from the federal center.143 The absence of strong ideological commitments 
of the ethnic regions to the KPRF as the main opposition party had allowed Putin to 
convert these regions from tactical opponents into regime supporters by offering 
higher transfer payments in exchange for political loyalty. This offer as a positive 
stimulus or a “carrot”, however, was supplemented with various “sticks” or 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
issues can be even more important and keeping a moderate position on them may seem reasonable for the 
majority of voters. For example, sharp inequality versus total equality or big business versus small business. 
Nevertheless, these issues are much less salient for swing (moderate) voters compared with those whose 
positions on these issues are determined ideologically or socially – the salience of social equality issue for 
socialists and the salience of privileges to small business for bakery owners, for instance. This approach, 
however, challenges common wisdom regarding the median voter. If position issues are assumed to be non-
salient, it appears that the median voter is more indifferent toward position issues than moderate. 
141
 In particular, McFaul (1997: 23) emphasizes the importance of capitalism – communism cleavage for 
Yeltsin’s victory: “[t]o win [the election of 1996], Yeltsin and his campaign had to make this vote yet another 
referendum on communism. Voters had to understand (or be made to believe) that they were choosing 
between two systems, not two candidates”. See McFaul (1997: Ch. 4) for Zyuganov’s political program in the 
election of 1996. Apart from this, Meleshkina (2000: 188) shows that, out of those respondents who voted for 
Yeltsin in the second round of the 1996 presidential election, 87% were proponents of the course of economic 
reforms and 16% were opponents, whereas only 3% Zyuganov’s voters supported the ongoing economic 
reforms and 55% of them were opponents to the reforms. 
142
 Although Gorenburg (1999) challenges this commonly held belief and argues that the promotion of ethnic 
revival policies by republic officials was determined more by primordialist reasons “in order to ensure the 
group’s collective survival” (p. 269) than by rational calculations, this argument does not exclude that 
“members of the titular political elite in each region sought to enact laws and adopt employment practices that 
would ensure that political power rested with members of their ethnic group” (p. 259). That is, by 
implementing ethnic revival policies, the ethnic elites strived to exclude Russians and members of other ethnic 
groups from the pool of potential competitors for power, even though publically they declared that their fight 
for sovereignty was aimed at enhancing economic development and producing other public goods, which 
should be distributed between all inhabitants, regardless of ethnicity.  
143
 In the early 1990s, the ethnic regions were Yeltsin’s tactical supporters. Yeltsin garnered their support in the 
result of a concession politics that can be summarized by his prominent phrase spoken in Kazan, the capital city 
of Tatarstan, in the fall of 1990: “take sovereignty as much as you can swallow”. Nevertheless, when the 
process of acquisition of sovereignty went too far, Yeltsin began to undertake preventive actions (including 
bringing troops into Chechnya in December 1994) and lost his supporters represented by regional separatists. 
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enforcement measures applied to those who might have preferred to adhere to the 
politics of fiscal appeasement. These measures included denunciation of 
agreements between the federal center and the regions on the delimitation of 
powers, the second war in Chechnya – the most rebellious region during the 1990s, 
cancelling of gubernatorial elections in 2004 and replacement of those governors 
who could not demonstrate fine electoral performance of the “party of power” – 
United Russia – in their regions (Reuter and Robertson 2012), and other 
recentralization measures (Gelman 2006: 97–102).  
To trace the major changes in the pattern of allocation of central transfers and 
in the incumbent’s vote, recall that Putin’s vote in 2000 does not explain the 
allocation of transfers in 2001 (see Table 5.4). It follows from Table 5.8 that it is also 
not helpful in predicting the share of transfers in regional budgets in any given 
year. There are only two statistically significant correlation coefficients in years 
2007 and 2008, yet the proportion of explained variance in these cases is about 6% 
that is obviously too small to draw any conclusions. At the same time, the 
incumbent’s vote of 2004 and the subsequent years explain roughly 30% of the 
STB’s variance in all years except 2000 where it explains twice less – 14%.  
Two points can be inferred from these facts. First, the spatial pattern of the 
incumbent’s vote was crucially changed in 2004 and has remained relatively stable 
thereafter. Second, the allocation of the federal transfers has also undergone a 
considerable amendment in 2001 after the reform of 1999–2001, which introduced 
estimates of fiscal capacity and fiscal need for formula-based calculations of 
donations being transferred to regions (Jarocińska 2010: 408). Once amended, the 
allocation of transfers remained very slightly variable over time: the STB of 2001 
and the subsequent years correlate at over 0.9 whereas the STB of 2000 correlate at 
approximately 0.7 with the STB of the all other years. The federal government, 
which is responsible for determining the principles of transfer allocation, could not 
know beforehand in 2001 the electoral outcome of 2004. Therefore, we may hardly 
suspect it of a deliberate attempt to manipulate transfers for electoral gain from a 
retrospective point of view. Nevertheless, since the allocation pattern was altered so 
that it became more correlated with the election results, we cannot exclude that 
central politicians granted more transfers to a sizable and stable constituency 
prospectively, hoping that this group will respond with loyalty in future. 
Accordingly, we cannot also discard the fact that the incumbent’s vote transformed 
in 2004 so that it began to correlate with the STB of 2000 and all subsequent years. 
Thus, the change in the STB of 2001 and the change in Putin’s vote of 2004 both 
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contributed to the appearance of a correlation between these variables, though the 
causal mechanism of this change is still not obvious. 
Table 5.8. The correlation matrix of the share of transfers in the budget and the 
incumbent’s vote in various years 
  
STB 
2000 
STB 
2001 
STB 
2002 
STB 
2003 
STB 
2004 
STB 
2005 
STB 
2006 
STB 
2007 
STB 
2008 
STB 
2009 
STB 
2010 
STB 
2011 
STB 
2012 
Putin's 
Vote 2000 
.14 .15 .18 .23 .20 .21 .23 .26* .25* .18 .21 .23 .23 
Putin's 
Vote 2004 
.39** .56** .56** .58** .59** .58** .63** .64** .63** .57** .61** .60** .60** 
Medvedev
's Vote 
2008 
.37** .53** .54** .58** .53** .54** .60** .61** .58** .54** .61** .60** .63** 
Putin's 
Vote 2012 
.39** .61** .58** .60** .60** .60** .65** .65** .64** .60** .65** .63** .67** 
STB 2000 1 .77** .77** .75** .70** .74** .76** .74** .72** .69** .68** .70** .70** 
STB 2001 .77** 1 .97** .95** .93** .95** .95** .93** .93** .89** .80** .90** .88** 
STB 2004 .70** .93** .94** .97** 1 .97** .93** .90** .91** .90** .91** .91** .91** 
STB 2008 .72** .93** .92** .90** .91** .95** .98** .99** 1 .95** .93** .94** 
.920*
* 
STB 2012 .70** .88** .91** .91** .91** .93** .93** .90** .92** .93** .96** .98** 1 
Note: The sample includes only regions that were net recipients of transfers at least once 
between 2000 and 2012; N=65. Entries are Pearson Correlation coefficients. Significant at: 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.1. 
Looking at regions with different constitutional status may help us to answer the 
question of why the distribution of Putin’s vote in 2004 became more correspondent 
with the distribution of transfers. Figure 5.4 presents the incumbent’s vote, which 
was ranked for a better comparability between 2000 and 2004, scattered against 
the share of transfers in budget of 2004. On the right plot, the ranked Putin’s vote 
of 2004 explains 28% of the STB’s 2004 variance while the vote of 2000 explains 
almost nothing, only 3% of the variance. The mean values of the rank Putin vote of 
2000 were almost indistinguishable in oblasts with a predominantly Russian ethnic 
makeup and in the other regions with constitutionally assigned autonomies for 
various ethnic groups (40.21 and 40.54 percent). The mean Putin vote rank in 
oblasts, however, decreased by 7% in 2004, whereas the mean rank in the other 
regions increased by 14%. In other words, the ethnic autonomies became more 
supportive of Putin between 2000 and 2004 and their increased vote rates began to 
correspond to the higher levels of transfers in their direction.  
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Figure 5.4. How Putin’s vote changed between 2000 and 2004 in regions with 
different constitutional status relatively to the allocation of transfers in 2004 
Note: The dashed line is the mean rank of Putin’s vote among regions constitutionally 
assigned the status of Oblasts; the solid line corresponds to the mean Putin’s vote rank of 
all other subjects of the federation, i.e., Republics, Autonomous Oblasts, Autonomous Okrugs, 
and Krais. The sample includes only regions that were net recipients of transfers in 2004. 
To examine the determinants of the change in a more systematic way I regress 
both the ranked Putin vote change of 2000–2004 and the ranked STB change of 
2000–2001 on the levels of these variables, the Ethnoreligion Index144, a dummy 
indicating whether the region is a republic or not (the latter two are indicators of 
ethnic and religious divergence with the cultural core of Russia), and on a set of 
control variables utilized in the analysis earlier. The neutrality hypothesis assumes 
no effect of ethno-religious concerns on the allocation of transfers. Similarly, an 
ethno-religious determination of the vote typically violates the democratic 
expectations. Results of the OLS models in Table 5.9, however, allow us to fully 
reject this hypothesis in relation to the incumbent’s vote change. Besides the fully-
specified Model 1, it presents the best model considering both – the Ethnoreligion 
Index and the republican status (Model 2) – and the best model only with the 
Ethnoreligion Index (Model 3). Both variables measuring constitutional and cultural 
deviation from central Russia are significant in all specifications. Model 2 shows 
that their explanatory power decreases by about a half when the variables are in 
                                                          
144
 See Appendix E5 on development of the index 
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the equation simultaneously indicating that they measure approximately the same 
phenomenon.145 
Table 5.9. How the crucial changes in transfers and Putin’s vote can be explained 
by various predictors: OLS models 
 
DV: Putin’s Vote Change, 
Ranked, 2000–2004 
DV: STB Change, 
Ranked, 2000–2001 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 
71.6*** 
(2.83) 
94.1*** 
(8.01) 
77.35*** 
(7.01) 
 
85.4*** 
(2.89) 
84.5*** 
(4.27) 
Putin's Vote (%), 2000 
-1.58*** 
(-8.17) 
-1.62*** 
(9.0) 
-1.56*** 
(-8.25) 
   
STB (%), 2000     
-.932*** 
(-5.86) 
-.878*** 
(-6.2) 
Log Ethnoreligion Index 
2.88* 
(1.91) 
.339** 
(2.56) 
.632*** 
(6.35) 
 
-.14 
(-.77) 
 
Republican Status 
16.7*** 
(2.85) 
17.5*** 
(3.17) 
  
13.6* 
(1.89) 
10.1** 
(2.05) 
Log Regional Taxes Per 
Capita (RUB), 2000 
1.1e-4 
(.81) 
   
-6.2e-4*** 
(-3.66) 
-5.8e-
4*** 
(-3.71) 
Log Unemployment (%), 2000 
.707 
(.8) 
   
.607 
(.52) 
 
Population with Income 
Below the Living Minimum 
(%), 2000 
.300* 
(1.68) 
.253** 
(2.07) 
.285** 
(2.21) 
 
.556** 
(2.35) 
.555** 
(2.41) 
Infrastructure Is More 
Developed, 2000 
-.119 
(-.05) 
   
1.32 
(.45) 
 
Infrastructure Is in Worse 
Condition, 2000 
-.763 
(.41) 
   
-2.63 
(-1.13) 
 
R-squared .614 .607 .557  .418 .403 
White heteroscedasticity test .663 .571 .209  .333 .336 
N 83 83 83  83 83 
Note: The variables of change firstly differenced and then ranked. The sample includes 
all cases; I found no considerable difference between donors and recipients in this regard. 
Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses Significant at: *p < 0.1, 
**p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Inferring from Model 3, a one-point increase in the Ethnoreligion Index increases 
the Putin’s vote difference between 2000 and 2004 by 0.63 ranks. Keeping other 
variables at their means, the shift from the 5th percentile on the Ethnoreligion scale 
(30.4, the level of Ivanovo Oblast) to the 95th percentile (94.7, the level of Kabardino-
Balkar Republic) result in a change in Putin’s vote from the rank 23.7 (12.75% in 
Saratov Oblast) to the rank 64.3 (23.0% in Samara Oblast). Putin’s vote of 2000, 
which is used as a control variable in the model, has the expected negative sign and 
                                                          
145
 I also ran the best model but only with the variable of republican status. The variable’s t-value was 6.71 that 
is very close to t-value of the Ethnoreligion Index in Model 3. These variables are statistically and essentially 
correlated but I use them both mainly for Models 5 and 6 where the Ethnoreligion Index appeared to be 
insignificant.  
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high t-values in all model specifications indicating that changes in the vote less 
likely occur at high levels of the vote: for very supportive regions becoming more 
supportive is not a simple task especially considering the 100-percent limit to the 
vote.  
It is worth mentioning that almost none of the variables associated with 
economic conditions was statistically significant to be included in the best model. 
The proportion of people with income below the living minimum is one exception, 
yet its positive sign goes contrary to the conventional argument of the economic 
voting. We cannot conclude here with certainty whether the incumbent’s vote 
change explained by the Ethnoreligion Index and by the proportion of people with 
small income came from the change in voters’ preferences or it was caused by 
electoral fraud. But our predictors are rather favorable to the latter supposition: 
electoral manipulations are more widespread in the ethnic republics and the share 
of indigent people is generally larger in those areas. 
The regional ethno-religious composition does not explain, however, the ranked 
change in the share of transfers in the budget between 2000 and 2001: the 
Ethnoreligion Index is not significant in the full and the best models. Yet the 
variable of republican status appears to be significant instead. Based on Model 6, 
the difference between republics and other regions amounts to 10.1 ranks of 
change in the STB between 2000 and 2001. Among the variables of social need the 
two appeared significant. The more extensive regional tax base resulted in a 
reduction in central remittances, while the larger proportions of destitute people a 
region had the more transfers it received as a result of the reform of 2000–2001. 
The STB 2000 is predictably the most significant variable having a negative sign: 
the magnitude of change in transfers is getting smaller as the level of transfers 
increases. 
Thus, the impact of ethno-religious concerns on the incumbent’s vote change 
between 2000 and 2004 was overwhelming and nearly unique among possible 
explanations. Meanwhile its effect on the change in the STB between 2000 and 
2001 was less prominent but still distinguishable along with effects of the variables 
of social need. Therefore, not only are the federal transfers systematically 
distributed in favor of supportive groups rather than swing voters, as predicted by 
Cox and McCubbins (1986) theory, but the regime’s most supportive group appears 
also to be bound by time-persistent ethno-religious identities and the regime was to 
some degree responsive to the demand of these supporters.  
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In the period of transition from the politics of fiscal appeasement to the politics 
of fiscal rewarding for political loyalty, central-level officials prospectively rewarded 
the group of non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox regions (as the result of the 
fiscal reform of 1999–2001). In combination with other actions of political 
centralization (see: Gelman 2006: 97–102), this gave most rebellious regional elites 
a signal that loyalty to the federal center can yield more benefits in a newly 
established authoritarian system than manifestations of separatism or blatant 
defiance of federal laws. And elites of these regions accepted the offer by responding 
with various expressions of loyalty ranging from such symbolic measures as posting 
Putin’s portraits in officials’ offices to engaging their political machines in the 
process of “vote delivery” for the central incumbent.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the determinants of the allocation of federal transfers 
to Russia’s regions. It has provided evidence that, along with equity and efficiency 
principles, political interests played a considerable role in distributive politics in the 
period from 2000 to 2012. Specifically, regions with larger vote shares for the 
federal incumbent presidents were more generously granted with the central 
transfers. The effect of other political variables on the allocation of transfers was 
revealed only in year 2013 (governor’s tenure in office) or insignificant (the number 
of United Russia’s MPs). This finding is consistent with Cox and McCubbins’ (1986) 
theoretical prediction suggesting that the regime rewards its core supporters for 
their loyalty. The study found relatively weak support for the proposition that the 
rewarding of the core supporters is tactical. The pattern of rewarding appears to be 
more of strategic character. That is, the rules of the distribution are stable and they 
are designed so that the most supportive regions to be benefited regardless of 
periodical fluctuations in the vote. In particular, the regime invests 
disproportionately in non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox regions and these 
regions constantly vote (or falsify votes) for the incumbent.  
This chapter continues the debate started in the 1990s by Daniel Treisman who 
found that regions with more bargaining power (i.e., which declared state 
sovereignty, lost more man-days to strikes, and voted against Yeltsin or pro-
government blocs) received larger federal transfers. From this finding, Treisman was 
led to conclude that the federal elite, without having other resources for 
maintaining the federal state, had to resort to the appeasement of rebellious 
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regional elites to prevent them from further disintegrative actions. The situation 
seems to have changed in the 2000s. Not a single region declares state sovereignty, 
legitimizes its special status in the constitution, promotes mass strikes or blocks 
the federal highways at the present day. At the same time, regions that possessed 
more bargaining power in the 1990s, i.e., regions with populations that ethnically 
and religiously diverge from central Russia, still manage to negotiate more federal 
financing for their budgets. And even though bargaining more transfers by 
challenging the regime in the electoral field has become inadmissible in Putin’s era, 
regional elites are actually encouraged to do just the opposite – to support the 
regime electorally in exchange for federal transfers. The explanation of this 
transformation offered in this chapter suggests that the ethnic regions in the 1990s 
were neither KPRF’s core supporters nor Yeltsin’s core opponents, rather they 
opposed Yeltsin for tactical reasons to extract more benefits, privileges and 
resources from the federal center. The absence of ideological commitment of the 
ethnic regions to the Communists, as the strongest opposition to the regime during 
the 1990s, has allowed Putin to offer the ethnic regions another deal: still receive 
larger transfers yet now in exchange for political loyalty to the regime. 
One might conclude from this that, albeit by authoritarian methods, regional 
separatism in the 2000s was done away with when Putin came to power. In 
practice, it was rather political manifestations of separatism as a tool for squeezing 
money from the federal center that was terminated. And even if the political surface 
is now seemingly calm and free of any unrest, the cultural dimension of separatism 
is purposefully overlooked by the central authorities. Tatarstan, for instance, does 
not declare state sovereignty and does not evade paying taxes to the federal budget 
as it used to be in the 1990s. But more school hours are presently dedicated to 
teaching the Tatar language than the Russian language in comprehensive schools, 
whereas a couple decades ago only 7% of pupils were taught their native language 
in special national schools (Nevzorova 2015). The Supreme Court, by its decree No. 
16-P of 16 November 2004, ruled that studying the Tatar language in such large 
proportion does not contradict the Russian Constitution and that Tatar language 
courses are obligatory for all school children who can practically neither abstain 
from studying nor change the Tatar language to any foreign language. A similar 
situation exists in several regions having “republican” constitutional status.  
Turning to another example, anyone may notice that Ramzan Kadyrov, the 
leader of the Chechen Republic, is overtly loyal to the regime. Vote shares for the 
federal incumbent presidents as well as for United Russia as the “party of power” 
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tend to approach one hundred percent at the territory of Chechnya. Kadyrov also 
gained popularity for his pompous expression regarding Putin: “Those who criticize 
Putin are not human, they are my personal enemies. As long as Putin backs me up, 
I can do everything – Allahu akbar”. This is how he ended his interview to the 
Newsweek journal (Nemtsova 2010). This Islamic appeal, however, refers not only to 
Putin’s legitimacy but expands further to other spheres of society. In recent years 
Kadyrov became known as a proponent of polygamy based on the Sharia law, 
though this is prohibited by Russian legislation and the dominant Christian 
tradition (Verdihanov 2017). These and many other occurrences of latent 
separatism still undermine the cultural cohesiveness of the Russian Federation. 
Thus, contrary to mass stereotypes imposed by the official media, regional elites 
strive to attain the popular support, exactly as they did in the 1990s, through 
substantively separatist policies based on adverse ethnic and religious appeals. A 
trick developed by the regime in the 2000s is that the regional elites do not declare 
state sovereignty in their strongholds nowadays and generally refrain from 
challenging the central authorities in the public sphere so as to bargain more 
benefits from the federal center. Instead, however, they share their legitimacy 
derived from the revived ethno-religious policies and state apparatuses, which are 
corrupted for more operability and impunity in repressing the opposition and 
perpetrating electoral fraud, with Putin to be eventually rewarded for their loyalty 
with larger central transfers and with more incentives for corruption, electoral 
fraud, repression, and ethnicization of politics.   
Finally, it is also worth noting that this is only about a half of the story so far as 
no appropriate data on federal expenditures by region are publicly available. The 
situation has unfortunately not improved much since the 1990s when McAuley 
(1997: 440) pointed out that the data are not published presumably because larger 
expenditures may be used as a proxy for military expenditures that may reveal the 
location of military formations. The findings of this chapter might have been more 
pronounced if the full data on the federal expenditures have been available. 
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Chapter 6. Elite Loyalty versus Mass Loyalty: The Political Outcomes of 
Distributive Politics 
Studying distributive politics, scholars theorize what types of electoral 
constituencies are rewarded the most (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Lindbeck and 
Weibull 1987) and test these models empirically (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; 
Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006), examine socio-demographic characteristics 
making voters more susceptible to electoral mobilization via offering particularistic 
benefits (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008), explore citizen-politician or voter-broker 
linkages that make the clientelist exchange credible (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
Muñoz 2014; Zarazaga 2014; Kramon 2017), consider the electoral effects of 
clientelist policy appeals versus public policy appeals (Wantchekon 2003) or look for 
an answer to the question why some politicians opt out of clientelism (Weitz-
Shapiro 2012). 
The literature on distributive politics, however, pays no specific attention to a 
distinction between incumbent’s rewarding strategies toward elites and masses. Do 
political leaders distribute material benefits to elites and masses equally or 
disregard one of these groups in favor of the other? Does this between-group 
balance of the distribution of benefits vary by type of political regime? What political 
consequences do mass-oriented and elite-oriented types of the distribution entail, 
especially in authoritarian regimes? This chapter aims to answer these questions by 
using, along with a set of various explanatory variables, the data on electoral fraud 
and the sincere incumbent’s vote obtained from the analysis of electoral fraud 
thoroughly carried out in Chapter 4.  
Throughout the study and especially in this chapter, I argue that, unlike 
democracies, where the distribution is targeted primarily at voters, authoritarian 
leaders have inevitably reward political elites in order to secure their loyalty, which 
is subsequently converted into electoral fraud, persecution of the media, and other 
intrinsically authoritarian practices. At the same time, political leaders in electoral 
authoritarian regimes are expected to deliver politically contingent benefits to voters 
in order to secure their sincere electoral support. In this regard, electoral fraud and 
sincere voting for the incumbent are supposedly two major outcomes of the 
politicized central transfers associated, respectively, with the elite-oriented and 
mass-oriented incumbent rewarding strategies.  
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This study differs from the previous research in several respects. First, it 
analyzes electoral fraud and electoral support separately. Second, rather than using 
ad hoc turnout and vote share thresholds for detecting electoral irregularities, it 
employs profound quantitative and qualitative measures of electoral fraud 
developed in Chapter 4. Third, it takes into account not only ethnicity but also 
religion as indicator of regional identity. Finally and most importantly, this chapter 
unveils the role of regional elites and federal distributive politics in perpetrating 
electoral fraud. 
The results of analysis in this chapter suggest that, as authoritarianism 
progresses over time, regional elites manage to derive more and more benefits from 
the politicized central transfers, whereas the size of regional transfer funds tends to 
have a much weaker impact on spending to masses in the period from 2000 
through 2012. These relatively larger investments in loyalty of political elites do in 
fact result into several responses of regional elites in the form of electoral fraud, 
persecution of the media, and other substantially authoritarian practices. However, 
contrary to theoretical expectations, the hypothesis on patronage voting is not 
empirically confirmed. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The next section explores the consumption 
of federal transfers with a focus on their prime beneficiaries – the regional 
bureaucracy as a member of elite clientelist coalition and teaches and doctors as 
members of mass patronage coalition. In the subsequent section, I proceed to 
analyzing effects of the politicized transfers and other variables of clientelism on 
electoral fraud, persecution of journalists, and the general bias of the electoral 
playing field. The ultimate section tests the hypothesis on patronage voting by 
examining effects of the politicized transfers and other variables of social spending 
on the sincere voting for the incumbent. Finally, I summarize and discuss the 
results in the conclusion. 
Patronage Spending versus Elite Appropriation in Consumption of the 
Federal Transfers 
The literature on distributive politics generally assumes that transfers are 
exclusively targeted at voters. Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev (2016: 43) 
formulate this explicitly by assuming that “regional elites serve as conduits and 
brokers, channeling transfers in ways that maximize vote shares for national 
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politicians rather than consuming them as rents”. Other studies, to the contrary, 
aim to examine the bureaucratic appropriation of transfers. Grossman (1994) found 
that the size of bureaucracy measured as state and local employment per capita 
was the strongest predictor of federal grants allocated to states during the era of the 
Democratic majority in the House of Representatives (1974–1983) having 
outperformed both election-related variables – the percentage of votes cast for the 
Democratic governor and the percentage of seats held by the Democrats in the state 
legislatures. The effect of the size of bureaucracy on federal grants was interpreted 
by Grossman as the influence of interest groups.  
Likewise, Treisman (2002) found that public employment in Russia’s regions 
was better explained by the variable of federal transfers in 1992–1998. Hence, 
subnational politicians deliberately set public employment levels beyond fiscal 
capacity of their regional economies, eventually filling this fiscal gap with transfers 
from the central government. Appropriation of transfer money by the bureaucracy 
has also been shown in the Brazilian case by Marconi and colleagues (2009). The 
study revealed that larger transfers entail higher wages for public workers relative 
to private sector ones, whereas a higher proportion of public employees in the 
economy increases the wage differential in favor of public workers. Argentina’s 
provincial spending on administrative personnel tends to increase with the amount 
of central transfers, as has been shown by Remmer (2007). Moreover, changes in 
transfers entail positive changes in administrative spending but changes in 
transfers appear not to impact social spending. The analysis of patronage politics in 
Argentina by Calvo and Murillo (2004), however, ended up with mixed results. 
Although the Peronist Party vote was positively associated with federal transfers, 
and public employment induced electoral returns for the Peronists, the share of 
transfers in provincial expenditures appeared to negatively impact the size of the 
public sector.   
This literature implicitly views the bureaucracy as an actor possessing some 
bargaining potential to substantiate its demand for larger benefits. I suppose that 
this is not exactly the case in Russia. It is not the bureaucracy that plays an 
independent role but rather the top regional elites participating in the bargaining 
process with the federal center over transfers play a decisive role. Based on the 
political and economic conditions of their regions, the elites receive the 
corresponding central remittances. Only after having received the tranches of 
money do they distribute portions of these sums to the bureaucracy in order to 
reward it as a member of the clientelist coalition.  
  
226 
 
Two competing hypotheses are examined regarding how transfer funds are 
consumed in the regions after having been received from the federal center. On the 
one hand, the central money can be targeted at voters, such as teachers or doctors 
as members of the incumbent’s patronage coalition, in order to secure their 
electoral support. On the other hand, the regional authorities may refrain from 
patronage spending and invest more in the elite in order to buy its loyalty, which 
will eventually be converted into electoral fraud, repression of the opposition, and 
persecution of journalists. 
To trace patterns of consumption of the central transfers, I rely on three 
variables of monetary remittances in the regional budget: money per regional and 
municipal official, money per person employed in education, and money per person 
employed in healthcare.146 It is also reasonable to control for the proportion of 
regional and municipal officials to the employed in the region’s economy as well as 
for the relative proportions of employed in education and employed in healthcare to 
gauge the size of these spheres in regional economies.147 Sure enough, these 
variables are merely approximations of incumbent’s distributive policies toward 
elites and masses. Their advantages include simplicity and comparability between 
each other. Furthermore, as of 2012, the average size of regional and municipal 
bureaucracy amounts to 2.9% of the economically active population and 1.4% of 
the total population – the size that encompasses top political elites and their inner 
circles in the regions. I do not have clear expectations regarding these variables. 
What is obvious is that the consumption of transfers by the bureaucracy is 
favorable mainly to regional elites and represents, therefore, an elite-rewarding 
strategy, whereas the consumption of transfers by teachers and doctors is beneficial 
to voters in general and represents a mass-rewarding strategy. 
                                                          
146
 The data on budget expenditures come from Rosstat (2009, 2013, 2014: Ch. 23, 22). The data on state needs 
expenditures are not available in Rosstat statistical yearbooks for years 2000 and 2004. I have taken it from 
Budgetary System of Changing Russia of the Center for the Budgetary Monitoring of the Petrozavodsk State 
University (available at: http://solidbase.karelia.ru). The indicators are in constant prices of 2012. 
I tried using the officially reported (at: https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/33433.do) average nominal monthly 
wages in general public administration and in organizations of private property at regional level to construct 
the wage differential, yet I found no relationship of this variable with transfers. It might more likely to occur 
due to lack of reliability of the data. In year 2012, these two variables have 72.2 percent of the common 
variance meanwhile the variable of money per one regional and municipal official have 47.6 percent in 
common with the variable of money per person employed in education and 49.0 percent in common with the 
money per person employed in healthcare. 
147
 The number of the executive body workers of regions and municipalities, the average annual number of 
employed in education and healthcare, and the overall number of the employed in the economy were taken 
from Rosstat (2013: Ch. 3). 
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Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. The 
multilevel models presented in the last column fit by maximizing the penalized quasi-
likelihood (PQL) with the general positive-definite covariance structure for the random 
effects, Log-Cholesky parametrization. The random term consists of intercepts and 
coefficients for all variables in the equation varying by year and budget type (random effects 
are not shown but they are very similar to the OLS coefficients in the models of the 
corresponding years and budget types). The OLS and multilevel models, along with election-
year, take also budget type into account since election-year models do generally not pass 
heteroscedasiticy tests (their results are more pronounced and shown in Appendix F2). 
Among the OLS models in Table 6.1, the White heteroscedasticity test is significant at <0.05 
level in the following models: 2008 Recipients, healthcare (0.019), 2008 Recipients, 
education (0.037), 2000 Donors, healthcare (0.005), and 2000 Donors, education (0.002). 
Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
One analytical approach to estimating the relevance of these incumbent’s 
strategies could be running separate regression models with variables of patronage 
and elite spending and then comparing the size of the effects between these models 
(i.e., in 8 models in each of 4 time periods). However, a more precise approach 
should examine the effect of patronage spending when elite spending is held 
constant, and vice-versa. Accordingly, Table 6.1 presents a head-to-head 
comparison of the federal transfers being consumed by the regional bureaucracy, 
teachers, and doctors. To give the variables more equal chances, I split the analysis 
into two sets of models that test the effects of outlays on the bureaucracy versus 
healthcare, and the bureaucracy versus education separately. All models control for 
the level of regional taxes since rich regions typically receive less transfers but they 
may allocate larger sums of money for state needs out of their own revenue. 
Although the dependent variable is the share of transfers in the budget and the 
spending items are predictors, the effects should rather be interpreted the other 
way about.148  
The results of the fixed effects models generally reveal that central transfers tend 
to be appropriated mostly by the bureaucracy, rather than used for mass patronage 
purposes. As follows from the t-values, the proportion of regional and municipal 
officials is 4.7 times more significant compared with the proportion of employed in 
                                                          
148
 This regression design is the only way to meet the aforementioned conditions though for simplicity of 
interpretation the dependent and independent variables should be reversed. Generally, static regression 
models that do not take time into account cannot make any causal claims by their nature and the relationships 
being revealed may be interpreted in both directions if this possibility is not excluded due to the essence of 
variables (for instance, this is ethnicity that defines the vote but not the contrary). At any rate, there is no 
theoretical ground to suggest that the allocation of transfers is causally determined by the variables being used 
in the models as predictors. 
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the field of healthcare and 2.5 times more significant than the proportion of 
employed in the field of education. The variable of money allocated per one official 
in the regional budget turns out to be 1.6 times more significant than the variable 
of money assigned to a person employed in the field of healthcare and 2.2 times 
more significant than the variable of money assigned to a person employed in the 
field of education.149 Furthermore, all variables of size and monetary allocations to 
the bureaucracy are significant in both models, whereas only the percentage of 
employed in the sphere of education is significant among the variables of mass 
patronage. Hence, the size of regional and municipal bureaucracy tends to be 
relatively larger than the size of education or healthcare in economically active 
population and more money is spent on regional and municipal officials than on 
teachers or doctors as the share of transfers in the regional budget increases.  
But probably a more interesting finding comes from the OLS models showing 
that the effects of patronage and elite spending are not constant over time. In the 
aggregate, the effects of variables associated with elite consumption gain in size in 
more recent years, meanwhile the effects of variables of patronage spending either 
insignificant or lose their significance after 2004. The size of the bureaucracy is 
significant in both types of regions – donors and recipients, though its effect is 
about twice as weaker in donor regions. Although the effects of the year 2000 are 
controversial between donors and recipients, the average t-values indicate an 
ascending trend from 2000 to 2012 with the apex in 2008 among the OLS models 
with healthcare variables (the mean t-values between donors and recipients = 2.4, 
2.3, 4.3, and 3.3 in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012, respectively) as well as with 
education variables (accordingly: 1.6, 2.4, 3.3, and 2.9). The variable of monetary 
spending to the bureaucracy becomes significant in more recent years – 2008 and 
2012 – in the lower and upper batteries of recipients models in the table. By 
contrast, the variables of size of healthcare and education and monetary allocations 
in these areas are sporadically significant only in 2000 and 2004, and they become 
completely insignificant in the subsequent years. 
Thus, the consumption pattern of transfers has experienced the following 
transformation: in the early 2000s, the transfer funds in regional budgets were 
distributed in roughly equal proportions between the elite and the general public. 
The situation changed up to 2012 so that the larger share of transfers in the budget 
is now only and strongly associated with appropriation of these resources by the 
                                                          
149
 I examined various interaction effects between the variables of size and monetary expenditures. They 
appeared to be insignificant. 
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bureaucracy, especially in regions that are net recipients of the federal transfers. 
Put otherwise, as authoritarianism is progressing, teachers and doctors as 
members of popular patronage coalition have to content with smaller and smaller 
portion of transfer money being remitted from the center to regions, whereas the 
state bureaucracy as a part of the elite clientele diverts more and more funds in its 
favor.  
Political Outcomes of Politicized Transfers: Electoral Fraud, Media 
Persecution and the General Authoritarian Effect 
Chapter 5 has revealed that the federal transfers in Putin’s era are distributed 
largely according to political interests and the prior section uncovered that this 
distribution tends to favor more regional elites than voters in recent times. The 
following question is what kind of political consequences do these politicized 
transfers entail with respect to loyalty of political elites? This section examines 
effects of central transfers on three particular outcomes of authoritarian politics – 
electoral fraud (as this measure has been developed in the Chapter 4), pressure on 
journalists (the Media Persecution Index and the Media Freedom Index were 
introduced in Chapter 5), and the general level of regional democracy, which 
summarizes political openness, freedom of the media, civil liberties, rotation of 
elites, and other elements of regional political regime (the rating of regional 
democracy is developed by experts of the Moscow Carnegie Center (Petrov and 
Titkov 2013)150). 
As to the explanatory variables, several studies found that the probability of 
electoral manipulation is higher in Muslim and Caucasus regions of Russia 
(Goodnow, Moser and Smith 2014), in the regions with large shares of ethnic 
minorities White (2016), in the regions with high percentage of non-ethnic Russians 
(Bader and Van Ham 2015), and in the ethnic regions as well as in the regions with 
high percentage of non-Russians (Moser and White 2017). Similarly, I hypothesize 
that regional ethno-religious composition that is distinct from Russian cultural core 
can be more conducive to various authoritarian practices. I use the Ethnoreligion 
Index, which is a composite of the share of non-Russian and non-Christian 
Orthodox populations in regions, and the interaction between them, to gauge 
                                                          
150
 The rating is an index that includes ten composites: political openness, democraticness of elections, political 
pluralism, independent media, economic liberalization, civil society, political arrangement, elites, corruption, 
and local governance. Each of them may take a maximum score of five. The maximal score is therefore 50.  
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regional ethnic identity.151 A second strong predictor of electoral fraud in Russia 
detected by several studies is the countryside measured by the percentage of rural 
population (White 2016, Moser and White 2017). I employ this measure along with 
the percentage of employed in agriculture as an alternative measure of the 
countryside. The both measures are expected to have a positive impact on electoral 
fraud and other authoritarian practices.  
The previous research has shown no consistent effect of such economic 
variables as regional economic development and economic growth, whereas natural 
resources wealth has demonstrated a positive effect on electoral fraud in several 
models (White 2016, Moser and White 2017). Together with GRP per capita and GRP 
growth as measures of regional economic development and economic growth, I use 
per capita extraction of natural resources to account for non-tax revenue leading to 
“resource curse” (Ross 2012; Dunning 2008; Fish 2005: Ch. 5; Gelman et al. 2010; 
Treisman 2010).  
However, these economic variables should supposedly have no independent 
effect on authoritarian practices. I argue that, to be effective, economic funds 
should be received by actors primarily responsible for perpetration of electoral fraud 
and other authoritarian practices, that is, by regional political elites, conditionally 
on their loyalty. Accordingly, I employ three variables tailored to tap elite 
clientelism: the share of transfers in the budget, and two variables introduced in the 
prior section – the percentage of regional and municipal officials in the employed and 
money per regional and municipal official in the budget. The prior section revealed 
that the federal transfer funds tend to be appropriated more by the regional 
bureaucracy as a member of the incumbent’s clientelist coalition. In this section, I 
hypothesize that the larger central transfers in combination with the higher 
spending to the bureaucracy result into loyalty of regional top and rank-and-file 
officials that subsequently misuse their bureaucratic apparatuses for promotion of 
various authoritarian practices. Finally, the size of regional bureaucracy is also 
expected to be positively associated with authoritarian practices, though its effect is 
not so theoretically straightforward. It was shown that authoritarian leaders may 
use valuable positions in the executive for co-optation of rivals making, thereby, 
their reign in power more stable (Arriola 2009). At the same time, authoritarian 
                                                          
151
 Unlike the Ethnoreligion Index in Chapter 5, the components of which was were attributed such weights to 
better account for the STB, in this chapter, the components on the Ethnoreligion Index have equal weights. The 
logged shares on non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox populations are multiplied by factor of 0.3, and the 
interaction between them is multiplied by factor of 0.003. As a result, the each component contributes by 1/3 
to the Ethnoreligion Index, which varies from 0.7 to 81.1. 
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leaders may need not to have a huge bureaucratic apparatus to perpetrate electoral 
fraud, for example. A relatively compact authoritarian state machinery can be 
efficient as well, if the purpose is selective suppression of opponents or periodical 
electoral forgery rather than ongoing mass surveillance and terror.  
The results of multilevel models of electoral fraud appear in Table 6.2. The 
bivariate multilevel models indicate that the Ethnoreligion Index (random effects R2 
= 0.245), the share of transfers in the budget (r.e. R2 = 0.171), and the percentage of 
rural residents (r.e. R2 = 0.123) are the strongest individual predictors of electoral 
fraud.152 Other variables obtain their explanatory power only in combinations of 
variables in the multivariate models. The percentage of rural residents, however, 
completely loses its explanatory power in the multivariate models, whereas effects of 
the other two variables persist when other variables are controlled for. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that regional ethnic and religious identity and the federal 
transfers are two interrelated and, therefore, mutually suppressive explanations. 
First, as was shown in Chapter 5, the region’s ethnic and religious composition 
correlates with the central transfers. Second, the Ethnoreligion Index is the major 
predictor of electoral fraud in Table 6.2. Third, the Ethnoreligion Index does also 
predict the official incumbent’s vote pretty well (in the same model setup as in Table 
6.2, bivariate random effects R2 = 0.357). For this reason, it is difficult to 
disentangle whether the regional ethno-religious makeup or the central transfers 
determine electoral fraud.  
                                                          
152
 The prime indicator of interest is random-effects R-squared. Fixed-effects R-squared is reported for 
informational purposes. It shows to what extent the fixed effects reported in the table provide a good fit for 
the pooled data. Specifically, a considerable discrepancy between fixed-effects and random-effects R-squared 
indicates heterogeneity in the data that necessarily should be treated by using a multilevel model. For instance, 
a negative fixed-effect R-squared of GRP per capita in Table 6.2 indicates that the grand mean explains per 
capita GRP better than its fixed effect prediction. All random effects in each election year are slightly negative, 
the fixed effect is accordingly negative, whereas the grand relationship in the pooled data measured by OLS is 
positive. That is, there are four negative within-year relationships but the groups are ordered so that a spurious 
relationship papers in the polled data – both per capita GRP and fraud tend to grow over time. Using a non-
multilevel model would entail a strong cointegration-related bias in this case. 
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From the theoretical perspective of this study, the incumbent distributes 
rewards in the form of central transfers chiefly to his loyal supporters. The 
incumbent infers the level of his support from the official level of the vote, which 
consists of the sincere vote and electoral fraud. Regional elites, in their turn, have 
an incentive to provide the incumbent with a higher rate of the official electoral 
support that can be easily done by means of fraud in order to receive larger central 
transfers. Ethno-religious aspects may intervene in this process in several ways. 
First, ethnicity and religion may have a supplementary effect on electoral fraud 
independently of transfers. To test this explanation, Table 6.2 reports full and best 
models with and without the Ethnoreligion Index. When the Ethnoreligion Index is 
not in the model, the variable of transfers takes over the effect of ethnicity and 
religion: the effect of the STB increases twofold from 0.048 to 0.101 in the full 
model and from 0.05 to 0.109 in the best model. Therefore, the supposition that 
ethno-religious aspects and central transfers are two independent predictors of 
electoral fraud is strongly rejected. Second, non-Russian and non-Christian 
Orthodox regions could be more responsive to the incumbent’s clientelist offer – 
federal transfers in exchange for political loyalty – in providing more electoral fraud. 
However, the second explanation is also refuted empirically. I tried to test an 
interaction effect between the Ethnoreligion Index and the STB, it appeared to be 
insignificant. Third, there could be a mediation effect of the central transfers on 
ethno-religious makeup in determining electoral fraud. It implies that the central 
government allocates transfers based predominantly on its ethno-religious 
preferences, not on the concerns of electoral loyalty, and then the transfer funds 
translate into electoral fraud. This explanation is not confirmed empirically as well. 
If the mediation effect took place, the effect of ethnicity and religion would drop 
precipitously, while the effect of transfers would remain nearly the same as in the 
bivariate model, if the variable of transfers is held constant. The results of the full 
and best models indicate that, if the two variables are simultaneously in the 
equation, both the Ethnoreligion Index and the STB lose their explanatory power by 
nearly a half.  
Consequently, if there is no evident preponderance between the variables and 
they mutually suppress each other in the models, the fourth explanation regarding 
the role of regional ethno-religious identity relatively to the role of central transfers 
in determining electoral fraud looks more plausible. As was argued in Chapter 5, 
the federal center offered the ethnic regions a new deal in the early 2000s – central 
transfers in exchange for political loyalty instead of the politics of fiscal 
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appeasement of ethnic separatism practiced in the 1990s. As a result of this 
agreement, the ethnic regions transformed into regions with high levels of the 
official electoral support for the incumbent, that is, as this section shows, with 
larger amounts of electoral fraud and, as the next section will reveal, with also 
somewhat slightly higher levels of sincere vote for the incumbent. These regions are 
granted larger central transfers for their electoral allegiance and they provide their 
electoral support in return for transfers. Therefore, regional ethno-religious makeup 
and central transfers are inextricably interrelated. It is impossible to account for 
electoral fraud only by ethno-religious concerns (as the political experience of the 
early 1990s shows, the ethnic regions could potentially commit fraud against the 
incumbent). It is also problematic to explain electoral fraud solely by the central 
transfers inasmuch as their prime recipients are the ethnic regions. 
Since the effects of variables may change under the influence of other variables, 
Table 6.2 reports also tree models representing the major groups of variables. The 
social cleavages model has the largest explanatory power (r.e. R2 = 0.28). This share 
of variance is explained almost exclusively by the Ethnoreligion Index so long as 
other variables in the model are insignificant. If the value of the index is shifted 
from its 5th to 95th percentile, the model predicts an increase in electoral fraud of 
8.7%. Although the variables associated with the economy are insignificant in the 
full and the best model, they are all significant in the economic explanations model. 
Expectedly, the regional level of economic development is negatively related to 
electoral fraud. Its marginal effect of a 5th – 95th percentile change (ME) on electoral 
fraud amounts to -7.1%. The regional economic growth, contrary to theoretical 
expectations, is rather favorable to electoral forgery. Its ME is estimated at 3.7%. 
The per capita income from extraction of natural resources is also positively related 
to fraud (ME = 4.3%). However, the solely economic explanations account merely for 
12.2% of electoral fraud variance. The variables of clientelism, except the size of 
regional bureaucracy, have expected significant effects on electoral fraud in all 
models. In the clientelism model, the marginal 5th – 95th percentile change in the 
share of transfers in the budget leads to an 8.5-percent increase in the level of 
fraud, whereas the monetary allocations per regional and municipal bureaucrats 
correspondingly increase electoral fraud by 3.7%. The share of variance explained 
by the model is five percent smaller in the absolute value (r.e. R2 = 0.219) compared 
with the social cleavages model. 
If we proceed to the best model, it turns out that, besides the variables of 
clientelism and ethno-religious identity, only the percentage of employed in 
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agriculture is significant in determining electoral fraud (ME = 3.9%). In this model, 
compared with the models representing the groups of variables, the ME of the 
Ethnoreligion Index is smaller by one third (6.7%), while the ME of the variable of 
central transfers has diminished twofold (3.4%), and the ME of spending to the 
bureaucracy has remained nearly the same (3.6%). If we consider the joint marginal 
5th – 95th percentile change of the variables of clientelism and ethno-religious 
identity setting the percentage of employed in agriculture at its mean, the expected 
amount of fraud would enlarge from 12.3% (3.0% in a non-log-transformed variable, 
which is the average 2000–2012 level of Perm Krai) to 25.9% (analogously, 16.5% or 
the level of Tuva Republic).  
Although the central transfers and the regional ethno-religious composition are 
empirically interrelated, we may try to model a situation in which they could be 
independent. The best model without the Ethnoreligion Index shows the results. If 
ethno-religious aspects are not controlled for, two additional variables gain 
significance – GRP growth and per capita income from natural resources, though 
their MEs are not large – 2.0% and 2.2%, respectively. While the MEs of the 
employment in agriculture and the monetary spending to the bureaucracy have 
remained almost unchanged (4.0% and 4.4%, respectively), the ME of the STB has 
enlarged substantively to 7.3%. If we again model the joint marginal 5th – 95th 
percentile change by using only two variables associated with clientelism to predict 
electoral fraud keeping the other variables at their means, the estimated effect 
appears very similar to that estimated in the best model. In a region with the 5th-
percentile levels of federal transfers and spending to the bureaucracy, the amount 
of electoral fraud is expected to be 13.5% (3.5% in a non-log-transformed variable, 
which is the average 2000–2012 level of Yaroslavl Oblast). If the federal transfers 
and spending to the bureaucracy increase simultaneously to their 95th-percentile 
levels, the amount of electoral fraud rises to 25.2% (analogously, 18.4% or the level 
of Kabardino-Balkar Republic). Thus, the amount of electoral fraud in the period of 
2000–2012 is primarily explained by the federal transfers allocated to the regions 
based on their electoral loyalty to the central incumbent and by the regional 
spending to the bureaucracy as a member of incumbent’s clientelist coalition. 
The second detrimental effect of the politicized transfers is repression applied 
against journalists. Table 6.3 displays OLS models explaining two variables 
accountable for political environment in which journalists have to work – the Media 
Persecution Index, which is an objective measure of the number of reported 
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assaults on journalists, and the Press Freedom Index, which is an expert index.153 
The central transfers apparently induce repression of the media only with respect to 
the Media Persecution Index. According to the best model, keeping the percentage 
of employed in agriculture constant, the marginal shift in transfers from the 5th 
percentile (10.8%) to the 95th percentile (72.8%) produces an increase in the Media 
Persecution Index of 40.2 points from 78.5 (the level of Ivanovo, Leningrad, and 
Vologda Oblasts) to 118.7 (the level of Kabardino-Balkar Republic, Pskov Oblast, 
and Arkhangelsk Oblast). The percentage of employed in agriculture is the next and 
the only significant variable in the model besides the STB. Its effect is unexpectedly 
negative yet similar in the size (ME = -41.7 points) to the marginal effect of the STB. 
Surprisingly, other variables demonstrate no significant effect on the Media 
Persecution Index either in the full and best models. 
Table 6.3. The determinants of persecution of journalists, OLS models 
 
DV: Log Media 
Persecution Index 
DV: Press Freedom 
Index 
Full Model Best Model  Full Model Best Model  
Constant 
112.778*** 
(2.95) 
95.039*** 
(12.97) 
2.5432*** 
(2.96) 
2.9672*** 
(7.83) 
Ethnoreligion Index 
.128 
(.51) 
 
-.0101* 
(-1.8) 
-.007* 
(-1.68) 
Rural Residents, % 
-.0267 
(-.05) 
 
-.0005 
(-.04) 
 
Employed in Agriculture, % 
-2.0096* 
(-1.91) 
-1.9455*** 
(2.94) 
-.0041 
(-.17) 
 
Log GRP per Capita, RUB 
-7.9e-6 
(-.07) 
 
1.4e-6 
(.58) 
 
GRP growth, % 
.1695 
(.1) 
 
-.0231 
(-.58) 
 
Log Natural Resources per Capita, 
RUB 
2.0e-5 
(.68) 
 
5.5e-7 
(.82) 
 
Share of Transfers in the Budget, 
% 
.8202** 
(2.11) 
.6478*** 
(3.11) 
.0099 
(1.13) 
 
Log Reg. & Municipal Officials in 
Employed, % 
-17.605 
(-1.13) 
 
-.6286* 
(-1.79) 
-.4132* 
(-1.82) 
Log Money per Reg. and Munic. 
Official, RUB 
-6.3e-6 
(-.32) 
 
-5.3e-8 
(-.12) 
 
R-squared .156 .127 .14 .105 
White’s heteroscedasticity test .031 .198 .433 .475 
N 83 83 83 83 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. Significant 
at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
There are also only two significant variables in the full and best models of the 
Press Freedom Index. In this time, however, the variable of central transfers is not 
                                                          
153
 The indices are introduced and described in Chapter 5. 
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significant. Instead, the Ethnoreligion Index and the size of regional bureaucracy 
significantly influence the level of regional press freedom. Their marginal effects are 
expectedly negative and amount respectively to -0.39 and -0.46 points (on a three-
point scale of the index). Explanatory power and statistically significant effects are 
relatively small throughout all models. Nevertheless, among the available 
explanations, the share of transfers in the budget and the Ethnoreligion Index again 
turn out to be the best predictors of an outcome of authoritarian politics – creating 
a hostile environment for journalists in order to complicate delivering of unbiased 
information to the society. 
Now we proceed to examining of the overall consequences of the politicized 
transfers, that is, to their effect on regional political regimes. The multilevel models 
in Table 6.4 show fixed effects of the earlier used set of predictors on the level of 
regional democracy. 
In the bivariate models, the best predictors appeared to be the share of transfers 
in the budget (r.e. R2 = 0.325), the percentage of rural residents (r.e. R2 = 0.305), 
and the size of regional bureaucracy (r.e. R2 = 0.212). The results of the multivariate 
models came to be substantively similar to the results of modeling of electoral fraud 
in Table 6.2. The percentage of rural residents again loses its significance in almost 
all multivariate models and the percentage of employed in the sphere of agriculture 
becomes significant instead, whereas the Ethnoreligion Index and the variables of 
clientelism have the strongest impact on the regional political regime. The latter 
ones obtained even a stronger influence vis-à-vis the variable of ethno-religious 
concerns compared with the models of electoral fraud. The central transfers and the 
regional ethno-religious composition are still two interrelated and mutually 
suppressing explanations. Among all other variables, the effect of the STB is altered 
the most in the full and best models if the Ethnoreligion Index is excluded. On 
average, the models of regional democracy have greater explanatory power (r.e. R2 = 
0.374) than the models of electoral fraud (r.e. R2 = 0.256). 
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All variables demonstrate significant expectedly negative effects on democracy in 
the social cleavages model. On the scale of the rating of democracy ranging on 
average between 2000–2012 from 18.2 (the 5th percentile) to 41.0 (95th percentile), 
the marginal effect produced by a 5th – 95th percentile change in the percentage of 
rural residents is the largest (-8.3), even though the variable is significant only in 
this model specification, then follows the ME of the Ethnoreligion Index (-4.3), and 
the ME of the percentage of employed in agriculture (-2.6). In the economic 
explanations model, the level of regional economic development has a strong and 
expectedly positive effect on the level of democracy suggested by the modernization 
theory: the more economically developed a region is the more likely it is to be 
democratic (ME = 9.8). Economic growth, to the contrary, has slightly negative 
effect on regional democracy (ME = -2.1). Similarly, natural resources abundance is 
associated with lower levels of democracy (ME = -3.4). Notwithstanding this 
particular result, which is in line with theoretical expectations, the effects of 
economic variables fade away when other variables intervene. The model of 
clientelism explains the largest share of variance (r.e. R2 = 0.366). In this model, the 
marginal change in the STB accounts for a 9.2-point decline in the level of 
democracy as well as the share of the bureaucracy in economically active 
population is adverse to democracy (ME = -4.5). 
 The best models, alongside the variables of clientelism and regional ethno-
religious structure, include also the percentage of employed in agriculture. The 
more agricultural the region, the less democratic its political system (ME = -5.0 and 
-5.7 in the best model and the best model without the Ethnoreligion Index, 
respectively). The marginal change in regional per capita GRP is associated with a 
2.6 points better state of democracy in a region, according to the best model. The 
MEs of the Ethnoreligion Index, the STB, the size of bureaucracy, and spending to 
the bureaucracy are equal, respectively, to -2.9, -4.2, -4.9, and -1.8 points. If we 
model the joint marginal effect of these variables keeping other variables at their 
means, we will come up with the predicted level of democracy of 35.3 points (the 
average 2000–2012 the level of Pskov Oblast) at low values of the predictors and the 
predicted level of democracy of 21.5 points (the average level of North Ossetia) at 
high values of the predictors. The joint marginal effect of the same variables at the 
means of other predictors in the best model without the Ethnoreligion Index is 
pretty much similar. In a region with the 5th-percentile levels of the STB, the size of 
the bureaucracy and spending to the bureaucracy, democracy is expected to be at 
the level of 37.3 points, whereas shifting of the predictors simultaneously to their 
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95th-percentile levels decreases the rating of democracy to 23.7 points. Stated 
otherwise, the politicized transfers in combination with clientelist inducements to 
regional bureaucratic apparatuses promote authoritarianism. 
Figure 6.1. The vicious circle of subnational authoritarian political economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thus, the results of this section show that loyalty of regional elites secured by 
means of federal transfers is converted into electoral fraud, persecution of the 
media, and the promotion of authoritarian practices in general. Not only does the 
politicized distribution of central transfers favor the most loyal elites, it also entails 
the elites’ response in the form of various intrinsically authoritarian practices that 
eventually reinforce the regime. This tragic logic is finally summarized in Figure 6.1. 
Sincere Voting for the Incumbent as a Political Outcome of Politicized 
Transfers? 
To what extent do the politicized transfers influence sincere voting for the 
incumbent? The previous section provided the evidence that the federal transfers 
allocated to regions contingently on their electoral results for the central incumbent 
presidents entail several responses of regional elites in the form of intrinsically 
authoritarian practices. This section examines the effect of the politicized transfers 
on electoral behavior using the authentic (i.e., non-affected by fraud) incumbent’s 
vote shares from the four presidential elections of 2000–2012 obtained as a result of 
Vote 
Elite Clientelism 
Electoral 
Fraud 
Biased Electoral Playing Field 
Opposition 
Repression  
Media 
Persecution 
Transfers 
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the analysis of electoral fraud in Chapter 4. However, contrary to theoretical 
expectations, I find no considerable effect of variables associated with patronage 
voting. Instead, along with the effects of socioeconomic variables, the results of the 
analysis show the regional ethno-religious identity, specifically the share of non-
Russian and non-Christian Orthodox populations in the regions, to be the best 
predictor of the sincere vote for the incumbent. However, this effect is not 
monotonic and not constant over time – the finding holds true for the ethnic regions 
only and for election years 2004, 2008, and especially 2012.  
The previous research on Russian presidential elections did make no explicit 
attempts to examine sincere voting for the incumbent. Nonetheless, several studies, 
acknowledging that the official electoral results are strongly influenced by fraud 
under electoral authoritarianism, introduce thresholds to account for electoral 
fraud. Findings of these studies overwhelmingly suggest that ethnicity has the 
strongest effect on the incumbent’s vote. In particular, White (2015) introduced a 
turnout threshold to isolate the effects of ethnicity on United Russia’s electoral 
performance from electoral manipulation. On average in the three parliamentary 
elections of 2003–2011, the threshold cuts off merely 6.5% of supposedly 
manipulated observations at the average level of turnout exceeding 90.3%. 
According to the results of Chapter 4, this threshold is obviously insufficient so long 
as only about one fifth of observations belonging to the 1st cluster were detected as 
having minor electoral violations. Although the central argument places ethnicity in 
the center among other determinants of support for United Russia, the presented 
empirical evidence is rather favorable to the importance of another social cleavage. 
The percentage of rural population explains much more variance of the United 
Russia’s vote (the average t-value between 2003 and 2011 is equal to 13.4) than the 
percentage of non-Russians (t-value = 2.9) and the “ethnic” constitutional status of 
the region (t-value = 2.7).154  
In a similar analysis of United Russia strongholds in 2007 and 2011, White 
(2016) uses the same threshold for detecting electoral malfeasance and presents the 
models for the pooled data controlling for the dichotomous variable of electoral 
fraud and for the data without supposedly manipulated observations. The results of 
both types of models, which are just one iota as different, indicate that the 
percentage of non-Russian minority determines whether the region is a United 
Russia stronghold or not (the share of the vote is higher or lower than one standard 
                                                          
154
 Calculations are based on Table 4 in the article. 
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deviation) at a commensurable level as the percentage of rural population. 
Examining electoral mobilization in the Russian 2000 and 2004 presidential 
elections, Saikkonen (2015) included a dummy variable proxying electoral fraud via 
indicating observations in which both turnout and votes for the winning candidate 
exceed 90%. In this study, the percentage of non-Russian is shown to be the 
second-best predictor of turnout after the percentage of employed in agriculture, 
while results of the models with and without the variable of electoral fraud are also 
pretty much similar suggesting, thereby two possible explanations. First, this is 
evident that the threshold cuts off a tiny fraction of actually fraudulent data limited 
only to the observations of extreme fraud. Consequently, the results may show the 
effect of ethnicity on electoral fraud rather than on the sincere incumbent’s vote. 
Second, even though the sincere vote is not isolated from electoral fraud, the 
relationship between ethnicity and the sincere vote may be the same as the 
relationship between ethnicity and electoral fraud. In this case, using a more 
precise delimitation between electoral fraud and the sincere vote would confirm a 
similarity of the effects of ethnicity. 
Other studies that do not control for electoral fraud also find a positive 
association between ethnicity and voting for incumbency in Russia. Reisinger and 
Moraski (2009) constructed a measure of deference to the Kremlin consisting of 
regional shares of the vote for incumbent presidential candidates and State Duma 
parties loyal to the Kremlin, and turnout in these elections. The results of their 
study show that changes in deference to the Kremlin from 1995/96 to 2007/08 
were less likely observed in the regions with large percentage of ethnic Russians 
and that the effect of regional ethnic composition on deference to the Kremlin is 
significant only in the ethnic regions. Hale (2007) argues that governors of the 
ethnic regions have an additional patronage opportunity in delivering of club 
benefits to voters from their own ethnic group in exchange for their votes. He shows 
that the region’s constitutional status and the governor’s titular ethnicity increase 
the level of the vote for governor’s candidates in Russia’s 1999 single member 
district Duma election. This study, however, only assumes but not examines in 
detail the clientelist linkages – the possibility for governors to monitor the “ethnic 
vote” and to allocate ethnic rewards and punishments. It does also not test whether 
the governors’ candidates were the members of the regions’ dominant ethnic groups 
to treat such vote as “ethnic”. 
Contrary to the studies drawing their inferences from official electoral data, a 
study by Colton and Hale (2009) based on survey data finds no substantive effect of 
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ethnicity and religion on voting for Russian presidents from 1996 through 2008. 
The variable of Orthodox faith is significant only in determining the reported vote 
for Putin in 2004, whereas the variable of Russian ethnicity is insignificant in all 
election years. In a similar vein, no significant effect of religion and ethnic Russians 
on support for Putin’s policies was found by White and McAllister (2008) in the 
analysis of a 2008 survey. In their earlier survey-based study, White and McAllister 
(2003) did not use a variable of ethnicity to predict voting for Putin in the 2000 
presidential election. At the same time, they show that the probability of voting for 
Putin is slightly higher non-believers. Nevertheless, inasmuch as explanatory power 
of the models in both studies is small (8% and 2%, respectively) the authors point 
out that the Putin leadership has relatively weak roots in the society. The absence 
of confirmation of the effect of ethnicity and religion on political support for Putin 
and Medvedev in the survey-based studies may indicate that this effect is actual 
only for electoral fraud but not for the sincere incumbent’s vote. Alternatively, 
however, this finding may result from a bias in the sample: Chechnya and other 
most prominent non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox regions are typically 
bypassed by polling agencies.   
In this section, I employ the variable of sincere incumbent’s vote scrupulously 
developed in Chapter 4 and the Ethnoreligion Index, which accounts not only for the 
share of non-Russian population but also for the share of non-Christian Orthodox 
believers in the regions, and the interaction between them, in order to overcome 
measurement-related problems of the previous studies and examine the 
relationship between the regional ethno-religious identity and the sincere 
incumbent’s vote more properly.  
The set of other explanatory variables of sincere voting for the incumbent 
generally overlaps with explanations of electoral fraud presented in the prior section 
but expands beyond them. Additionally to the variables of social cleavages from the 
previous section – the percentage of rural residents and employed in agriculture, I 
use also the percentage of population over working age and the percentage of 
persons with higher education. The previous studies show mixed results with 
respect to the relationship of the latter two variables with electoral or policy support 
for the incumbent. These variables are either insignificant (Treisman 1999: Ch. 4; 
White and McAllister 2003) or age has a negative effect while education is 
insignificant (White and McAllister 2003; Colton and Hale 2009). The literature also 
diverges regarding the effect of urbanization, yet its differentiation is systematic. 
While the studies based on the official electoral data find a strong positive effect of 
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urbanization (White 2015; 2016), the survey-based studies find no significant effect 
(White and McAllister 2003; 2008) or a controversial effect of urbanization (Colton 
and Hale 2009). Accordingly, I do not have clear expectations regarding these 
variables except that their effects should not be strong.155 
The set of economic voting variables includes variables that appeared in the 
analysis earlier: per capita GRP, GRP growth, the percentage of unemployed and the 
percentage of people with income below the living minimum. According to the 
economic voting hypothesis (Fiorina 1981; Powell and Whitten 1993), I expect that 
these variables are positively associated with sincere voting for the incumbent. The 
level of GRP, however, may constitute an exception. Since elections in Putin’s times 
are not ordinary elections but elections under authoritarianism, the relationship 
may be determined by the modernization theory (Lipset 1959, Przeworski et al. 
2000). Namely, voters in more prosperous regions may claim more democracy and 
vote, therefore, against the authoritarian incumbent. 
As shown in Chapter 4, voters in practice receive their welfare from different 
sources. While economies of one group of regions are self-sufficient, the other group 
of regions cannot meet their ends without external donations, they are net 
recipients of federal transfers. As also argued in this chapter, regional authorities 
may channel the federal money to either elites in order to buy their loyalty 
signalized via electoral fraud and other authoritarian practices or masses in order 
to secure their genuine political support translated into sincere voting for the 
incumbent. To account for patronage voting, I employ variables of the share of 
transfers in the budget, per capita social spending, the percentage of employed in 
education, and the money per person employed in education. The variable of social 
spending includes expenditures of consolidated regional budgets on education, 
healthcare, and social policy, thereby, it accounts for the spending broadly targeted 
at voters.156 The per capita monetary allocations to the employed in education and 
the size of the sphere of education also account for social spending but in a more 
detailed manner. If a phenomenon of patronage voting takes place, all these 
variables are expected to be positively associated with the incumbent’s vote. 
 
                                                          
155
 The data on the percentage of persons with higher education in election years 2000 and 2004 come from 
the national census of 2002 (available at: http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/doc/TOM_03_03.xls). For election 
years 2008 and 2012 I use the data of the national census of 2010 summarised by Rosstat (2013). 
156
 The data on expenditures on “socio-cultural activities” come from Rosstat (various years). 
  
2
4
6
 
 
T
a
b
le
 6
.5
. 
M
u
lt
il
e
v
e
l 
m
o
d
e
ls
 e
x
p
la
in
in
g
 t
h
e
 s
in
ce
re
 i
n
cu
m
b
e
n
t’
s
 v
o
te
 i
n
 2
0
0
0
–2
0
1
2
, 
fi
x
e
d
 e
ff
e
c
ts
 
D
V
: 
S
in
c
e
re
 I
n
c
u
m
b
e
n
t’
s
 
V
o
te
, 
%
 
B
iv
a
ri
a
te
 
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
 
F
u
ll
 M
o
d
e
l 
F
u
ll
 M
o
d
e
l 
w
/
o
 
E
th
n
ic
it
y
  
S
o
c
ia
l 
C
le
a
v
a
g
e
s
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
ic
 
V
o
ti
n
g
 
P
a
tr
o
n
a
g
e
 
V
o
ti
n
g
 
B
e
s
t 
M
o
d
e
l 
B
e
s
t 
M
o
d
e
l 
w
/
o
 
E
th
n
ic
it
y
 
C
o
n
s
ta
n
t 
 
6
8
.3
3
2
**
* 
(8
.9
5
) 
8
1
.1
2
2
**
* 
(1
0
.8
4
) 
5
3
.8
1
8
**
* 
(1
2
.9
1
) 
6
2
.1
4
9
**
* 
(1
5
.8
1
) 
4
9
.0
4
4
**
* 
(1
0
.3
4
) 
7
6
.9
7
6
**
* 
(1
8
.8
) 
7
2
.7
2
3
4
**
* 
(1
3
.9
1
) 
E
th
n
o
re
li
g
io
n
 I
n
d
e
x
 
.1
5
4
**
* 
(.
0
5
3
) 
.1
3
9
2
**
* 
(4
.0
) 
 
.1
7
3
4
**
* 
(5
.9
3
) 
 
 
.1
1
9
2
**
* 
(5
.4
2
) 
 
L
o
g
 P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 O
v
e
r 
W
o
rk
in
g
 A
g
e
, 
%
 
.0
5
**
* 
(.
0
1
8
) 
.2
1
0
9
 
(1
.2
7
) 
-.
1
6
8
2
 
(-
1
.1
4
) 
.3
3
4
4
**
* 
(2
.7
8
) 
 
 
 
 
H
ig
h
e
r 
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
, 
%
 
.0
4
**
* 
(-
.0
4
9
) 
-.
4
6
0
9
**
* 
(-
2
.7
8
) 
-.
3
1
6
5
**
 
(-
2
.0
9
) 
-.
4
0
5
**
* 
(-
3
.0
1
) 
 
 
-.
4
8
9
9
**
* 
(-
3
.2
1
) 
-.
3
2
5
5
* 
(-
1
.7
8
) 
R
u
ra
l 
R
e
s
id
e
n
ts
, 
%
 
.0
5
2
* 
(.
0
1
1
) 
.0
0
9
4
 
(.
1
6
) 
.0
2
4
4
 
(.
3
8
) 
.0
8
1
* 
(1
.7
4
) 
 
 
 
 
E
m
p
lo
y
e
d
 i
n
 A
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
re
, 
%
 
.0
3
4
 
(.
0
0
4
) 
-.
2
4
2
2
**
 
(-
2
.2
7
) 
-.
2
3
8
7
**
 
(-
2
.3
1
) 
-.
3
3
1
6
**
* 
(-
2
.8
) 
 
 
-.
2
7
5
**
* 
(-
3
.5
8
) 
-0
.2
4
6
7
**
* 
(-
2
.7
6
) 
L
o
g
 G
R
P
 p
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
, 
R
U
B
 
-.
0
4
1
* 
(.
0
4
7
) 
-5
.7
e
-5
**
 
(-
2
.2
6
) 
-6
.6
e
-5
**
 
(-
2
.4
4
) 
 
-2
.3
e
-5
**
* 
(-
2
.6
7
) 
 
-4
.1
e
-5
**
* 
(-
3
.0
5
) 
-3
.8
e
-5
**
* 
(-
2
.7
9
) 
G
R
P
 g
ro
w
th
, 
%
 
.0
3
3
**
* 
(.
1
3
3
) 
.2
9
5
3
* 
(1
.6
8
) 
.3
3
9
4
**
 
(2
.1
3
) 
 
.4
1
9
2
**
* 
(3
.3
5
) 
 
.4
1
9
4
**
* 
(2
.3
5
) 
.4
5
9
3
**
* 
(2
.6
) 
L
o
g
 U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
m
e
n
t,
 %
 
.0
4
2
 
(-
.0
6
7
) 
.0
2
3
8
 
(.
1
3
) 
-.
0
4
8
2
 
(-
.2
6
) 
 
.2
4
1
4
* 
(1
.6
9
) 
 
 
 
B
e
lo
w
 L
iv
in
g
 M
in
im
u
m
, 
%
 
.0
0
0
 
(-
.0
0
3
) 
-.
1
6
1
3
**
 
(-
2
.5
7
) 
-.
1
9
0
4
**
* 
(-
2
.6
3
) 
 
-.
0
9
3
4
**
 
(-
2
.1
3
) 
 
-.
1
2
9
2
**
* 
(-
3
.5
2
) 
-.
1
3
1
5
**
* 
(-
3
.1
4
) 
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
T
ra
n
s
fe
rs
 i
n
 t
h
e
 
B
u
d
g
e
t,
 %
 
.0
5
2
 
(.
0
1
3
) 
-.
0
3
9
7
 
(-
1
.1
4
) 
-.
0
3
8
7
 
(-
1
.0
8
) 
 
 
-.
0
1
5
6
 
(-
.4
7
) 
 
 
L
o
g
 S
o
c
ia
l 
S
p
e
n
d
in
g
 p
e
r 
C
a
p
it
a
, 
R
U
B
 
.0
4
6
 
(.
0
3
2
) 
3
.8
e
-5
 
(.
9
3
) 
4
.1
e
-5
 
(.
9
1
) 
 
 
-8
.8
e
-5
 
(-
1
.6
3
) 
 
 
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
 E
m
p
lo
y
e
d
, 
%
 
.0
8
9
**
* 
(.
0
2
9
) 
.1
5
7
6
 
(.
7
5
) 
.3
6
8
4
* 
(1
.6
9
) 
 
 
.7
3
2
8
**
* 
(3
.5
2
) 
 
.5
2
2
7
**
 
(2
.4
2
) 
L
o
g
 M
o
n
e
y
 p
e
r 
P
e
rs
o
n
 i
n
 
E
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
, 
R
U
B
 
.0
3
9
 
(.
0
0
4
) 
1
.4
e
-5
 
(1
.4
4
) 
9
.5
e
-6
 
(.
8
3
) 
 
 
2
.9
e
-5
* 
(1
.6
7
) 
 
 
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
 b
y
 r
a
n
d
o
m
  
a
n
d
 (
fi
x
e
d
) 
e
ff
e
c
ts
 
 
.3
8
1
 
(.
3
7
6
) 
.3
0
6
 
(.
3
2
8
) 
.2
6
3
 
(.
0
7
2
) 
.0
9
6
 
(.
1
1
9
) 
.1
5
9
 
(.
0
7
) 
.2
9
3
 
(.
1
5
9
) 
.2
1
2
 
(.
1
7
4
) 
A
n
a
lo
g
u
e
 o
f 
th
e
 W
h
it
e
 T
e
s
t 
 
1
.5
e
-6
 
1
.8
e
-6
 
2
.2
e
-1
1
 
1
.6
e
-5
 
3
.8
e
-6
 
8
.5
e
-6
 
3
.5
e
-6
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
o
b
s
. 
b
y
 Y
e
a
r 
M
in
im
u
m
 –
 8
0
; 
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 –
 8
1
.5
; 
M
a
x
im
u
m
: 
8
3
 
T
o
ta
l 
N
 o
f 
o
b
s
. 
3
2
6
 
N
o
te
: 
S
e
e
 c
o
m
m
e
n
ts
 t
o
 T
a
b
le
 6
.2
 f
o
r 
d
e
ta
il
s
. 
S
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
t 
a
t:
 *
p
 <
 0
.1
, 
**
p
 <
 0
.0
5
, 
**
*p
 <
 0
.0
1
.
  
247 
 
The results of the bivariate multilevel models presented in Table 6.5 indicate 
that there is only two relevant predictors of the incumbent’s sincere vote – the 
regional ethno-religious identity (r.e. R2 = 0.154) and the percentage employed in 
the sphere of education (r.e. R2 = 0.089). Other variables as single predictors do not 
explain more than five percent of the variance. There are six statistically significant 
variables in the full model that also remain significant in other models. The 
strongest of them – the Ethnoreligion Index – is also the best predictor of the 
authentic incumbent’s vote in other models. The positive relationship suggests that 
non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox social groups apparently constitute a 
sizable electoral base of the incumbent. This result is in accordance with the finding 
by White (2015) that the United Russia’s regional support in the parliamentary 
elections of 2003–2011 is concentrated in the regions with high percentage of titular 
ethnic minorities, even in the absence of electoral fraud (White 2016). The results of 
the analysis of the sincere incumbent’s vote, however, diverge with the second main 
finding by White (2015; 2016) that the incumbent is supported more in the 
countryside. The percentage of rural residents, which is used in her analysis, is 
only marginally significant in the social cleavages model. Instead, the percentage of 
employed in agriculture (an alternative to urbanization though not exact measure of 
the countryside)157 has a relatively strong and negative effect on the authentic 
incumbent’s vote in all models. It should be noted, however, that this negative effect 
appears only in combination with other variables; the percentage of employed in 
agriculture has no independent significant effect on the authentic incumbent’s vote.  
Other socioeconomic variables generally have expected effects. An interesting 
finding from Table 6.5 is that higher education is negatively associated with sincere 
voting for authoritarianism. It is not surprising, therefore, that authoritarian 
leaders are not interested in highly educated citizens, especially in Russia, where 
permanent “reforms” of education pursue the goal to “nurture a qualified 
consumer” instead of a “human-creator”.158 Regional per capita GRP is also 
                                                          
157
 The measure of employed in agriculture implies that the rural area not only exists but is also used for 
agriculture. Therefore, it may diverge from the percentage of rural residents. For example, as of 2012, 60.1% 
(2.3 standard deviations above the mean) of Ingushetia’s population lived in the rural area, yet only 8.3% (0.5 
SD below the mean) of them were employed in agriculture.  
158
 Andrei Fursenko, the minister of science and education of the Russian Federation in 2004–2012 known as 
the initiator of the reduction in the number of universities, the proponent of a new federal educational 
standard according to which lessons "Russia in the World", "Fundamentals of Life Safety", and physical training 
but not physics, chemistry, biology or a foreign language to be mandatory for all school children, and also one 
of  the curators of the education cooperation program with the European University Institute under which this 
dissertation is written, said at a pro-regime youth forum on Seliger in 2007 that “the shortcoming of the Soviet 
education system was an attempt to form a human-creator but now the task is to nurture a qualified consumer 
who can skillfully use the results of the creativity of others” (Fursenko 2013). 
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negatively related to the sincere incumbent’s vote. This result is in line with 
economic development theory suggesting that high income is disadvantageous for 
authoritarianism. The positive effect GRP growth supports the theory of economic 
voting in authoritarian settings: economic growth is favorable to electoral support 
for authoritarian leaders. In accordance with economic voting theory, the 
percentage of people with income below the living minimum also has a negative 
effect on sincere voting for the incumbent. It must be underlined again, however, 
that these effects should be viewed with some degree of caution since they emerge 
only in multivariate models. Even though significant, the socioeconomic variables 
explain relatively small shares of variance: 14.4% in the social cleavages model 
without the Ethnoreligion Index, 9.6% in the economic explanations model, and 
20.9% in the best model without Ethnoreligion Index and the percentage of 
employed in education. 
In the full model without the Ethnoreligion Index, the effects of explanatory 
variables are mainly not altered with exception of the percentage of employed in 
education. The variable’s coefficient becomes significant, though only marginally, if 
regional ethno-religious identity is not controlled for. Similarly, the size of education 
is significant in two other models without the Ethnoreligion Index. In this relation, 
the most important result is that the multilevel models do not find support for the 
hypothesis on patronage voting. Although the variables of size and monetary 
expenditures to education are significant in the patronage voting model, the share 
of transfers in the budget and per capita social spending in the budget have no 
significant effect on the sincere vote for the incumbent throughout all models. 
The marginal effects produced by 5th – 95th percentile changes in the variables of 
the best model are equal about to five percent. As the Ethnoreligion Index shifts 
from its 5th percentile to the 95th percentile, the sincere incumbent’s vote increases 
by 6.6%, the percentage of people with higher education decreases it by 4.4%, as 
well as do it regional economic development (ME = -6.7%), the percentage of people 
with income below the living minimum (ME = -3.5%), and the percentage of 
employed in agriculture (ME = -6.1%), whereas economic growth makes the 
authentic incumbent’s vote larger by 4.2%.  
Since it was found in the previous section that the level of electoral fraud is 
higher in the ethnic regions, it can be asserted that the effect of the Ethnoreligion 
Index on the sincere incumbent’s vote is substantively spurious and results from 
erroneous nature of the dependent variable, namely, that it still contains a 
  
249 
 
considerable portion of electoral fraud along with the variation of the sincere vote. 
This question can be addressed toward the effects of other variables also but the 
commonality of the effect of ethno-religious concerns between the models of 
electoral fraud and the sincere incumbent’s vote is the most remarkable and, 
therefore, the most suspicious. Such doubts have theoretical grounds. As was 
theorized in Chapter 4 and empirically shown in its section “Adjusted QR Estimate”, 
the quantitative estimate of the authentic incumbent’s vote tends to be 
indiscriminant between the authentic vote and fraud at high levels of fraud. That is, 
when electoral data are heavily distorted by fraud, the initial share of the vote 
becomes undefinable, while the adjusted QR estimate approaches to the official 
share of the vote. As a consequence, even the adjusted QR estimate may contain 
some share of fraud in the regions with high levels of electoral forgery, the regions 
that turn out to be “ethnic regions”. In Appendix F4, I run auxiliary models that 
show that the positive relationship exists only at high levels of the Ethnoreligion 
Index and the sincere incumbent’s vote.  
This may occur for two reasons. First, high values of the sincere incumbent’s 
vote (> 60%) can be overestimated (too high) because of overwhelming influence of 
fraud. Second, the level of sincere incumbent’s support can be in fact higher in the 
strongly ethnic regions. To test which one of these suppositions is true, I run 
auxiliary models gradually deleting observations with large amount of electoral 
fraud measured by the mean cluster of fraud in the region. If highly fraudulent 
observations are deleted, the effect of the Ethnoreligion Index actually weakens and 
eventually becomes insignificant, yet this occurs only after several other variables 
have lost their significance. This implies that the sincere incumbent’s vote is in 
effect somewhat higher in strongly non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox 
regions irrespectively of the fraud-related error in the dependent variable. At any 
rate, we should keep in mind that the relationship between regional ethno-religious 
identity and the sincere voting for the incumbent is not monotonic and not constant 
over time. It does not exist in the election year of 2000, it exists only at high levels 
of the sincere incumbent’s vote (> 65%) in 2004 and 2008, and, surprisingly, the 
relationship is monotonic within the entire range of observations and relatively 
strong (bivariate OLS model’s R2 = 0.312) in 2012 (see Appendix F4). 
To conclude this section, the most important finding is that the analysis of the 
sincere incumbent’s vote does not find support for the hypothesis on patronage 
voting. Sincere voting for the incumbent is explained by a combination of 
socioeconomic variables, which have theoretically expected effects on the vote, and 
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by regional ethno-religious identity – regions with high shares of non-Russian and 
non-Christian Orthodox populations demonstrate stronger sincere electoral support 
for the incumbent. However, these results should be viewed with some reasonable 
degree of caution inasmuch as statistically and substantively perceptible effects of 
socioeconomic variables appear only in multivariate models, while the effect of 
ethno-religious identity, even though it withstands several robustness tests, is not 
monotonic in election years 2004 and 2008 and not significant in 2000.The latter 
finding is only in partial correspondence with the previous research suggesting that 
once the variable of the official incumbent’s vote is adjusted by the amount of 
electoral fraud in a more accurate manner, the relationship between the regional 
ethno-religious identity and sincere voting for the incumbent turns out to be not as 
strong as the previous research suggests. More broadly speaking, the strict 
differentiation between electoral fraud and the sincere vote allows to conclude that 
the regional ethno-religious identity influences electoral fraud to a much greater 
extent than it affects sincere voting for the incumbent. In other words, the high level 
of the officially reported incumbent’s vote in the ethnic regions is the result of 
electoral fraud perpetrated by the ethnic elites rather than the outcome of genuine 
popular support by ethnic minorities. These two different effects of the ethno-
religious identity were amalgamated in the previous studies that were incapable of 
distinguishing them without having precise instruments of election forensics.  
Conclusion 
This chapter provides the evidence on political consequences of distributive politics 
under electoral authoritarianism. The analysis of consumption of federal transfers 
has shown that, as the authoritarian regime progresses over, time the state 
bureaucracy as a part of the elite clientelist coalition begins to divert more transfer 
money in its own favor compared with that for teachers and doctors as members of 
the mass patronage coalition. This contrasts with the situation of the early 2000s 
when transfer funds in regional budgets were consumed in roughly equal 
proportions by the elite and the general public. It has also been shown that the 
politicized central transfers in combination with spending to the regional 
bureaucracy determine electoral fraud, persecution of the media and generally have 
a detrimental impact on the level of political and civil liberties in Russia’s regions. 
That is, distributive politics and authoritarian practices perpetrated by political 
elites appear to be interdependent creating, thereby, a vicious circle of authoritarian 
political economy. On the demand side, authoritarian incumbents strive to improve 
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their electoral performance and to secure loyalty of political elites by means of the 
central transfers allocated to the regions conditionally on election results. On the 
supply side, regional elites signal their loyalty in order to receive larger transfers by 
providing electoral fraud, repression of the opposition, persecution of the media and 
other intrinsically authoritarian practices that bias the electoral playing field in 
favor of the incumbent. 
In line with previous studies, the analysis in this chapter has detected a strong 
effect of regional ethno-religious characteristics on electoral fraud. However, in this 
study, I argue that ethnicity matters in determining fraud not by facilitating 
monitoring of the ethnic vote (Hale 2007), since the analysis of electoral fraud in 
Chapter 4 has shown that vote buying and voter coercion are relatively rare 
practices in the Russian presidential elections compared with deliberate vote 
miscount. For the same reason, voter mobilization through ethnic networks (White 
2016: 1134) is especially irrelevant in the ethnic regions, where extreme levels of 
electoral fraud indicate that electoral data are not of real-world but rather of fully 
artificial origin. Ethnicity does also not matter through “the [United Russia] party’s 
capacity to engage in reliable patronage-based relationships, where the party 
delivers political and economic benefits in exchange for the delivery of electoral 
support” (White 2016: 1134) so long as United Russia does generally not distribute 
any sizable amount of goods to votes neither in the form of patronage, nor in the 
form of vote buying, irrespectively of ethnicity. The analysis of sincere incumbent’s 
vote did also not find support for the hypothesis put forward by Bader and Van 
Ham (2015: 524) that “electoral manipulation is simply more needed in these [non-
Russian] regions as genuine political support is lacking”. Voters’ identity in non-
Russian and non-Christian Orthodox regions has rather a slightly positive impact 
on the genuine vote for the incumbent.  
Instead, the results of this chapter imply that, first, not the dominant regional 
ethnicity and religion matter for determining electoral fraud but particularly 
political elites that govern non-Russian and non-Christian Orthodox regions. 
Regional political elites and their local agents are personally and primarily 
responsible for perpetration of electoral fraud and other substantively authoritarian 
practices. Second, the regional ethno-religious characteristics do not have an effect 
independently of the central transfers but these variables are inextricably 
interrelated. Namely, when Putin came to power, the federal center reached an 
agreement with the ethnic regions, which were formerly in opposition to the center, 
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that they will be rewarded by larger central payments for their loyalty. And these 
regions turned into main suppliers of electoral fraud for the incumbent. 
Finally, contrary to theoretical expectations, the analysis of the sincere 
incumbent’s vote has provided no empirical evidence of patronage voting. First, the 
analysis of consumption of federal transfers has shown that political leaders prefer 
to deliver benefits to political elites in expense of voters under consolidated electoral 
authoritarianism. At the first glance, there is no obvious rationale of why 
authoritarian incumbents prefer elite loyalty over mass loyalty. Elites can falsify 
election results as well as voters can vote for the incumbent. Discontented elites 
can challenge the incumbent in elections or arrange a coup d’état. Disaffected 
voters can similarly vote against the incumbent or depose him in a “color 
revolution”.  
To disentangle this puzzle, assume that political leaders are typically risk-
averse, meaning, in particular, that they minimize the strongest potential threat to 
their rule in the first place. If this threat comes from the side of masses in the form 
of popular protest or a low level of electoral support and elites cannot credibly 
eliminate this threat by means of electoral fraud and repression, the incumbent has 
a strong incentive to resort to distributing benefits in the form of patronage in order 
to pacify the masses. If the threat comes from the side of the elites and masses 
cannot credibly neutralize it by strong incumbent’s support, the incumbent has 
more incentives to distribute more benefits toward the elites. In reality, however, 
these “pure” types of conflict are relatively rare but the threats come simultaneously 
from both sides. Yet the threat-neutralizing potential of masses looks much more 
modest than the threat-neutralizing potential of elites. While loyal police and 
military forces can easily suppress popular demonstrations in most of cases, to 
prevent an elite’s attempt to overthrow the dictator in a coup d’état, for example, the 
genuine dictator’s popular support should be high to such an extent that members 
of the elite to be convinced that they will be torn to pieces or at least ousted abroad 
by indignant crowds, even if the coup will be successful. Few dictators or none at 
all, taking into consideration their routinely terroristic methods of governance 
applied against the society, can deserve such popular allegiance. Therefore, the 
most common situation, as Svolik (2012: 5) notes, is that “the predominant political 
conflict in dictatorships appears to be not between the ruling elite and the masses 
but rather among regime insiders.” Highlighting the importance of conflict between 
regime insiders having the access to state spoils and outsiders that are “left to 
languish in the wilderness”, Bratton and Van de Walle (1994: 464) also point out 
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that former regime insiders pose a serious threat to leaders of neopatrimonial 
regimes: “it is striking how commonly opposition in Africa today is led by former 
insiders who have fallen out of official favor.” Thus, by the nature of 
authoritarianism, political leaders are primarily motivated to distribute benefits to 
the elites in order to secure their loyalty. 
Second, not only does the incumbent distributes less benefits to voters but it 
also follows from the analysis that these benefits do not entail sincere voting for the 
incumbent. This result raises a conceptual question. What does explain sincere 
voting for the incumbent under electoral authoritarianism? The socioeconomic 
correlates that demonstrated significant effects on the genuine incumbent’s vote in 
this chapter might potentially give an answer. However, they can neither 
quantitatively nor substantively account for incumbency survival. While electoral 
fraud varies from 2.0% (the 5th percentile) to 22.2% (the 95th percentile) in 2000–
2012 and the variables of clientelism do a good job in explaining this variance and 
the substantive meaning of the effect is also not dubious: if the system of material 
rewarding for political loyalty is dismantled, the ethnic regions will more likely 
perpetrate fraud against the central incumbent and revive the practices of ethnic 
separatism, the sincere incumbent’s vote varies, accordingly, from 49.4% to 67.7% 
and its determinants can explain only some share of variance in between. That is, 
the variance of the sincere incumbent’s vote never approaches the level of electoral 
defeat. Substantively, the most socioeconomic variables cannot be manipulated by 
the incumbent as easily as the variables of clientelism. 
Thus, sincere voting for the incumbent still remains puzzling under electoral 
authoritarianism. As an avenue for further research, I offer a possible solution to 
the puzzle in Appendix F6 by looking at the problem from another perspective. 
Trying to explain electoral behavior in a spectrum of political regimes from electoral 
democracies to electoral authoritarianism, scholars for more than fifty years employ 
the notions of patronage and clientelism the origins of which trace back to Ancient 
Rome. Emphasizing the ability of modern-day patrons to secure loyalty of their 
clients via various material benefits, researchers disregard, however, the fact that 
Roman emperors secured loyalty of masses by a combination of stimuli known as 
“bread and circuses”. In Appendix F6, I strive to fill this gap by bringing “circuses” 
back into the explanatory model. With respect to findings of this study, it is no 
exaggeration to say that, in the combination of “bread and circuses”, Putin’s regime 
keeps voters on a starvation ration but generously shows various “circuses” on 
television, whereas nearly all “bread” is transferred to political elites. 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this dissertation, I have argued that authoritarian incumbents gain and retain 
power through a combination of various legal and illegal practices, including 
electoral fraud, persecution of the mass media, and repression of opposition forces. 
At the same time, distributive politics is a key to understanding electoral 
authoritarian dominance. Not only have authoritarian incumbents to distribute 
benefits to voters, as their democratic counterparts have to do, but they must also 
invest in political elites to secure their loyalty, which is subsequently converted into 
various authoritarian policy outcomes that allow authoritarian leaders to stay in 
power and to maintain the regime. This argument has been tested using the data 
from Russian regions with especial focus on electoral fraud as an intrinsic 
inextricable element of authoritarian politics and the allocation of the federal 
transfers as an element of distributive politics. The final part of the dissertation 
discusses the main theoretical findings in the context of the existing theories of 
authoritarian dominance. 
The Role of Electoral Fraud under Electoral Authoritarianism 
The quantitative examination of the extent of electoral fraud in the Russian 2012 
presidential election has shown that, in line with theoretical predictions for electoral 
authoritarianism, falsification of the vote in favor of the incumbent was widespread 
but generally not outcome-changing. However, conditions surrounding the 
perpetration of electoral fraud and its consequences pose several theoretical 
challenges. Magaloni (2006: Ch. 8) argues that uncertainty about the extent of 
electoral fraud impelled moderate PRI’s opponents to abstain from post-electoral 
protests and to abandon those opposition parties that were engaged in post-
electoral battles, thereby legitimizing the PRI’s dominance. The Russian experience 
of post-electoral protests in 2011–2012, however, shows that though public 
awareness of electoral forgery appeared as a result of the electoral oversight 
undertaken by thousands of electoral observers indeed triggered large-scale mass 
protests, which lasted throughout the period between the parliamentary and the 
presidential elections, the scale of protests quickly came to naught as soon as the 
voters and the opposition activists learned from the copies of polling station 
protocols that Putin could have won even without resorting to fraud.  
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Moreover, the Russian case may be deemed a natural experiment that shows a 
crucial difference in the scope of protest between nearly/or outcome-changing 
fraud, as occurred in the parliamentary election of 2011, when United Russia 
received 34.3 percent of the vote on average, 32.5% in Moscow, was defeated by 
Just Russia in Saint Petersburg and Novgorod Oblast (having received 26.2% 
versus 29.2% and 28.7% versus 31.3%, respectively) and by KPRF in 
Nizhegorodskaya Oblast (23.7% vs. 34.8%)159, and fraud at the margin in the 
presidential election of 2012, when Putin’s official  vote share (63.6%) was not much 
larger than reported by electoral observers – 54.3% (Combined Protocol 2012), 
51.3% (SMS-CIK 2012) and both exceeded fifty-percent threshold. In the first case 
(nearly/or outcome-changing fraud coupled with public awareness), electoral fraud 
had engendered a strong wave of post-electoral protest. In the second case (fraud at 
the margin coupled with public awareness), this wave had crashed against the 
rocks of futility. Hence, even if the uncertainty about the scope of electoral fraud 
hinders post-electoral protests, mass awareness of the electoral fraud does not 
necessarily translate into protest. It happens only in that case, when the voters 
perceive the incumbent as vulnerable to electoral defeat. Conversely, mass 
awareness of the real election outcome may negatively influence the propensity to 
protest if voters learn from trustworthy electoral monitoring that the incumbent had 
won with a huge margin and that electoral fraud had only bolstered an already 
impressive victory.  
This evidence partially contradicts Simpser (2013: 24–26) who argues that “color 
revolutions” typically follow after marginal electoral manipulation, and that blatant 
and excessive electoral manipulation conveys the message to the public that the 
manipulator is strong. For a more precise prediction, at least three variables 
influencing the probability of protest should be considered: 1) information, 2) the 
amount of fraud, and 3) the level of true vote.160 Indeed, the “color revolutions” in 
the post-Soviet area were preceded by relatively small-scale electoral manipulations. 
But the levels of electoral support for the incumbent candidates as well as their 
margins of victory were also small, indicating that the elections were highly 
competitive and the incumbents were vulnerable. We, however, hardly find any 
support for Simpser’s argument if we hypothetically test it on the Russian empirics 
                                                          
159
 Calculations are based on RuElect (2011). 
160
 In his cross-country analysis Simpser (2013: Ch. 7.3) controls only for the margin of victory by defining an 
election as “excessively manipulated” if the margin of victory was at least 20 percent. According to this 
definition, the State Duma 2011 election was evidently manipulated excessively in so far as United Russia’s 
margin of victory over the Communist Party was equal to 30.1 percent. 
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by imagining that the Central Electoral Commission would have reported not 49.3 
percent but 79.3 or 99.3 percent of United Russia’s vote, keeping all other 
conditions constant, i.e., the mass public awareness of the degree of fraud and the 
true vote equaling to slightly more than thirty percent. Such a situation would have 
presumably resulted in an even more widespread protest since the voters’ 
resentment would have been driven by a much larger number of their votes being 
stolen by the incumbent party.  
Explaining the reasons why authoritarian leaders resort to electoral fraud 
beyond a simple winning of elections, scholars ordinarily underline the capacity of 
fraud to generate a popular “image of invincibility” (Magaloni 2006), to convey an 
“image of strength” to other political actors (Simpser 2013) or to [positively] 
influence the bureaucrat’s perception of the citizen’s support for the incumbent in 
order to neutralize bureaucratic efforts on ousting the leader (Gehlbach and 
Simpser 2015). Nearly no previous research asserts that electoral manipulations are 
almost inevitable under authoritarianism by the nature of the regime itself. A 
noticeable exception, however, is the study of Rundlett and Svolik (2016) who argue 
that “overwhelming incumbent victories are the unintended byproduct of the 
principal-agent and collective action problems in the political organization of 
electoral fraud” (p. 182). Specifically, individual agents are most willing to 
perpetrate fraud in a situation of the least potential costs of this action – when the 
incumbent is genuinely popular and the probability of criminal prosecution if the 
challenger were to win the election is accordingly small. Although the general 
intuition of this approach is correct – authoritarian regime supporters commonly 
tend to defect when they anticipate a defeat of the incumbent, it assumes too much 
freedom for local agents.  
On the one hand, local agents (regional elites in my terminology) are not totally 
manageable by the incumbent because they have their own interests and their own 
capacity to perpetrate fraud. Their interests may indeed sometimes diverge from the 
incumbent’s interests (as the authors show) but may also be strictly conditional on 
regime survival and, therefore, strongly tied with the incumbent’s interests. Those 
local actors who are engaged in electoral fraud the most (such actors are typically 
engaged in corruption and other criminal practices as well) cannot simply defect to 
the opposition even when the regime is beginning to disintegrate (they can but only 
if a new criminal authoritarian government is assumed). They cannot also refrain 
from perpetrating fraud if they want to evade prosecution for their prior crimes if 
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the challenger will win161. The second reason of why the extent of electoral fraud is 
not totally manageable by the incumbent is the variable capacity of regional elites to 
perpetrate fraud. Even if a governor wants to please the incumbent with the highest 
vote share in his region, this intention will produce null result if the bureaucracy, 
including electoral commissions, is impartial, observers of the opposition monitor 
elections, and the media and courts are independent. This crucial element is 
missing in Rundlett and Svolik’s model.  
On the other hand, the incumbent’s control over local agents is provided by 
means of material inducements and repression. According to Rundlett and Svolik’s 
model, “an agent who delivers 70% where the incumbent was expected to receive 
only 50% of the vote is rewarded more than one who delivers 90%” (p. 189). This 
theoretical expectation is not confirmed by empirical research. To the best of my 
knowledge, no inversed u-shaped relationship between central transfers and 
election results has been found in the literature. The analysis of federal transfers in 
this study has also shown that the allocation of funds was in a linear dependence 
from the incumbent’s vote in Putin’s era.162 Rather than lesser perceived potential 
costs of fraud related to the level of Putin’s genuine popularity163, a broader flow of 
federal transfers toward Mordovia (the share of transfers in the budget in 2012 = 
55.6%), Dagestan (STB = 77.2%) and Tuva (STB = 79.4%) has induced elites of 
these regions to falsify more votes for Putin in 2012 (the difference between the 
offical and the estimated vote share amounts to 25.0%, 27.5%, and 27.1%, 
respectively) compared with Perm Krai, Irkutsk Oblast and Tomsk Oblast, where 
the STB and the amount of fraud are equal respectively to: 11.7, 14.8, and 19.8 
percent and 1.0, 2.2, and 2.4 percent.  
If Kremlin’s political strategists had considered that the excessive level of fraud 
threatens their dominance, they would have reduced (or just hinted to reduce) 
funding of these regions. Alternatively, if the system of economic rewards fails to 
achieve the result, authoritarian incumbents may resort to various legal and illegal 
                                                          
161
 Rundlett and Svolik (2016) assume that the new government will forgive all crimes of the regime 
functionaries. Sometimes it can take place, especially if regime transition is initiated, negotiated and controlled 
by the ruling elite (examples are Post-Soviet and other top-down or “pacted” (O’Donnel and Schmitter 1986: 
Ch. 4) transitions). In the most of cases this assumption is, however, not held since the elites find themselves to 
be at risk under a new regime.    
162
 Due to skewness of distributions, the relationship for transfers measured in rubles and transfers per capita is 
exponential, yet it is not u-shaped. 
163
 Rundlett and Svolik (2016: 181) atheoretically assume that agents infer the level of incumbent’s genuine 
popularity, which influences the probability of incumbent’s victory or defeat in national elections and 
accordingly their chances for reward or punishment, from their own precincts but not from nationwide results 
of previous elections, public polls or media messages at the national level. 
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tools of repression, including dismissal of members of election commissions, 
removal of governors from office (in 2005–2011 when gubernatorial elections were 
canceled) or rejection of governor’s candidacy by United Russia (2011– ), sudden 
arrests and criminal litigations164 (special services usually collect sensitive 
information on most of relevant politicians and officials, furthermore, reliable 
evidence is not necessary for conviction by corrupted courts), blackmail or 
assassination as the last resort. Therefore, the degree of freedom of local agents, 
who can deliberately undersupply or oversupply fraud, is largely exaggerated in 
Rundlett and Svolik’s model. 
The role of bureaucrats as the ruler’s agents is also misleadingly interpreted by 
Gehlbach and Simpser (2015). They argue that electoral manipulation can help 
rulers to solve the problem of bureaucratic compliance by influencing bureaucrats’ 
perceptions of the incumbent’s popular support. This formulation, however, 
contains a high degree of endogeneity since the ruler cannot manipulate elections 
personally and independently of the bureaucracy, and therefore, not only electoral 
fraud may influence the bureaucrats’ perceptions of the ruler’s strength but the 
bureaucracy is also largely involved in perpetrating electoral fraud.165 For this 
reason, excessive fraud is unlikely committed to convince the bureaucracy or 
region-level elites more broadly that the incumbent’s hold on power is secure. The 
informational effect of fraud on elites’ propensity to rebellion is rather indirect. So 
far as regional elites and the bureaucracy are widely engaged in the process of 
electoral forgery, they do not perceive huge incumbent’s vote margins as an 
indicator of his popular support (as it is assumed by Gehlbach and Simpser) but 
                                                          
164
 The most notable event occurred on 18 September 2015 when the governor of Komi Republic Vyacheslav 
Geizer together with other 18 top regional officials and businessmen, including Deputy Governor A. Chernov, 
Chairman of the State Council of Komi Republic I. Kovzel, Deputy Chairman of the Komi government K. 
Romadanov, and businessmen A. Zarubin and V. Veselov, were detained and taken to Moscow. Central 
television showed how a lock box with money, a one-million dollar wristwatch, and registration certificates of 
offshore companies were found in Geizer’s office during the search (NTV 2015). Geizer and colleagues were 
arrested and accused of creation of a criminal community, which acted over ten years, and fraud with the 
estimated loss to the budget of over 3.5 billion rubles (about 50 million U.S. dollars). The principal activity of 
the group is asserted to be money laundering from privatization of state property (Azar 2015; Bnkomi 2017).  
Overall, five governors were arrested from 2015 to 2017. The governor of Sakhalin Oblast Alexander 
Khoroshavin was detained on 4 March 2015 and accused of taking a bribe of $5.6 million. The governor of 
Kirovaskaya Oblast Nikita Belych was detained on 24 June 2016 during taking a bribe of 400,000 euro. 
Governors of Udmurtia (Alexander Solovyov on 4 April 2017) and Mari El (Leonid Markelov on 13 April 2017) 
were also accused of bribery and discharged from office. 
165
 In particular, members of electoral commissions, who are (formally) bureaucrats, are primarily responsible 
for the vast majority of electoral manipulations. Electoral fraud cannot also be carried out without permission, 
consent or assistance of other state bodies. Courts and the police are the most conspicuous of them. However, 
as it was noted in Chapter 2, even school principals and hospital chief doctors from time to time expert 
pressure on ordinary teachers and doctors to obtain their votes. The implementation of such policies of vote 
buying and voter coercion is hardly possible without engagement of the bureaucracy at the ministerial level. 
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rather they conclude from this fact that the incumbent possesses sufficient 
resources to pay for loyalty of all relevant actors associated with electoral fraud and 
that he is strong enough to suppress opposition dissentients. 
In this connection yet from a different perspective, throughout the study I 
argued that the regime’s commitment to fraud, even in those cases when it may 
seem unnecessary, can be explained by two main reasons. First, the costs of 
electoral defeat vary greatly by the type of political regime. In a democracy, a 
defeated candidate loses only the benefits associated with holding office. These 
benefits, however, are relatively moderate. Democratic leaders ordinarily do not 
extract as much rents from the state as would allow them to appropriate their own 
castles, yachts, jets or engage in similar kinds of luxury consumption. 
Authoritarian leaders can afford to do this since a lack of public scrutiny allows 
them to wallow deeply in corruption under crony capitalism to enrich themselves 
sometimes to an incredible extent. Not only corruption, but also political repression, 
electoral fraud and other intrinsically authoritarian illegal practices make 
authoritarian leaders subject to criminal investigations when a change of the regime 
occurs (except if a new regime, having a considerable degree of similarity and 
heredity, guarantees them personal immunity) and they lose everything – power, 
property and personal freedom. Hence, central autocrats as well as regional elites 
and other regime functionaries who are also engaged in various malpractices have 
much many incentives to cling to the regime and to sustain it by any means, 
including electoral fraud. They cannot allow free and fair competition to exist,166 
even if they are currently capable of winning without fraud, since equal competition 
undermines their chances of dominance in the future and will someday or other 
result in electoral defeat.167  
                                                          
166
 It should be underlined that electoral fraud should be understood in a complex with other authoritarian 
practices rather than independently of them. Authoritarian leaders may, in fact, forgo electoral fraud in a short 
run and stay in power due to repression, media bias, elite loyalty secured by means of distributive politics and 
corruption or mass loyalty secured by means of patronage. Nevertheless, they cannot suspend all authoritarian 
practices simultaneously without putting their dominance in jeopardy even in a situation of favorable economic 
and other exogenous conditions since the relaxation of authoritarian pressure would entail a backlash at each 
direction: repression entails resistance, electoral fraud and corruption result into criminal litigations, and the 
relaxation of control over the media translates into glasnost, that is, making crimes of the regime publically 
announced and giving the opposition more space for delivering their messages to voters.  
167
 In a similar vein, Simpser (2013: 158–158) discusses the effect of high stakes of holding office on electoral 
manipulation, when more than winning matters, along with other alternative explanations of excessive 
electoral manipulation – uncertainty, low cost of manipulation, and the necessity of keeping the machinery of 
electoral manipulation “well-oiled”. He aptly points out that these stakes can be of monetary form (related to 
corruption and embezzlement of public funds) and of non-monetary form (the possibility of lifetime jail or 
death on failing to win the election). However, he rejects these concerns and concludes that “the stakes of 
office could account for excessive manipulation only in exceptional circumstances” (p. 158). Simpser does not 
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Second, this study has shown that federal transfers are allocated to regions to a 
large degree based on electoral concerns. By doing this, the central-level 
incumbents aim to secure loyalty of regional elites and instigate them to implement 
various authoritarian policies, including electoral fraud, in order to retain power.168 
Therefore, regional elites have a financial interest in larger vote numbers for the 
incumbent president and his “party of power” and they will strive to falsify votes 
due to this material incentive until the entire system of economic rewarding for 
political loyalty is dismantled.169 Put differently, electoral fraud and distributive 
politics are interdependent under authoritarianism. Not only do central incumbents 
require a higher electoral support (which can be most easily increased by fraud) by 
offering larger transfers to regional elites, but also regional elites demand larger 
transfers by supplying more fraud.170 Such dyadic (even though hierarchical) 
reciprocal and mutually beneficial character of clientelist relationships is widely 
pointed out in the literature (Lemarchand and Legg 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1980; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; Hicken 2011). Since the system of clientelist 
exchange includes also regional elites as actors having their own interests, which 
must be satisfied, authoritarian incumbents cannot simply stop this system when 
they do not need fraud for winning office and then, once the level of their popularity 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
notice that the stakes of office vary by type of political regime. Moreover, he argues that the relationship 
between regime type and excessive/blatant manipulation is virtually absent (pp. 143–146). Similarly, 
Thompson and Kuntz (2007) assert fear of criminal prosecution and charges of corruption to be probably most 
decisive in motivating electoral theft. This study does also not specify that the level of corruption is higher in 
authoritarian regimes and does not consider other grounds for prosecution that are intrinsically linked to 
authoritarianism – electoral fraud, repression, and other illegal means of political survival.  
168
 The approach of Rundlett and Svolik (2016) is primarily focused on the probability of incumbent’s defeat or 
survival in power as a condition for receiving favours by the local-level agents and touches the role of 
distributive politics in the system of authoritarian practices only tangentially. 
169
 The dissertation shows only one particular element of this system – the distributive politics of federal 
transfers. But looking from a broader perspective, this system consists of plenty of similar elements and 
mechanisms, including politically motivated employment and career promotion in administrative positions, 
especially those having repressive significance such as courts, the police, and electoral commissions, which 
penetrate the state body from the federal center to the lowest-level municipality. General corruption, which 
holds the regime afloat, is so pervasive that nothing useful is done: no roads, hospitals, schools, even 
spaceports and other objects of public infrastructure are maintained or constructed unless extra profits for 
state officials accountable for these activities can be gained from them. Vice-versa, everything detrimental is 
done as long as it provides a benefit: opposition votes are stolen; honest journalists are bribed or intimidated; 
opposition parties and candidates are denied access to the media, offered “pork” in exchange for docility and 
are not registered by the electoral commission or prosecuted as political extremists if they reject the offer – 
and so on and so forth.  
170
 It should be noted that, besides electoral fraud, the system of mutual relationships between the central 
incumbent and political elites includes also repression of the opposition, persecution of the media, refraining 
from challenging the incumbent, supporting his legislative initiatives, and other elements. In these cases, a 
demand for larger transfers by actively supplying these authoritarian outcomes is also expected from the side 
of political elites. 
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decreased, resume its functioning without losing loyalty of regional elites or 
disintegrating the entire system of authoritarian (mal)practices.171  
Electoral Authoritarianism, Ethnicity, and Clientelist Coalitions 
This study has uncovered that the central government distributed its resources in 
the form of federal transfers to the most electorally supportive regions, which 
appeared to be predominantly non-Russian and non-Orthodox Christian regions. 
These ethnic regions, however, were mostly rebellious during the 1990s. They 
declared state sovereignty, signed agreements with the federal center on the 
delimitation of powers, voted against Yeltsin and pro-government parties, and 
primarily supported the Communists. How did the regime manage to convert them 
from its main opponents into its prime supporters? An implication of the spatial 
competition theory for this case suggests that although the ethnic regions were 
oppositional to the federal center in the 1990s, they had not been inextricably 
linked with the main competitor – the Communist Party – as well as with any other 
political power at the federal level by ideological or other strong ties. Put differently, 
these regions comprised a tactical opposition group to the Kremlin; they have not 
been someone’s core constituency. When Putin came to power, he made them a 
simple offer: corruption and material benefits in exchange for political loyalty, while 
credibly supporting the offer by applying force to those who was prone to reject it (in 
such cases as the second war in Chechnya and other counter-terrorist operations). 
Without having strong stable ties with the opposition, it was easy for the ethnic 
regions to accept this alluring offer and to support the incumbent. Therewith they 
lost nothing. Although the pattern of distribution had changed (from a negative to a 
positive association between federal transfers and support for the incumbent from 
the 1990s to the 2000s), the beneficiary group of regions remained almost the same 
                                                          
171
 Consider what would have happened if authoritarian leaders had decided to refrain from fraud, at least 
temporarily. First, they can do it by eliminating the relationship between central transfers and the incumbent’s 
vote. In this case, the elites would have received a signal that political loyalty is not encouraged and would 
have inferred from it that there is no inducement to support the regime, at least in this area. Such attempt 
would obviously mean an act of self-destruction of authoritarianism. Second, and more realistic, autocrats can 
give an informal command to temporarily stop the machinery of electoral manipulations. Such ambivalent 
signal would imply that regional elites would have to compete for economic favours by using primarily 
democratic tools or sacrifice their ability to extract benefits (and extra benefits associated with holding office 
under authoritarianism) in these conditions. The both outcomes (a partial democratisation or a loss of elite 
loyalty) are subversive for authoritarianism. The consequences of demise of authoritarian rule, which will 
ineluctably occur if such subversive policies are implemented systematically, for political elites, are described in 
the main text above. 
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with the only difference that the ethnic regions were rewarded for disobedience (i.e., 
were appeased) under Yeltsin and began to be rewarded for loyalty under Putin. 
At the same time, the question whether non-Russian and non-Christian 
Orthodox regions have become regime’s core or tactical supporters is open for 
debate. On the one hand, a simple intuition says that these regions support Putin’s 
regime tactically in order to receive larger federal transfers and other privileges; no 
ideological, ethno-religious or similar invariable characteristics bond them together. 
Cox and McCubbins (1986: 380) suggest that “a politician's core supporters are 
those who will stick with him through thick and thin”, where “thick and thin” refers 
to the level of promised benefits. From this definition, it follows that the ethnic 
regions are tactical or opportunistic rather than core supporters of the regime. If 
they lose their benefits, they will highly likely transform into opposition groups, 
especially if the loss occur in relative terms, comparatively to ethnically Russian 
regions. 
On the other hand, studies routinely report that the level electoral fraud is 
higher in the ethnic regions (Goodnow, Moser and Smith 2014; White 2016) and 
republics (Mebane and Kalinin 2009; Lukinova, Maygkov and Ordeshook 2011; 
Skovoroda and Lankina 2017), political ethnicity was one of the main sources that 
determined the success of governors’ political machines in the post-Soviet period 
(Hale 2003). This study has also shown that the a region’s ethno-religious 
divergence from central Russia is conducive to electoral fraud as well as to sincere 
vote for the incumbent and it is negatively associated with the regional level of 
democracy. Hence, the common denominator between non-Russian regions and 
Putin’s regime is authoritarianism. Due to the proximity on authoritarian cleavage, 
it appeared easy for central elites, as Gelman (2010: 16) notes, to make use of “the 
opportunity to co-opt it [subnational authoritarianism] “from above” into a 
nationwide system of authoritarian rule”. 
The sources of this authoritarian proximity, of course, require further 
examination but they presumably include a greater mass tolerance to authoritarian 
practices and a larger degree of political elites’ habituation to fraud, repression, 
corruption, and other informal political practices. When these informal practices re-
emerged at the central level in the 2000s, they were supported from below in the 
ethnic regions, since these practices were previously more commonly practiced and 
tolerated in these regions. In particular, the local origins of authoritarianism may 
include more tolerance for corruption as a tool for solving various problems, a 
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greater degree of susceptibility to the image of a “strong man” attributed to Putin 
and to the regional political leaders by the official media, and a lesser ability to 
evaluate politicians based on the outcomes of their policies rather than on their 
tempting and deceptive declarations. 
In Cox and McCubbins’s (1986) model, the amount of promised benefits by a 
candidate crucially depends on the degree of responsiveness of a group: 
unresponsive (opposition) groups should be promised little while responsive (swing 
and support) groups – relatively more. The proximity of the ethnic regions on 
authoritarian cleavage with the incumbent makes them more responsive to the 
regime’s clientelist appeals compared with ethnically Russian regions. The question 
about the responsiveness of ethnic and religious minorities for forging the 
incumbent’s clientelist coalition can be addressed by simply considering what 
would have happened if Putin had decided in the early 2000s to provide benefits 
primarily to ethnically Russian regions while withdrawing funds from the North 
Caucasian and other ethnic republics. Non-Russian regions would more likely have 
continued and reinforced the practices of sovereignty declarations, tax avoidance, 
boycotting of federal elections and similar secessionist policies that would obviously 
have entailed high costs for the central authorities. However, these costs would 
have hardly been compensated by political returns from ethnically Russian regions. 
Neither would Russian voters have been so pleased by the larger transfers that it 
would have induced them to increase Putin’s vote and turnout rates by twenty 
percent, nor would the elites of these regions have been capable of falsifying the 
incumbent’s vote up to nearly a hundred percent. 
Electoral Authoritarianism and Distributive Politics 
The analysis of the consumption of transfers has revealed that as the authoritarian 
regime is getting more established and consolidated over time, it becomes less rent-
sharing with respect to the general public. Instead, it primarily distributes its 
resources to political elites in order to secure their loyalty. This type of distribution 
is more consistent with state exploitation or state predation, as vividly depicted by 
Grzymala-Busse (2008). Describing the designation of development programs in 
clientelist and predatory regimes she notes:172 
                                                          
172
 However, Grzymala-Busse (2008) codes Russia under Putin as a clientelist (i.e., highly distributive) regime. I 
admit that in a cross-country comparison the Russian regime may look more distributive than the predatory 
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“[h]owever they are contingent or inefficient, such programs [in the distributive 
regimes] nonetheless deliver benefits to constituents. [...] In contrast, predatory 
regimes with large agricultural sectors use development programs largely to 
channel funding into the pockets and accounts of the rulers. There is little pay-
off to either targeting or delivering these programs to their intended 
constituencies, narrow or broad. [...] Where agricultural and infrastructure 
programs in rent-sharing regimes deliver benefits to local supporters, predatory 
versions of similar programs divert funds into the pockets of ruling elites at the 
national level, before distribution can take place” (p. 663). 
The declining magnitude of mass patronage in Russia also raises a question 
about the relationship between competition and distribution in autocracies. 
Grzymala-Busse (2007) found that robust electoral competition has limited rent-
seeking practices of governing parties in post-communist democracies.173 Can this 
finding be extrapolated to authoritarian regimes? The dynamics of Russian 
distributive politics offers rather a positive answer to this question. And even 
though extensive welfare programs may be found in several closed authoritarian 
regimes – such as Muammar Gaddaffi’s Libya or the Soviet Union – there is an 
empirical ground to consider that in trivial autocracies, which are not constrained 
by any ideological doctrines, incumbents are primarily concerned with securing elite 
loyalty, especially in hegemonic regimes, which tolerate only a tightly controlled and 
limited opposition in elections.  
More broadly, findings of this study contribute to the debate on distributional 
consequences of different political regimes (Boix 2003; Acemoglu et al. 2015) by 
revealing the mechanism that engenders social inequality under electoral 
authoritarianism – the vital necessity by authoritarian leaders to pay for loyalty of 
political elites. Authoritarian leaders have more incentives relatively to their 
democratic counterparts to take loyalty of political elites seriously. First, if channels 
of electoral competition are clamped or closed, discontented members of the elite 
have basically two options for political change in the country – they may overthrow 
the dictator in a coup d’état or initiate a “color revolution” from below; as an 
intermediate measure, they may commit sabotage of incumbent’s political 
decisions. Due to high potential costs of these measures compared with 
participation in elections, unconstitutional means of power change can be used 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
regimes of Marcos in the Philippines, Abacha in Nigeria or Mugabe in Zimbabwe. In any case, the Russian 
regime is becoming less distributive to voters within its own temporal magnitude. 
173
 Elsewhere, Grzymala-Busse (2008) does not differentiate between types of political regimes; her sample 
includes also electoral democracies, such as Italy, Japan, and Poland. 
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only as the last resort in democracies. In authoritarian regimes, the violent ouster 
from power is the Damocles sword of dictators. Second, authoritarian leaders 
cannot repress their opponents, perpetrate electoral fraud and other authoritarian 
practices personally, they need assistance of elites for these purposes. Due to high 
potential costs of authoritarian practices, elites will barely provide their services to 
the incumbent gratuitously. Furthermore, disloyal authoritarian elites, as the 
spread of the ethnic separatism in Russia’s regions in the early 1990s shows, can 
turn their political machines against the incumbent. 
In contrary, authoritarian incumbents have few incentives to invest in patronage 
of masses, especially if the authentic level of incumbent’s mass support is high, if 
masses cannot credibly threaten the stability of the regime by means of popular 
protest or supporting the opposition, and if electoral competition is tightly restricted 
and nearly meaningless (in hegemonic autocracies). Even if the popular threat to 
the regime is credible, authoritarian leaders may still prefer to invest more in elites 
(by raising salaries to the police, the military, and the secret services and giving 
them wider discretionary powers, delivering side payments to potential elite 
defectors for their acquiescence, and bribing popular opposition leaders), in order to 
provide more repression for counteracting the popular threat. Therefore, 
authoritarian leaders should encounter rather a rare historical situation to 
distribute benefits to voters seriously.  
Although this study is mostly focused on the regional elites as primary 
beneficiaries of the federal transfers and shows that these funds pursue the goal of 
buying elite loyalty, which is eventually converted into various authoritarian 
outcomes, including electoral fraud, its findings can hypothetically be extended to 
the nation-level elites. It is a well-known fact that, after coming to power, Putin put 
his cronies into the key positions in the economy and polity. The argument 
developed at the regional level suggests that not only did these persons, who 
subsequently became known as “oligarchs” or influential politicians, enriched 
themselves from corruption but their loyalty secured through illegal or politically 
contingent means also contributed to the strengthening of autocracy. A much 
discussed inquiry by Morar (2007) revealed that big state companies and controlled 
businessmen were compelled to pay a “tribute” to what she called the Kremlin’s 
“black cashbox”. The moneys were then channeled into electoral funds of political 
parties – not only to United Russia but also to those opposition parties that are 
affiliated with the regime. In this regard, Putin only continued the vicious practice 
initiated in Yeltsin’s times. An apotheosis of the presidential campaign of 1996 has 
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become the detention of two Yeltsin’s activists at the entrance of the House of 
Government who were trying to took out of the building $538,000 in cash (Gelman 
1998: 158–159). In the time of Yeltsin, however, these practices have not been “the 
only game in town”, they were resisted by several members of the elite, including 
Alexander Korzhakov, the Head of the Presidential Security Service, who came into 
conflict with Yeltsin over this case and was eventually sacked (Korzhakov 1997: Ch. 
1), and the low state repressive capacity made incumbent’s threats to businessmen 
not credible, rather it was the politics of concessions of the Kremlin to oligarchs. In 
the time of Putin, the opposition between the oligarchs has been exterminated (the 
cases of V. Gusinskiy, B. Berezovskiy, and M. Khodorkovskiy) and the oligarchs’ 
access to state funds and the very opportunity of doing business has become 
conditional on political loyalty. In any case, using of such “black cashboxes” 
donated by business elites as well as the (semi)legal use of public money on political 
discretion allow the incumbent to outspend competitors in electoral campaigns, to 
support “spoiler” parties, to buy off non-affiliated opposition candidates or to bribe 
state officials, creating, thereby, hyper-incumbency advantages.  
Thus, not simply the political and economic elites are corrupted and 
disproportionately rewarded under electoral authoritarianism, they are purposefully 
corrupted and deliberately rewarded to subsequently respond for their access to 
state spoils with political loyalty to the incumbent, which takes multiple forms, 
such as refraining from challenging the incumbent, perpetration of electoral fraud 
and political repression against opposition groups or cutting off financial flows to 
the opposition and paying “tributes” to the incumbent and his political affiliates. 
However, the disproportionate rewarding of elites relatively to masses raises 
another question: why does mass political support appear to be not such a rare 
phenomenon in electoral authoritarian regimes and especially in Putin’s Russia? 
This study has examined the effect of politicized federal transfers and other 
variables of patronage spending on the sincere incumbent’s vote, yet, contrary to 
theoretical expectations, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis of 
patronage voting. Instead, it was found that the level of sincere incumbent’s vote is 
somewhat higher in regions with large proportions of non-Russian and non-
Christian Orthodox populations, that is, in the so-called ethnic regions that are also 
characterized by higher levels of authoritarianism. In this relation, one answer to 
the question on popular support for authoritarian incumbents can be drawn from a 
viewpoint on public opinion under authoritarianism as a product of biased delivery 
of information by the manipulated mass media, the limited ability of opposition 
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parties to convey their messages to the public, and repression of dissenters. All 
these facts are true, indeed. Nevertheless, the stronger the authoritarian pressure, 
the more powerful backlash in the form of public discontent with authoritarian 
practices is expected to follow against it. This is what Greene (2008) calls the 
“cross-cutting regime cleavage”, that is, a demand for the openness of the electoral 
arena, good governance, eradication of corruption, and democratization in general. 
This cleavage is advantageous exclusively to the opposition since the authoritarian 
incumbent cannot offer a more level playing field. Even though Putin’s regime 
imposes higher costs on political participation compared with fully competitive 
systems, it is not Stalinism or a similar kind of closed autocracy severely 
exterminating any discontent. In other words, electoral authoritarianism in Putin’s 
Russia is generally permissive of forming political parties, participating in political 
meetings (including post-electoral protests), and disseminating information via the 
social networks or on the internet. Notwithstanding, political parties that are not 
affiliated with the incumbent attract very few supporters; protests occur on ad hoc 
issues, rarely find mass support and are not transformed into broader social 
movements or political platforms; and the mostly important, the general resentment 
with authoritarian practices is either weak or absent in the society. 
Besides that, in Putin’s Russia, voting is not compulsory and elections are not 
uncontested as it used to be in the Soviet Union, for example. Nevertheless, the 
analysis of electoral fraud in this study has shown that about fifty percent of the 
eligible voters came to the polls and 57.6 percent of them voted for the incumbent 
more or less sincerely in the presidential elections of 2000–2012, on average; the 
level of the authentic vote for the incumbent has been below the 50-percent 
threshold (47.3%) only in the election of 2000. Why do the voters, when coming to 
the polls, not punish incumbents for sliding into authoritarianism so as they 
typically punish them for economic slumps? Is this issue not salient for them? Are 
they completely unaware of what is happening in politics? Examining the dynamics 
of public opinion concerning perceptions of the political regime in Russia, Whitefield 
(2009) found that evaluations of democracy and several aspects of democracy were 
surprisingly stable over time and almost statistically indistinguishable from 1993 to 
2007, while there is a broad consensus between scholars and experts that Russia 
has undergone an authoritarian transition under Putin. Trying to explain this 
discrepancy, Whitefield considered several explanations but he finally concluded 
that this question is difficult to answer and calls for further investigation. Thus, the 
popular support for electoral authoritarianism still remains puzzling. To tackle this 
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problem, I offer a possible explanation based on the theory of motivated reasoning 
in Appendix F6, which suggests that voters adhere to biased information delivered 
by the incumbent-controlled media and prefer it over unbiased information since 
state-sponsored propaganda minimizes psychological costs of perception of the 
reality relatively to true information. 
The Limitations of the Study and Avenues for Further Research 
As it was noted earlier in Chapter 1, the main argument has rather been tested 
throughout the study in its minimal version. Many issues of authoritarian survival 
have not been explicitly addressed and deserve further examination. In this final 
section, I point out the most important of them. 
Although this study is primarily focused on electoral fraud as an authoritarian 
outcome of political loyalty of regional elites and it has additionally examined the 
effect of politically determined transfers on media freedom and the general level of 
regional democracy, the argument can also be studied in application to other 
authoritarian policy outcomes – repression of the opposition and refraining from 
challenging the incumbent by loyal regional elites. The latter authoritarian policy 
outcomes have not been included in the study due to complexity of their 
operationalization. The refraining from challenging is an intrinsically latent variable. 
We cannot observe the act of refraining from challenging as such until a governor or 
a mayor has revealed his support for the opposition by nominating his candidacy 
under the label of an opposition party, for example. However, such explicit electoral 
confrontation is rare in consolidated authoritarian regimes. The struggle for power 
more frequently takes behind-the-scenes forms. As a consequence, we can learn 
from public sources that, for instance, a governor was taken into custody and 
accused of corruption. But we may only speculate whether the real cause of 
detention is corruption or the governor was punished thereby for his informal 
negotiations and agreements with the opposition on donations, providing (too 
much) space for public meetings or mediating relationships between the business 
and the opposition.  
The repression of the opposition manifests itself more openly. Nevertheless, 
repression, similarly to persecution of the media, is an interaction between strength 
of the opposition, strength of the regime, and time. If regime’s repressive capacity is 
high and the opposition is initially weak, the opposition has already been or will be 
exterminated in the nearest future as in regions like Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and 
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Mordovia, for example, and there will be no need for repression due to the absence 
of the object for repression (similarly, the number of per million reported incidents 
with journalists – the media persecution index – is equal in these regions, 
respectively, to 8.7, 12.5, and 20.3, whereas the country’s mean is equal to 29.5). If 
regime’s repressive capacity is high and the opposition is strong, the conflict may 
take a form of ongoing civil war with numerous incidents of harsh repression (as in 
Ingushetia, for example, with its 167.0 reported incidents with journalists per 
million). The rate of repression, however, is also expected to be high if regime’s 
repressive capacity is modest and the opposition is highly developed (in Moscow 
and Saint Petersburg, for instance, values of the media persecution index are equal 
to 70.3 and 63.3, respectively). All these measurement-related problems require to 
be tackled in a more detailed study. 
Apart from this, scholars on political repression differentiate between two types 
of repression – violations of personal integrity (repression in a narrow sense) and 
restrictions on civil liberties (Davenport 2007; Escribà-Folch 2013). While using 
restrictions on civil liberties as a subtype of repression rather implies conceptual 
stretching, legal restrictions on electoral competition belong to the same policy 
domain as repression (i.e., compulsion, as opposed to two other domains – 
distribution of material benefits and provision of information), yet unlike repression, 
legal restrictions on competition pursue the aim of eliminating competitors without 
violation of law. Both these practices may work in combination. Although electoral 
rules are almost constant throughout the country, Russia’s regions show a 
considerable variation in the outcomes of electoral competition restriction. In the 
regional legislative elections held from 2008 to 2012, 26.3% of applied opposition 
candidates were not allowed to run in the election, on average. This proportion 
varied from 5.3% to 55.8% and the standard deviation of 10.1% between the 
regions. And the range of non-registered candidates was larger for candidates not 
affiliated with major opposition parties represented in the State Duma: from 7.7% 
as the minimum to 88.4% as the maximum and 47.3% on average with the 
standard deviation of 18.4%.174 This and similar indicators can be used to gauge 
legal restriction of electoral competition in gubernatorial and legislative elections in 
Russia’ regions. 
This study has examined only clientelism as a formal practice of the distribution 
of benefits to political elites. Several informal practices, however, can be also 
                                                          
174
 Author’s calculations based on the data from the Central Electoral Commission. 
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employed by authoritarian leaders to secure loyalty of political elites. As indicated 
in Table 1.3, they include two major types of political corruption – direct bribery 
and indirect bribery in the form of incumbent’s consent for embezzlement of public 
funds by the elites (the elites can also squeeze money from the private sector of the 
economy in the form of kickbacks but this type of corruption is presumably less 
appropriate as a reward for loyalty due to scarcer opportunities for incumbent’s 
control over the thflow of benefits). Direct bribery by its very nature is unobserved 
and it can hardly be accounted for in a quantitative research. The other form of elite 
corruption – misappropriation and embezzlement of public funds – is fortunately 
more observable inasmuch as the information on public investment becomes 
increasingly available. In the case of Russia, it is mainly available on the website of 
state procurement – http://zakupki.gov.ru. Similarly to studying of electoral fraud, 
the objective data are expected to be more reliable than expert indices of corruption. 
Regardless of the measure of corruption being used, the following research 
questions should be addressed. Do mostly corrupted officials demonstrate more 
allegiance to the incumbent? If yes, in what forms does their loyalty manifest itself? 
It is important to note that political corruption can definitely be not associated with 
loyalty to the incumbent but pursue only the goal of personal enrichment by public 
officials, especially in non-consolidated authoritarian regimes where incumbents do 
not dispose sufficient instruments for controlling elite behavior. Yet if incumbent’s 
control over elites is assumed, as in Putin’s Russia, does the incumbent punish 
those officials that extract benefits from corruption but not respond with loyalty? In 
other words, do corruption investigations concern primarily those officials who 
“take too much but give too little”? 
It should be noted with respect to all abovementioned authoritarian practices 
that they are not associated with the central incumbent as closely as electoral fraud 
and central transfers. Therefore, repression, for example, can signalize loyalty of 
regional law enforcement agencies or criminal structures to regional governors in 
exchange for side payments or common corruption affairs, but not loyalty to the 
central incumbent. Such nuances require proper selection of the level at which the 
exchange of material benefits for political loyalty occurs. 
Finally, this study has shed light chiefly on political behavior of elites under 
electoral authoritarianism, whereas electoral behavior of masses has not been 
equally accounted for on empirical grounds. Contrary to the literature that conflates 
clientelism with vote buying and voter intimidation (Magaloni 2006; Stokes et al. 
2013; Nichter 2014), this study has suggested that patronage distribution should 
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be legal and, more importantly, leave a room for a sincere vote. Notwithstanding 
these theoretical expectations, no significant effect of the politically motivated 
federal transfers and the variables of social spending was found on the sincere 
incumbent’s vote. Furthermore, the detailed examination of electoral fraud has also 
shown that vote buying and voter intimidation are scarcely sued in Putin’s Russia 
relatively to manipulations with vote count, which allow to boost the official vote 
share of the incumbent more effectively and less costly if the process of vote count 
is not monitored and Themis in courts appears so blind that she closes her eyes to 
thousands of verified copies of polling station protocols showing discrepancies with 
the officially reported numbers of votes. Another stand of the literature stresses the 
informational role of clientelism and finds that brokers distribute benefits to voters 
to signalize them electoral viability of the candidate (Muñoz 2014; Zarazaga 2014; 
Kramon 2017). In the case of Russia, we do also not find such grounded in the local 
society brokers that distribute social benefits from the municipality, a candidate or 
the dominant party office to voters. Thus, mass patronage turns out to have no 
effect on sincere voting for the incumbent in any of existing definitions. 
It can be argued that such poor account for voter behavior from the patronage-
related perspective results merely from an individual specificity of Russia’s political 
situation. However, election-related handouts to voters were also widespread in 
Russia in the 1990s until the early 2000s before the authoritarian consolidation 
has occurred. Since then, electoral campaigns have become much more routine, 
unremarkable and media-based. In the late 1990s, while studying in school, I 
discussed (mainly ironized and spoiled) with my school mates candidates’ electoral 
booklets that were available in abundance and took even notice such original kind 
of electoral advertisement as aerosol-painted slogans on the snow. In the 
presidential campaigns of 2012 and especially of 2018, an external observer could 
only notice political posters placed sparsely between commercial advertisements, 
about a half of which just called for turn out to the election.  
Besides that, the recent studies stressing the informational role of clientelism 
examine the relationships between brokers and voters in electoral democracies 
(contemporary Argentina and Peru) that are much more similar to Yeltsin’s Russia, 
in which the informational theory of broker-based patronage could work, than to 
Putin’s Russia, where multitasked brokers as trustworthy neighbors and even 
ordinary vote buyers are so rare that they probably outnumber those who would 
like to sell their votes for some benefit. Contrary to electoral authoritarian regimes, 
electoral competition in electoral democracies is tighter and each individual vote is 
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more valuable since it cannot be effectively substituted by electoral fraud or 
repression of viable political competitors. In this connection, delivering of politically 
contingent benefits to voters seems to be a more rational strategy under electoral 
democracy than under electoral authoritarianism, and the Russian political 
experience from the 1990s to the 2000s confirms it. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the case of Russia is not entirely unique and we will more likely find a 
little relevance of patronage voting in other consolidated authoritarian regimes. At 
any rate, the puzzle of popular support under electoral authoritarianism still calls 
for further examination. 
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Appendixes  
Appendix C. Supplementary Materials to Chapter 3 
Appendix C1. Cross-regional descriptive statistics for polling stations with 
electronic vote count and without 
Table C1. Descriptive statistics for polling stations with electronic vote count and 
without by region, the Russian presidential election of 2012 
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Altai K. 1.96 1862 100 .17 57,9 59,3 54,9 59,7 54,7 58,1 
Amur O. .66 783 40 .24 63,6 59,6 57,4 56,4 58,4 56,1 
Arkhangelsk O. .99 984 53 .37 58,5 57,6 50,7 60,0 58,0 54,3 
Astrakhan O. .77 586 35 .08 69,6 55,5 59,6 60,3 71,3 55,0 
Belgorod O. 1.21 1250 61 .33 60,0 73,5 55,3 70,1 55,2 70,6 
Bryansk O. 1.05 1124 58 .05 64,7 66,3 63,0 64,4 64,5 67,3 
Vladimir O. 1.20 940 49 .28 54,2 52,4 54,9 53,7 61,2 52,2 
Volgograd O. 2.00 1653 85 .45 64,0 63,2 61,1 63,4 66,8 69,6 
Vologda O. .99 1040 100 .36 60,1 61,0 56,9 61,2 57,1 61,2 
Voronezh O. 1.92 1680 84 .14 62,0 67,3 54,5 62,8 56,8 62,6 
Moscow 7.31 3386 250 .80 47,9 56,9 49,0 58,8 41,7 58,4 
Saint Petersburg 3.85 1937 120 .92 59,6 61,2 56,1 59,3 72,1 73,3 
Jewish A.Ob. .14 144 8 .19 62,5 57,6 57,5 58,4 59,2 55,5 
Zabaykalsky K. .83 955 50 .22 66,4 59,3 62,7 63,0 63,3 59,2 
Ivanovo O. .87 717 110 .48 62,5 59,3 61,6 56,5 66,1 60,9 
Kabardino-Balkar R.  .53 356 18 .05 77,7 73,0 79,7 77,1 77,7 72,8 
Kaliningrad O. .77 551 27 .14 53,2 58,6 46,3 61,3 48,0 59,9 
Kaluga O. .80 723 37 .25 59,8 62,7 56,2 58,4 56,5 58,8 
Kamchatka K. .26 323 18 .21 60,6 60,3 57,4 58,0 59,1 56,8 
Karachay-Cherkess R. .32 246 13 .05 91,6 91,1 82,4 89,4 92,0 91,2 
Kemerovo O. 2.08 1718 87 .12 77,9 78,3 75,5 84,4 79,1 82,2 
Kirov O. 1.13 1211 66 .19 58,6 60,6 55,7 60,0 56,9 59,5 
Kostroma O. .57 623 35 1.0 53,2 60,9 54,2 61,1 – – 
Krasnodar K. 3.80 2713 132 .05 64,5 69,9 60,5 68,3 64,8 70,1 
Krasnoyarsk K. 2.19 2174 112 .24 60,9 58,7 56,6 58,5 56,7 58,4 
Kurgan O. .75 1175 59 .24 64,0 63,6 56,9 63,3 60,5 57,7 
Kursk O. .95 1153 61 .30 61,1 63,3 55,7 59,6 55,9 59,8 
Leningrad O. 1.28 989 49 .45 62,7 62,4 60,8 59,1 62,3 57,0 
Lipetsk O. .95 875 46 .31 61,8 64,8 54,5 62,7 54,4 59,7 
Magadan O. .12 103 7 .14 56,9 58,3 52,4 56,4 53,6 57,2 
Moscow O. 5.78 3388 167 .19 57,8 60,3 54,8 61,7 58,3 62,5 
Murmansk O. .67 622 31 .08 60,8 59,7 58,1 54,4 59,5 59,2 
Nizhny Novgorod O. 2.78 2331 119 .64 64,5 66,3 55,4 55,9 60,1 65,8 
Novgorod O. .53 545 28 .32 58,6 58,0 53,5 58,2 53,2 58,7 
Novosibirsk O. 2.14 2032 101 .90 57,0 62,5 53,4 62,5 49,3 70,6 
Oryol O. .66 749 40 .29 53,4 67,3 47,7 66,2 48,6 66,6 
Penza O. 1.12 1149 59 .19 65,1 67,3 57,9 65,9 59,7 63,8 
Perm K. 2.12 1890 95 .51 63,8 54,3 56,1 55,2 58,4 56,9 
Primorsky K. 1.54 1587 77 .18 58,1 63,2 43,3 56,5 49,3 58,5 
Pskov O. .58 648 33 .35 60,3 60,5 54,7 59,0 57,8 60,4 
Adygea R. .34 264 14 .12 64,9 63,5 60,3 63,5 64,8 64,8 
Bashkortostan R. 3.01 3509 178 .06 75,9 75,7 74,5 82,9 82,2 84,4 
Buryatia R. .63 836 41 .24 67,0 65,4 58,4 69,3 61,7 66,1 
Dagestan R. 1.56 1899 92 .09 93,2 90,8 84,4 85,5 93,6 92,1 
Ingushetia R. .19 130 8 .07 92,1 86,2 80,8 84,9 92,5 86,1 
Kalmykia R. .21 253 15 .06 71,0 61,4 73,4 64,1 70,8 61,2 
Karelia R. .56 543 30 .24 56,1 54,7 50,6 60,2 52,1 55,7 
Komi R. .75 660 34 .33 65,9 69,1 61,7 69,8 59,0 70,0 
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Mari El R. .54 552 29 .06 60,6 70,1 55,4 64,9 59,8 69,5 
Mordovia R. .65 802 45 .24 87,6 89,0 75,8 84,3 81,9 83,8 
Sakha (Yakutia) R. .61 813 41 .39 70,1 73,9 64,5 73,7 64,9 69,3 
Tatarstan R. 2.87 2853 146 .11 83,3 82,4 94,8 98,0 95,2 97,1 
Ryazan O. .97 1063 55 .35 60,4 63,5 53,4 63,6 55,1 63,6 
Saratov O. 1.99 1783 92 .05 71,3 65,8 67,5 63,7 71,6 65,9 
Sakhalin O. .40 445 23 .29 57,0 56,5 49,7 57,6 50,3 56,3 
Sverdlovsk O. 3.53 2537 600 .45 65,3 58,1 61,9 58,5 63,7 58,5 
Smolensk O. .82 810 41 .24 57,4 58,3 50,5 60,0 53,4 57,1 
Stavropol K. 1.98 1265 65 .14 65,1 59,6 61,6 59,8 66,9 64,8 
Tambov O. .88 952 52 .12 72,4 69,4 65,2 67,8 71,7 69,3 
Tver O. 1.14 1259 67 .37 58,6 58,1 51,1 59,0 52,5 58,8 
Tomsk O. .79 777 110 .79 57,7 57,6 51,9 62,0 51,4 56,0 
Tuva R. 1.25 1135 61 .15 68,5 68,7 68,5 66,9 71,6 70,0 
Tyumen O. 1.06 1128 58 .05 73,7 78,5 68,7 79,4 73,9 78,5 
Ulyanovsk O. 1.05 993 51 .35 58,8 62,9 51,6 59,5 53,6 57,7 
Khabarovsk K. 1.06 833 43 .15 56,9 61,1 52,2 64,0 55,1 60,8 
Khanty–Mansi A.O. 1.10 657 30 .28 67,2 63,3 64,0 56,8 64,0 56,9 
Chelyabinsk O. 2.76 2245 111 .38 66,0 61,8 63,1 63,1 65,1 64,5 
Chuvash R. .95 1176 59 .54 63,3 72,5 57,1 63,0 65,3 83,0 
Chukotka A.O. .04 57 3 .14 73,7 80,4 73,6 81,6 82,9 88,7 
Yamalo-Nenets A.O. .36 211 11 .31 85,3 92,6 72,3 94,5 89,8 91,7 
Yaroslavl O. 1.06 906 47 .40 55,2 62,8 57,3 58,9 62,8 64,6 
Total 95.27 82261 4972 .28 63.3 67.8 58.9 62.3 68.0 68.2 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. Turnout and vote share entries are the ratios of total 
votes expressed in percentage points.  The number of regions is equal to 71 (the number of 
regions in which electronic voting systems were installed). KOIBs denote to Optical Scan 
Voting Systems and KEGs denote to Electronic Voting Systems. 
Table C1 shows a considerable variation in Turnout and Putin’s vote in UIKs 
with and without electronic vote count across regions. The difference in Putin’s vote 
between UIKs with KOIBs and KEGs and other UIKs within the same TIKs varies 
from a positive 7.2% in Moscow to a negative 17.6% in Yamalo-Nenets A.O., 16.0% 
in Saint Petersburg, and 11.7% in Astrakhan Oblast and Ingushetia. Besides vote 
and turnout shares, the table reports several statistics that allow us to estimate to 
what extent electronic vote counting machines are evenly distributed according to 
population. First, we can consider the share of UIKs with electronic voting in the 
total number of UIKs by region (column 4 over column 3). This share has the mean 
of 5.9%, the standard deviation of 2.7%, and the minimum of 4.6%. Four cases 
strongly deviate from the mean on the right: Sverdlovsk Oblast (23.7% – the 
maximum), Ivanovo Oblast (15.3%), Tomsk Oblast (14.2%), and Vologda Oblast 
(9.6%). If the four outliers are deleted, the standard deviation decreases to 0.4%. 
The second measure – the ratio of UIKs with electronic voting to the number of 
eligible voters (column 4 over column 1) – comes up with similar results: the mean 
= 5.5, the standard deviation = 2.3, the minimum = 2.7, and the corresponding 
outliers on the right = 17.0, 12.7, 14.0, and 10.1, respectively. The deletion of the 
outliers decreases the standard deviation to 1.1. These two measures indicate that, 
with few exceptions, regions have the number of KOIBs and KEGs proportional to 
the numbers of their UIKs and eligible voters. The third measure – the share of UIKs 
with electronic vote count in TIKs where electronic vote count is present (column 5) 
– is much more variable. It varies from 0.05 in six regions to 1 in Kostroma Oblast, 
has the mean of 0.28 and the standard deviation of 0.21. Furthermore, it tends to 
be somewhat smaller as Putin’s overall share of the vote increases (R2 = 0.186). It 
means that TIKs in the most susceptible to fraud regions include very few UIKs with 
electronic vote count (6% in Bashkortostan, 7% in Ingushetia, 9% in Dagestan, 11% 
in Tatarstan, etc.), and that these UIKs, therefore, can be easily allocated in those 
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places where the level of incumbent’s support is higher or electoral fraud can be 
more manageable. 
Appendix C2. Last-digit frequencies of Putin’s vote count and vote share in 
Russia’s regions from the 2012 presidential election 
Table C2. Last-digit frequencies of Putin’s vote count in Russia’s regions from the 
2012 presidential election compared with Benford’s law 
Region 
Last Digit 
SD, %     
  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Altai K. 192 183 176 198 203 180 173 185 183 189 .51 4.3 
Amur O. 82 68 84 89 82 56 75 75 82 90 1.31 12.1 
Arkhangelsk O. 102 102 103 95 99 89 89 117 95 93 .85 6.3 
Astrakhan O. 62 61 67 54 63 46 65 49 65 54 1.25 8.2 
Belgorod O. 142 137 115 109 105 122 122 128 136 134 1.00 11.3 
Bryansk O. 116 125 119 109 108 110 98 108 117 114 .66 4.5 
Vladimir O. 94 91 81 85 96 107 91 82 113 100 1.11 1.4 
Volgograd O. 154 177 147 173 158 178 167 161 165 173 .62 5.8 
Vologda O. 108 89 125 108 106 99 101 111 92 101 .98 9.0 
Voronezh O. 195 155 199 164 156 156 162 156 162 175 .98 14.5 
Moscow 334 348 323 353 329 343 351 308 349 348 .44 5.8 
Saint Petersburg 187 167 231 177 213 194 209 176 192 191 1.00 17.3* 
Jewish A.Ob. 12 17 21 11 10 16 5 21 16 15 3.47 15.6 
Zabaykalsky K. 104 81 103 98 115 94 77 97 99 87 1.19 12.1 
Ivanovo O. 74 80 62 65 84 71 67 72 84 58 1.25 1.1 
Irkutsk O. 190 189 183 213 205 196 195 173 193 188 .58 5.7 
Kabardino-Balkar R.  42 37 35 37 47 38 33 27 24 36 1.86 11.1 
Kaliningrad O. 47 61 56 52 53 75 60 46 46 55 1.60 12.7 
Kaluga O. 72 74 75 58 79 77 83 69 69 67 .97 6.2 
Kamchatka K. 27 41 35 32 35 33 30 25 34 31 1.39 5.6 
Karachay-Cherkess R. 23 18 27 25 30 25 27 19 25 27 1.51 5.1 
Kemerovo O. 184 160 195 175 178 198 148 150 148 182 1.11 19.1* 
Kirov O. 136 119 124 119 111 119 134 119 120 110 .70 5.3 
Kostroma O. 58 65 52 63 66 72 58 70 57 62 1.00 5.6 
Krasnodar K. 267 284 284 268 269 262 275 283 253 268 .38 3.5 
Krasnoyarsk K. 201 211 231 196 225 211 231 218 221 229 .57 6.4 
Kurgan O. 126 117 119 113 122 118 113 101 124 122 .62 4.0 
Kursk O. 130 110 95 120 115 119 115 121 109 119 .81 6.7 
Leningrad O. 112 97 96 90 87 114 107 92 96 98 .93 7.6 
Lipetsk O. 91 101 83 87 81 93 82 76 81 100 .97 7.4 
Magadan O. 5 14 12 11 15 5 14 8 11 8 3.55 11.7 
Moscow O. 324 350 346 322 334 318 319 350 374 351 .54 9.0 
Murmansk O. 64 53 61 67 57 69 59 75 62 55 1.09 6.6 
Nenets A.O. 3 4 4 7 2 9 5 4 5 8 4.38 8.8 
Nizhny Novgorod O. 235 232 230 217 227 267 229 241 220 233 .59 7.3 
Novgorod O. 66 55 57 52 49 42 51 66 61 46 1.49 1.8 
Novosibirsk O. 224 201 200 211 205 208 205 171 198 209 .66 8.0 
Omsk O. 192 183 161 173 185 167 199 189 199 199 .74 9.2 
Orenburg O. 173 181 189 161 191 177 156 196 210 178 .89 12.9 
Oryol O. 85 57 82 75 87 71 67 69 80 76 1.23 1.1 
Penza O. 129 118 104 115 117 142 110 106 102 106 1.09 12.3 
Perm K. 176 199 176 184 189 190 198 206 181 191 .53 4.8 
Primorsky K. 162 172 170 138 159 161 162 144 151 168 .70 7.1 
Pskov O. 66 61 57 68 65 61 66 68 75 61 .78 3.6 
Adygea R. 26 30 24 28 36 23 35 16 20 26 2.36 13.2 
Altai R. 16 21 34 24 21 20 21 30 26 29 2.27 11.2 
Bashkortostan R. 302 339 369 356 347 356 339 367 366 368 .59 11.0 
Buryatia R. 87 94 70 77 80 78 88 81 83 98 1.00 7.5 
Dagestan R. 237 190 180 172 189 219 172 176 190 174 1.14 22.4** 
Ingushetia R. 17 16 14 21 12 10 8 8 11 13 3.18 11.8 
Kalmykia R. 37 27 28 17 33 21 24 21 27 18 2.53 14.6 
Karelia R. 59 72 64 43 72 43 43 45 53 49 2.16 22.9** 
Komi R. 63 66 63 62 90 68 62 68 54 64 1.41 11.8 
Mari El R. 68 67 51 52 47 57 67 42 51 50 1.66 13.8 
Mordovia R. 63 84 84 81 75 66 84 93 83 89 1.19 1.2 
Sakha (Yakutia) R. 69 92 86 75 92 69 70 78 93 89 1.25 11.4 
North Ossetia-Alania R.  46 40 51 32 31 24 34 41 38 34 2.11 14.8 
Tatarstan R. 289 291 293 282 296 291 288 287 282 254 .42 4.4 
Tuva R. 14 16 21 18 24 22 14 20 20 14 2.00 6.6 
Khakassia R. 47 48 37 38 28 45 37 38 35 42 1.54 8.5 
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Rostov O. 290 256 235 245 263 276 274 256 258 241 .66 1.0 
Ryazan O. 119 109 107 98 109 98 115 93 104 111 .76 5.6 
Samara O. 170 157 167 196 186 160 183 142 187 162 .98 14.7 
Saratov O. 191 177 157 162 172 191 217 165 171 180 .99 15.8 
Sakhalin O. 54 37 40 43 40 48 51 53 39 40 1.43 8.2 
Sverdlovsk O. 264 235 263 276 251 241 246 258 246 257 .48 5.3 
Smolensk O. 71 88 83 85 62 86 82 90 84 79 1.05 8.0 
Stavropol K. 130 135 117 122 143 143 131 115 120 109 .93 9.8 
Tambov O. 101 116 102 95 86 87 87 89 92 97 .98 8.2 
Tver O. 120 130 108 139 146 153 114 123 113 113 1.23 17.2* 
Tomsk O. 91 76 85 87 68 70 65 82 69 84 1.19 9.9 
Tuva R. 113 113 101 106 107 119 119 120 111 126 .67 4.6 
Tyumen O. 106 130 102 109 95 122 106 125 118 115 .98 9.8 
Udmurt R. 134 117 125 126 97 114 123 123 111 115 .86 7.9 
Ulyanovsk O. 83 80 91 102 109 121 103 109 105 90 1.30 15.2 
Khabarovsk K. 82 92 77 70 88 89 84 77 83 91 .85 5.4 
Khanty–Mansi A.O. 77 73 65 62 55 58 66 66 70 65 1.00 5.9 
Chelyabinsk O. 216 255 229 232 244 221 201 236 209 202 .80 12.9 
Chechen R. 41 44 41 56 42 40 43 52 41 54 1.35 7.4 
Chuvash R. 114 124 124 98 137 111 110 120 111 127 .94 9.3 
Chukotka A.O. 6 8 7 5 7 6 5 2 8 3 3.51 6.3 
Yamalo-Nenets A.O. 19 21 15 20 25 23 20 19 27 22 1.60 4.9 
Yaroslavl O. 74 99 90 85 100 91 95 78 99 95 1.00 8.1 
Median 101 97 95 95 96 94 91 93 96 98 1.0 8.8 
Mean 117 116 114 112 116 115 113 112 114 114 1.23 9.5 
Total 9713 9652 9535 9378 9655 9627 9455 9369 9528 9548 .12 13.2 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. SD denotes the standard deviation of probabilities 
(frequencies are converted into probabilities for this statistic) expressed in percentages (i.e., 
multiplied by 100).     
  denotes chi-squared statistic for the last digit, where all digits’ 
expected probability, according to Benford’s law, is equal to 0.1. Due to space limits, mean 
statistics for digits are rounded and shown without fractional parts. Significance levels: 
14.69 – p < 0.1, 16.92 – p < 0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01, 27.88 – p < 0.001. Significant at : *p < 
0.05, **p < 0.01. 
Table C2 confirms the irrelevance of Benford’s law for detecting fraud in vote 
counts. Not only chi-squared statistic is insignificant at total but also few statistics 
appeared to be significant at the regional level. Surprisingly, we do not find 
significant values of chi-squared even in those regions where elections are evidently 
rigged: in Chechnya (   = 7.4), Tatarstan (   = 4.4), and Bashkiria (   = 11.0). 
Among the highly suspected of fraud regions, only the Dagestan’s statistic is 
significant at 1-percnt level (   = 22.4), yet the statistic for Karelia is of the same 
level of significance (   = 22.9) though the level of fraud in this region is moderate. 
Among the other three regions, where significant irregularities were detected, the 
amount of fraud is moderate in Saint Petersburg (   = 17.3) and Kemerovo Oblast 
(   = 19.1) and rather small in Tver Oblast (   = 17.2).175 
Similarly to Table 3.2, the size of last-digit deviations, as indicated by the 
median, is much larger at the regional level (1.0) than at total (0.12). The chi-
squared statistics do not show such discrepancy; it is even smaller at the regional 
level (8.8) than at total (13.2). Hence, larger last-digit deviations at the subnational 
level occur also under conditions of electoral fraud. Our two measures of this 
discrepancy applied to vote counts, however, do not allow to conclude that the 
difference is larger in the exposed to fraud election data. 
                                                          
175
 See Chapter 5 for measurement of electoral fraud. 
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Table C3. Last-digit frequencies of Putin’s vote share in Russia’s regions from the 
2012 presidential election compared with Benford’s law 
Region 
Last Digit 
SD, %      
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Altai K. 190 212 185 199 195 194 154 188 167 178 .89 13.2 
Amur O. 87 72 58 87 68 67 78 92 90 84 1.47 15.3 
Arkhangelsk O. 113 91 88 104 92 110 102 98 99 87 .91 7.4 
Astrakhan O. 66 53 69 47 60 49 56 62 55 69 1.35 9.6 
Belgorod O. 141 137 117 125 131 121 116 127 124 111 .75 6.4 
Bryansk O. 109 110 120 112 111 127 102 109 105 119 .67 4.5 
Vladimir O. 106 105 96 86 89 86 79 70 106 117 1.54 2.2 
Volgograd O. 190 172 161 146 155 166 190 175 149 149 .99 14.4 
Vologda O. 112 112 102 92 100 86 97 122 117 99 1.10 11.4 
Voronezh O. 158 175 191 163 174 171 172 168 157 151 .68 7.0 
Moscow 367 353 303 333 310 299 316 339 362 403 .98 29.3** 
Saint Petersburg 239 198 220 202 204 190 161 174 173 176 1.23 26.6* 
Jewish A.Ob. 12 13 13 16 11 16 16 18 16 13 1.58 3.2 
Zabaykalsky K. 92 79 91 103 101 97 97 81 100 114 1.09 1.1 
Ivanovo O. 69 69 74 79 64 76 70 66 81 69 .78 3.9 
Irkutsk O. 189 197 177 156 190 215 198 194 220 189 .94 15.2 
Kabardino-Balkar R.  25 14 16 13 25 37 39 38 98 51 7.09 161.1*** 
Kaliningrad O. 59 51 50 61 55 58 65 40 56 56 1.25 7.8 
Kaluga O. 67 59 63 85 73 64 85 77 75 75 1.24 1.0 
Kamchatka K. 36 31 27 28 23 23 40 40 38 37 2.08 12.6 
Karachay-Cherkess 
R. 
22 17 15 20 31 29 31 24 28 29 2.39 12.6 
Kemerovo O. 178 202 186 158 168 174 153 195 141 163 1.11 19.1 
Kirov O. 112 99 118 123 115 134 138 131 109 132 1.04 11.9 
Kostroma O. 72 68 67 64 52 56 64 59 49 72 1.29 9.3 
Krasnodar K. 255 314 282 256 221 298 302 268 237 280 1.09 29.1** 
Krasnoyarsk K. 225 222 246 203 214 209 210 204 214 227 .60 7.0 
Kurgan O. 123 123 107 114 117 121 121 113 114 122 .46 2.2 
Kursk O. 113 104 106 116 116 112 119 127 129 111 .70 5.1 
Leningrad O. 108 106 97 104 110 95 96 95 93 85 .79 5.6 
Lipetsk O. 76 87 86 84 97 108 105 89 80 63 1.53 18.5 
Magadan O. 9 15 15 10 10 6 11 9 10 8 2.75 7.0 
Moscow O. 353 329 334 355 347 349 328 345 306 342 .44 5.9 
Murmansk O. 64 77 40 57 56 65 50 69 63 81 1.96 21.5 
Nenets A.O. 0 6 4 6 6 9 5 6 6 3 4.66 1.0 
Nizhny Novgorod O. 239 223 263 221 224 268 231 210 242 210 .86 15.6 
Novgorod O. 51 52 69 49 67 61 58 44 38 56 1.79 15.7 
Novosibirsk O. 185 213 198 219 244 206 204 183 205 175 .98 17.6 
Omsk O. 207 190 180 194 169 164 175 179 189 200 .74 9.1 
Orenburg O. 192 185 183 183 180 160 171 181 192 185 .53 4.5 
Oryol O. 69 59 88 77 98 64 77 71 73 73 1.50 15.3 
Penza O. 115 122 111 116 114 122 99 131 104 115 .79 6.5 
Perm K. 177 185 179 178 156 177 208 225 202 203 1.06 19.2 
Primorsky K. 197 148 180 159 159 157 151 152 146 138 1.10 17.2 
Pskov O. 52 72 63 57 66 68 79 72 63 56 1.29 9.7 
Adygea R. 28 33 26 20 30 27 24 20 23 33 1.80 7.7 
Altai R. 17 24 28 32 23 20 32 24 20 22 2.09 9.5 
Bashkortostan R. 330 339 393 348 330 479 405 350 281 254 1.81 103.8*** 
Buryatia R. 75 84 91 88 86 84 74 84 86 84 .63 3.0 
Dagestan R. 275 99 111 119 155 250 275 256 196 163 3.68 231.5*** 
Ingushetia R. 7 20 32 45 8 7 4 4 2 1 11.35 150.6*** 
Kalmykia R. 32 23 30 23 27 28 23 27 19 21 1.64 6.1 
Karelia R. 73 47 56 54 63 54 44 56 51 45 1.61 12.7 
Komi R. 67 60 62 73 71 65 64 58 73 67 .79 3.7 
Mari El R. 64 55 64 56 50 47 48 62 60 46 1.29 8.3 
Mordovia R. 50 52 42 55 75 108 105 109 119 87 3.62 94.7*** 
Sakha (Yakutia) R. 85 77 93 75 91 80 81 76 85 70 .89 5.8 
North Ossetia-Alania 
R.  
99 26 28 28 32 30 29 27 23 49 6.16 126.8*** 
Tatarstan R. 216 162 157 182 185 313 299 364 525 450 4.51 522.0*** 
Tuva R. 21 9 8 13 16 18 28 24 22 24 3.67 22.2* 
Khakassia R. 39 38 32 49 43 38 33 39 42 42 1.25 5.5 
Rostov O. 275 273 273 258 277 275 263 233 237 230 .73 12.5 
Ryazan O. 91 111 121 116 118 97 87 95 115 112 1.17 13.2 
Samara O. 153 166 175 170 164 179 179 201 171 152 .83 1.5 
Saratov O. 187 185 174 187 176 202 194 174 136 168 1.01 16.5 
Sakhalin O. 69 48 36 37 43 46 35 37 50 44 2.28 20.7 
Sverdlovsk O. 248 267 259 247 233 232 266 248 283 254 .62 8.8 
Smolensk O. 90 68 64 90 98 78 75 72 99 76 1.53 17.1 
  
280 
 
Stavropol K. 133 138 120 137 130 107 124 135 124 117 .79 7.1 
Tambov O. 111 92 99 90 85 108 82 107 82 96 1.14 11.1 
Tver O. 122 138 127 142 119 113 125 112 135 126 .80 7.3 
Tomsk O. 74 94 80 86 66 72 81 89 67 68 1.27 11.2 
Tuva R. 108 116 113 100 100 110 139 114 116 119 .97 9.7 
Tyumen O. 111 134 125 132 113 131 114 87 83 98 1.64 27.3* 
Udmurt R. 142 132 115 115 111 112 104 98 133 123 1.17 14.5 
Ulyanovsk O. 110 96 110 102 114 101 107 80 88 85 1.18 12.4 
Khabarovsk K. 85 83 93 84 89 77 80 85 78 79 .61 2.8 
Khanty–Mansi A.O. 44 54 67 84 79 101 67 56 67 38 2.88 49.2*** 
Chelyabinsk O. 220 246 249 208 238 219 216 211 247 191 .87 15.4 
Chechen R. 437 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 14 30.32 3757*** 
Chuvash R. 131 91 109 97 126 130 141 125 132 94 1.55 25.3* 
Chukotka A.O. 10 4 3 2 5 3 12 4 11 3 6.62 22.5* 
Yamalo-Nenets A.O. 11 14 14 24 30 39 21 20 18 20 3.94 29.5** 
Yaroslavl O. 89 110 86 100 102 99 81 81 75 83 1.26 13.0 
Median 108 94 96 97 100 101 97 92 99 87 1.17 12.5 
Mean 122 112 112 111 112 117 115 115 116 112 2.07 73.7 
Total 10181 9365 9346 9274 9307 9788 9630 9550 9643 9374 .29 74.6*** 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. Vote share is measured in percentage points and 
pounded (for example, Putin   
     = 616/1010 = 0.6099009901 -> 61%). The most 
numerous last-digit frequencies are shown in bold, bold italics marks the scantiest 
frequencies. SD denotes the standard deviation of probabilities (frequencies are converted 
into probabilities for this statistic) expressed in percentages (i.e., multiplied by 100).     
  
denotes chi-squared statistic for the last digit, where all digits’ expected probability, 
according to Benford’s law, is equal to 0.1. Due to space limits, mean statistics for digits are 
rounded and shown without fractional parts. Significance levels: 14.69 – p < 0.1, 16.92 – p < 
0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01, 27.88 – p < 0.001. Significant at: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.001, ***p < 
0.0001. 
In contrast with the distributions of vote counts, in Table C3, we find support 
for the applicability of Benford’s law for detecting fraud in percentage points of the 
vote. Out of 83 regions, chi-squared statistics are significant at 0.01 and higher 
levels in 17 regions and 26 observations are significant at p < 0.05. All major 
paradigmatic cases of expected fraud are marked by significant    values. No cases 
of fraud are detected misleadingly. A moderate level of fraud is unexpectedly 
detected only in Moscow where nines are observed too frequently and twos are 
observed too seldom. The most deviating case is Chechnya (   = 3757). Zeroes 
prevail in the distribution of the last digit, numbers from 1 to 7 are not observed at 
all, and few numbers of 8 and 9 occur. This happens, however, for the reason that 
the average Putin’s vote share in the region is equal to 99.9%. This vote share is 
rounded to 100 for the analysis. Even if the vote share had been equal to 96–99%, 
the probability of numbers 6–9 would have been higher since the vote share is 
limited on the right at 100%. Such limit is absent if the vote share equals, for 
example, 88% and given that the vote share in a fair electoral contest tend to be 
normally-distributed, the last-digit distribution should theoretically not have an 
intrinsic bias. Put otherwise, the validity of last-digit tests applied to percentages of 
the vote is questionable in cases where the candidate’s vote share in the region 
exceeds 90%.  
Putin’s vote share in Kabardino-Balkar Republic (KBR) is equal to 77.7%. At this 
level, digit tests should work properly. The last-digit distribution in KBR is 
characterized by low frequencies of numbers 1, 2, and 3 (2.4 times smaller than it 
should be according to the LBL) and by excessively frequent number 8 (2.9 times > 
the LBL). Furthermore, 85 out of 98 eights belong to the vote share (78%) that is 
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exactly equal to the region’s average. In this regard, KBR’s data contain a record 
number of falsifications “in a line” (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, this type of fraud 
occurs relatively rarely. The average Putin’s vote share in Mordovia equals 87.6%. 
Here we may again see that eights occur 1.5 times more frequently than the LBL 
prescribes. But exactly equal to the region’s average vote shares (88%) occur only in 
7 precincts; the vast majority of eights belongs to 98% (frequency = 96). A similar 
situation is with adjacent nines (1.4 times > the LBL): only 15 of them belong to 
89% but 52 belong to 99%. This difference, in particular, indicates that types of 
fraud vary by region. 
On the one hand, looking at the most numerous and the scantiest last-digit 
frequencies in the regions where most serious irregularities were detected (indicated 
by bold font), we can see several digit biases: 1) a bias toward zeroes (Dagestan 
(together with nines), North Ossetia (together with nines), Sakhalin, and Chechnya), 
2) a bias toward fives (Bashkiria, Dagestan, and Khanty–Mansi A.O.), 3) a bias 
toward nines (Moscow, North Ossetia, and Tatarstan), and a bias toward numbers 
between 5 and 9 (KBR, Mordovia, and Tuva). These biases are sometimes mutually 
exclusive. A bias toward fives in Bashkiria leads to a lower frequency of nines. In  
Yamalo-Nenets A.O., it lowers the frequency on zeroes. In Khanty–Mansi A.O., a 
bias toward fives lowers both frequencies of zeroes and nines. A bias toward eights 
lowers the frequency of zeroes in Mordovia. 
On the other hand, in the result of aggregation, this variety of biases produces a 
general pattern in which smaller numbers (1, 2, and 3) are scarce and zeroes, fives, 
and eights are excessive. To what extent are effects of these biases muted in the 
result of aggregation? We can try to answer this question by comparing region-
specific and total indicators from Table C2 where no fraud is detected and Table C3 
where a considerable amount of fraud is detected, while both represent the same 
election and only the level of fraud rather than other characteristics should 
theoretically influence the cross-regional variability. Presumably, if the average 
standard deviation of the last-digit probabilities relatively to the country-total 
standard deviation is larger in the case of fraud than in the case where no fraud is 
detected, then the larger variance of probabilities at the regional level is muted 
when the data are pooled. The ratio of median to total SD (8.3) is close to the ratio 
of mean to total SD (10.3) in Table C2. Where electoral fraud is detected by the LBL 
(Table C3), the distribution of regional SD of last-digit probabilities is more skewed 
due to the cases of extreme fraud (Chechya, Tatarstan etc.), therefore to the ratio of 
mean to total SD (7.1) is considerably larger than the ratio of median to total SD 
(4.0). However, the both ratios are rather smaller than the ratios from the table with 
vote counts. Hence, at least from this comparison, we cannot conclude that the 
existing region-level biases are muted in the result of aggregation. 
It should be also pointed out that the digit biases observed in Table C3 are 
substantively different from those revealed in the literature. The experimental 
results suggest that subjects prefer small numbers (1, 2, and 3) over larger 
numbers (5 – 9) and zero when they are asked to produce random numbers (Beber 
and Scacco 2012: 218–220). By contrast, the last-digit frequencies indicate that 
perpetrators of fraud largely prefer zeroes, fives, and larger numbers, whereas small 
numbers (1, 2, and 3) are neglected. 
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Figure C1 confirms a finding from the main text in Chapter 3 that the scope of 
variance of the last digit probabilities is larger when the number of observations is 
smaller and displays that this relationship is exponential for both vote counts and 
vote percentages. This fact, additionally to similar results of Table 3.2, puts validity 
of measures designed to gauge the share of falsified polling stations based on the 
deviation of observed digit probabilities from Benford’s law (such as Medzihorsky 
2015) into question, especially at the regional level, so long as these measures do 
not take the dependence of the last-digit SD on the number of cases into account. 
Figure C1. The dependence of the region-level standard deviations of last-digit 
probabilities on the number of observations    
    
Note: The data come from Table C2 and C3, respectively. Chechnya as an outlier is 
excluded from the plot on the right. 
Appendix C3. Falsification of a polling station protocol: The last digit remains 
unamended 
Figures C2 and C3 display a photocopy of electoral commission’s protocol of 
polling station (UIK) No. 681 (located at Saint Petersburg, territorial electoral 
commission (TIK) No. 21) from the Russian 2011 parliamentary election . The copy 
is made by the author in the role of electoral observer at the polling station.176 In 
combination with Figure C4, which shows the official election results for the set of 
UIKs in TIK No. 21, Figures C2 and C3 clearly indicate that fictitious numbers were 
reported by the Central Electoral Commission in such a manner that the number of 
eligible voters, the number of valid ballots, and other common fields (first 18 cells in 
the table) remained the same as in the polling station protocol but only the results 
of political parties were changed. Furthermore, the results were changed so that 
only the first or first two digits in the vote counts deviate from the protocol but the 
last digit is left unamended.  
                                                          
176
 For the full process of observation, see the video entitled “The Total Falsification of Elections in Saint 
Petersburg on 04.12.2011 [Totalnaya Falsifikatsiya Vyborov v Peterburge 04.12.2011]”. Available at:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DPKN3tDOZ4 
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Figure C2. The copy of protocol of UIK No. 681 (Saint Petersburg, TIK No. 21) from 
the Russian 2011 parliamentary election, the front page 
  
Figure C3. The copy of protocol of UIK No. 681 (Saint Petersburg, TIK No. 21) from 
the Russian 2011 parliamentary election, pages 2–3 
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Figure C4. Election results from the Russian 2011 parliamentary election reported 
by the electoral commission, including UIK No. 681 (Saint Petersburg, TIK No. 21)   
 
Note: The table is a webpage screenshot of the Saint Petersburg Electoral Commission. 
Available at at: 
http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom?action=show&global=true&root=78200002
8&tvd=2782000259702&vrn=100100028713299&prver=0&pronetvd=null&region=78&sub_
region=78&type=233&vibid=2782000259702 (site visit: 10 January 2018). 
Nearly all “stolen” votes were expectedly redistributed in favor of United Russia; 
only the mostly affiliated with the incumbent LDPR received a “bonus” of 30 votes.  
Judging from the absolute number of votes, Just Russia has suffered the most – it 
was deprived of 210 of its votes, thereby its vote share decreased from 24.1% to 
8.6%. The second challenger – KPRF – lost exactly 200 votes and its vote share 
decreased from 19.3% to 4.6%. A liberal-democratic party Yabloko, which is 
relatively popular in Saint Petersburg, lost the most in relative terms – 120 (82.2%) 
of its 146 votes, ant its vote share decreased from 10.7% to an insignificant 1.9%. 
Few votes of two small “spoiler parties” – the Patriots of Russia and the Right Cause 
– appeared to be unchanged. In the result, United Russia gained 500 additional 
votes to the initial 417 (i.e., received 2.2 times more votes than it possessed); its 
vote share increased from 30.6% to 66.5%. Notwithstanding these huge changes, 
the last digit in the vote counts is unamended. This example shows how the 
numbers can be easily manipulated to make last-digit Benford’s law irrelevant for 
detecting fraud in electoral data.  
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Table C4. Last-digit frequencies and probabilities of the difference between the 
official vote counts and the vote counts indicated in copies of polling station protocols 
from the Russian 2011 parliamentary election 
Last Digit 
United Russia Just Russia KPRF Yabloko Total 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
0 208 31.9 202 54.6 118 38.2 137 40.1 665 39.7 
1 62 9.5 25 6.8 27 8.7 27 7.9 141 8.4 
2 48 7.4 17 4.6 20 6.5 30 8.8 115 6.9 
3 41 6.3 22 5.9 23 7.4 25 7.3 111 6.6 
4 60 9.2 19 5.1 18 5.8 19 5.6 116 6.9 
5 60 9.2 27 7.3 29 9.4 30 8.8 146 8.7 
6 38 5.8 13 3.5 16 5.2 23 6.7 90 5.4 
7 52 8.0 12 3.2 16 5.2 14 4.1 94 5.6 
8 46 7.0 19 5.1 21 6.8 22 6.4 108 6.5 
9 38 5.8 14 3.8 21 6.8 15 4.4 88 5.3 
Total 653 100 370 100 309 100 342 100 1674 100 
Note: Data source: RuElect (2011). 
As follows from last-digit frequencies of the difference between the official United 
Russia’s vote count and its vote count from polling station protocols collected by 
observers (RuElect 2011), this type of electoral forgery is widespread. Out of 653 
cases in which the difference between the official data and the data of protocols 
exceeds zero,177 in 64 cases this difference is equal to a factor of 100 (100, 200, 
300...). Put otherwise, in nearly ten percent of cases, fraudsters do not bother 
themselves with complicated calculations; they simply add exactly one or several 
hundreds of votes to United Russia. They also tend to add quantities of votes that 
are factors of ten. In 208 (31.9%) cases, the last digit of the difference between the 
official United Russia’s vote and its result verified by electoral observers turns out 
to be zero (see Table C4). The proportion of zeroes in the last digit of the number of 
votes “stolen” from the opposition parties is even larger. It reaches 54.6% in Just 
Russia’s fictitiously subtracted votes and equals to 38.2% and 40.1% for KPRF and 
Yabloko, respectively. In 163 cases, vote counts were falsified so that United Russia 
received an additional number of votes that can be divided by 10 without producing 
a fraction and at the same time each of major opposition parties (Just Russia, 
KPRF, and Yabloko) either lost a number of votes that can be also evenly divided by 
10 or its vote counts were unamended. Thus, nearly in one third of cases (in 31.9% 
regarding only United Russia’s votes and in 25.0% if opposition’s votes are 
simultaneously taken into account), fraudsters changed only the first, first two or 
first three significant digits in vote counts but left the last digit unamended by 
adding (to United Russia) or subtracting (from opposition’s vote counts) numbers 
that are factors of ten. These findings are, however, relevant only to those polling 
stations for which copies of polling station protocols are available (N = 1022). The 
                                                          
177
 In no case the difference is negative. It equals zero in 369 (36.1%) cases. Hence, United Russia’s election 
results were changed in its favor after the vote count in 63.9% of cases. 
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pattern of fraud is more likely to be different in non-monitored polling stations 
where electoral manipulations are more centralized and members of electoral 
commissions are compelled to produce a claimed share of the vote.  
Table C4 also indicates that the second fraudster preference in adding or 
subtracting fictitious vote counts regarding the last digit is number five. In other 
words, fraudsters add (or subtract) fives to the last digit of genuine vote counts. 
Nevertheless, since the last digit in a genuine vote count is distributed in conformity 
with Benford’s law, a systematic adding or subtracting of any constant does not 
cause a deviation of the falsified vote counts from Benford’s law probabilities. 
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Appendix D. Supplementary Materials to Chapter 4 
Appendix D1. The results of the analysis of electoral fraud by region and year 
Table D1. Incumbent’s official vote share, QR vote estimate, measures of fraud, 
and election observer reports by Russia’s regions, the presidential election of 2012 
Region 
Putin 
  
    , 
official 
Putin 
  
    , 
observers 
N of 
re-
ports 
QR 
adjusted 
estimate  
N of 
TIKs (%) 
Clus-
ter 
QR 
fraud 
MADT MADR      
  
Altai K. .5794 .5114 5 .5363 41(55) 1.4 -.0990 .0671 .0247 16.1 
Amur O. .6359 .5986 3 .5893 20(69) 1.6 -.2119 .0771 .0298 19.2 
Arkhangel. O. .5853 .5541 3 .5346 25(78) 1.7 -.0297 .0713 .0325 16.7 
Astrakhan O. .6958 .6370 6 .6089 14(88) 2.2 -.4362 .0775 .0545 13.4 
Belgorod O. .5998 .5197 3 .4958 21(95) 1.8 -1.174 .0752 .0364 21.8 
Bryansk O. .6466 .5692 2 .5442 28(82) 2.1 -.8626 .0876 .0352 1.1 
Vladimir O. .5422 .5029 23 .5488 21(91) 1.2 .0015 .0531 .0226 15.2 
Volgograd O. .6404 .5929 24 .5600 42(95) 1.9 -.9765 .0726 .0390 13.9 
Vologda O. .6009 .6031 5 .5633 23(79) 1.4 -.3246 .0575 .0314 19.7 
Voronezh O. .6196 .5994 8 .5196 34(87) 1.8 -1.298 .0723 .0363 18.3 
Moscow .4794 .4605 
110
8 
.4876 93(74) 1.2 -.4088 .0336 .0208 13.4 
St. Petersburg .5960 .5180 169 .5327 26(87) 2.2 -2.184 .0566 .0451 25.6 
Jewish A.Ob. .6254  0 .5623 3(50) 1.4 -.1879 .0835 .0238 11.4 
Zabaykals. K. .6639 .6114 1 .6021 23(61) 1.8 -.2924 .0882 .0297 15.1 
Ivanovo O. .6250 .6032 14 .5820 15(50) 1.8 -.7725 .0669 .0230 11.0 
Irkutsk O. .5609 .5066 40 .5387 38(84) 1.4 -.1247 .0668 .0263 17.1 
Kab.-Balk. R.  .7773 n.a. 0 .7104 3(23) 3.5 .6254 .0447 .0144 77.0 
Kaliningrad O. .5322 .5319 5 .4452 9(38) 1.7 .1227 .0704 .0271 14.5 
Kaluga O. .5976 .5400 12 .5527 13(46) 1.6 -.3693 .0631 .0242 15.1 
Kamchatka K. .6059 n.a. 0 .5620 3(21) 1.1 -.2469 .0546 .0301 22.9 
Karachay-. R. .9155 n.a. 0 .6544c 0(0) 4.0 -1.485 .0364 .0233 31.2 
Kemerovo O. .7795 .6599 6 .6143 36(78) 2.5 -3.350 .0761 .0366 14.8 
Kirov O. .5860 .6088 1 .5518 21(44) 1.4 -.2408 .0580 .0273 17.9 
Kostroma O. .5325 .5119 19 .5089 10(33) 1.3 -.3820 .0471 .0275 27.4 
Krasnodar K. .6451 .5942 32 .5389 56(95) 2.1 -.8133 .0827 .0383 14.1 
Krasnoyar. K. .6092 .5924 12 .5649 53(77) 1.6 -.1552 .0663 .0267 17.3 
Kurgan O. .6396 .5489 16 .5670 26(96) 1.5 -.2232 .0767 .0339 14.8 
Kursk O. .6109 .5744 10 .5625 31(89) 1.6 -.4763 .0595 .0334 17.5 
Leningrad O. .6273 .5610 13 .5670 
18 
(100) 
1.8 -.4596 .0719 .0377 17.6 
Lipetsk O. .6176 .5693 20 .5668 
23 
(100) 
1.6 -.7042 .0592 .0278 19.7 
Magadan O. .5687 n.a. 0 .4905 1(10) 1.0 -.2696 .0563 .0189 12.8 
Moscow O. .5785 .5338 178 .5413 49(66) 1.5 -.4070 .0581 .0308 16.4 
Murmansk O. .6076 .6358 8 .5591 8(47) 2.7 -.3909 .0917 .0557 3.6 
Nenets A.O. .5780 n.a. 0 .5179 1(50) 2.0 -.0449 .1043 .0715 12.8 
Nizh. Novg. O. .6450 .5712 47 .5579 50(82) 1.7 -.7372 .0681 .0334 15.2 
Novgorod O. .5858 .5237 5 .5642 7(32) 1.5 -.1475 .0564 .0259 18.7 
Novosibirsk O. .5703 .5184 19 .5329 40(91) 1.4 -.0562 .0564 .0296 16.1 
Omsk O. .5627 .4508 6 .5108 35(95) 1.5 -.2420 .0728 .0326 18.8 
Orenburg O. .5747 .5160 8 .5376 46(94) 1.5 -.3601 .0593 .0314 15.9 
Oryol O. .5345 .4984 17 .4615 19(63) 1.5 -.3535 .0503 .0310 14.4 
Penza O. .6510 .5433 6 .5578 
32 
(100) 
2.0 -2.062 .0692 .0359 14.5 
Perm K. .6384 .6027 28 .6287 41(76) 1.4 -.1776 .0572 .0248 14.5 
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Primorsky K. .5812 .4222 9 .4859 29(78) 2.2 .9202 .0755 .0570 2.3 
Pskov O. .6035 .6105 2 .5595 11(42) 1.4 -.3744 .0580 .0275 16.6 
Adygea R. .6494 .6381 19 .5864 7(78) 1.8 -.4488 .0672 .0325 13.4 
Altai R. .6763 n.a. 0 .5702 8(73) 1.8 -.4104 .0787 .0385 9.9 
Bashkort. R. .7586 .6393 22 .5667 54(78) 2.9 -5.039 .0833 .0392 26.1 
Buryatia R. .6699 n.a. 0 .5521 18(72) 2.3 -.7418 .1242 .0400 14.7 
Dagestan R. .9318 n.a. 0 .6571 9(17) 3.8 -9e+10 .0355 .0201 58.6 
Ingushetia R. .9215 n.a. 0 .6598c 0(0) 4.0 -.3941 .0367 .0063 67.2 
Kalmykia R. .7096 n.a. 0 .6077 3(21) 1.4 -.6040 .0645 .0304 15.1 
Karelia R. .5608 .5138 22 .5374 12(60) 1.3 -.1674 .0602 .0266 13.8 
Komi R. .6589 .6706 82 .5761 19(90) 1.8 -.5425 .0580 .0368 13.0 
Mari El R. .6061 .5873 23 .5200 11(61) 1.6 -.8997 .0496 .0366 14.7 
Mordovia R. .8763 .8437 1 .6263 9(36) 3.4 -12.69 .0544 .0339 23.4 
Yakutia R. .7007 .6630 0 .5850 17(49) 1.7 -.5737 .0816 .0334 15.4 
North Osse. R.  .7074 n.a. 0 .6172 5(50) 2.5 .0092 .0643 .0265 115 
Tatarstan R. .8330 .6630 12 .6004 16(25) 3.3 -17.16 .0389 .0318 36.8 
Tuva R. .9053 n.a. 0 .6339 1(5) 3.0 -1.215 .0670 .0295 8.3 
Khakassia R. .5907 n.a. 0 .5330 11(85) 1.6 -.6285 .0656 .0311 15.9 
Rostov O. .6331 .5826 59 .5556 57(92) 2.0 -.9675 .0725 .0414 16.3 
Ryazan O. .6037 .5470 5 .5435 23(72) 1.7 -.6689 .0602 .0370 17.7 
Samara O. .5935 .5392 33 .5385 38(81) 1.9 -.2952 .0568 .0290 2.4 
Saratov O. .7131 .6482 29 .5995 33(70) 2.5 -2.227 .0945 .0463 17.9 
Sakhalin O. .5701 .5447 1 .5178 5(25) 1.3 -.2159 .0533 .0312 23.5 
Sverdlovsk O. .6531 .6053 18 .6326 50(63) 1.3 -.1325 .0543 .0234 15.5 
Smolensk O. .5739 .5059 2 .5400 17(59) 1.6 -.6638 .0596 .0302 14.9 
Stavropol K. .6515 .6698 20 .5859 30(81) 1.9 -.5756 .0732 .0290 12.5 
Tambov O. .7241 n.a. 0 .5832 23(72) 2.2 -1.223 .0984 .0419 11.4 
Tver O. .5865 .5530 8 .5426 31(69) 1.5 -.3309 .0662 .0290 13.3 
Tomsk O. .5773 .5309 14 .5538 18(78) 1.3 -.1098 .0578 .0238 15.5 
Tuva R. .6847 .6003 7 .5823 24(83) 2.0 -.6733 .0934 .0361 14.3 
Tyumen O. .7371 .6533 7 .5773 21(72) 2.5 -3.533 .0535 .0570 16.3 
Udmurt R. .6652 .6118 5 .6134 29(85) 1.7 -.3939 .0587 .0242 2.5 
Ulyanovsk O. .5879 .5454 3 .5475 28(97) 1.5 -.3746 .0587 .0277 17.7 
Khabarovsk K. .5691 .5238 9 .5085 18(78) 1.5 -.2195 .0751 .0276 19.7 
Khanty-. A.O. .6724 .6393 2 .6393 11(50) 2.1 -.1637 .0545 .0177 37.9 
Chelyabin. O. .6599 .6169 55 .6208 46(90) 1.6 -.3013 .0633 .0266 16.4 
Chechen R. .9990 n.a. 0 .6410c 0(0) 4.0 28.291 .0011 .0004 261 
Chuvash R. .6326 .5894 14 .5494 
28 
(100) 
2.1 -.8939 .0468 .0355 16.6 
Chukotka A.O. .7371 n.a. 0 n.a. 0(0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Yamalo-. A.O. .8526 n.a. 0 .5709 2(15) 3.3 -16.50 .0282 .0427 28.1 
Yaroslavl O. .5515 .4887 1 .5132 23(88) 1.3 -.0946 .0543 .0287 12.9 
Mean 
.6435a .5148a 
29 .5548 1893 
(69)b 
1.9 -1e+10 .0632 .0331 20.3 
Median 6 .5517 2.0 -.2944 .0582 .0292 15.3 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. The official vote share and the share based on the data 
of electoral observers are calculated as ratios of summed Putin’s votes to summed valid 
votes. The data of electoral observers comes from http://ruelect.com (accessed in March 
2012). QR adjusted estimate, Cluster, QR fraud, MADT, MADR, and      
  are calculated as 
the means weighted by the number of eligible voters; their total means and medians are also 
weighted by the number of eligible voters. N of TIKs (%) denotes the number of TIKs used in 
the analysis for derivation of QR adjusted estimate as percentage of the total number of TIKs 
(in parentheses). a. The total averages are the ratios of total Putin’s votes to total valid votes.  
b. Denotes the total number of TIKs in the analysis as percentage of the total number of 
TIKs (in parentheses). c. Values are imputed using predicted values from the following 
model, which is fitted at the level of TIKs with the limited MADT [0, 0.15] and  
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MADR [0, 0.1]:                                                                    
                                                                       . 
Model’s R-squared = 0.8297. After the variable of electoral fraud has been predicted, the 
adjusted QR estimate is defined as the difference between the official share of the vote and 
the predicted value of fraud. 
Table D2. Incumbent’s official vote share, QR vote estimate, and measures of 
fraud by Russia’s regions, the presidential election of 2008 
Region 
Medvedev 
  
    , 
official 
QR 
adjusted 
estimate  
Fraud, 
% 
N of 
TIKs (%) 
Clus-
ter 
QR fraud MADT MADR      
  
Altai K. .6133 .5912 2.2 43(60) 1.7 -.1182 .0715 .0357 15.9 
Amur O. .6509 .6098 4.1 18(64) 1.9 -.4751 .0920 .0438 19.2 
Arkhangelsk O. .6831 .6373 4.6 19(66) 1.7 -1.2228 .0667 .0256 28.6 
Astrakhan O. .7740 .7191 5.5 12(75) 2.5 -.3742 .1125 .0387 21.0 
Belgorod O. .7066 .6075 9.9 15(68) 2.1 -3.7942 .0603 .0376 27.8 
Bryansk O. .6261 .5891 3.7 21(66) 1.5 -.5727 .0689 .0268 14.2 
Vladimir O. .6444 .6431 0.1 21(91) 1.4 -.1648 .0604 .0213 16.5 
Volgograd O. .6317 .5797 5.2 31(78) 1.6 -.2895 .0833 .0353 18.5 
Vologda O. .6907 .6437 4.7 15(63) 1.6 -.4141 .0675 .0254 46.1 
Voronezh O. .6813 .6103 7.1 16(59) 1.9 -3.0006 .0807 .0390 14.7 
Moscow .7438 .6621 8.2 71(63) 2.1 -1.0718 .0744 .0220 23.9 
St. Petersburg .7356 .6697 6.6 25(83) 2.0 -.6162 .0950 .0245 23.7 
Jewish A.Ob. .6593 n.a. 65.9 0(0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Zabaykalsky K. .6637 .5949 6.9 21(62) 1.8 -.6304 .0720 .0343 18.2 
Ivanovo O. .6532 .6784 -2.5 8(50) 1.3 -.0329 .0578 .0167 15.3 
Irkutsk O. .6201 .5855 3.5 37(82) 1.5 -.2727 .0733 .0310 17.4 
Kab.-Balk. R.  .8890 .7076 18.1 5(38) 3.4 -8.5903 .0291 .0222 36.1 
Kaliningrad O. .6298 .6000 3.0 9(39) 1.9 -.3507 .0755 .0307 16.0 
Kaluga O. .6659 .6244 4.1 18(69) 1.6 -.4171 .0689 .0257 18.4 
Kamchatka K. .7390 .3192 42.0 1(7) 3.0 -3.9600 .0000 .2055 34.3 
Karachay-Ch. R. .9059 .6347 27.1 2(18) 3.6 -65.4751 .0346 .0201 28.8 
Kemerovo O. .7288 .6253 10.4 37(79) 1.9 -.9631 .0488 .0280 28.6 
Kirov O. .7853 .6835 10.2 35(74) 2.6 1.7678 .0974 .0385 22.5 
Kostroma O. .6302 .6156 1.5 13(57) 1.5 -.0491 .0545 .0280 24.6 
Krasnodar K. .7635 .6403 12.3 36(68) 2.4 -2.1730 .0611 .0487 21.9 
Krasnoyar. K. .6289 .6036 2.5 39(58) 1.5 -.2975 .0630 .0282 24.7 
Kurgan O. .6542 .6235 3.1 25(93) 1.7 -.0513 .0838 .0376 13.8 
Kursk O. .6789 .6258 5.3 22(71) 2.0 -1.0043 .0708 .0448 13.8 
Leningrad O. .7098 .6696 4.0 17(94) 1.9 -.3854 .1039 .0250 17.0 
Lipetsk O. .6689 .5777 9.1 23(100) 1.7 -1.3385 .0457 .0364 22.4 
Magadan O. .6399 .5314 10.8 1(10) 1.0 -.5419 .0562 .0263 27.5 
Moscow O. .7138 .6390 7.5 47(69) 2.0 -.8210 .0815 .0272 28.1 
Murmansk O. .6549 .6222 3.3 5(31) 1.9 -.2275 .0520 .0561 3.3 
Nenets A.O. .6255 .6547 -2.9 1(50) 2.0 .1991 .1411 .0467 9.6 
Nizhny Novgorod O. .6243 .5827 4.2 49(83) 1.5 -.2477 .0549 .0263 33.6 
Novgorod O. .6636 .6452 1.8 9(41) 1.4 -.3605 .0748 .0204 24.7 
Novosibirsk O. .6277 .5948 3.3 36(78) 1.4 -.2006 .0604 .0334 2.1 
Omsk O. .6425 .5695 7.3 35(95) 1.8 -.4648 .0599 .0438 37.2 
Orenburg O. .6140 .5816 3.2 46(94) 1.7 -.4124 .0794 .0388 15.1 
Oryol O. .6721 .5707 10.1 24(80) 2.2 -1.5576 .0571 .0357 21.5 
Penza O. .7497 .6397 11.0 27(87) 2.3 -2.6022 .0522 .0420 11.6 
Perm K. .6708 .6565 1.4 34(74) 1.4 -.1556 .0596 .0197 27.2 
Primorsky K. .6468 .5819 6.5 27(73) 2.2 -1.1852 .0780 .0443 22.5 
Pskov O. .7045 .6271 7.7 15(58) 1.8 -1.0001 .0643 .0267 22.0 
Adygea R. .6951 .6195 7.6 8(89) 1.7 -3.7137 .0831 .0323 18.1 
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Altai R. .7470 .6624 8.5 11(100) 2.2 -.6782 .0683 .0420 19.9 
Bashkortostan R. .8885 .6892 19.9 14(21) 3.5 -16.1632 .0364 .0282 61.9 
Buryatia R. .7084 .6194 8.9 15(68) 2.4 -.8176 .1062 .0386 25.7 
Dagestan R. .9205 .7209 20.0 16(30) 3.6 6.1e+12 .0261 .0214 52.9 
Ingushetia R. .9177 .6808c 13.7c 0(0) 4.0 1.2959 .0033 .0011 16.9 
Kalmykia R. .7231 .6621 6.1 3(21) 2.0 -.8314 .0589 .0347 1.3 
Karelia R. .6807 .6644 1.6 13(65) 1.6 -.5223 .0628 .0208 18.7 
Komi R. .7255 .6536 7.2 19(90) 1.9 -.2736 .0712 .0385 16.3 
Mari El R. .7811 .6072 17.4 10(56) 2.2 -2.9161 .0411 .0286 2.6 
Mordovia R. .9081 .6449 26.3 5(20) 3.5 -39.8845 .0355 .0236 38.8 
Yakutia R. .6890 .6113 7.8 14(41) 1.8 -.1492 .0888 .0309 24.5 
North Ossetia R.  .7480 .6756 7.2 7(70) 2.0 -.4827 .1058 .0470 12.9 
Tatarstan R. .8191 .6203 19.9 19(31) 3.0 3.7e+12 .0346 .0274 4.5 
Tuva R. .9037 .7551 14.9 1(5) 2.0 .1010 .1210 .0196 6.6 
Khakassia R. .6197 .6030 1.7 9(82) 1.4 -.3234 .0691 .0330 12.7 
Rostov O. .7756 .6699 10.6 55(89) 2.3 -2.3290 .0859 .0340 18.2 
Ryazan O. .6173 .5944 2.3 23(72) 1.5 -.1610 .0601 .0275 14.4 
Samara O. .6495 .6211 2.8 41(91) 1.4 -.6221 .0625 .0251 3.7 
Saratov O. .7646 .6393 12.5 32(68) 2.4 -2.4129 .1146 .0396 17.4 
Sakhalin O. .6419 .6059 3.6 12(60) 1.4 -.1971 .0697 .0254 29.9 
Sverdlovsk O. .7022 .6769 2.5 43(60) 1.2 -.1285 .0561 .0169 34.5 
Smolensk O. .6032 .5637 4.0 20(69) 1.8 -.6313 .0839 .0328 13.4 
Stavropol K. .6455 .5834 6.2 22(65) 1.8 -.5974 .0808 .0300 19.6 
Tambov O. .7488 .6531 9.6 25(78) 2.6 -1.0666 .0791 .0594 22.1 
Tver O. .6905 .6408 5.0 21(57) 2.0 -.4597 .0832 .0345 18.0 
Tomsk O. .6563 .6324 2.4 13(62) 1.4 -.2407 .0669 .0250 17.0 
Tuva R. .6857 .6259 6.0 19(68) 2.0 -.7906 .0866 .0311 14.8 
Tyumen O. .7924 .6365 15.6 8(31) 2.6 -6.7237 .0455 .0392 28.8 
Udmurt R. .7007 .6591 4.2 25(74) 1.3 -.2192 .0545 .0179 3.5 
Ulyanovsk O. .6501 .6385 1.2 19(66) 1.3 -.2595 .0461 .0213 34.5 
Khabarovsk K. .6564 .5753 8.1 8(42) 1.6 -.7915 .0644 .0246 15.2 
Khanty-Mansi. A.O. .6784 .5791 9.9 13(59) 1.4 -.1131 .0428 .0205 28.9 
Chelyabin. O. .6625 .6113 5.1 41(84) 1.3 -.1846 .0543 .0236 26.9 
Chechen R. .8878 .7310 15.7 3(15) 3.6 -.0245 .0202 .0200 36.1 
Chuvash R. .6824 .5896 9.3 16(80) 1.8 -1.4136 .0540 .0360 37.0 
Chukotka A.O. .8255 n.a n.a. 0(0) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Yamalo-Nenets A.O. .8441 .6717 17.2 3(23) 2.7 -2.5307 .0633 .0584 1.7 
Yaroslavl O. .6460 .6335 1.2 19(79) 1.3 -.1422 .0559 .0200 18.3 
Mean 
.7122a 
.6286 8.6 1654 
(64)b 
1.9 1.7e+11 .0673 .0298 26.2 
Median .6284 6.5 2.0 -.3554 .0571 .0249 20.4 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. The official vote share is calculated as the ratio of 
summed Medvedev’s votes to summed valid votes. QR adjusted estimate, Cluster, QR fraud, 
MADT, MADR, and      
  are calculated as the means weighted by the number of eligible 
voters; their total means and medians are also weighted by the number of eligible voters. N 
of TIKs (%) denotes the number of TIKs used in the analysis for derivation of QR adjusted 
estimate as percentage of the total number of TIKs (in parentheses). a. The total average is 
the ratio of total Putin’s votes to total valid votes.  b. Denotes the total number of TIKs in the 
analysis as percentage of the total number of TIKs (in parentheses). c. Imputed using 
predicted values from the following model, which is fitted at the level of TIKs with the limited 
MADT [0, 0.15] and  
MADR [0, 0.1]:                                                                  
                                                                          . 
Model’s R-squared = 0.7426. After the variable of electoral fraud has been predicted, the 
adjusted QR estimate is defined as the difference between the official share of the vote and 
the predicted value of fraud. 
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Table D3. Incumbent’s official vote share, QR vote estimate, and measures of 
fraud by Russia’s regions, the presidential election of 2004 
Region 
Putin 
  
    , 
official 
QR 
adjusted 
estimate  
Fraud, 
(%) 
N of TIKs 
(%) 
Clus-
ter 
QR fraud MADT MADR      
  
Altai K. .6877 .6329 5.5 38(54) 1.5 .0457 .0728 .0281 16.5 
Amur O. .6487 .6141 3.5 19(70) 1.7 -.1454 .0864 .0420 18.0 
Arkhangelsk O. .7762 .7047 7.1 25(83) 2.1 -.1886 .0726 .0233 31.0 
Astrakhan O. .6609 .6189 4.2 13(81) 1.6 -.3166 .0850 .0340 20.6 
Belgorod O. .5557 .5051 5.1 18(82) 1.7 -.3102 .0603 .0457 25.5 
Bryansk O. .6439 .6162 2.8 24(73) 1.4 -.0105 .0701 .0331 18.6 
Vladimir O. .6922 .6547 3.8 18(82) 1.5 -.2023 .0601 .0239 22.8 
Volgograd O. .6332 .6106 2.3 41(91) 1.5 -.0884 .0742 .0320 18.8 
Vologda O. .7650 .7002 6.5 24(86) 1.5 -.2514 .0791 .0282 33.2 
Voronezh O. .6530 .6035 4.9 28(82) 1.5 -.2487 .0868 .0315 13.6 
Moscow .6924 .6517 4.1 79(68) 1.4 -.3775 .0546 .0229 15.4 
St. Petersburg .7532 .6950 5.8 23(82) 1.8 -.0022 .0426 .0177 57.1 
Jewish A.Ob. .6862 .6339 5.2 4(67) 1.7 -.6628 .0779 .0362 15.0 
Zabaykalsky K. .7351 .6841 5.1 19(54) 1.9 -.3930 .0959 .0322 23.6 
Ivanovo O. .6772 .6493 2.8 22(73) 1.3 -.0444 .0682 .0206 14.7 
Irkutsk O. .6344 .6048 3.0 36(84) 1.5 -.1983 .0706 .0279 21.5 
Kab.-Balk. R.  .9603 .6904 27.0 1(8) 3.9 -3.6294 .0107 .0236 139.5 
Kaliningrad O. .7046 .6207 8.4 10(43) 1.4 -.3394 .0618 .0278 12.7 
Kaluga O. .7013 .6592 4.2 9(45) 1.5 -.4877 .0732 .0207 16.0 
Kamchatka K. .7346 .6695 6.5 3(27) 1.1 -.3131 .0616 .0321 17.5 
Karachay-Ch. R. .8269 .6597 16.7 4(40) 2.5 -1.6703 .1093 .0413 14.6 
Kemerovo O. .7304 .6374 9.3 37(82) 2.0 -2.7e+12 .0745 .0377 18.5 
Kirov O. .6649 .6320 3.3 29(71) 1.6 -.1638 .0866 .0376 15.4 
Kostroma O. .6981 .6881 1.0 16(53) 1.6 .0071 .0715 .0311 16.8 
Krasnodar K. .6742 .6212 5.3 44(88) 1.6 -.1913 .0874 .0304 16.3 
Krasnoyar. K. .6185 .6044 1.4 51(70) 1.6 -.1515 .0717 .0281 26.7 
Kurgan O. .6740 .6446 2.9 23(88) 1.7 -.0451 .0899 .0424 16.8 
Kursk O. .6494 .5955 5.4 19(59) 1.5 -.1763 .0716 .0329 25.9 
Leningrad O. .7725 .7319 4.1 17(61) 1.9 -.7244 .0628 .0280 17.4 
Lipetsk O. .6415 .5788 6.3 16(80) 1.4 -.1280 .0507 .0290 21.5 
Magadan O. .7306 .6732 5.7 1(10) 3.0 .1633 .0000 .1412 16.9 
Moscow O. .7186 .6791 3.9 45(65) 1.5 -.4372 .0628 .0250 21.0 
Murmansk O. .7358 .6600 7.6 6(32) 2.5 -.2435 .0589 .0359 41.8 
Nenets A.O. .7654 .7295 3.6 2(100) 1.4 -.0322 .0832 .0351 13.0 
Nizhny Novgorod O. .6618 .6341 2.8 53(88) 1.5 -.2431 .0737 .0293 19.0 
Novgorod O. .7073 .6724 3.5 5(33) 1.3 -.0790 .0647 .0220 13.5 
Novosibirsk O. .6295 .6127 1.7 35(92) 1.4 -.1131 .0711 .0393 14.2 
Omsk O. .6722 .6276 4.5 31(89) 1.5 -.2464 .0788 .0379 23.6 
Orenburg O. .6004 .5729 2.7 36(86) 1.5 -.2807 .0695 .0407 15.2 
Oryol O. .6301 .5375 9.3 15(56) 1.8 -1.8300 .0572 .0483 10.9 
Penza O. .6455 .5911 5.4 19(76) 1.4 -.4321 .0638 .0325 12.1 
Perm K. .7368 .6854 5.1 41(82) 1.4 -.1849 .0654 .0248 19.7 
Primorsky K. .5939 .5527 4.1 30(81) 1.9 -.5248 .0754 .0503 24.1 
Pskov O. .7220 .6651 5.7 17(65) 1.6 -.1245 .0802 .0272 32.6 
Adygea R. .7618 .6494 11.2 6(67) 1.8 -2.5702 .0788 .0403 14.3 
Altai R. .7566 .7173 3.9 8(73) 1.8 -.6725 .0799 .0417 11.2 
Bashkortostan R. .9304 .7119 21.9 11(16) 3.4 2.2e+12 .0357 .0210 76.0 
Buryatia R. .6839 .6219 6.2 19(83) 2.0 -.7736 .0927 .0468 17.2 
Dagestan R. .9494 .7277 22.2 10(20) 3.8 1.5e+11 .0227 .0159 67.5 
Ingushetia R. .9832 .6773c 30.6c 0(0) 4.0 -34.1977 .0171 .0065 103.4 
Kalmykia R. .8027 .6843 11.8 7(50) 2.5 -2.0565 .0796 .0345 18.5 
Karelia R. .7449 .6927 5.2 14(78) 1.4 -.0426 .0729 .0241 20.4 
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Komi R. .7388 .7097 2.9 19(90) 1.5 -.0856 .0696 .0269 17.2 
Mari El R. .6896 .6410 4.9 12(71) 2.1 -.5792 .0600 .0477 15.4 
Mordovia R. .9228 .6657 25.7 5(20) 3.5 -3.2e+12 .0283 .0251 58.4 
Yakutia R. .7022 .6446 5.8 11(35) 2.1 .1229 .0868 .0520 14.5 
North Ossetia R.  .9198 .7922 12.8 3(33) 3.2 -1.4032 .0491 .0405 23.2 
Tatarstan R. .8381 .6762 16.2 22(37) 2.7 5.6e+12 .0583 .0320 31.1 
Tuva R. .8837 .7514 13.2 1(5) 2.0 -1.4012 .0921 .0317 20.8 
Khakassia R. .6069 .5925 1.4 6(50) 1.5 -.3717 .0683 .0352 16.9 
Rostov O. .7441 .6156 12.8 47(78) 2.2 -6.5044 .0699 .0323 29.5 
Ryazan O. .7417 .6958 4.6 24(80) 1.6 -.3100 .0628 .0269 16.0 
Samara O. .6430 .5983 4.5 32(78) 1.3 -.1994 .0584 .0233 23.1 
Saratov O. .7136 .6075 1.6 28(72) 2.4 -3.3173 .1075 .0423 17.0 
Sakhalin O. .6736 .6380 3.6 4(36) 1.1 -.2980 .0588 .0271 18.4 
Sverdlovsk O. .7702 .7286 4.2 47(64) 1.2 -.1453 .0524 .0195 25.4 
Smolensk O. .6502 .6138 3.6 16(73) 1.8 -.4050 .1054 .0399 13.2 
Stavropol K. .6438 .5913 5.3 27(73) 1.6 -.2767 .0786 .0324 14.6 
Tambov O. .6416 .5971 4.4 24(77) 1.9 -.1847 .0727 .0472 20.4 
Tver O. .7115 .6702 4.1 36(84) 1.6 -.2570 .0863 .0267 17.4 
Tomsk O. .6725 .6133 5.9 16(73) 1.3 -.0422 .0674 .0276 22.4 
Tuva R. .6645 .6363 2.8 23(82) 1.6 -.3350 .0819 .0321 22.0 
Tyumen O. .7413 .6507 9.1 23(82) 1.7 -.8957 .0531 .0396 15.8 
Udmurt R. .7695 .6936 7.6 28(82) 1.4 -.3398 .0608 .0220 18.2 
Ulyanovsk O. .6692 .6295 4.0 28(93) 1.6 -.2716 .0684 .0345 20.5 
Khabarovsk K. .6402 .5744 6.6 14(64) 1.5 -.4766 .0650 .0349 17.8 
Khanty-Mansi. A.O. .7560 .6723 8.4 10(56) 2.1 -.1973 .0522 .0152 44.7 
Chelyabin. O. .6993 .6443 5.5 39(76) 1.5 -.2386 .0596 .0292 19.2 
Chechen R. .9368 .7232 21.4 5(28) 3.5 -5.1632 .0238 .0281 34.5 
Chuvash R. .6804 .6324 4.8 24(86) 1.7 -.2721 .0569 .0384 15.5 
Chukotka A.O. .8705 .6960 17.4 2(22) 3.0 -2.6750 .1086 .0323 24.4 
Yamalo-Nenets A.O. .8505 .7124 13.8 3(23) 1.7 .0809 .0652 .0148 24.8 
Yaroslavl O. .7157 .6739 4.2 23(88) 1.3 -.1606 .0576 .0220 16.8 
Mean 
.7192a 
.6443 7.0 1723 
(67)b 
1.8 9.0e+10 .0663 .0295 25.4 
Median .6471 5.2 2.0 -.1635 .0570 .0239 17.8 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. The official vote share is calculated as the ratio of 
summed Putin’s votes to summed valid votes. QR adjusted estimate, Cluster, QR fraud, 
MADT, MADR, and      
  are calculated as the means weighted by the number of eligible 
voters; their total means and medians are also weighted by the number of eligible voters. N 
of TIKs (%) denotes the number of TIKs used in the analysis for derivation of QR adjusted 
estimate as percentage of the total number of TIKs (in parentheses). a. The total average is 
the ratio of total Putin’s votes to total valid votes.  b. Denotes the total number of TIKs in the 
analysis as percentage of the total number of TIKs (in parentheses). c. Imputed using 
predicted values from the following model, which is fitted at the level of TIKs with the limited 
MADT [0, 0.15] and  
MADR [0, 0.1]:                                                                   
                                                                           
              . Model’s R-squared = 0.7286. After the variable of electoral fraud has 
been predicted, the adjusted QR estimate is defined as the difference between the official 
share of the vote and the predicted value of fraud. 
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Table D4. Incumbent’s official vote share, QR vote estimate, and measures of 
fraud by Russia’s regions, the presidential election of 2000 
Region 
Putin 
  
    , 
official 
QR 
adjusted 
estimate  
Fraud, 
(%) 
N of TIKs 
(%) 
Clus-
ter 
QR fraud MADT MADR      
  
Altai K. .4504 .4065 4.4 34(44) 1.5 .0676 .0662 .0345 15.0 
Amur O. .4986 .4480 5.1 21(75) 1.5 .0051 .0784 .0455 12.9 
Arkhangelsk O. .6027 .5159 8.7 24(77) 2.1 -.2075 .0624 .0442 13.8 
Astrakhan O. .6163 .5689 4.7 13(81) 2.1 -.3406 .0623 .0431 16.0 
Belgorod O. .4806 .4220 5.9 21(95) 2.0 -.1475 .0704 .0475 22.1 
Bryansk O. .4335 .3773 5.6 29(85) 1.6 .1303 .0661 .0475 12.8 
Vladimir O. .5369 .5021 3.5 23(85) 1.6 -.0310 .0489 .0367 14.7 
Volgograd O. .5383 .4953 4.3 44(96) 1.8 -.0614 .0610 .0381 16.1 
Vologda O. .6737 .5962 7.7 23(82) 2.0 -.2789 .0663 .0335 24.6 
Voronezh O. .5711 .5236 4.7 36(92) 1.7 .1176 .0692 .0408 14.6 
Moscow .4657 .4330 3.3 84(69) 1.9 .0460 .0326 .0187 14.0 
St. Petersburg .6269 .5911 3.6 26(87) 2.0 .1070 .0351 .0190 23.8 
Jewish A.Ob. .4328 .3944 3.8 4(67) 1.5 -.0132 .0811 .0425 13.4 
Zabaykalsky K. .5049 .4685 3.6 25(66) 1.7 .0196 .0974 .0544 12.1 
Ivanovo O. .5357 .4924 4.3 20(67) 1.9 -.1570 .0577 .0299 14.5 
Irkutsk O. .5094 .4741 3.5 41(85) 1.8 -.1462 .0662 .0367 16.7 
Kab.-Balk. R.  .7547 .5381 21.7 5(45) 3.1 -1.6862 .0630 .0528 13.2 
Kaliningrad O. .6066 .5184 8.8 7(30) 1.7 .2665 .0627 .0396 11.6 
Kaluga O. .5142 .4737 4.1 14(50) 2.0 -.2762 .0492 .0335 14.0 
Kamchatka K. .4910 .3657 12.5 2(20) 2.5 .0050 .0094 .0827 32.4 
Karachay-Ch. R. .5846 .4086 17.6 4(40) 2.7 -1.7106 .0816 .0619 9.2 
Kemerovo O. .2521 .2183 3.4 39(83) 1.7 .0069 .0554 .0241 15.2 
Kirov O. .5899 .5407 4.9 31(65) 1.9 -.0799 .0672 .0466 13.7 
Kostroma O. .5974 .5467 5.1 13(43) 1.8 .0645 .0543 .0392 16.5 
Krasnodar K. .5189 .4736 4.5 55(96) 1.6 .0289 .0636 .0339 14.8 
Krasnoyar. K. .4900 .4626 2.7 49(66) 1.8 -.0305 .0716 .0382 16.4 
Kurgan O. .4881 .4368 5.1 25(93) 1.5 -.0274 .0801 .0491 16.1 
Kursk O. .5056 .4519 5.4 30(86) 1.7 -.1284 .0612 .0526 14.4 
Leningrad O. .6713 .6289 4.2 18(67) 1.9 -.2570 .0516 .0396 14.1 
Lipetsk O. .4123 .3585 5.4 23(100) 1.3 -.2332 .0602 .0418 12.2 
Magadan O. .6235 .4976 12.6 1(11) 1.0 .2863 .1026 .0349 13.4 
Moscow O. .4835 .4593 2.4 46(63) 1.9 -.0486 .0483 .0269 17.7 
Murmansk O. .6647 .5538 11.1 7(39) 2.2 .0977 .0255 .0583 34.3 
Nenets A.O. .6008 .5419 5.9 1(100) 1.0 -.5792 .1027 .0828 1.1 
Nizhny Novgorod O. .5421 .5070 3.5 52(88) 1.7 -.0551 .0598 .0344 19.3 
Novgorod O. .6530 .5437 1.9 11(50) 1.9 -.4404 .0757 .0295 23.1 
Novosibirsk O. .4024 .3709 3.1 42(91) 1.9 -.0490 .0720 .0362 19.0 
Omsk O. .3852 .3360 4.9 26(70) 1.9 -.1390 .0756 .0482 18.8 
Orenburg O. .4562 .4204 3.6 44(86) 1.6 .0714 .0648 .0508 13.9 
Oryol O. .4615 .4071 5.4 21(70) 1.7 -.0644 .0480 .0493 12.0 
Penza O. .4987 .4521 4.7 32(89) 1.8 -.1669 .0622 .0455 14.7 
Perm K. .6179 .5728 4.5 45(78) 1.6 .0606 .0667 .0330 15.5 
Primorsky K. .4057 .3425 6.3 31(82) 1.8 -.1921 .0969 .0505 15.9 
Pskov O. .6296 .5547 7.5 14(54) 1.7 -.0546 .0737 .0342 19.9 
Adygea R. .4514 .3824 6.9 6(75) 2.1 -.1954 .0687 .0409 18.6 
Altai R. .3842 .3471 3.7 8(73) 1.8 -.1638 .0919 .0605 13.9 
Bashkortostan R. .6109 .4683 14.3 37(53) 2.5 -3.9816 .0593 .0577 16.9 
Buryatia R. .4272 .3801 4.7 17(68) 1.6 -.0779 .0904 .0409 13.1 
Dagestan R. .8165 .6244 19.2 13(25) 3.2 -1.9259 .1046 .0773 19.6 
Ingushetia R. .8607 .6938c 16.7c 0(0) 4.0 -2.6607 .0854 .0797 11.4 
Kalmykia R. .5735 .4601 11.3 2(14) 1.0 -.3656 .0514 .0481 15.4 
Karelia R. .6475 .5837 6.4 11(58) 1.9 -.2589 .0579 .0318 17.5 
  
294 
 
Komi R. .6043 .5550 4.9 17(81) 2.0 -.1177 .0640 .0376 13.1 
Mari El R. .4504 .4005 5.0 11(65) 1.6 .0246 .0638 .0441 15.5 
Mordovia R. .6140 .4995 11.4 15(56) 2.3 -1.3831 .0539 .0609 11.6 
Yakutia R. .5309  n.a. n.a. 0(0)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
North Ossetia R.  .6570 .5395 11.8 4(40) 2.8 -.8526 .1465 .0511 16.0 
Tatarstan R. .6995 .5639 13.6 27(44) 2.4 -4.9165 .0529 .0439 19.2 
Tuva R. .6352 .5288 1.6 1(6) 2.0 -.0646 .0633 .0201 5.3 
Khakassia R. .4290 .3962 3.3 10(91) 1.9 .0440 .0627 .0410 15.8 
Rostov O. .5376 .4689 6.9 53(85) 2.0 -.4562 .0596 .0408 13.8 
Ryazan O. .4904 .4557 3.5 27(84) 1.8 -.0527 .0655 .0453 16.8 
Samara O. .4130 .3777 3.5 37(79) 1.8 .0188 .0504 .0254 24.6 
Saratov O. .5861 .4722 11.4 23(50) 2.8 -2.0506 .0868 .0616 16.6 
Sakhalin O. .4717 .4180 5.4 7(39) 2.1 -.2100 .0959 .0289 25.3 
Sverdlovsk O. .6345 .6106 2.4 49(63) 1.8 -.0365 .0590 .0255 17.2 
Smolensk O. .5284 .4799 4.8 21(72) 1.9 -.1824 .0701 .0406 13.9 
Stavropol K. .5257 .4654 6.0 28(76) 1.7 -.1239 .0566 .0381 14.5 
Tambov O. .4860 .4523 3.4 28(88) 1.8 -.0460 .0732 .0483 12.9 
Tver O. .5806 .5114 6.9 35(76) 1.6 -.1789 .0667 .0382 12.9 
Tomsk O. .5300 .4919 3.8 18(78) 1.9 -.0080 .0697 .0343 15.3 
Tuva R. .4845 .4367 4.8 24(83) 1.6 -.1681 .0583 .0359 15.0 
Tyumen O. .5466 .4867 6.0 25(89) 1.9 -.2497 .0722 .0390 15.8 
Udmurt R. .6157 .5742 4.2 29(85) 1.7 .1674 .0538 .0353 16.7 
Ulyanovsk O. .4799 .4178 6.2 27(93) 2.0 -.2590 .0668 .0439 15.1 
Khabarovsk K. .4998 .4601 4.0 19(83) 1.8 -.0179 .0796 .0333 19.5 
Khanty-Mansi. A.O. .6122 .5486 6.4 8(36) 1.9 -.2379 .0496 .0184 28.0 
Chelyabin. O. .4945 .4542 4.0 45(88) 1.8 -.0398 .0640 .0332 18.7 
Chechen R. .5206  n.a.  n.a. 0(0)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Chuvash R. .4515 .4065 4.5 27(96) 2.0 -.2354 .0531 .0447 15.7 
Chukotka A.O. .6767  n.a.  n.a. 0(0)  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
Yamalo-Nenets A.O. .5949 .5332 6.2 4(31) 1.9 -.4046 .0659 .0248 11.9 
Yaroslavl O. .6411 .5936 4.8 21(81) 1.9 -.1449 .0502 .0289 15.7 
Mean 
.5340a 
.4733 7.0 1890 
(69)b 
1.7 -.3975 .0609 .0376 16.7 
Median .4704 5.2 1.0 -.0032 .0544 .0263 14.8 
Note: Constitutional status: R. – Republic, O. – Oblast, K. – Krai, A.O. – Autonomous 
Okrug, A.Ob. – Autonomous Oblast. The official vote share is calculated as the ratio of 
summed Putin’s votes to summed valid votes. QR adjusted estimate, Cluster, QR fraud, 
MADT, MADR, and      
  are calculated as the means weighted by the number of eligible 
voters; their total means and medians are also weighted by the number of eligible voters. N 
of TIKs (%) denotes the number of TIKs used in the analysis for derivation of QR adjusted 
estimate as percentage of the total number of TIKs (in parentheses). a. The total average is 
the ratio of total Putin’s votes to total valid votes.  b. Denotes the total number of TIKs in the 
analysis as percentage of the total number of TIKs (in parentheses). c. Imputed using 
predicted values from the following model, which is fitted at the level of TIKs with the limited 
MADT [0, 0.15] and  
MADR [0, 0.1]:                                                                
                                                                          
               . Model’s R-squared = 0.4264. After the variable of electoral fraud has 
been predicted, the adjusted QR estimate is defined as the difference between the official 
share of the vote and the predicted value of fraud. 
 
  
295 
 
Appendix D2. Replication syntax for the analysis of electoral fraud in R and 
SPSS 
Quantile Regression: obtaining α and β by TIK 
This syntax shows commands only for the presidential election of 2012. The syntax 
for other election years is similar.  
# Before running the syntax, the following packages must be installed by 
using install.packages("") and then loaded:178 
 
library ("foreign") 
library ("data.table") 
library ("quantreg") 
library ("stats") 
library("stringr") 
library("car") 
library(mclust) 
library("Cairo") 
 
rm(list=ls())# removes all objects from memory 
 
# Before opening datasets, check the working directory getwd () and set it 
to setwd("D:/") if necessary. 
 
Data <-   read.spss("D:/Presidential election 2012.sav",   
use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
newdat <- subset(Data, uikintik >20 & turnoutsd>0 & putinsd>0)# selecting 
the data with the number of UIKs in TIKs larger than 20 and filtering 
invariable cases by choosing the TIK-level standard deviations of turnout 
and Putin’s vote larger than 0. 
 
dat=data.table(newdat) 
 
coeffi <- dat[,list( intercept.05=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  
.05))[1], intercept.1=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .1))[1], 
intercept.15=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .15))[1], 
intercept.2=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .2))[1], 
intercept.25=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .25))[1], 
intercept.3=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .3))[1], 
intercept.35=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .35))[1], 
intercept.4=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .4))[1], 
intercept.45=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .45))[1], 
intercept.5=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau =  .5))[1], 
coef.05=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .05))[2], 
coef.1=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .1))[2], 
coef.15=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .15))[2], 
coef.2=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .2))[2], 
coef.25=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .25))[2], 
coef.3=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .3))[2], 
coef.35=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .35))[2], 
coef.4=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .4))[2], 
coef.45=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .45))[2],  
coef.5=coef(rq(putinv_e~turnout, tau = .5))[2]), by=tikgrp] # QR intercepts 
and coefficients by TIK 
 
                                                          
178
 Comments and associated commands marked by # refer to R, * refers to SPSS. 
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write.table(coeffi, file = "foo.csv", sep = ";", dec = ",", col.names = NA, 
qmethod = "double")# exporting to Excel 
 
* Open foo.csv in SPSS (file For QR estimate 12.sav). Restructure cases into 
variables in the dataset For QR estimate 12.sav to obtain For QR estimate 12 
restructured.sav: 
 
GET 
  FILE='D:\For QR estimate 12.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSetQRest WINDOW=FRONT. 
VARSTOCASES 
  /ID=id 
  /MAKE intercept FROM intercept05 intercept1 intercept15 intercept2 
intercept25 intercept3 intercept35 intercept4 intercept45 intercept5 
  /MAKE coef FROM coef05 coef1 coef15 coef2 coef25 coef3 coef35 coef4 
coef45 coef5 
  /INDEX=Index1(10) 
  /KEEP=ordered tikgrp 
  /NULL=KEEP. 
SAVE OUTFILE='D:\For QR estimate 12 restructured1.sav' 
  /COMPRESSED.   
Closest to zero intercept 
rm(list=ls())# removes all objects from memory 
 
Data <-   read.spss("D:/For QR estimate 12 restructured.sav",   
use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
dat <- data.table(tikgrp=Data$tikgrp, intercept=Data$intercept) 
 
which1 <- dat[,list (which= which.min(abs(intercept - 0))), by=tikgrp]# 
defines the closest to zero intercept 
 
disaggr<-(data.frame(lapply(which1, function(x) rep(x, each = 10))))# 
restructuring the data by repeating which1 by N of tau 
 
write.table(disaggr, file = "foo.csv", sep = ";", dec = ",", col.names = 
NA, qmethod = "double")# exporting to Excel 
 
* Transfer variable which1 from foo.csv into For QR estimate 12 restructured.sav. 
Generate selection dummy variable: select = 1 if which = index1 (recode index1 into 
select: all values into 1 if Index1 = which): 
GET 
  FILE='D:\For QR estimate 12 restructured.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSetQRestRestr WINDOW=FRONT. 
DO IF  (Index1=which). 
RECODE Index1 (ELSE=1) INTO select. 
END IF. 
EXECUTE. 
   
* Select cases based on the selection variable with filtering unselected cases into a 
new dataset QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav:  
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FILTER OFF. 
USE ALL. 
SELECT IF  (NOT(select=0)). 
EXECUTE. 
SAVE OUTFILE='D:\QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav' 
  /COMPRESSED. 
 
* From Presidential election 2012.sav, add into this dataset the means of 
regionnumeric, uikintik, turnout, and putinv_v and the sum of eligible by TIK (use 
condition: UIKinTIK>20 and TurnoutSD>0 and PutinSD>0; and split file by TIKgrp).  
GET 
  FILE='D:\Presidential election 2012.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSetPres12 WINDOW=FRONT.  
     
USE ALL. 
COMPUTE filter_$=(UIKinTIK>20 and TurnoutSD>0 and PutinSD>0). 
VARIABLE LABELS filter_$ 'UIKinTIK>20 and TurnoutSD>0 and PutinSD>0 
(FILTER)'. 
VALUE LABELS filter_$ 0 'Not Selected' 1 'Selected'. 
FORMATS filter_$ (f1.0). 
FILTER BY filter_$. 
EXECUTE. 
 
SORT CASES  BY TIKgrp.  
SPLIT FILE LAYERED BY TIKgrp.  
DESCRIPTIVES VARIABLES=RegionNumeric UIKinTIK Eligible Turnout PutinV_V 
  /STATISTICS=MEAN SUM. 
   
   
* From QR estimate 12.sav, add intercept.5 and coef.5 to QR estimate, MADT and 
MADR 12.sav, rename intercept and coef in interceptclosest0 and coefclosest0, 
respectively.  
* Calculate QR estimate and QR fraud. QRestimate = 
(1/turnout)*(interceptclosest0+coefclosest0*turnout). QRfraud.5 = intercept5/(1-
(intercept5+coef5)).  
GET 
  FILE='D:\QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSetQRestAndFraud WINDOW=FRONT. 
 
COMPUTE QRestimat=(1/Turnout)*(interceptclosest0+coefclosest0*Turnout). 
EXECUTE. 
COMPUTE QRfraud=intercept5/(1-(intercept5+coef5)). 
EXECUTE. 
   
* Check for missing values in all variables. They may result from a division by zero. 
Impute logically appropriate values. 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Turnout PutinV_V QRestimate intercept5 coef5 
QRfraud.5 
  /FORMAT=NOTABLE 
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.   
MADT and MADR: Median absolute deviation of turnout and residuals  
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rm(list=ls())# removes all objects from memory 
 
Data <- read.spss("D:/Presidential election 2012.sav",   
use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
newdat <- subset(Data, uikintik >20 & turnoutsd>0 & putinsd>0) 
 
datna <- newdat[!is.na(newdat$turnout),]# creating a dataset without 
missing values defined by turnout (otherwise N/A will be created in TIKs 
with missing cases) 
 
dat <- data.table(datna) 
 
madtr <- dat[,list(madt=mad(turnout), madr=mad(rq(putinv_e~turnout, 
tau=.5)$residuals)),by=tikgrp]# MADT and MADR by TIK 
 
write.table(madtr, file = "foo.csv", sep = ";", dec = ",",  col.names = NA, 
qmethod = "double")# exporting to Excel 
 
# The variables of MADT and MADR are then transferred from foo.csv into QR 
estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav. 
Last-digit distributions of the incumbent’s vote by TIK 
rm(list=ls()) 
 
Data <- read.spss("D:/Presidential election 2012.sav",   
use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
newdat <- subset(Data, uikintik >20 & turnoutsd>0 & putinsd>0) 
dat<-data.table(newdat) 
 
ta<-table(str_sub(dat$putinv_vbinned,-1,-1), by=dat$tikgrp)# last-digit 
probabilities by TIK 
 
write.table(ta, file = "foo.csv", sep = ";", dec = ",", col.names = NA, 
qmethod = "double")# exporting to Excel 
 
# Transfer the probabilities into Calculation of Chi squared for Benford law 
Presidential 2012 by TIK.xlsx, calculate Chi-squared, transpose, and then insert as 
ChiSquaredBenford in QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav. 
Cluster analysis 
rm(list=ls()) 
 
Data <-   read.spss("D:/QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav ",   
use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
dat <- data.table(putinv_v = Data$putinv_v, qrfraud.5= 
recode(Data$qrfraud.5, "lo:-4 = -4; 1:hi = 1"), madt=recode(Data$madt, 
".15:hi = .15"), madr=recode(Data$madr, "0.1:hi = 0.1"), chisquaredbenford 
=recode(Data$ chisquaredbenford, "150:hi = 150"))# the extreme values 
(outliers) are set to moderate levels  
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fit <- Mclust(dat, G=1:4)# cluster analysis 
summary(fit, parameters= TRUE)# display the results 
plot(fit) # plot the results 
 
clust<-data.table(fit$ classification, fit$data)# saving the results 
 
write.table(clust, file = "foo.csv", sep = ";", dec = ",", col.names = NA, 
qmethod = "double")# exporting to Excel 
 
 
#Plotting Putin’s vote versus four variables of fraud by cluster: 
 
dev.off() 
Cairo(800, 800, file="plot.png", type="png", bg="white", dpi=82) 
par(pty = "s", mfrow = c(2,2), col.lab = "white", cex.lab= 1.42)# four 
plots in one 
coordProj (dat, dimens=c(2,1), parameters = fit$parameters, z = fit$z,   
what = "classification", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "black", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
title(xlab = "QR fraud [-4, 1]", ylab = "Putin V/V", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "white", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
coordProj (dat, dimens=c(3,1), parameters = fit$parameters, z = fit$z,   
what = "classification", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "black", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
title(xlab = "MADT [0, 0.15]", ylab = "Putin V/V ", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "white", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
coordProj (dat, dimens=c(4,1), parameters = fit$parameters, z = fit$z,   
what = "classification", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "black", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
title(xlab = "MADR [0, 0.1]", ylab = "Putin V/V ", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "white", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
coordProj (dat, dimens=c(5,1), parameters = fit$parameters, z = fit$z,   
what = "classification", cex.lab= 1.42) 
par( col.lab = "black", cex.lab= 1.42)# four plots in one 
title(xlab = "Chi-squared LBL [0, 150]", ylab = "Putin V/V ", cex.lab= 
1.42) 
dev.off() 
 
# After that add Cluster variable to QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav. Recode 
cluster variable so that it would gradually increase with the incumbent’s vote. 
* Select the most empirically representative TIKs by cluster. TIKs are selected based 
on the least absolute total deviation of z-values. The medians and the standard 
deviations are taken from Table 4.2. 
GET 
  FILE='D:\QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSetQRestAndFraud WINDOW=FRONT. 
 
*TIKgrp = 1675 in cluster 1 
 
COMPUTE totaldeviation1=(ABS((PutinV_V-.5638)/.0645))+(ABS((QRfraud.5--
.0428)/.2253))+(ABS((madt-.0462)/.0162))+(ABS((madr-
.0193)/.0058))+(ABS((ChiSquaredBenford-15.3)/6.9)) 
SORT CASES BY totaldeviation1 (A). 
 
* TIKgrp = 1874 in cluster 2 
 
COMPUTE totaldeviation2=(ABS((PutinV_V-.6618)/.0538))+(ABS((QRfraud.5--
.5360)/.4714))+(ABS((madt-.0754)/.0246))+(ABS((madr-
.0403)/.0116))+(ABS((ChiSquaredBenford-11.2)/3.7)) 
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SORT CASES BY totaldeviation2 (A). 
 
* TIKgrp = 481 in cluster 3 
 
COMPUTE totaldeviation3=(ABS((PutinV_V-.7462)/.0940))+(ABS((QRfraud.5--
2.14)/1.309))+(ABS((madt-.0772)/.033))+(ABS((madr-
.0478)/.0184))+(ABS((ChiSquaredBenford-12.5)/6.0)) 
SORT CASES BY totaldeviation3 (A). 
 
* TIKgrp = 137 in cluster 4 
 
COMPUTE totaldeviation4=(ABS((PutinV_V-.9377)/.0957))+(ABS((QRfraud.5--
3.63)/2.05))+(ABS((madt-.0184)/.028))+(ABS((madr-
.0143)/.0193))+(ABS((ChiSquaredBenford-45.1)/44)) 
SORT CASES BY totaldeviation4 (A). 
The adjustment for the QR estimate 
rm(list=ls() 
Data <-  read.spss("D:/QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav", 
   use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
newdat <- data.table(subset(Data, cluster==1 | cluster==2 | cluster==3))# 
drop the 4th cluster 
 
dat <- data.table(ordered=newdat$ordered,tikgrp=newdat$tikgrp, 
turnout=newdat$turnout, qrestimate= newdat$qrestimate, putinv_v = 
newdat$putinv_v, qrfraud.5= recode(newdat $qrfraud.5, "lo:-4 = -4; 1:hi = 
1"), madt=recode(newdat $madt, "0.15:hi = 0.15"), madr=recode(newdat $madr, 
"0.1:hi = 0.1"), chisquaredbenford =recode(newdat $ chisquaredbenford, 
"150:hi = 150"), which=newdat$which)# the extreme values (outliers) are set 
to moderate levels  
 
# The best full-factorial interaction model of variables that should not 
correlate with QR estimate: 
 
mod<- step(lm(dat$qrestimate ~ dat$qrfraud.5+ dat$madt + dat$madr +   
dat$chisquaredbenford+  dat$which + dat$turnout + dat$qrfraud.5* dat$madt + 
dat$qrfraud.5* dat$madr + dat$qrfraud.5* dat$which +dat$qrfraud.5* 
dat$chisquaredbenford+ dat$qrfraud.5* dat$turnout+   dat$madt* dat$madr +   
dat$madt* dat$which +   dat$madt* dat$chisquaredbenford +   dat$madt* 
dat$turnout+ dat$madr* dat$which + dat$madr* dat$chisquaredbenford + 
dat$madr* dat$turnout +   dat$which* dat$chisquaredbenford +   dat$which* 
dat$turnout +  dat$chisquaredbenford*  dat$turnout ), direction= "both") 
 
summary(mod) 
 
fit<-data.table(ordered=dat$ordered, tikgrp=dat$tikgrp, qrestimate 
=dat$qrestimate , fitted=fitted(mod), adjustment=(0.5525 - fitted(mod)))# 
saving results 
 
write.table(fit, file = "foo.csv", sep = ";", dec = ",",col.names = NA, 
qmethod = "double")# exporting to Excel 
 
* Since the number of cases without the 4th cluster is smaller, to transfer results of 
the model, generate a variable orderedforadj in QR estimate, MADT and MADR 
12.sav: recode ordered into the new variable using old values if cluster = 1:3, if 
cluster = 4 -> 2500: 
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GET 
  FILE='D:\QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav'. 
DATASET NAME DataSetQRestAndFraud WINDOW=FRONT. 
DO IF  (Cluster<4). 
RECODE ordered (ELSE=Copy) INTO orderedforadj. 
END IF. 
EXECUTE. 
RECODE orderedforadj (MISSING=2500). 
EXECUTE. 
   
* Sort the data according to orderedforadj and transfer fitted and adjustment into 
QR estimate, MADT and MADR 04.sav.  
* Generate QRestimateAdjusted = QRestimate + Adjustment 
COMPUTE QRestimateAdjusted=QRestimate+Adjustment. 
EXECUTE.   
Distributions of various estimates compared with Putin V/V 
rm(list=ls()) 
 
Data <-  read.spss("D:/QR estimate, MADT and MADR 12.sav", 
   use.value.labels=TRUE, max.value.labels=Inf, to.data.frame=TRUE) 
colnames(Data) <- tolower(colnames(Data)) 
 
dat<- data.table(Data) 
 
datna <- dat[!is.na(dat$qrestimateadjusted), ]# creating a dataset without 
missing values defined by adjusted estimate (without the fourth cluster) 
 
dev.off() 
Cairo(600, 400, file="plot.png", type="png", bg="white", dpi=82) 
 
plot (density(datna$ qrestimateadjusted), col="azure4", lty=1, 
xlab="Incumbent’s vote", xlim=c(0,1), main="Presidential election, 2012", 
cex.main=1) 
lines (density(dat$qrestimate), col="steelblue2", lty=5) 
lines (density(dat$ putinv_v), col="coral2", lty=2) 
lines (density(datna$qrestimate), col="olivedrab3", lty=6) 
legend("topleft",   legend=c("QR estimate adjusted", "QR est. without 4th 
cluster", "QR estimate", "Putin V/V"), col=c("azure4","olivedrab3", 
"steelblue2", "coral2"), lty=c(1, 6, 5, 2), cex=0.8) 
dev.off() 
 
# Weighted by the number of eligible voters: 
 
dev.off() 
Cairo(600, 400, file="plot.png", type="png", bg="white", dpi=82) 
plot (density(datna$ qrestimateadjusted, weights=datna$eligible), 
col="azure4", lty=1, xlab="Incumbent’s vote", ylab="Density (weighted by 
Eligible)", xlim=c(0,1), main="Presidential election, 2012", cex.main=1) 
lines (density(dat$qrestimate, weights=dat$eligible), col="steelblue2", 
lty=5) 
lines (density(dat$ putinv_v, weights=dat$eligible), col="coral2", lty=2) 
lines (density(datna$qrestimate, weights=datna$eligible), col="olivedrab3", 
lty=6) 
legend("topleft",   legend=c("QR estimate adjusted", "QR est. without 4th 
cluster", "QR estimate", "Putin V/V"), col=c("azure4","olivedrab3", 
"steelblue2", "coral2"), lty=c(1, 6, 5, 2), cex=0.8) 
dev.off() 
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Appendix D3. The analysis of electoral fraud in the presidential election of 
2008 
Appendix D3, D4, and D5 iteratively repeat the approach to estimating electoral 
fraud developed in Chapter 4 for the presidential elections of 2008, 2004, and 2000. 
For reasons of parsimony, I comment the results concisely. 
Cluster Analysis 
The results of clasterization for the election year 2008 displayed in Figure D1 are 
generally similar to the results for the election year 2012.  
Figure D1. The measures of electoral fraud versus the official vote share marked 
by clusters, 2008 
 
Note: Ellipses indicate means (centers) and standard deviations by cluster.  
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The most distinct is again the 4th cluster (see mixing probabilities in Table D5), 
then follows the 1st cluster followed by the 3rd one, and the 2nd cluster is 
characterized by even greater uncertainty. The most noticeable difference is that 
MADT and MADR do not correlate with the incumbent’s vote as clearly as they do in 
Figure 4.2. Therefore, the 3rd cluster is primarily defined by QR fraud, the plot of 
which still shows an increasing trend of cluster means with an increase in the level 
of Medvedev’s vote. 
The low performance of MADT and MADR for detecting fraud at high levels of the 
incumbent’s vote can more plausibly be explained by a lareger degree of falsification 
of electoral data, especially at low levels of the vote. The large-scale electoral 
observation campaign of 2012 made possible to prevent fraud in several thousands 
of polling stations. As a result, electoral data of 2012 contain multiple observations 
with real election results. These results are most commonly not favorable for the 
incumbent, that is, the share of the vote is small and the values of MADT and 
MADR are small also. In the election of 2008 and in the prior election, hands of 
fraudsters have not been tied by observers’ scrutiny. Consequently, the level of 
fraud could be higher. An alternative explanation suggests that, to the contrary, the 
election of 2008 was “cleaner” and, therefore, the relationship between MADT, 
MADR and Medvedev’s vote weakened. However, this explanation is in conflict with 
indications of other variables of fraud. If it were true, we would observed (as we will 
see during the consideration of the election of 2000) smaller mean values of QR 
fraud in clusters 1–3 and smaller non-significant values of      
 . By contrast,  
Table D5 shows that the values of QR fraud are slightly hihger in 2008 compared 
with 2012 and chi-squared is significant in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cluster.  
Table D5. Descriptive statistics for the official incumbent’s vote share, QR 
estimate, and the measures of fraud by cluster, 2008 
Clus-
ter 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Medve-
dev 
  
     
QR 
Esti-
mate 
QR Fraud 
[-6, 1] 
MADT 
[0, 0.15] 
MADR 
[0, 0.1] 
     
  
[0, 150] 
Mixing 
Prob-s 
N 
1 
Mean .6422 .6206 -.1048 .0431 .0161 24.7 
.1669 316 Median .6381 .6157 -.0712 .0423 .0157 21.5 
St. Dev. .0522 .0584 .2252 .0129 .0046 15.4 
2 
Mean .6866 .6371 -.4834 .0907 .0440 13.9 
.5222 952 Median .6872 .6337 -.4227 .0868 .0402 12.9 
St. Dev. .0571 .0727 .4672 .0311 .0187 5.7 
3 
Mean .7883 .7291 -2.6157 .0646 .0475 21.0 
.2302 389 Median .7942 .7287 -2.2883 .0587 .0455 17.2 
St. Dev. .0803 .1087 2.0928 .0318 .0214 12.7 
4 
Mean .9391 .9264 -3.7369 .0129 .0153 59.2 
.0907 172 Median .9482 .9373 -6.0000 .0123 .0140 43.4 
St. Dev. .0432 .0598 2.8766 .0091 .0110 44.0 
Note: See notes to Table 4.2. Significance levels for      
 : 14.69 – p < 0.1,  
16.92 – p < 0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01, 27.88 – p < 0.001. 
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Adjusted QR Estimate 
The best interaction effects model for defining the adjustment for the QR estimate is 
reported in Table D6. The model explains 55.4% of the QR estimate’s variance.  
Table D6. The best OLS interaction effects model of the QR estimate on four 
measures of fraud, regression quantile, and turnout; 2008 
DV: QR Estimate Coefficient Std. Error t-value 
(Intercept) .2246 .0425 5.29*** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] .0179 .0156 1.15 
MADT [0, 0.15] 1.9317 .3833 5.04*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] -.1988 .6412 -.31 
     
 
 [0, 150] .0019 .0010 1.97* 
Tau -.0091 .0039 -2.30* 
Turnout .6301 .0607 10.38*** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × MADT [0, 0.15] -.2324 .0466 -4.99*** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × Tau -.0008 .0004 -2.17* 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × Turnout -.0253 .0162 -1.56 
MADT [0, 0.15] × Tau .0458 .0154 2.98** 
MADT [0, 0.15] ×      
 
 [0, 150] .0159 .0039 4.06*** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × Turnout -3.3160 .5147 -6.44*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Tau .0631 .0294 2.15* 
MADR [0, 0.1] ×      
 
 [0, 150] -.0145 .0068 -2.12* 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Turnout -2.3850 .7829 -3.05** 
Tau × Turnout .0211 .0059 3.58*** 
     
 
 [0, 150] × Turnout -.0030 .0014 -2.18* 
R-squared .554 
1657 N 
Note: See comments to Table 4.3. Significance codes: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
As a result, the adjusted QR estimate in Figure D2, especially its right tail, 
differs substantively from both the non-adjusted estimate and the official 
Medvedev’s vote share. The adjusted QR estimate is again is nearly normally 
distributed except two small peaks at the top of the distribution. The mean adjusted 
QR estimate (62.9%) is smaller than the official share of the vote (71.2%) by 8.3% – 
the estimated amount of fraud in the election. 
Table D2 reports the results of the analysis of electoral fraud by region. QR 
estimates are missing in three regions: there are too small numbers of UIKs in TIKs 
(< 20) in Chukotka and Jewish Autonomous Oblast; all observations from 
Ingushetia are of the 4th cluster. In five regions, the adjusted estimates are based 
only on one or two TIKs; in six regions – on three to five. The reliable estimates are 
obtained for 64% of all TIKs. Regions-leaders of electoral forgery appeared to be 
almost the same in this election as in 2012. According to the level of fraud, they 
include: Kamchatka Krai (42.0% – yet only one TIK in analysis), Karachay-
Cherkessia (27.1%), Mordovia (26.3%), Dagestan (20.0%), Bashkortostan (19.9%), 
Tatarstan (19.9%), and Kabardino-Balkaria (18.1%). Perhaps, most surprisingly, 
Chechnya appeared in this list with its 15.7% of fraud and 73.1% of the initial vote; 
and this estimate is based on 3 out of 15 TIKs in the region. Obviously, the 
presidential election of 2008 in Chechnya has been manipulated in a lesser degree 
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than in 2012. However, there is not a good reason for optimism. The quantitative 
amount of fraud is large and the mean cluster in the region (3.6) indicates that, in 
qualitative terms, the level of fraud is just slightly below the complete artificiality of 
data. 
Figure D2. The distributions of Putin’s QR-based estimates and the official vote 
share, 2008 
 
Note: For the adjusted QR estimate and the QR estimate without the 4th cluster, non-
weighted N = 1657, for both other distributions non-weighted N = 1829.  
Appendix D4. The analysis of electoral fraud in the presidential election of 
2004 
Cluster Analysis 
For the election of 2004, the results of the cluster analysis that appear in Figure 
D3 and Table D7 are similar to the results of 2008. MADT and MADR do already 
not have and QR fraud is beginning to lose its discriminating power. The 4th cluster 
is again identified with the highest degree of certainty due to large and significant 
values of      
  and extraordinarily small values of MADT and MADR; the 3rd cluster 
is now more distinct than the 1st one; and the 2nd cluster is again characterized by 
the least certainty (see mixing probabilities in Table D7). The number of cases in 
the 3rd and 4th clusters decreased. 
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Figure D3. The measures of electoral fraud versus the official vote share marked 
by clusters, 2004 
 
Note: Ellipses indicate means (centers) and standard deviations by cluster.  
All these attributes may indicate that the level of fraud was smaller in the 
election of 2004. However, the averages of QR fraud show a perceptible reduction 
only in the 1st cluster and      
  is significant in all clusters except the 2nd one. 
Therefore, we may preliminary conclude that the amount of fraud was sizable 
enough but it was probably smaller than in the election of 2008. 
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Table D7. Descriptive statistics for the official incumbent’s vote share, QR 
estimate, and the measures of fraud by cluster, 2004 
Clus-
ter 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Putin 
  
     
QR 
Esti-
mate 
QR Fraud 
[-6, 1] 
MADT 
[0, 0.15] 
MADR 
[0, 0.1] 
     
  
[0, 150] 
Mixing 
Prob-s 
N 
1 
Mean .6824 .6582 -.0431 .0475 .0183 18.9 
.2475 469 Median .6825 .6590 -.0020 .0451 .0175 16.8 
St. Dev. .0611 .0672 .2310 .0158 .0053 9.6 
2 
Mean .6969 .6461 -.4130 .0965 .0485 13.5 
.535 1005 Median .6995 .6475 -.3388 .0946 .0445 12.7 
St. Dev. .0780 .0943 .4808 .0306 .0192 4.8 
3 
Mean .7748 .7116 -2.6157 .0673 .0509 24.2 
.1461 249 Median .7690 .7067 -2.2131 .0640 .0480 18.6 
St. Dev. .0895 .1157 2.1217 .0367 .0234 17.4 
4 
Mean .9678 .9596 -3.9096 .0155 .0114 73.1 
.0714 134 Median .9725 .9696 -6.0000 .0129 .0096 66.6 
St. Dev. .0201 .0356 2.9018 .0125 .0075 48.5 
Note: See notes to Table 4.2. Significance levels for      
 : 14.69 – p < 0.1,  
16.92 – p < 0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01, 27.88 – p < 0.001. 
Adjusted QR Estimate 
Table D8 displays that the QR estimate changes under the influence of the four 
variables of fraud, the regression quantile, and turnout. Overall, these variables and 
their interaction effects account for 43.8% of the variance of the QR estimate. This 
proportion is relatively large.  
Table D8. The best OLS interaction effects model of the QR estimate on four 
measures of fraud, regression quantile, and turnout; 2004 
DV: QR Estimate Coefficient Std. Error t-value 
(Intercept) 0,3171 0,0357 8,89*** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] 0,0024 0,0055 0,43 
MADT [0, 0.15] 1,5120 0,3941 3,84*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] -1,6170 0,6866 -2,36* 
     
 
 [0, 150] 0,0014 0,0004 3,02** 
Tau 0,0050 0,0016 3,24** 
Turnout 0,5674 0,0530 10,70*** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × MADT [0, 0.15] -0,1391 0,0447 -3,11** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × MADR [0, 0.1] -0,1615 0,0836 -1,93. 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × Tau -0,0015 0,0005 -3,34*** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × Turnout -2,1280 0,5651 -3,77*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Tau 0,1934 0,0264 7,33*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] ×      
 
 [0, 150] -0,0111 0,0077 -1,43 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Turnout -2,5740 0,9059 -2,84** 
     
 
 [0, 150] × Tau -0,0001 0,0001 -1,76. 
R-squared .4378 
1723 N 
Note: See comments to Table 4.3. Significance codes: .p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,  
***p < 0.001. 
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The distributions QR estimates and the official share of the vote in Figure D3 
follow the same general patters as in the elections of 2008 and 2012. The specificity 
of the official vote share is that its main part is more normal-shaped than the 
distributions of the following years. On the other hand, the abnormal peak in the 
range of 90–100% of the vote is most salient in this election. Supposedly, electoral 
fraud has not been as widespread in 2004 as it occurred in future, yet electoral 
fraud in ethnic republics has already been extreme.  
Figure D4. The distributions of Putin’s QR-based estimates and the official vote 
share, 2004 
 
Note: For the adjusted QR estimate and the QR estimate without the 4th cluster, non-
weighted N = 1723, for both other distributions non-weighted N = 1857.  
The adjusted QR estimates are obtained for 67% of all TIKs (see Table D3). The 
estimate is undefined for Ingushetia where all observations belong to the 4th cluster. 
In five regions, the estimate is based on only one or two TIKs; in nine regions – on 
three to five. The top list of fraud contains already known regions: Kabardino-
Balkaria (27.0% of fraud, yet only one TIK in analysis), Mordovia (25.7%), Dagestan 
(22.2%), Bashkortostan (21.9%), Chechnya (21.4%), Chukotka (17.4%), Karachay-
Cherkessia (16.7%), and Tatarstan (16.2%). The total amount of fraud in the 
election of 2004 is estimated at 7.5%. 
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Appendix D5. The analysis of electoral fraud in the presidential election of 
2000 
Cluster Analysis 
The results of cluster analysis for the election of 2000 in Figure D5 show a different 
picture compared with the results of the following election years.  
Figure D5. The measures of electoral fraud versus the official vote share marked 
by clusters, 2000 
 
 
Note: Ellipses indicate means (centers) and standard deviations by cluster.  
  
310 
 
MADT, MADR, and      
  do not correlate with the incumbent’s vote. The 
correlation is present only on the scale of QR fraud and it is determined only by the 
3rd and the 4th clusters. Furthermore, the average values of QR fraud, as indicated 
in Table D9, are close to zero in the 1st and the 2nd cluster; the mean of the 3rd 
cluster is about threefold smaller than the means of QR fraud in the elections of 
2004–2012. Only the average QR fraud in the 4th cluster is high. It exceeds even the 
4th cluster’s means of the subsequent election years but primarily due to the lack of 
extremely positive values on the QR fraud scale. Apart from this, the QR estimate is 
nearly constant between clusters 1 to 3. Even in the 4th cluster, the QR estimate is 
lower than the level of the official vote by 8.8%, whereas the maximal difference in 
the subsequent elections is observed in 2012 an equal to 1.6%. In other words, the 
level of electoral distortion in the 4th cluster is not high enough to let the QR 
estimate converge with the official vote share as it is observed in the subsequent 
elections. 
Table D9. Descriptive statistics for the official incumbent’s vote share, QR 
estimate, and the measures of fraud by cluster, 2000 
Clus-
ter 
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Putin 
  
     
QR 
Esti-
mate 
QR Fraud 
[-6, 1] 
MADT 
[0, 0.15] 
MADR 
[0, 0.1] 
     
  
[0, 30] 
Mixing 
Prob-s 
N 
1 
Mean .4992 .4775 .0340 .0455 .0192 16.8 
.246 516 Median .4909 .4715 .0333 .0436 .0186 15.9 
St. Dev. .0967 .0998 .1717 .0146 .0049 6.7 
2 
Mean .5227 .4722 -.0032 .0809 .0606 10.5 
.4684 977 Median .5217 .4702 -.0098 .0785 .0595 10.5 
St. Dev. .1194 .1410 .3439 .0258 .0222 2.9 
3 
Mean .5772 .4932 -.7129 .0810 .0688 15.0 
.2189 397 Median .5755 .4897 -.7524 .0796 .0665 14.9 
St. Dev. .0962 .1226 .6597 .0286 .0220 5.5 
4 
Mean .7836 .6952 -4.2087 .0626 .0658 15.3 
.0667 122 Median .7900 .6749 -4.7650 .0544 .0669 13.6 
St. Dev. .1039 .1727 1.9653 .0396 .0282 6.1 
Note: See notes to Table 4.2. Significance levels for      
 : 14.69 – p < 0.1,  
16.92 – p < 0.05, 21.67 – p < 0.01, 27.88 – p < 0.001. 
This indicates that the amount of electoral fraud has been markedly smaller in 
the election of 2000. However, the election has not been free of fraud at all. 
Although the 4th cluster includes a smaller number of observations, this cluster of 
extreme fraud is still the most distinct (mixing probability = 0.0667). The means of 
MADT and MADR in the 2nd and 3rd cluster are about twice larger than in the 1st 
cluster. These oversized variances indicate that electoral fraud took place in 
observations of the 2nd and 3rd clusters. Specifically, the values of MADR in clusters 
2, 3, and especially 4 are the largest compared with all subsequent elections. It 
means that, first, the most widespread type of fraud in these clusters was counting 
excessive number of votes in favor of the incumbent without affecting the number of 
valid votes (i.e., not changing the turnout). Second, since not only MADR but also 
MADT are atypically large in the 4th cluster, the average type and degree of fraud in 
this cluster can be compared with type and scope of fraud in the average 3rd cluster 
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of the subsequent elections. Appendix D8 and Figure 4.3 show this difference 
graphically on the most typical TIKs by cluster and election year.  
Adjusted QR Estimate 
Table D10 confirms this suggestion. The explanatory power of the model used for 
defining the adjustment decreased nearly twofold compared with the models for 
election years 2008 and 2012.  
Table D10. The best OLS interaction effects model of the QR estimate on four 
measures of fraud, regression quantile, and turnout; 2000 
DV: QR Estimate Coefficient Std. Error t-value 
(Intercept) .2460 .0869 2.83** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] .1909 .0647 2.95** 
MADT [0, 0.15] .0780 .3096 .25 
MADR [0, 0.1] .8928 1.1126 .8 
Tau -.0128 .0101 -1.28 
Turnout .3457 .1284 2.69** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × MADT [0, 0.15] -.6616 .2109 -3.14** 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × MADR [0, 0.1] .5279 .2626 2.01* 
QR fraud [-6, 1] × Turnout -.3192 .0872 -3.66*** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × MADR [0, 0.1] -1.9820 3.4992 -3.14** 
MADT [0, 0.15] × Tau .0553 .0334 1.65. 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Tau .2056 .0442 4.65*** 
MADR [0, 0.1] × Turnout -3.5963 1.4406 -2.50* 
Tau × Turnout .0216 .0151 1.43 
R-squared .2738 
1890 N 
Note: See comments to Table 4.3. Significance codes: .p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01,  
***p < 0.001. 
Accordingly, the distribution of the adjusted QR estimate shown in Figure D6 
differs only slightly from the non-adjusted estimate. Although all distributions in 
the figure are bimodal, the bimodality more likely appears as a result of 
heterogeneity of preferences in the electorate rather than as a result of electoral 
manipulation. First, the analysis of electoral fraud does not detect massive electoral 
forgery. Second, the leaders on the scale of electoral fraud in 2000, similarly as in 
the following election years, were ethnic republics: Kabardino-Balkaria (21.7%), 
Dagestan (19.2%), Karachay-Cherkessia (17.6%), Bashkortostan (14.3%), and 
Tatarstan (13.6%) (see Table D4). However, according to the level of sincere vote 
measured by the adjusted QR estimate, the ethnic regions were the most 
heterogeneous in 2000: exactly 50% of them voted for Putin at rates higher than the 
median. This proportion has increased subsequently and amounted 75% in 2004, 
65% in 2008, and 72.2% in 2012. Non-ethnic (predominantly Russian) regions, to 
the contrary, decreased their estimated shares of the incumbent’s vote relatively to 
the median. In 2000, the estimated vote share in 50.8% of them was above the 
median, in 2004 – 41.9%, in 2008 – 43.3%, in 2012 – 44.3%. Put otherwise, 
Russian and ethnic regions voted for Putin in almost equal proportions. We may 
find in the area of the highest peak with equal probabilities Rostov (the adjusted QR 
estimate = 46.9%), Smolensk (48.0%), and Ivanovo Oblasts (49.2%) together with 
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Republics of Kalmykia (46.0%), Bashkortostan (46.8%), and Mordovia (50.0%). In 
the area of the second lower peak we may observe Perm Krai (57.3%), Saint 
Petersburg (59.1%), and Vologda Oblast (59.6%) together with Republics of 
Udmurtia (57.4%), Karelia (58.4%), and Dagestan (62.4). Such neighborhood would 
have been highly improbable in the subsequent election years. 
Figure D6. The distributions of Putin’s QR-based estimates and the official vote 
share, 2000 
 
Note: For the adjusted QR estimate and the QR estimate without the 4th cluster, non-
weighted N = 1890, for both other distributions non-weighted N = 2012.  
The adjusted QR estimate is not obtained in four regions: in Chukotka, Yakutia, 
and Chechnya due to the small number of observations (UIKs in TIKs < 20) and in 
Ingushetia because of extreme fraud (the mean cluster = 4). The adjusted QR 
estimate is equally based on one and two TIKs and on three to five TIKs in five 
regions. Overall, the estimates are obtained in 69% of all TIKs. 
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Appendix D6. The relationship between the QR estimate and the adjustment 
by election year 
Figure D7. The QR estimate’s adjustment plotted against the QR estimate by 
election year 
 
Note: Horizontal dashed lines indicate the means weighted by the number of eligible 
voters. 
The correlation between the QR estimate and its adjustment increases from 
2000 to 2012 together with explanatory power of the models in Table D6, D8, D10, 
and 4.2. The strength of the relationship also varies markedly by cluster. It 
increases from the 1st to the 3rd cluster (the election of 2008 in an exception, the fit 
lines of the 1st and the 2dn cluster do almost coincide). The difference in means is 
greatest in the presidential election of 2012, therefore, the average adjustment 
diverges the most from zero in 2012. 
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Appendix D7. Non-weighted distributions of QR estimates and the incumbent’s 
vote  
Figure D8–D11. The distributions of Putin’s QR-based estimates and the official 
vote share (cases are not weighted), 2000–2012
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Appendix D8. The most typical “fingerprints” of fraud by cluster, 2000–2008 
See Figure 4.3 for the typical “fingerprints” of fraud in 2012. 
Figure D12. Four typical “fingerprints” of fraud: The most empirically 
representative TIKs by cluster, 2008 
 
Note: Horizontal dot-dash lines indicate the mean ordinary share of incumbent’s vote 
(  
    ). Dashed lines depict the QR estimate. Solid lines represent the adjusted QR estimate. 
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Figure D13. Four typical “fingerprints” of fraud: The most empirically 
representative TIKs by cluster, 2004 
 
Note: Horizontal dot-dash lines indicate the mean ordinary share of incumbent’s vote 
(  
    ). Dashed lines depict the QR estimate. Solid lines represent the adjusted QR estimate. 
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Figure D14. Four typical “fingerprints” of fraud: The most empirically 
representative TIKs by cluster, 2000 
 
Note: Horizontal dot-dash lines indicate the mean ordinary share of incumbent’s vote 
(  
    ). Dashed lines depict the QR estimate. Solid lines represent the adjusted QR estimate. 
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Appendix E. Supplementary Materials to Chapter 5 
Appendix E1. Descriptive statistics 
Table E1. Descriptive statistics for variables in analysis and auxiliary variables 
  
5th 
Percentile 
95th 
Percentile 
Mean Std. Dev. 
Corr. 
With 
STBc 
Panel Data, Average Values of 2000–2012a 
Incumbent's Vote (%) 54.14 86.23 65.67 9.41 .350** 
Budget Type 0 1 .49 .50 .655** 
Share of Transfers in the Budget (%) 4.43 71.62 28.17 20.19 1 
Share of Transfers in the Budget 
(%), 2001–2013b 
7.22 77.23 32.57 19.99 .914** 
Log Total Transfers (RUB) 1.04E+10 3.66E+10 2.30E+10 7.37E+09 .287** 
Log Total Transfers (RUB), 2001–
2013b 
1.66E+10 4.46E+10 2.95E+10 8.23E+09 .202** 
Log Total Transfers Per Capita 
(RUB) 
13343.55 45838.43 29003.47 9215.95 .552** 
Log Total Transfers Per Capita 
(RUB), 2001–2013b 
23112.40 52401.97 36006.07 8650.28 .512** 
Log Regional Taxes Per Capita 
Inflation Adjusted (RUB) 
49245.12 116361.06 78954.53 19174.78 -.630** 
Log Regional Taxes Inflation 
Adjusted (RUB) 
4.31E+10 1.99E+11 1.24E+11 4.35E+10 -.728** 
Terrorist Attacks 0 1 .14 .35 .143** 
Conflict Situation 0 1 .15 .36 .304** 
Years Last Governor in Office 0.05 14.36 6.63 4.56 .038 
Log GRP (RUB) 1.30E+11 1.17E+12 7.01E+11 2.89E+11 -.480** 
Log GRP Per Capita (RUB) 214685.37 375652.67 283236.86 49859.36 -.341** 
Log Population 742840.8 3745626.8 2329588.8 862981.9 -.487** 
Log Unemployment (%) 8.86 19.21 13.27 2.68 .217** 
Pop. With Income Below the Living 
Minimum (%) 
13.00 40.40 24.26 8.41 .223** 
Infrastructure is More Developed -1.64 1.50 0.00 1.00 -.228** 
Infrastructure in Worse Condition -1.58 1.80 0.00 1.00 .114* 
Time-Invariant or Variables of 2012d 
Declared Sovereignty in the Early 
1990s 
0 1 .31 .47 .492** 
Republican Status 0 1 .25 .44 .562** 
Media Persecution Index 3.93 76.97 29.48 29.03 .182 
Mean N of Years Governor in Office 3.61 15.80 7.96 3.73 -.041 
N of Governors Since 2004 1 4 2.28 .85 -.039 
MPs Biographically Adjusted 0 14.28 3.98 3.95 -.300** 
MPs Biogr-lly Adj. Per 1 Mln. Pop. 0 4.05 2.21 1.11 .101 
Non-Russians (%) 3.0 92.0 23.06 25.77 .42** 
Non-Orthodox Christians (%) 3.0 58.0 13.98 16.31 .422** 
Ethnoreligion Index 30.39 94.66 59.43 19.69 .427** 
Variables of Changes, Average Values of 2000–2012e 
All Ranked Variables 4.50 79.80 42.00 24.01 n/a 
Incumbent’s Vote Change -12.22 24.99 3.56 12.2 n/a 
Regional Taxes Percent Change -12.91 75.21 22.94 27.41 n/a 
Infr. More Developed Change -.59 .57 .00 .35 n/a 
Infr. in Worse Condition Change -.78 1.2 .00 .55 n/a 
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Note: a. All statistics are based on the pooled CSTS data. The average between-year 
statistics are presented, that is, each statistic is firstly calculated for each year of 2000, 
2004, 2008, and 2012 and then averaged between the years. b. Additionally specified for 
2001, 2005, 2009, 2013. c. Correlations with the pooled STB 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 
calculated based on log-transformed variables where necessary (see Appendix E8). Other 
statistics based on non-transformed variables. d. Correlations for time-invariant variables 
presented with the STB 2012. e. Statistics for the variables of changes is also based on the 
pooled CSTS data of years 2000–2004, 2004–2008, and 2008–2012. Significant at: *p < 
0.05, **p < 0.01 (2-tailed).  
Appendix E2. Alternative measures and explanations 
Table E2. OLS models explaining the allocation of transfers of various types, 2013 
Dependent Variable: 
Donations 
(Total) 
Donations 
Leveling 
Donations 
Balance 
Subsidies Subventions 
Share of Total Transfers: 40.1% 27.6% 11.7% 34.4% 18.2% 
Constant 
-1.5e+10 
(-1.04) 
5.6e+9 
(.37) 
-5.5e+9 
(-.90) 
5.3e+9 
(1.13) 
3.5e+9 
(1.30) 
Log Population 
3249.3** 
(2.32) 
2563.1 
(1.67) 
1487.0* 
(2.43) 
1516.5** 
(3.23) 
1654.1*** 
(6.18) 
Log Regional Taxes (RUB) 
-.01 
(-.38) 
-.051* 
(-1.84) 
.018 
(1.61) 
-.003 
(-.31) 
-.003 
(-.56) 
Log GRP (RUB) 
-.002 
(-.76) 
6.9e-4 
(.21) 
-.003* 
(-1.93) 
-6.0e-4 
(-.60) 
5.4e-4 
(.95) 
Log Unemployment (%) 
7.0e+8 
(1.00) 
1.0e+09 
(1.32) 
5.1e+8 
(1.67) 
-4.0e+7 
(-.17) 
-2.0e+8 
(-1.45) 
Population with Income 
Below the Living Minimum 
(%) 
8.8e+8** 
(2.62) 
1.1e+9*** 
(2.87) 
6.4+7 
(.44) 
8.1e+7 
(.72) 
4.4e+7 
(.68) 
Infrastructure Is More 
Developed 
5.0e+9* 
(2.40) 
4.3e+9 
(1.91) 
1.9e+9** 
(2.13) 
3.6e+8 
(.51) 
2.0e+8 
(.51) 
Infrastructure Is in Worse 
Condition 
-2.9e+9 
(-1.55) 
-2.1e+9 
(-1.03) 
-6.6e+7 
(-.08) 
-2.3e+9*** 
(-3.70) 
1.5e+8 
(.43) 
Putin’s Vote (%), 2012 
2.8e+8* 
(1.88) 
4.1e+6  
(.03) 
1.1+8* 
(1.75) 
2.3e+7 
(.47) 
-3.3e+7 
(-1.19) 
Declared Sovereignty in the 
Early 1990s 
-6.6e+7 
(-.02) 
7.2e+7 
(.02) 
-9.9e+8 
(-.81) 
-3.4e+8 
(-.36) 
6.6e+8 
(1.23) 
Terrorist Attacks 2009–
2012 [Attacked] 
4.5e+9 
(1.45) 
3.6e+9 
(1.07) 
1.5e+9 
(1.15) 
-4.5e+8 
(-.44) 
-3.5e+8 
(-.59) 
Log Media Persecution 
Index 2007–2012 
-2.8e+7 
(-.78) 
-3.3e+7 
(-.84) 
-3.5e+7** 
(-2.27) 
-9.0e+8 
(-.77) 
9.4e+6 
(1.40) 
Log Years Governor in 
Office up to 2012 
1.1e+8 
(.57) 
1.3e+8 
(.63) 
1.2e+7 
(.14) 
6.8e+7 
(1.06) 
2.8e+7 
(.77) 
Log N of MPs 
4.8e+8 
(.91) 
6.7e+8 
(1.15) 
1.9e+8 
(.82) 
2.2e+8 
(1.24) 
1.3e+7 
(.13) 
R-squared .500 .580 .445 .622 .878 
N 83 83 83 83 83 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. Significant 
at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
The money being remitted from the federal center to regions generally include 
unconditional donations of two types (donations for leveling regional budgets and 
donations for providing budgetary balance), and two earmarked grants: subsidies 
and subventions, the latter is targeted at financing responsibilities delegated from 
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the center to regions.179 Table E2 examines determinants of allocation of these 
transfer types. Among the politically neutral variables, none has an effect in all 
models. The amount of regional taxes is significant in the Donations Leveling model 
while GRP is significant in the Donations Balance model yet none of them is 
significant in the model of total donations. Putin’s vote is expectedly significant in 
the models of non-earmarked transfers. One may wonder, however, why the 
incumbent’s vote is significant at all if all types of transfers presented in the table 
are based on various formulas. Grossman (1994: 302) answers to this question by 
postulating that “[f]ormulae are set by politicians not by apolitical, benevolent 
outsiders and as such political considerations may influence the formulas' 
determination”. Likewise, Levitt and Snyder (1995) found empirical evidence that 
the U.S. federal outlays distributed with formulas were even more heavily biased 
toward Democratic voters than non-formula programs. Nor did formula-based 
transfers eliminate politically motivated targeting in Ghana (Banful 2011). 
Generally, none of the transfer types has demonstrated a better performance than 
the total amount of transfers, which is used in the main text. Apparently, this is 
some critical mass or the total amount of transfers that makes sense. It should be 
also noted that, as follows from Table E3, the transfer types differ markedly from 
each other and from the total transfers having rarely more than 40% of the common 
variance. 
Table E3. The correlation matrix of total transfers and their components 
Note: Entries are Pearson Correlation coefficients. Significant at: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01. 
                                                          
179
 There are several minor gratuitous receipts to regional budgets that not mentioned here. 
  
Transfers 
(Total) 
Donations 
(Total) 
Donations 
Leveling 
Donations 
Balance 
Subsidies Subventions 
Transfers ( Total) 1 .526** .239* .525** .733** .668** 
Donations 
(Total) 
.526** 1 .803** .574** .319** .048 
Donations 
Leveling 
.239* .803** 1 .089 .108 -.235* 
Donations 
Balance 
.525** .574** .089 1 .509** .473** 
Subsidies .733** .319** .108 .509** 1 .645** 
Subventions .668** .048 -.235* .473** .645** 1 
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Table E4. Testing various measurements of the political concerns’ variables, 2013 
Dependent Variable: STB 
Log Transfers Per 
Capita (RUB) 
Log Transfers (RUB) 
 
Full 
Model 
Best 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Best 
Model 
Full 
Model 
Best 
Model 
Constant 
-2.592 
(-.11) 
12.37 
(.86) 
-6059.1 
(-.19) 
33564.8*
* 
(2.51) 
1.2e+10 
(.57) 
-1.42e+8 
(-.02) 
Log Population     
5009.1**
* 
(2.92) 
4786.7**
* 
(3.50) 
Log Regional Taxes Per 
Capitaa  
-3.4e-
5 
(-.51) 
 
.105 
(1.12) 
 
-.023 
(-.79) 
 
Log GRP Per Capitaa 
-1.5e-
5* 
(-1.75) 
-1.8e-
5*** 
(-6.46) 
-.014 
(-1.14) 
 
.002 
(.63) 
 
Putin’s Vote (%), 2012 
.717**
* 
(3.74) 
.704*** 
(4.66) 
1009.4**
* 
(3.69) 
845.7*** 
(4.16) 
2.75e+8 
(1.64) 
3.9e+8*** 
(3.49) 
Terrorist Attacks 2009–
2012 [Attacked] 
8.352 
(1.48) 
 
9172.1 
(1.14) 
 
1.5e+8 
(.03) 
 
Terrorist Threat 1997–
2012 [Attacked] 
-
9.651* 
(-1.68) 
 
-1.7+4** 
(-2.08) 
 
1.35e+9 
(.27) 
 
Press Freedom 2010 
1.102 
(.44) 
 
1987.7 
(.55) 
 
-4.6e+8 
(-.22) 
 
Log Media Persecution 
Index 2007–2012 
.120** 
(2.44) 
.131*** 
(2.86) 
98.68 
(1.40) 
 
-1.16e+6 
(-.03) 
 
Log Mean N of Years 
Governor in Office 
.0719 
(.13) 
.559** 
(2.20) 
-512.3 
(-.64) 
-1045.3** 
(-2.02) 
-2.7e+8 
(-.61) 
 
N of Governors Since 
2004 
2.609 
(.92) 
 
2312.6 
(.57) 
 
7.8e+6 
(.00) 
 
Log Years Governor in 
Office up to 2012 
.747** 
(2.39) 
 
1161.7** 
(2.60) 
968.6** 
(2.50) 
1.12e+8 
(.42) 
 
Log MPs Adjusted Per 1 
mln. pop.a 
-2.657 
(-1.40) 
-3.081** 
(-2.39) 
-4048.2 
(-1.49) 
-5392*** 
(-2.91) 
1.25e+9 
(1.65) 
1.5e+9** 
(2.60) 
Log United Russia’s MPs 
Adjusted Per 1 mln. 
pop.a 
.483 
(.99) 
 
698.9 
(1.01) 
 
-
2.4e+9*** 
(-2.66) 
-
2.4e+9*** 
(-3.17) 
Log MPs non-Adjusted 
Per 1 mln. pop.a 
-.567 
(-.25) 
 
-196.7 
(-.60) 
 
5.47e+8 
(.71) 
 
R-squared .642 .806 .351 .273 .553 .535 
White heteroscedasticity 
test 
.477 .61 .553 .704 n/a n/a 
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values indicated in parentheses.  
a. For models with Log Transfers explanatory variables present in their units of 
measurement without dividing by population, the variable of population is included instead. 
Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Appendix E3. The mediation effect of regional taxes on GRP in determining the 
STB 
Besides the fact that the regional tax revenue and the regional gross added value 
are highly correlated there is another reason to forgo including these variables in 
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the equation as predictors of the central transfers simultaneously, namely, the 
causal relationship between variables, which follows from GRP to regional taxes and 
then to transfers. Figure A1 depicts this mediation effect. 
Figure A1. The mediation effect of regional taxes on the relationship between GRP 
and the STB 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Entries indicate coefficients with t-values in parentheses. [a], [b], and [c] are 
bivariate multilevel regression models while [c’] includes both Log GRP Per Capita and Log 
Regional Taxes Per Capita as predictors; the dependent variables are shown by the arrows. 
The random term consists of the intercepts and coefficients varying by Year and Type, where 
years include 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012. Models fit by maximizing penalized quasi-
likelihood (PQL) with general positive-definite covariance structure for the random effects, 
Log-Cholesky parametrization. ***p < 0.01 
There is evidently no direct effect of GRP on transfers. The explanatory power of 
the bivariate models with regional taxes and GRP is very similar: [b] and [c] explain 
respectively 63.7 and 62.4 percent of the STB’s variance, respectively. However, 
once the variable of regional taxes is controlled for, the explanatory capacity of GRP 
falls dramatically up to statistical insignificance. Compared to [c], entering GRP in 
the equation [c’] improves the model only slightly: the explanatory power increases 
by two percent and becomes equal to 64.6%. The effect of regional taxes is also 
suppressed but not so strongly (-3.7e-4) and it remains significant (t-value = -
2.88).180 The decrease in significance of both variables comes from the fact that GRP 
and regional taxes are highly correlated (R2 [a] = 0.911). These conditions met the 
classical requirements for mediation (Baron and Kenny 1986), namely, that [a], [b], 
[c] are significant, the mediator is significant in [c’], and that the predictor’s effect 
decreases greatly in [c’]. Moreover, the causal direction of mediation is quite 
obvious: regional taxes are collected based on the size of regional economies and 
the federal decisions to allocate transfers are determined by the levels of sufficiency 
of regional revenues. The Sobel test also indicates that the moderation effect of 
regional taxes on transfers is statistically significant (z-value = 2.83, p-value = 
0.0046).181 
                                                          
180
 Full models’ parameters are not shown. 
181
 Sobel test equation:   (    √            
 ⁄ , where a is the predictor’s coefficient for [a], b is the 
mediator’s coefficient for [c’],    and    denote standard errors of a and b. 
Log GRP Per Capita 
Log Regional Taxes Per Capita 
STB 
[a] 0.37 (15.53)*** [b] -4.7e-4 (-5.75)*** 
[c] -1.7e-4 (-5.69)*** 
[c’] -3.6e-5 (-0.94) 
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Appendix E4. Declarations of state sovereignty being explained by ethno-
religious concerns and by the set of alternative explanations 
 
Table E5. Who declared sovereignty in the early 1990s: Logistic regression models 
Dependent Variable: Declared Sovereignty 
Predictors’ year: 2012 2008 2004 2000 
Reduced 
Model 
Constant 
1.6e-9** 
(-1.97) 
5.9e-8*** 
(-2.82) 
.000** 
(-2.15) 
5.5e-6** 
(-2.39) 
.011*** 
(-4.95) 
Non-Russians (%) 
1.35* 
(1.86) 
1.29** 
(2.27) 
1.25** 
(2.42) 
1.25*** 
(2.65) 
1.19*** 
(4.33) 
Non-Orthodox Christians 
(%) 
1.01 
(.05) 
.965 
(-.26) 
1.05 
(.42) 
1.04 
(.38) 
 
Extraction of Natural 
Resources Per Capita (RUB) 
.999 
(-1.05) 
.999 
(-1.31) 
   
GRP Per Capita (RUB) 
1.00 
(1.11) 
1.00 
(1.49) 
1.00 
(.49) 
1.00 
(.24) 
 
Unemployment (%) 
1.78 
(.88) 
1.52 
(1.3) 
1.52 
(1.27) 
1.52 
(1.52) 
 
Pop. With Income Below the 
Living Minimum (%) 
1.48 
(1.61) 
1.33* 
(1.73) 
1.04 
(.56) 
1.02 
(.2) 
 
Infrastructure Is More 
Developed 
3.87* 
(1.7) 
3.15 
(1.26) 
10.45* 
(1.84) 
6.51* 
(1.86) 
 
Infrastructure Is in Worse 
Condition 
.457 
(-1.06) 
.828 
(-.31) 
.277* 
(-1.71) 
.336 
(-1.58) 
 
Terrorist Attacks 1997–
2012 [Attacked] 
9.6e-6 
(-1.27) 
.001 
(-1.43) 
.002 
(-.26) 
.001 
(-.25) 
 
Media Persecution Index  
1.02 
(.41) 
    
Population 
1.00 
(1.05) 
1 
(.075) 
1 
(.58) 
1 
(.79) 
 
Pseudo R-squared .761 .747 .726 .738 .646 
N 83 83 83 83 83 
Note: Entries are odds ratios with t-values in parentheses. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Table E5 aims to explain what kind of regions declared sovereignty by the end of 
1991. Since this question is of auxiliary character in this analysis I use the 
available set of variables without collecting that-time data. It, of course, leads to 
some degree of imprecision but I assume that, first, several especially economic 
variables are very inertial and, second, the relationship between explanatory and 
the outcome variables should be stronger as time is getting closer to the early 
1990s. Due to this reason the table presents the models for various years. The 
results of logistic regression show that only two variables – the share of non-
Russian population and the level of development of regional infrastructure – can 
explain the adoption of sovereignty declarations in a systematic manner.182 
Infrastructure development appears to be significant in all but 2008 years while the 
share of non-Russians is significant in models of all years and its significance 
                                                          
182
 Since there are no strict assumptions on linearity in logistic regression I do not use log-transformed 
variables. Log-transformation however produces very similar results to those presented in the table. 
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increases from 2012 through 2000, as indicated by t-values. However, only the 
percentage of non-Russians is significant enough to be included in the best 
model.183 As follows from the reduced model, the proportion of non-Russian 
population explains over sixty percent of the maximized likelihood of declaring 
sovereignty. If the proportion of non-Russians shifts from the 5th percentile (3% or 
the level of Ivanovo Oblast) to the 95th percentile (92% or the level of Dagestan) the 
probability of sovereignty declaration correspondingly increases from 1.8 to 99.9 
percent.  
It is worth mentioning that in his other work Treisman (1997) admits that ethnic 
and religious concerns played a major role in determining regional propensity to 
separatist activism. He especially underlines that “[t]he Muslim/non-Muslim 
boundary was more influential than other cultural or linguistic divisions” (p. 243). 
Therefore, sovereignty declarations should be rather deemed as a mediator variable 
between primordial ethno-religious characteristics and central transfers. 
Appendix E5. The effects of electoral interests versus ethno-religious concerns 
on the allocation of transfers 
Table E6. OLS models testing electoral interests versus ethno-religious concerns to 
determining the allocation of transfers in various years by budget type 
DV: STB 
2001 2005 2009 2013 
FM BM FM BM FM BM FM BM 
Recipients 
Constant 
-37.79 
(-1.24) 
-46.7*** 
(-2.98) 
-14.41 
(-.56) 
14.28 
(.8) 
-6.8 
(-.37) 
-9.18 
(-.52) 
-10.0 
(-.45) 
11.64 
(.93) 
Incumbent’s Vote 
-.293 
(-1.3) 
 
.233 
(1.06) 
 
.423** 
(2.3) 
.48*** 
(3.04) 
.337 
(1.41) 
 
Log Ethnoreligion 
Index 
.254 
(1.33) 
 
.303* 
(1.86) 
.449*** 
(3.55) 
.061 
(.66) 
 
.335** 
(2.24) 
.448*** 
(4.17) 
Log Regional Taxes Per 
Capita 
-4.2e-5 
(-.26) 
 
-2.2e-4 
(-1.37) 
-3.4e-
4** 
(2.66) 
-2.4e-
4** 
(-2.55) 
-2.3e-
4** 
(2.58) 
-2.5e-4* 
(2.0) 
-3e-4*** 
(-2.98) 
Log Unemployment (%) 
3.05* 
(2.06) 
3.3*** 
(3.56) 
1.73* 
(2.03) 
1.38* 
(1.84 
2.12*** 
(3.05) 
2.23*** 
(3.54) 
.262 
(.15) 
 
Population With 
Income Below the 
Living Minimum (%) 
.616*** 
(3.48) 
.633*** 
(4.03) 
.234 
(1.25) 
 
.756** 
(2.65) 
.77*** 
(2.74) 
1.41*** 
(2.89) 
 
Infrastructure Is More 
Developed 
2.56 
(.93) 
 
.807 
(.4) 
 
.53 
(.42) 
 
.48 
(.22) 
 
Infrastructure Is in 
Worse Condition 
3.89* 
(1.94) 
 
3.11* 
(1.97) 
3.3** 
(2.15) 
1.19* 
(1.85) 
2.3* 
(1.99) 
-1.4 
(-.81) 
 
R-squared .817 .754 .793 .774 .743 .74 .69 672 
White test .406 .787 .703 .253 .265 .138 .28 .055 
N 25 25 38 38 63 63 47 47 
Donors 
Constant 
-2.31 
(-.13) 
5.53 
(.44) 
7.61 
(.5) 
28.8*** 
(2.96) 
66.32* 
(1.82) 
.543 
(.09) 
6.34 
(.39) 
18.05** 
(2.5) 
Incumbent’s Vote 
-.059 
(-.56) 
 
.11 
(.74) 
 
-.624* 
(-2.01) 
 
.176 
(1.08) 
 
Log Ethnoreligion 
Index 
.157* 
(1.92) 
.169** 
(2.19) 
.032 
(.48) 
 
.349* 
(2.06) 
 
-.074 
(-.97) 
 
Log Regional Taxes Per -2.3e- -2.5e- -2.8e- -2.9e- -2.8e-4*  -9.7e-5 -1.4e-
                                                          
183
 Based on significance level > 0.10, the variable of ethnicity was the only one in the best models of years 
2004, 2008, and 2012. Unemployment and the index of infrastructure development were additionally included 
in the model of 2000. Therefore, I call the best model “the reduced model”. 
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Capita 4** 
(-2.32) 
4** 
(-2.69) 
4*** 
(-3.51) 
4*** 
(3.92) 
(-2.13) (-1.3) 4** 
(-2.48) 
Log Unemployment (%) 
.846 
(1.34) 
 
.658 
(1.56) 
 
1.6* 
(1.9) 
2.04*** 
(3.42) 
1.21* 
(1.8) 
1.25** 
(2.19) 
Population With 
Income Below the 
Living Minimum (%) 
.68*** 
(4.25) 
.75*** 
(5.33) 
.592*** 
(2.9) 
.548*** 
(2.86) 
-1.04 
(-1.42) 
 
.174 
(.36) 
 
Infrastructure Is More 
Developed 
.641 
(.29) 
 
.755 
(.54) 
 
6.94*** 
(3.39) 
7.73*** 
(3.46) 
1.8 
(1.43) 
 
Infrastructure Is in 
Worse Condition 
.291 
(.19) 
 
-1.64 
(-1.46) 
 
-3.0 
(-1.43) 
 
.021 
(.02) 
 
R-squared .667 .648 .649 .607 .739 .567 .375 .294 
White test .81 .951 .499 .892 .395 .927 .422 .004 
N 58 .58 45 45 20 20 36 36 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses.  
Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Ethno-religious concerns in allocation of transfers are tested against electoral 
interests and the set of alternative explanations in Table E6. For this purpose, I 
construct an index that combines two variables of ethnicity and religion, and the 
interaction between them in such manner that it would better explain the share of 
transfers in regional budgets.184 For doing this I run thirteen regression models for 
years 2000, 2001,... 2012 with the STB as the dependent variable, the predictors 
include log-transformed centered percentage of non-Russians, non-Orthodox 
Christians, and the interaction between them.185 The averaged unstandardized b-
coefficients are used then to define the index so that:186 
                   
                                                    
             
The results of the regression models are mixed. The incumbent’s vote and the 
Ethnoreligion index are never significant together. Significance of one variable 
implies absolute insignificance of the other if two variables are in the equation 
together though each of two is significant if it is included in the model without the 
other.187 This could indicate a mediation effect but this is unclear what mediates 
what since electoral interests and ethno-religious concerns change their places in 
                                                          
184
 I do not use factor analysis for constructing the index since the purpose is not defining the commonality 
between the variables but giving these three variables a more equal chance in regression analysis. In other 
words, one variable is supposed to explain the same variance of transfers that is explained by three.  
185
 The variables are centered since I am interested in the effects at their mean levels but not at zero level. In 
the second case both effects are negative (see Figure 4 for the conditional effect of non-Russians).  
In the result of centring by subtracting the means of independent variables the coefficient of X or Z can be 
interpreted as the effect of that variable on Y at the mean level of the other independent variable while a non-
centered variable indicate the effect of that variable on Y when the value of the other independent variable is 
zero 
186
 The variables are not centered at this stage since centring creates negative values that provide misleading 
index’s values: when value of one of two centered variables is less the mean and it has negative sign the 
interaction term is negative, in other cases it is positive though; when values of the centered variables are 
negative then they are subtracted from the value of interaction term, when they are positive they are summed 
to it. 
187
 The Ethnoreligion index is significant in the analogous models without the incumbent’s vote for the 
recipients in the years 2005, 2009, and 2013; models are not shown. Significance of the incumbent’s vote 
without the index of Ethnoreligion follows from the main analysis. 
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various years: the incumbent’s vote is significant in 2009 while the Ethnoreligion 
index is significant in 2005 and 2013. Neither the Ethnoreligion index nor the 
incumbent’s vote is significant in the recipients’ model of 2000 though the 
Ethnoreligion index is significant in the donors’ model of 2000 – the only one 
significant coefficient of the two variables among the recipients. I also tried running 
analogous models with transfers per capita and raw transfers controlled by 
population as the dependent variables among the recipients. The variables were 
again mutually exclusive. In the first case the Ethnoreligion index was significant 
for years 2001 and 2013; the incumbent’s vote prevailed in the other two election 
years. In the second case the Ethnoreligion index was significant only for year 2001; 
the incumbent’s vote outperformed it in all other years. Thus, based on these 
results we cannot conclude whether electoral interests or ethno-religious concerns 
predominate in the allocation of transfers. At the same time, we cannot discard any 
of them. It is rather a mediation effect of ethnicity and religion on the vote in 
determining transfers accompanied with the main effect of ethno-religious concerns 
on transfers.188 
However, it is difficult to disentangle whether the positive effect of the 
Ethnoreligion index on the allocation of transfers is associated with appeasement or 
rewarding strategy. It may be interpreted on both sides: ethnically and religiously 
divergent regions may be perceived as more rebellious by the Kremlin, they may, 
however, be considered as members of the ruling coalition either so long as the 
regime draws the bulk of its electoral support from these regions. In fact, the 
incumbent’s vote is quite well predicted by the share of non-Russian and non-
Christian Orthodox population, and the interaction between them: 54%, 53%, and 
61% of the variance is explained for elections of years 2004, 2008, and 2012, 
respectively.189 At any rate, it might be reasonably asserted that appeasement 
strategy prevails if a positive association between the ethno-religious concerns and 
central transfers has been accompanied with a negative relationship between the 
incumbent’s vote and the transfers. Since this is not the case, non-Russian and 
non-Orthodox Christian regions were rewarded rather than appeased under the 
Putin’s rule. 
                                                          
188
 It would be a clear mediation effect of ethno-religious composition on the vote in determining transfers if 
only the incumbent’s vote had been significant in the models with the Ethnoreligion index while the 
Ethnoreligion index is significant in the models without the incumbent’s vote. The causal association in such 
case is twofold: ethnicity and religion firstly determine the vote and then the vote determines transfers. See 
more on mediation effects in Appendix E3.  
189
 40%, 36%, and 40% is explained solely by the Ethnoreligion Index in the respective election years. The 
explained proportion of variance is much smaller for the election of 2000 – 8% is predicted by the Ethnoreligion 
Index and 16% by the variables of ethnicity and religion, and the interaction term: the Russians firstly trusted 
and voted for Putin while the ethnic republics partially were still rebellious since the 1990s. 
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Appendix E6. Random effects of the best multilevel models in Table 5.4 and 
postestimation 
Table E7. The random effects of the best multilevel models presented in Table 5.4 
Note: D denotes donor regions and R refers to recipients. 
The residuals plots in Figure A2 generally indicate no shortcomings of the 
models presented in Table 5.4. Normal q-q plots at the bottom of the graph show 
only slight deviation from normality while some degree of heteroscedasticity is 
visible on the upper scatter plots with Log Transfers Per Capita and Log Transfers 
as dependent variables; few outliers present among which Tyumen Oblast, which 
received significantly smaller transfers in 2009 than predicted by each of three 
models. It should be noted, however, that the residual terms have the multilevel 
structure that cannot be easily presented by the graphical tools. Marking residuals 
by various colors depending on panels defined by years partly mitigates this 
problem. We see from the colored distributions that residuals within groups are 
much less heterogeneous and distributed closer to normality than the overall 
distributions (the heterogeneity on two plots to the right follows from the fact that 
the transfers measured in rubles vary over time whereas the mean of the STB is 
relatively time-invariant). It must be also pointed out that residuals should be 
standardized individually to each group of the random term (including the budget 
Dependent Variable: STB 2001–2013 
 
2001/D 2001/R 2005/D 2005/R 2009/D 2009/R 2013/D 2013/R 
(Intercept) -11.478 -21.681 10.914 -6.9618 18.934 -9.8678 20.185 -27.002 
logregtaxpercapita -.0002 -.0001 -.0003 -.0002 -.0002 -.0002 -.0003 -.0002 
logunemployment 1.2676 2.4437 .7280 1.9259 1.9868 1.5959 1.5492 2.2927 
belowlivingminimum .7921 .5778 .4703 .4500 .0228 .9462 .1112 1.0542 
incvote .0146 .0552 .1056 .2442 .1269 .5314 .0602 .6149 
conflictsituation 1.8885 -.1857 5.0734 3.3195 3.3092 5.5331 3.5594 4.1894 
Dependent Variable: Log Transfers Per Capita 2001–2013 (RUB) 
 
2001/D 2001/R 2005/D 2005/R 2009/D 2009/R 2013/D 2013/R 
(Intercept) -140.98 -1816.59 -962.99 -2105.69 -30227 -2573.8 -3200.7 -29887 
logregtaxpercapita .0524 .082 .0664 .099 .2508 .2689 .2758 .3165 
logunemployment 729.50 537.14 307.66 381.94 3729.97 1606.56 3299.30 1902.04 
belowlivingminimum 108.51 103.53 27.10 136.52 -172.75 722.01 159.64 659.24 
infrmoredeveloped 1449.75 1183.64 532.30 898.14 6404.86 1621.38 5155.21 218.64 
incvote -1.87 86.20 6.15 139.18 251.60 432.03 334.19 527.20 
Dependent Variable: Log Transfers 2001–2013 (Million RUB) 
 
2001/D 2001/R 2005/D 2005/R 2009/D 2009/R 2013/D 2013/R 
(Intercept) -5609.2 -4705.6 -6821.7 -6053.9 -25121 -25004 -12775 -12722 
logpopulation .0045 .0031 .0065 .0035 .0105 .0087 .0067 .0050 
logregtaxes -1.1e-8 5.3e-8 -1.8e-8 5.1e-8 6.2e-8 1.1e-7 3.3e-8 8.5e-8 
logunemployment 620.95 547.04 138.13 230.55 605.40 686.15 301.16 440.55 
belowlivingminimum 92.39 63.01 134.45 105.33 551.22 547.64 302.79 306.71 
incvote 75.49 87.79 103.17 124.30 295.22 305.68 19.09 225.33 
  
329 
 
type: donors and recipients) therefore a single standardized scale for residuals is 
not precise. 
Figure A2. The residuals plots for the best multilevel models presented in Table 
5.4 
 
Several formal tests for normality and heterogeneity of residuals allow us to 
carry out more detailed diagnostics. The normality can be tested by the Shapiro-
Wilk test calculated individually for each group of residuals. Obtaining statistics of 
the White test of heteroscedasticity is more problematic because the most of 
software calculates it based on a particular (usually linear) model. To create an 
analogue of the White test for multilevel analysis, I regress squared residuals 
obtained from the multilevel model on the multilevel model’s predictors using the 
same syntax on the right-hand side of the multilevel equation. Unlike the White 
test, I do not include in the model squared and interaction terms due to 
computational complexity of such a model. The null hypothesis suggests that if 
heteroscedasticity is absent then none of predictors should correlate with the error 
term, alternatively, if errors increase or decrease with any independent variable, 
significance of its coefficient would indicate heteroscedasticity. The chi-squared 
statistic for the White test is derived from Lagrange multiplier, which is the product 
of R2 and the total number of observations. 
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Table E8. The residuals statistics for the best multilevel models presented in  
Table 5.4 
Dep.Var. 
Shapiro-Wilk test of normalitya Het. 
Testb 2001/D 2001/R 2005/D 2005/R 2009/D 2009/R 2013/D 2013/R 
STB  
.9458 
(.011)** 
.9709 
(.689) 
.971 
(.315) 
.9475 
(.074)* 
.9557 
(.224) 
.9723 
(.265) 
.8537 
(.000)*** 
.9611 
(.105) 
.057 
(18.9) 
Log 
Transfers 
P. C. 
.9593 
(.046)** 
.8753 
(.007)**
* 
.8195 
(.000)*** 
.9093 
(.005)*** 
.9451 
(.114) 
.9462 
(.021)** 
.9762 
(.651) 
.9868 
(.853) 
.212 
(73)** 
Log 
Transfers 
.9342 
(.003)*** 
.9096 
(.035)** 
.965 
(.189) 
.976 
(.577) 
.9571  
(.244) 
.9764  
(.387) 
.9759 
(.641) 
.9653 
(.156) 
.205 
(68)* 
Note: D denotes donor regions and R refers to recipients. a. Entries are W-statistics with 
p-values in parentheses. b. Entries are within-group R2 of the multilevel model with squared 
residuals from models in Table 5.4 – on the left-hand side, and with the same set of 
predictors as on the right-hand side in Table 5.4. R2 is calculated as follows:  
   
  (∑    (  (∑     
    
     ∑ (      ̅  )
    
   ⁄ ))     )   , where   denotes the model’s error term, 
u to the dependent variable, which is the error term of the best model presented in Table 
5.4,  ̅ to its mean, all grouped by budget type t nested within year y, whereas     is the 
number of observations in ith region in year y with budget type t, and   refers to the total 
number of observations; chi-squared statistic with 54 degrees of freedom (the number of 
model parameters is equal in in all models and includes 48 random and 6 fixed effects) is 
shown in parentheses. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
The formal tests of Table E8 indicate relatively high reliability of the STB model. 
The null hypothesis of normality is strongly rejected for donors in 2013; a moderate 
deviation from normality is detected for donors in 2005 and recipients in 2001. The 
heteroscedasticity test statistics confirms that residuals are distributed with equal 
variance. In the multilevel model of regression of the squared residuals on 
predictors from the same equation only the variable of regional taxes was significant 
at 0.01 level determining thereby the largest portion of heteroscedasticity. The 
models with Log Transfers and Log Transfers Per Capita are less trustworthy in this 
regard. The residual term of Log Transfers model approximates normality fairly well 
whereas residuals of the Log Transfers Per Capita model strongly deviate from 
normality in three out of eight groups and minor deviations exist in two groups. The 
both models, however, barely pass the heteroscedasticity test. The main role in 
determining heteroscedasticity again belongs to regional taxes; the population (sig. 
at 0.01) and in a lesser degree the incumbent’s vote (sig. at 0.07) also contributed to 
heteroscedasticity in the Log Transfers model. In each of three models, the variable 
of regional taxes had a positive coefficient meaning that the error of prediction is 
larger at high values of regions’ own revenues.  
Appendix E7. Testing causality between the incumbent’s vote and transfers 
The Granger (1969) test is frequently applied for examining directions of causal 
relationships in time-series analysis. The idea behind the Granger causality test is 
simple: if X causes Y then the past values of X can predict the present values of Y 
but not the contrary, and that inclusion of X in the model allows significantly 
improve the prediction of Y compared to the model based only on Y’s own past 
values. This statement mathematically implies the following pair of vector 
autoregression (VAR) modes:  
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Table E9 replicates the VAR design based on the panel data. The results of the 
VAR models indicate a unilateral causal direction from the incumbent’s vote to the 
share of transfers in the budget. The lagged variables of transfers in all models are 
completely insignificant in determining Putin’s vote in 2012.190 It also appears from 
the 3 lags full model (FM) that the lags of the Conflict Situation, besides the lags of 
the dependent variable, predict the Putin’s vote in the most systematic way. On 
average, Putin received 1.8 percent of the vote less in regions affected by conflicts in 
the previous decade. This finding nonetheless is not confirmed by the full model 
containing two lags. 
Table E9. Granger causality tests 
 DV: STB 2012 DV: Putin’s Vote 2012 
 
3 Lags 
FM 
3 Lags 
RM 
2 Lags 
FM 
2 Lags 
RM 
3 Lags 
FM 
3 Lags 
RM 
2 Lags 
FM 
2 Lags 
RM 
Medvedev's Vote 
2008 
.298* 
(2.0) 
.425*** 
(3.31) 
.381*** 
(3.02) 
.424*** 
(3.34) 
.643*** 
(5.3) 
.743*** 
(6.49) 
.694*** 
(6.11) 
.751*** 
(6.49) 
Putin's Vote 2004 
-.053 
(-.33) 
-.248* 
(-1.73) 
-.144 
(-1.16) 
-.233* 
(-1.99) 
.451*** 
(3.42) 
.297** 
(2.32) 
.181 
(1.63) 
.196* 
(1.83) 
Putin's Vote 2000 
-.062 
(-.58) 
.024 
(.26) 
  
-.237*** 
(-2.75) 
-.129 
(-1.57) 
  
STB 2008 
.522*** 
(5.05) 
.507*** 
(5.85) 
.468*** 
(5.36) 
.527*** 
(6.59) 
.046 
(.55) 
.077 
(.99) 
.027 
(.24) 
.040 
(.55) 
STB 2004 
.229** 
(2.43) 
.309*** 
(3.99) 
.275*** 
(3.22) 
.314*** 
(4.21) 
-.086 
(-1.2) 
.041 
(.60) 
-.007 
(-.009) 
.045 
(.67) 
STB 2000 
.016 
(.023) 
.032 
(.62) 
  
.043 
(.78) 
-.052 
(-1.11) 
  
Log Reg. Tax. PC 08 
1.9e-4 
(.54) 
 
-3.8e-4* 
(-1.93) 
 
2.6e-4 
(.9) 
 
-9.1e-6 
(-.05) 
 
Log Reg. Tax. PC 04 -8e-4 
(-1.19) 
 
3.4e-4 
(1.66) 
 
-5.1e-4 
(-1.02) 
 
-5.7e-6 
(-.03) 
 
Log Reg. Tax. PC 00 5.3e-
4* 
(1.91) 
   
2.1e-4 
(.93) 
   
Unemployment 2008 
.296 
(.48) 
 
.271 
(.47) 
 
.033 
(.07) 
 
-.085 
(-.16) 
 
Unemployment 2004 
-.260 
(-.57) 
 
-.262 
(.62) 
 
.781** 
(2.1) 
 
.575 
(1.51) 
 
Unemployment 2000 
-.243 
(-.49) 
   
-738 
(1.82) 
   
Below Living Min. 08 
.360 
(1.48) 
 
.258 
(1.14) 
 
-.133 
(-.67) 
 
-.224 
(-1.12) 
 
Below Living Min. 04 
-.125 
(-.65) 
 
-.005 
(-.04) 
 
.050 
(.32) 
 
.044 
(.39) 
 
Below Living Min. 00 
.095 
(.98) 
   
.014 
(.14) 
   
                                                          
190 I also tried to run analogous VAR models for predicting central transfers and the incumbent’s vote in 2008. 
However, the test has shown no causal effect: the lagged values of the incumbent’s vote were insignificant in 
predicting the STB and the lagged values of the STB failed to predict the incumbent’s vote at a statistically 
significant level. 
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Table E9. Continued:         
Infr. More Developed 
08 
-4.01* 
(-1.93) 
 
-3.86** 
(-2.02) 
 
-2.43 
(-1.44) 
 
-1.87 
(-1.09) 
 
Infr. More Developed 
04 
8.16* 
(1.97) 
 
5.97*** 
(2.86) 
 
4.17 
(1.17) 
 
.170 
(.09) 
 
Infr. More Developed 
00 
-2.59 
(-.68) 
   
-4.2 
(-1.36) 
   
Infr. Worse 
Condition 08 
-.763 
(-.43) 
 
-1.6 
(-1.02) 
 
1.48 
(1.02) 
 
.836 
(.59) 
 
Infr. Worse 
Condition 04 
.836 
(.41) 
 
1.4 
(.97) 
 
-.373 
(-.23) 
 
.103 
(.08) 
 
Infr. Worse 
Condition 00 
-.085 
(-.46) 
   
.336 
(.31) 
   
Conflict Situation 08 
.517 
(.17) 
 
1.2 
(.48) 
 
-5.04** 
(-2.08) 
 
-3.14 
(-1.39) 
 
Conflict Situation 04 
6.17* 
(1.79) 
 
5.04* 
(1.71) 
 
7.61*** 
(2.71) 
 
2.24 
(.84) 
 
Conflict Situation 00 
-1.03 
(-.56) 
   
-4.32*** 
(2.87) 
   
Constant 
-4.36 
(-.34) 
-7.01 
(-1.09) 
-5.74 
(-.51) 
-6.64 
(-1.05) 
2.46 
(.23) 
-4.32 
(-.75) 
-2.01 
(-.20) 
-4.70 
(-.81) 
R-squared .936 .902 .913 .902 .860 .742 .811 .729 
F valuea 14.6*** 3.79** 20.0*** 5.71*** 18.9*** 1.92 18.1*** 3.11** 
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Note: FM denotes full model; RM denotes reduced model. Entries are unstandardized 
OLS coefficients with t-values in parentheses. a. F test is calculated applying the formula: 
  
(            ⁄
     (    ⁄
, where RSS denotes the residual sum of squares of the restricted model (R), 
which includes only the dependent variable’ lags, or of the unrestricted model (UR); m is 
equal to the number of lagged predictor’s terms (3 or 2 depending on the model’s 
specification); k (25, 17, 7 or 5) is the number of parameters estimated in the unrestricted 
model (including the constant); and n (83) is the number of cases. See also Gujarati (2004: 
698). Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
If we consider the models predicting the STB in 2012, the lagged variables of the 
incumbent’s vote, especially Medvedev’s vote of 2008, appear to be statistically 
significant predictors throughout all four models. The average effects of the lagged 
variables of the incumbent’s vote equal to 0.183 (3 lags FM), 0.201 (3 lags RM), 
0.231 (2 lags FM), and 0.191 (2 lags RM). Hence if we traveled in 2008 from the 
region with the 5th-percentile support for the incumbent, which was Ryazan Oblast 
with 61.7% of Medvedev votes, to the 95th percentile as supportive Karachay-
Cherkessia with 90.6% of the vote then using our four models we could predict the 
future difference between these regions in the STB of 2012 equals 5.3, 5.8, 6.8, and 
5.5 percent, respectively.  
Alternatively, if we keep the past vote of 2004 and 2000 at a constant level and 
use only Medvedev’s vote, which is the most significant, the shift between nearly the 
least and nearly the most electorally supportive regions in 2008 would predict the 
difference in the STB in 2012 by, respectively, 8.9, 12.7, 11.4, and 12.6 percent. 
Surprisingly, the lagged values of per capita regional taxes are rather not causally 
linked with central transfers: there are only two marginally significant effects of 
different years in the 3 and 2 lags FMs. The index of regional infrastructure 
development is seemingly a Granger cause of the federal transfers.191 The average 
                                                          
191 I ran analogous full and reduced auxiliary VAR models testing whether the past values of the STB allow to 
predict the infrastructure development in 2012. It turned out that throughout the models all lags of the STB 
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effect of the lagged infrastructure equals to 4.15 (3 lags FM) and 2.11 (2 lags FM) 
that yields, respectively, 6.6 and 3.1 percent increase in the STB of 2012 if the 
index shifts from its 5th percentile to the 95th percentile. F values for the Granger 
test indicate the statistical difference between the restricted models, which include 
only the dependent variable’s lags, and the unrestricted models. The F statistics is 
quite large and therefore non-indicative in the full models since the auxiliary 
variables contribute to the prediction. Meanwhile the F values considerably larger in 
the reduced models predicting the STB compared to the reduced models of the 
incumbent’s vote. Moreover, the difference between the full and the restricted 
models is insignificant in the 3 lags RM. Thus, bilateral causality cannot be rejected 
with absolute certainty. Nevertheless, this is much more likely that the incumbent’s 
vote determines transfers but not vice-versa. 
Appendix E8. Zero-Skewness Log-Transformation Commands 
Variables having strongly skewed distributions are transformed applying the 
following algorithm: 
1. Zero-skewness log-transformation is applied, 
2. Variables are linearly rescaled so that the minimal and the maximal values of 
the log-transformed variables fit to the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the 
non-transformed variables.192 
This procedure comes up with the following transformation commands: 
5.2752*(-3537.3511+837.3993*ln(TransfersPerCapita00+70.94379000000001)) 
4.396*(-4355.5160+1224.3111*ln(TransfersPerCapita01+49.3188)) 
2.6759*(-18506.8462+3232.7115*ln(TransfersPerCapita04+306.3928)) 
2.243*(-11872.4227+2644.7015*ln(TransfersPerCapita05+128.0516)) 
1.45*(-24315.6118+6247.9955*ln(TransfersPerCapita08-3633.438)) 
1.4215*(-37233.4218+8303.1443*ln(TransfersPerCapita09-3982.521)) 
-51178.4690+10649.9013*ln(TransfersPerCapita12-4221.756) 
.9524*(-55946.9356+11652.9354*ln(TransfersPerCapita13-3541.99)) 
5.2752*(-16117741822.1565+858675065.6683*ln(TotalTransfers00+150000000)) 
4.396*(-39845942397.7171+209124136.1852*ln(TotalTransfers01+256000000)) 
3.6634*(-60379585743.5447+3017251951.7645*ln(TotalTransfers02+685000000)) 
3.2191*(-82922031137.5893+3971662584.8788*ln(TotalTransfers03+1230000000)) 
2.6759*(-69032559073.3894+3342812856.0715*ln(TotalTransfers04+930000000)) 
2.243*(-93592109852.1989+4576250863.4568*ln(TotalTransfers05+1010000000)) 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
were insignificant; additionally to the dependent variable’s lags only the first lag of unemployment was 
significantly and negatively associated with the levels of infrastructure development in 2012. 
192
 Exceptions are LogGRPperCapitaRescaled00, –04, –08, and –12 the minimal and maximal values of which are 
equal to the 5
th
 and the 90
th
 percentiles of their corresponding non-transformed variables. The extremely 
skewed distributions make the 95
th
 percentile an inappropriate benchmark for the relevant upper limit; the 
90
th
 percentile is used instead in these four cases. Other exceptions include all variables related to MPs, 
governors, LogMediaPersecutionIndexRescaled07_12, LogNonRussiansRescaled, LogNonOrthodoxRescaled. 
Since the distributions of the corresponding non-transformed variables skewed moderately, the minimal and 
the maximal values of the rescaled variables fit to the minimal and the maximal values of the non-transformed 
variables. Rescaling of the variables included in the indices of infrastructure development and infrastructure 
condition is also based on the minimal and maximal values. The minimal and maximal values of the rescaled 
Ethnoreligion Index set to 0 and 100, respectively. 
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1.9471*(-119765327683.2840+5811755542.5220*ln(TotalTransfers06+1190000000)) 
1.7109*(-64760989427.8241+3502107877.1759*ln(TotalTransfers07-2.35e+08)) 
1.45*(-190940960357.2120+9205173089.7570*ln(TotalTransfers08-1.33e+09)) 
1.4215*(-270049455745.9110+12943822346.5783*ln(TotalTransfers09-1.44e+09)) 
1.2448*(-24734731554.1130+1175271768.0237*ln(TotalTransfers10-5.44e+08)) 
1.074*(-214359347698.5230+10575349863.3527*ln(TotalTransfers11-1.72e+09)) 
-282112360953.4510+13800982595.5957*ln(TotalTransfers12-2.08e+09) 
.9524*(-244641796812.1490+11734367837.3664*ln(TotalTransfers13-1.62e+09)) 
-139104354406.8510+6859309363.4203*ln(DonationsTotal13+649000000) 
-65316346489.4686+3369873467.3647*ln(DonationsLeveling13+262000000) 
-1762440916.5047+948759416.5536*ln(DonationsBalance13+122000000) 
-99543133691.6706+4897928148.2101*ln(SubsidiesTotal13+910000000) 
-31465834509.8321+1636657286.6161*ln(SubventionsTotal13+24600000) 
-122864.0192+20643.8839*ln(RegTaxesPerCapita00-243.5918) 
-125234.6780+20319.1379*ln(RegTaxesPerCapita04-1395.108) 
-144275.7009+22483.5057*ln(RegTaxesPerCapita08-2631.506) 
-141833.7568+21129.7366*ln(RegTaxesPerCapita12-3836.19) 
-65345641742.3160+32599949906.4029*ln(RegionalTaxes00+256000000) 
-736874118927.9750+36081839923.3897*ln(RegionalTaxes04-1.06e+08) 
-858261756998.9430+41203272407.2172*ln(RegionalTaxes08-2.45e+08) 
-665527984935.1270+3136487963.7619*ln(RegionalTaxes12-3.70e+08) 
-181022262631.9980+9920730143.5485*ln(FederalTaxes00+9277237) 
-237156649232.4160+12962700768.9200*ln(FederalTaxes04-1.10e+08) 
-341156957274.3840+18414395692.3854*ln(FederalTaxes08-1.30e+08) 
-374361854303.5620+19954221925.9073*ln(FederalTaxes12+11000000) 
-34795.6671+8727.5047*ln(FederalTaxesPerCapita00-157.8858) 
-3133.6968+8097.1784*ln(FederalTaxesPerCapita04-408.0263) 
-38851.1764+10203.9366*ln(FederalTaxesPerCapita08+5123.894) 
-56225.1110+1026.6841*ln(FederalTaxesPerCapita12+16055.42) 
-129885.6696+25044.6221*ln(TotalTaxCapita00-687.1442) 
-126283.3494+23983.0797*ln(TotalTaxCapita04-2209.851) 
-131349.8027+25835.8174*ln(TotalTaxCapita08-3895.092) 
-11762.7522+21332.8525*ln(TotalTaxCapita12-5546.043) 
-37.1662+4.9366*ln(MediaPersecutionIndex07_12+2.479101) 
.8994+6.8150*ln(MeanN_GovernY_inOffice-1.904092) 
-1.0229+6.6654*ln(YearsGovernorInOffice+1.165867) 
.8418+5.8414*ln(MPsBiogrAdjusted11+.8657951) 
-34.0529+13.8426*ln(MPsBiogrAdjustedPerMlnPop11+11.70174) 
2.2582+5.3969*ln(MPsUnitedRussiaBiogrAdjusted11+.4829296) 
7.9481+4.9840*ln(MPsUnitedRussiaBiogrAdjustedPerMlnPop11-.9613547) 
3.6143+3.6198*ln(MPsBiogrNONAdjusted11+.368433) 
-.8970+2.8614*ln(MPsBiogrNONAdjustedPerMlnPop11+1.368164) 
5.2752*(-656374313465.8480+30390180721.1161*ln(GRP00+101000000) 
2.6759*(-1796403789608.9600+80294290746.0577*ln(GRP04-3.07e+08) 
1.45*(-4656957692844.1500+201330741277.5900*ln(GRP08-6.19e+09) 
-7751133826899.8100+329511067249.2660*ln(GRP12-1.11e+10) 
5.2752*(-44824.2576+8661.1954*ln(GRPperCapita2000-5957.626)) 
2.6759*(-109286.8681+19196.2732*ln(GRPperCapita2004-12669.57)) 
1.45*(-234482.2933+38001.8152*ln(GRPperCapita2008-43786.16)) 
-416073.4380+6324.8750*ln(GRPperCapita2012-73987.99) 
-15657289.2922+1260597.0462*ln(Population00+249147.9) 
-14597268.1573+1186426.4556*ln(Population04+216913.5) 
-14052442.1922+1153237.1938*ln(Population08+18778.7) 
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-13986392.9747+1155361.8728*ln(Population12+168901.4) 
2.0041+1.1917*ln(OfficialsInEmployed00-.0774513) 
2.9444+1.1768*ln(OfficialsInEmployed04-.5734294) 
2.5973+1.8283*ln(OfficialsInEmployed08-.2467711) 
2.8771+1.4553*ln(OfficialsInEmployed12-.4288766) 
16.5497+9.4960*ln(EmployedInPublic00-24.6222) 
9.3859+11.4419*ln(EmployedInPublic04-22.62886) 
18.8647+8.9535*ln(EmployedInPublic08-22.53918) 
21.6169+6.0432*ln(EmployedInPublic12-22.22315) 
.1945+7.6686*ln(Unemployment00-1.545919) 
-.2802+7.4182*ln(Unemployment04+.1332896) 
-4.4737+7.1501*ln(Unemployment08+1.88121) 
-11.1162+8.1864*ln(Unemployment12+4.975686) 
.16*(.0000+3.7738*ln(NonOrthodox+.3301965)) 
11.207+19.17*ln(NonRussians-1.380358) 
17.138+15.4399*ln(EthnoreligionIndex+43.73527) 
89.507+(-269.0781+73.6491*ln(-ChildrenCover00+124.7545)*-1) 
99.786+(-258.3355+72.5776*ln(-ChildrenCover04+129.398)*-1) 
97.807+(-176.8359+56.9777*ln(-ChildrenCover08+114.9443)*-1) 
100.311+(-156.0689+53.1664*ln(-ChildrenCover12+113.1995)*-1) 
-339.8397+87.5312*ln(RoadsCondition00+47.95709) 
-29.4183+78.5029*ln(RoadsCondition04+39.72922) 
-258.2735+72.6525*ln(RoadsCondition08+33.9613) 
-263.5627+72.6271*ln(RoadsCondition12+37.41891) 
-716.1825+148.2923*ln(RoadDensity00+124.9443) 
-1026.2081+198.7977*ln(RoadDensity04+174.337) 
-461.4307+105.5010*ln(RoadDensity08+78.86972) 
-1025.6795+201.3148*ln(RoadDensity12+162.7372) 
7.6487+7.0515*ln(DilapidHousing00-.042266) 
6.4077+6.3022*ln(DilapidHousing04-.1083575) 
4.7861+5.2170*ln(DilapidHousing08+.123203) 
4.7134+5.3212*ln(DilapidHousing12+.0445887) 
Note: Numbers in the final parts of variables’ titles indicate years. Transformation 
commands for the variables associated with transfers additionally include inflation 
adjustment factors. 
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Appendix E9. Replication of main results by Marques, Nazrullaeva and 
Yakovlev (2016) without outliers 
The findings of Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev (2016) are crucially determined 
by outliers. To show this, Model 1 in Table E10 replicates the main results as they 
appear in Model 2 in Table 1 of the article.  
Table E10. Replication of Model 2 in Table 1 by Marques, Nazrullaeva and 
Yakovlev (2016) with and without outliers 
 Model 1a Model 2b Model 3c Model 4d 
L.GRP Growth Rate 
50.95** 
(2.18) 
7.66 
(1.04) 
121.4 
(.65) 
21.09 
(.6) 
L.UR Vote Margin in Duma 
20.35*** 
(3.04) 
2.89 
(.94) 
-.032 
(-.17) 
.053 
(.91) 
L.GRP Growth × UR Margin 
in Duma 
-194.7*** 
(-3.22) 
-29.3 
(-.8) 
-3.26 
(-1.15) 
-1.15* 
(-1.67) 
L.GRP per capita 
-.0067 
(-1.61) 
-.0002 
(-.08) 
-.023 
(-.45) 
-.036 
(-1.39) 
L. Transfers per capita 
.0602*** 
(2.9) 
.064* 
(1.74) 
.451 
(1.2) 
.317* 
(1.85) 
LD.Ratio of Urbanization 
17.8 
(.76) 
15.6 
(1.45) 
234.7 
(.51) 
227.7*** 
(2.72) 
LD.Share of Employed in 
Public Sector 
-.867 
(-.76) 
-.399 
(-.91) 
-17.8* 
(-1.68) 
-1.91 
(-1.02) 
LD.Ratio of Young People to 
Labor Force 
.046 
(.97) 
-.01 
(-.65) 
.118 
(.32) 
-.187 
(-1.34) 
LD.Ratio of Pensioners to 
Labor Force 
.028 
(.48) 
-.15 
(-.59) 
.514 
(.97) 
.308*** 
(2.83) 
LD.Index of Tax Potential 
-.738** 
(-2.59) 
.142 
(.83) 
-6.84 
(-1.18) 
-3.48 
(-.93) 
LD.Index of Budget Expenditures 
8.45*** 
(7.26) 
-1.43 
(-1.01) 
43.3** 
(2.55) 
14.36 
(1.53) 
Constant 
-5.34** 
(-2.02) 
-.767 
(-1.11) 
33.29** 
(2.43) 
37.88*** 
(8.9) 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 702 684 702 702 
Number of Instruments 51 51 51 n.a. 
Heteroscedasticity teste .384 .173 .059 .117 
Note: a. Model 1 replicates Model 2 from Table 1 in Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev 
(2016: 40). Estimates are obtained by using xtabond2 command in Stata with the following 
script: xtabond2 dtransfpercapita c.l.gdpgrowth##c.l.ur_margin l.grpfixprpercapita 
l.transfpercapita l.(`exog_controls') i.reg_year if reg_year>=2000&reg_year<=2008, 
iv(l.tempjanpercapita l.ivcrossterm i.reg_year) gmm(l.transfpercapita l.grpfixprpercapita, lag(3 
4)) twostep robust cluster(reg_id), where `exog_controls' are the differenced variables. b. Model 
2 is identical to Model 1 with exception that Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and Magadan 
Oblast are excluded (&reg_id!=89&reg_id!=86 is added to if filter). c. In Model 3, the 
dependent variable and United Russia’s vote margin are ranked. The interaction is based on 
the ranked variables. d. Model 4 is OLS regression with the same model specification as 
Model 3. e. An analogue of White heteroscedasticity test shows R-squared of the OLS model, 
where the dependent variable is squared residuals from the model in the table and the right-
hand side of the equation includes the same set of predictors as in the corresponding model. 
Data source: israelmarques.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Substituting_Distribution_replication_data_and_codes.rar. T-
values are shown in parentheses. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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The first lags of GRP growth rate, United Russia’s vote margin of 2011, and the 
interaction between them are significant along with several control variables. 
However, the authors could have tested the model’s validity by looking at its 
residuals or by using a more formal test for heteroscedasticity of residuals. Figure 
A3 displays that not only do the residuals of Model 1 contain multiple outliers, but 
also they strongly correlate with predicted values, indicating thereby a possible 
non-linearity. Unfortunately, Stata does not report residuals diagnostics for 
xtabond2. I substituted it by an analogue of White heteroscedasticity test. Its R-
squared statistic (.384) indicates that the residuals of Model 1 are correlated with 
the model’s predictors, especially with GRP growth (t-value = -5.8), the interaction 
term (t-value = 7.3), transfers per capita (t-value = 15.7), and the Index of Budget 
Expenditures (t-value = 6.5); the full regression table is not shown for parsimony.   
By detecting the most influential residuals, I found that they are associated 
primarily with two regions. Accordingly, in Model 2, two most influential outliers – 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug and Magadan Oblast – are filtered,193 while the rest 
of the script remains the same. The difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is 
huge. Only the lagged variable of transfers per capita is marginally significant. 
Nevertheless, this minimalist approach filters only the strongest outliers, several 
other outliers, as follows from Figure A3, are still present in the data, though in 
Model 2 they are not as influential as in Model 1. More importantly, the 
heteroscedasticity test (.173) still indicates possible non-linearity.  
Figure A3. The residuals of the models from Table E10 plotted against the fitted 
values 
                                                          
193
 Observations for the cases are filtered for all years, yet it would be sufficient (with a similar result) to filter 
only statistically strong outliers: Magadan Oblast 2008 and Chukotka 2000–2001, 2004–2008. 
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In Model 3, the dependent variable is ranked to tackle outliers and United 
Russia’s vote margin is ranked to tackle skewness of its distribution (the rank 
variable is coded with using also negative values of the vote, which set to 0 in Model 
1 and 2). The lagged economic growth, the vote margin, and the interaction between 
them are again insignificant. Judging from the heteroscedasticity test (R2 = .059), 
the residual term of the model improved markedly, yet Figure A3 displays a negative 
relationship between fitted values and residuals for Model 3. The results of 
Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev (2016) also depend on model parameters of 
xtabond2, including the use of instrumental variables and the selection of variables 
in the GMM option. For instance, in Model 1, the inclusion of all control variables 
(i.e. l.(`exog_controls')) in the GMM option, as it is suggested by Rodman (2006) in 
most examples,194 makes the main variables insignificant. The variability of results 
caused by model specification deserves a separate consideration but it is not 
discussed here for parsimony.  
For more simplicity, Model 4 presents OLS estimates instead of xtabond2 for the 
specification of Model 3 (i.e., the dependent variable and United Russia’s vote are 
ranked). The main effects in Model 4 are insignificant; only the interaction term is 
marginally significant. The lagged differences in urbanization and in the share of 
pensioners seemingly determine changes in transfers. However, the explanatory 
power of the model in only 4.4% and these effects are rather spurious. The residual 
term of the model does not contain outliers, yet regressors still correlate with the 
errors. Thus, for a proper model selection, distributions of other explanatory 
variables should be checked for skewness and the analysis should be implemented 
by year – similarly to the multilevel approach practiced in this dissertation. The 
latter is not done here as well as other parameters of the models are not discussed 
(the combination of lags and differences) since the purpose of the appendix is not to 
build the best model for explaining transfers, this is elaborated in the main text, 
but rather to show that the results of Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev (2016) 
appear as a consequence of violation of basic regression assumptions. 
It can be added that everything noted here regarding outliers in the models with 
differenced dependent variable holds true regarding models of levels presented in 
Table 2 in the Online Appendix to Marques, Nazrullaeva and Yakovlev (2016): 
deleting outliers or ranking the corresponding variables makes the main 
explanatory variables insignificant (the results are not shown for parsimony). 
                                                          
194
 In particular, Rodman (2006: 128) notes: “[o]rdinarily, put every regressor into the instrument matrix, Z, in 
some form. If a regressor, w, is strictly exogenous, standard treatment is to insert it as one column (in 
xtabond2, with ivstyle(w)). If w is predetermined to not be strictly exogenous, standard treatment is to use lags 
1 and longer, GMM-style (gmmstyle(w)). And if w is endogenous, standard treatment is lags 2 and longer 
(gmmstyle(L.w)).” So, every regressor should be put in  gmm() or iv(). This is a philosophical question to what 
extent the control variables in the model are endogenous or exogenous. Rodman (2006: 112) uses lagged 
wages, the firm’s capital, and the lagged dependent variable – employment – from Arellano and Bond (1991) 
data as endogenous variables and concludes that the coefficient on lagged employment improved by moving 
into the credible range, compared with the situation when wages and the firm’s capital are treated as 
exogenous.  
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Appendix F. Supplementary Materials to Chapter 6 
Appendix F1. Descriptive statistics 
Table F1. Descriptive statistics for variables in analysis  
  5th Percentile 95th Percentile Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel Data, Average Values of 2000–2012a 
Incumbent's Sincere Vote (%) 49.46 67.74 57.98 5.80 
Incumbent's Sincere Vote, Ranked 4.13 78.38 41.25 23.67 
Log Electoral Fraud (%) 8.72 30.83 17.82 6.65 
Electoral Fraud, Ranked 4.13 78.38 41.25 23.67 
Log Mean Cluster Fraud 1.90 3.72 2.69 0.55 
Rating of Democraticness (%) 18.15 40.95 29.50 6.11 
Log Population Over Working Age 
(%) 
7.42 23.59 15.73 4.76 
Higher Education (%) 12.95 22.02 17.04 2.59 
Rural Residents (%) 8.33 56.96 30.83 13.36 
Employed in Agriculture (%) 1.49 23.53 12.08 6.36 
Log GRP per Capita (RUB) 214685.4 375652.7 283236.9 49859.4 
GRP growth (%) -0.32 9.67 4.30 3.05 
Log Unemployment, % 8.86 19.21 13.27 2.68 
Below Living Minimum (%) 13.00 40.40 24.26 8.41 
Log Natural Resources per Capita 
(RUB) 
159268.0 466838.0 298727.6 96152.9 
Share of Transfers in the Budget 
(%) 
4.43 71.61 28.17 20.19 
Log Social Spending per Capita 
(RUB) 
65273.1 141283.5 95129.5 23094.3 
Log Proportion of Reg. and Municipal 
Officials to the Employed (%) 
1.37 2.38 1.76 0.31 
Proportion of Employed in Education 
to the Employed (%) 
7.04 15.19 9.58 2.39 
Proportion of Employed in Healthcare 
to the Employed (%) 
5.48 9.35 7.27 1.31 
Money Per Regional and Municipal 
Official Inflation Adjusted 
593013.8 1975817.9 1264404.7 373225.6 
Money Per Person Employed In 
Education Inflation Adjusted 
339047.4 598637.7 445485.3 79188.8 
Money Per Person Employed In 
Healthcare Inflation Adjusted 
252469.5 540398.7 379178.8 80911.8 
Time-Invariant Variables 
Index of Press Freedom, 2010 1 3 1.93 .68 
Media Persecution Index 3.93 76.97 29.48 29.03 
Ethnoreligion Index 19.91 74.97 42.53 16.65 
Note: a. The average between-year statistics are presented, that is, each statistic is firstly 
calculated for each year of 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 and then averaged between the 
years.  
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Appendix F2. Alternative models of consumption of transfers 
Table F2. OLS and the multilevel models explaining consumption of transfers, by 
year only 
DV: Share of Transfers in 
the Budget 
OLS,  
2000 
OLS,  
2004  
OLS,  
2008  
OLS,  
2012 
Fixed Eff.,  
2000–
2012 
(Constant) 
-53.98*** 
(-2.68) 
17.59 
(1.17) 
14.98 
(1.49) 
21.45** 
(2.26) 
.93 
(.06) 
Log Regional Taxes Per 
Capita, RUB 
-6.9e-4*** 
(-6.79) 
-8.8e-4*** 
(-8.7) 
-7.4e-4*** 
(-9.51) 
-8.5e-4*** 
(-10.66) 
-7.8e-4*** 
(-13.32) 
Log Reg. & Municipal 
Officials in Employed, % 
25.96*** 
(3.26) 
16.73*** 
(3.36) 
27.88*** 
(7.85) 
24.49*** 
(6.03) 
23.63*** 
(7.41) 
Healthcare in Employed, 
% 
4.5*** 
(2.73) 
2.3* 
(1.72) 
.48 
(.56) 
-.14 
(-.13) 
1.81* 
(1.93) 
Log Money per Reg. and 
Munic. Official, RUB 
-2.3e-6 
(-.43) 
6.7e-6* 
(1.93) 
1.9e-5*** 
(4.96) 
1.6e-5*** 
(2.67) 
1.0e-5** 
(2.31) 
Log Money per Person in 
Healthcare, RUB 
2.4e-4*** 
(3.84) 
4.7e-5* 
(1.9) 
1.7e-6 
(.1) 
2.7e-5* 
(1.96) 
7.1e-5* 
(1.7) 
R2 (Random Eff. R2) .571 .723 .785 .781 (.726) 
White Test  .000 .003 .000 .143 n.a. 
N 83 83 83 83 332 
DV: Share of Transfers in 
the Budget 
OLS,  
2000 
OLS,  
2004  
OLS,  
2008  
OLS,  
2012 
Fixed Eff.,  
2000–
2012 
(Constant) 
-5.45 
(-.34) 
15.6 
(1.39) 
9.4 
(.96) 
14.18* 
(1.71) 
8.4 
(1.33) 
Log Regional Taxes Per 
Capita, RUB 
-4.8e-4*** 
(-4.43) 
-7.5e-4*** 
(-6.93) 
-7.2e-4*** 
(-7.85) 
-7.3e-4*** 
(-8.44) 
-6.6e-4*** 
(-10.34) 
Log Reg. & Municipal 
Officials in Employed, % 
25.27** 
(2.6) 
15.93*** 
(3.31) 
24.16*** 
(5.94) 
23.05*** 
(5.38) 
20.97*** 
(6.81) 
Education in Employed, % 
2.26** 
(2.5) 
2.37*** 
(3.77) 
1.12 
(1.53) 
.84 
(1.35) 
1.81*** 
(4.21) 
Log Money per Reg. and 
Munic. Official, RUB 
9.4e-6* 
(1.7) 
7.3e-6** 
(2.37) 
1.7e-5*** 
(4.11) 
1.5e-5** 
(2.3) 
1.0e-5*** 
(4.09) 
Log Money per Person in 
Education, RUB 
-1.5e-5 
(-.24) 
5.3e-6 
(.21) 
1.3e-5 
(.82) 
1.1e-5 
(.62) 
1.0e-5 
(1.09) 
R2 (Random Eff. R2) .523 .749 .792 .775 (.719) 
White Test .000 .053 .000 .116 n.a. 
N 83 83 83 83 332 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. The 
multilevel models presented in the last column fit by maximizing the penalized quasi-
likelihood (PQL) with the general positive-definite covariance structure for the random 
effects, Log-Cholesky parametrization. The random term consists of intercepts and 
coefficients for all variables in the equation varying by year. Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 
0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
The results of the fixed effects models are in line with results presented in the 
main text: central transfers are appropriated mostly by the bureaucracy, rather 
than used for mass patronage purposes. As follows from the t-values, the 
proportion of regional and municipal officials is 3.8 times more significant 
compared with the proportion of employed in the field of healthcare and 1.6 times 
more significant than the proportion of employed in the field of education. The 
variable of money allocated per one official in the regional budget turns out to be 
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1.4 times more significant than the variable of money assigned to a person 
employed in the field of healthcare and 3.8 times more significant than the variable 
of money assigned to a person employed in the field of education.  In the temporal 
dimension, the effects of variables associated with elite consumption gain in size 
from year to year, meanwhile the effects of variables of patronage spending 
gradually fall into decline. Although the coefficients of the relative size of the 
bureaucracy are almost constant over time, t-values indicate double growth of their 
significance between 2000 and 2012 in the both model specifications. The 
coefficients of spending on the bureaucracy, in both specifications, follow an 
increasing trend with the apex in 2008 and then somewhat decline in 2012. 
Meanwhile the coefficients of the elite consumption are significant in nearly all 
models, the relative size of education and healthcare were significantly associated 
with the transfers only in 2000 and 2004. Since then these effects have come to 
naught. The effect of the money per employed in healthcare faded away from 2000 
to 2008 but then revived in 2012 to a moderate extent whereas the effect of the 
money per employed in education appeared to be insignificant in all years. 
Table F3. Multilevel models explaining consumption of transfers: two competing 
variables controlling for regional tax revenue 
DV: Share of Transfers in the 
Budget 
Fixed Eff.,  
2000–2012 
Fixed Eff.,  
2000–2012 
Fixed Eff.,  
2000–2012 
Fixed Eff.,  
2000–2012 
(Constant) 
15.67* 
(1.71) 
13.65** 
(2.21) 
49.21*** 
(8.2) 
52.81*** 
(10.29) 
Log Regional Taxes Per Capita, 
RUB 
-.00044*** 
(-7.47) 
-.00039*** 
(-7.25) 
-.00058*** 
(-4.81) 
-.00053*** 
(-4.27) 
Log Reg. & Municipal Officials in 
Employed, % 
21.08*** 
(4.41) 
15.5*** 
(5.05) 
  
Healthcare in Employed, % 
1.17 
(1.39) 
   
Education in Employed, %  
1.73*** 
(3.9) 
  
Log Money per Reg. and Munic. 
Official, RUB 
  
5.3e-6 
(1.53) 
7.3e-6** 
(2.24) 
Log Money per Person in 
Healthcare, RUB 
  
5.0e-5** 
(2.04) 
 
Log Money per Person in 
Education, RUB 
   
1.29e-5 
(.79) 
R2 (Random Eff. R2) .492 .516 .413 .378 
N 332 332 332 332 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. The 
multilevel models presented in the last column fit by maximizing the penalized quasi-
likelihood (PQL) with the general positive-definite covariance structure for the random 
effects, Log-Cholesky parametrization. The random term consists of intercepts and 
coefficients for all variables in the equation varying by year and budget type. Significant at: 
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Appendix F4. Non-monotonicity of the relationship between regional ethno-
religious makeup and the sincere incumbent’s vote 
Table F5. Multilevel models explaining the sincere incumbent’s vote at different 
levels of the Ethnoreligion Index and sincere incumbent’s vote, fixed effects 2000–
2012 
DV: Sincere Incumbent’s 
Vote, % 
SV & EI < 
95th 
percentilea 
SV & EI < 
93rd 
percentilea 
SV & EI < 
90th 
percentilea 
SV & EI < 
85th 
percentilea 
SV & EI < 
80th 
percentilea 
Constant 
79.44*** 
(18.48) 
76.71*** 
(15.46) 
75.46*** 
(14.28) 
77.27*** 
(13.96) 
78.55*** 
(11.83) 
Ethnoreligion Index 
.0738*** 
(3.16) 
.0732** 
(2.38) 
.046 
(1.43) 
.0393 
(1.01) 
.0353 
(.91) 
Higher Education, % 
-.5042*** 
(-3.17) 
-.3957*** 
(-2.95) 
-.4654*** 
(-3.07) 
-.5585*** 
(-3.76) 
-.5598*** 
(-3.7) 
Log GRP per Capita, RUB 
-4e-5*** 
(-2.78) 
-3e-5*** 
(-3.26) 
-2e-5** 
(-2.07) 
-3e-5** 
(-2.32) 
-3e-5** 
(-2.47) 
GRP growth, % 
.3182 
(1.53) 
.2259 
(1.16) 
.3129* 
(1.7) 
.3439* 
(1.84) 
.3674* 
(1.93) 
Below Living Minimum, % 
-.157** 
(-2.0) 
-.1815** 
(-2.1) 
-.1519** 
(-2.27) 
-.1374 
(-1.65) 
-.1396 
(-1.56) 
Employed in Agriculture, 
% 
-.3252*** 
(-3.59) 
-.2578*** 
(-4.0) 
-.281*** 
(-4.11) 
-.2689*** 
(-3.73) 
-.2652*** 
(-3.59) 
Random Effects R2 .243 .222 .192 .202 .219 
N 299 290 275 247 230 
Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. See 
comments to Table 6.5 for details. a. The sample includes observations if values of the 
sincere vote (SV) and the Ethnoreligion Index (EI) are below their 95th percentiles (70.9, 
74.4, respectively), 93rd percentiles (69.4, 73.9), 90th percentiles (68.2, 80.8), 85th percentiles 
(66.9, 60.1), and 80th percentiles (65.4, 56.7). Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 
0.01. 
Table F6. Multilevel models explaining the sincere incumbent’s vote at different 
levels of the mean cluster of fraud, fixed effects 2000–2012 
DV: Sincere Incumbent’s 
Vote, % 
Cluster 
Mean < 
90th 
percentile 
Cluster 
Mean < 
80th 
percentile 
Cluster 
Mean < 
70th 
percentile 
Cluster 
Mean < 
65th 
percentile 
Cluster 
Mean < 
60th 
percentile 
Constant 
73.47*** 
(18.08) 
76.96*** 
(17.84) 
77.78*** 
(15.36) 
77.0*** 
(13.0) 
79.32*** 
(12.58) 
Ethnoreligion Index 
.0836*** 
(3.34) 
.066** 
(2.23) 
.0613* 
(1.76) 
.038 
(.70) 
.01 
(.32) 
Higher Education, % 
-.49*** 
(-3.4) 
-.5878*** 
(-3.57) 
-.6074*** 
(-3.94) 
-.68*** 
(-4.13) 
-.706*** 
(-4.07) 
Log GRP per Capita, RUB 
-2e-5** 
(-2.39) 
-3e-5*** 
(-2.69) 
-3e-5** 
(-2.34) 
-2e-5 
(-1.13) 
-2e-5 
(1.38) 
GRP growth, % 
.341** 
(1.97) 
.3913** 
(2.46) 
.3384** 
(2.02) 
.2813 
(1.57) 
.2772 
(1.51) 
Below Living Minimum, % 
-.0742 
(-1.29) 
-.0593 
(-1.07) 
-.0599 
(-1.15) 
-.0782 
(-1.46) 
-.0667 
(-1.2) 
Employed in Agriculture, % 
-.278*** 
(-3.69) 
-.3461*** 
(-4.74) 
-.3736*** 
(-5.14) 
-.349*** 
(-3.74) 
-.362*** 
(-4.21) 
Random Effects R2 .200 .222 .220 .221 .210 
N 294 258 235 212 191 
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Note: Entries are unstandardized coefficients with t-values in parentheses. See 
comments to Table 6.5 for details. The sample includes observations if values of the mean 
cluster (See Appendix D1) are below its 90th percentile (3.49), 80th percentile (3.12), 70th 
percentile (2.91), 65th percentile (2.84), and 60th percentile (2.75). Significant at: *p < 0.1, **p 
< 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
Table F5 presents several specifications of the best model from Table 6.5 in which 
observations with upper values of the sincere vote (SV) and the Ethnoreligion Index 
(EI) are gradually removed. The level of statistical significance of the Ethnoreligion 
Index indicated by t-values declines from 5.4 in Table 6.5 to 2.4 if the SV and the EI 
are limited by their 93rd percentiles. The effect of the Ethnoreligion Index weakens 
dramatically and becomes insignificant if the sample includes observations with the 
SV and the EI below their 90th percentiles. The effects of variables of economic 
growth and the percentage of population with income below the living minimum are 
also affected by cutting off the upper values of the data. The effect of education 
tends to be stronger in the restricted samples.  
A more straightforward way to test the sensitivity of the results to the extent of 
electoral fraud (i.e., quality of the dependent variable) is to run the models at 
various levels of electoral fraud. Table F6 displays fixed effects of the models of the 
sincere incumbent’s vote including observations without high values of the mean 
cluster of fraud – the qualitative measure of fraud developed in Chapter 4. In this 
case, the Ethnoreligion Index also becomes insignificant if the cluster mean is below 
its 65th percentile (i.e., when nearly one third of observations is excluded). However, 
three other variables are also insignificant in the model. While economic 
development gradually lose their significance, the percentage of people with income 
below the living minimum is not significant in all restricted samples in the table, 
that is, the effect of this variable appears from few regions with extreme levels of 
electoral fraud. The effect of employment in agriculture is the most monotonic and 
the effect of education gets stronger among the regions with moderate and minor 
electoral manipulations.  
It should be also noted that the relationship between the Ethnoreligion Index 
and the sincere incumbent’s vote is not constant over time. Figure F1 shows that it 
is absent in 2000. In 2004 and 2008, the relationship is rather determined by a 
small group of observations located at the EI > 65 and the SV > 65. In the election 
year 2012, however, the relation is monotonic and relatively strong (R2 = .312). 
Thus, the hypothesis that the variable of the sincere incumbent’s vote represents 
more electoral fraud than the authentic vote at its high values, and therefore 
correlates with the variable of ethnicity, can be rejected. The level of the sincere 
voting for the incumbent is father a little bit higher in non-Russian and non-
Christian Orthodox regions, especially in 2012. 
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Figure F1. The Ethnoreligion Index and the sincere incumbent’s vote by year 
 
 
Appendix F5. Zero-Skewness Log-Transformation Commands 
Variables having strongly skewed distributions are transformed applying the 
algorithm described in Appendix E8.  
This procedure comes up with the following transformation commands: 
7.4917+4.7606*ln(Fraud2000-2.047556) 
6.8214+6.9866*ln(Fraud2004-.5653532) 
-19.6481+15.9406*ln(Fraud2008+5.775942) 
-5.2616+11.2798*ln(Fraud2012+2.302548) 
1.4762+1.8987*ln(ClusterMean00-.2218331) 
3.0977+0.8242*ln(ClusterMean04-1.011411) 
2.6759+1.1302*ln(ClusterMean08-.7729866) 
2.9320+0.9368*ln(ClusterMean12-.8728499) 
4.50+26.70+(-11,2853+11.6481*ln(-PopOverWorkingAge00+30.57747))*-1 
5.50+26.40+(-7.3217+10.5747*ln(-PopOverWorkingAge04+29.76185))*-1 
6.80+27.00+(0.4666+8.5468*ln(-PopOverWorkingAge08+29.0981))*-1 
8.30+28.60+(3.8589+7.9992*ln(-PopOverWorkingAge12+30.34228))*-1 
-123163.3378+19316.6413*ln(SocialSpendingPCInfAdj00+585.1581) 
-122485.5221+25802.1145*ln(SocialSpendingPCInfAdj04-11053.55) 
-169170.8418+27631.4469*ln(SocialSpendingPCInfAdj08-9644.458) 
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-148925.3893+27860.2289*ln(SocialSpendingPCInfAdj12-17370.56) 
1.5797+0.5897*ln(RegAndMunicOfficialsInEmployed00-.1022941) 
1.7670+0.7749*ln(RegAndMunicOfficialsInEmployed04-.1136453) 
1.5880+1.0036*ln(RegAndMunicOfficialsInEmployed08+.0241918) 
1.6083+0.8098*ln(RegAndMunicOfficialsInEmployed12-.0650549) 
-4101892.8430+408238.5950*ln(MoneyPerRegAndMunicOfficial00-114751.8) 
-5615372.0001+566036.0021*ln(MoneyPerRegAndMunicOfficial04-146601.7) 
-4663929.3026+457470.8423*ln(MoneyPerRegAndMunicOfficial08-273228.2) 
-2711490.8526+295114.8850*ln(MoneyPerRegAndMunicOfficial12-269323.8) 
-242098.6700+43299.4613*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInEducationA00-62186.29) 
-455786.3901+77234.1789*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInEducationA04-116799) 
-1061638.5005+135344.0500*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInEducationA08-101121.1) 
-714596.8876+110840.3211*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInEducationA12-183289.8) 
-554948.0062+69931.2845*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInHealthcareA00+6803.793) 
-597330.8268+85859.0790*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInHealthcareA04-95556.23) 
-892905.3216+110055.5623*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInHealthcareA08-56754.29) 
-1026339.0017+131059.0949*ln(MoneyPerEmployedInHealthcareA12-132816.9) 
-9162.8630+73053.1000*ln(NatResources05-46.94832) 
-75519.4223+150999.3380*ln(NatResources08-72.44271) 
-189326.8737+284716.0540*ln(NatResources12-104.6205) 
Note: Numbers in the final parts of variables’ titles indicate years. Transformation 
commands for the variables associated with transfers additionally include inflation 
adjustment factors. The log-transformation cammands of variables that earlier appear in 
analysis in Chapter 5 are given in Appendix E8. 
Appendix F6. The motivated reasoning theory to explain popular support for 
authoritarianism 
Everything that has been done in this study is done within the framework of 
rational choice theory. However, as new events are unfolding, the limitations to 
rationality in the Russian public opinion and political support are becoming 
increasingly evident. In 2014, Russia was involved in the military conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine during which Putin was presented by the official media as a patriot who 
was protecting the “rights of the Russians” in Ukraine against the Nazi radicals of 
the Right Sector and other extreme-right paramilitary formations. After the 
referendum on the status of Crimea, the peninsula reunited with Russia on16 
March. The Western community, however, considered this fact as annexation and 
imposed various sanctions on Russia. Besides that, oil prices slumped nearly 
twofold between August and December, thereby Russia appeared to be deprived of 
the large part of its prime source of income. Accordingly, the purchasing power of 
the ruble dropped precipitously from 36.1 rubles per one U.S. dollar in August 2014 
to 65.2 RUB/USD in January 2015, 77.9 RUB/USD in January 2016; and then 
stabilized at a level of about 56 RUB/USD.195 
                                                          
195
 Official inflation numbers are relatively small but still perceptible to the ordinary consumer: year-to-year 
consumer price inflation amounted to 11.7% in 2014, 16.8% in 2015, and 5.6% in 2016, i.e., 37.9% of the 
cumulative inflation in three years. The cumulative amount may to some extent reflect the reality. However, it 
should be noted that the index of consumer price inflation consists of inflation rates of various goods and 
services and 37.9% is the average between them. Consumer goods, however, were much more influenced by 
inflation than services. The reliability of the inflation index is generally questionable since several items 
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A straightforward intuition of economic voting suggests that United Russia 
should definitely have lost the 2016 election. Nevertheless, not only did United 
Russia receive more than a half of the vote without resorting to outcome-changing 
fraud,196 but also Putin’s popular support measured by the leading survey agencies 
exceeded eighty percent197 and Putin successfully won the election of 2018 with an 
unprecedented level of the vote of 76.7%. How could this happen? The regime has 
simply blamed the West for everything: dumping the oil prices, the intervention in 
Ukraine, influencing Russian politics, etc. And people were generally convinced by 
this explanation of their economic troubles. The popular mood of that time was 
summarized by an anecdote, when one Russian says: “I have never lived as badly as 
under the president Obama”.198  
But what is problematic in this viewpoint? Let’s assume that the message of 
Russian television is generally true. It is the West that dumped the oil prices, 
orchestrated the Euromaidan to split Ukraine from Russia, and now rules Russia as 
a colony via the economic politics of the Russian Central Bank and the corrupted 
bloc of the liberals in the government. A set of counter-questions, however, can be 
raised. Who has built such an economy that appears to be so heavily dependent on 
oil? Who did not take any peaceful measures to prevent Ukraine from cultural 
splitting, while appointing such ambassadors to Ukraine who were formerly political 
bankrupts199, and considered that gas blackmail decides everything in the relations 
between the two countries? Who appoints those liberals to the government posts 
and approves the Central Bank leadership? Who sends the military divisions to 
Syria to allegedly fight the Islamic terrorists “in collaboration with the international 
community” meanwhile waging war against the West? There are too many 
contradictions in the official propaganda to mention all of them here. However, 
people mostly do not see them and prefer to be cheated by the regime. And the 
question is why. 
A possible explanation can be taken from political psychology, more specifically, 
from the motivated reasoning theory (Kunda 1990; Westen et al. 2006; Lodge and 
Taber 2013). The theory suggests that people tend to reject even overwhelming 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
included in the index manifest evident miscalculations. For example, imported cars have reportedly become 
8.7, 16.5, and 8.5 percent more expensive in the years 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. In reality, the prices 
of imported cars rose proportionately to the ruble exchange rate (it could not have been otherwise). A more 
interesting fact is that these inflation values do not considerably differ from the inflation index values of the 
domestically produced cars of Russian automakers – 4.9, 18.9, and 4.6 percent, respectively 
(https://www.fedstat.ru/indicator/31074). 
196
 See a preliminary analysis of S. Shpilkin at: http://podmoskovnik.livejournal.com  
197
 The Russian Public Opinion Research Center’s (VCIOM) estimate of Putin’s approval rating rose from 64.3% 
in February 2014 to 82.2% in April, and until the fall of 2015 it never decreased below 80%; in October 2015 it 
reached the highly improbable value – 89.9% (VCIOM 2015). The Putin’s approval rating of the Levada-Center 
similarly raised from 65% in January 2014 to 82% in April, and it never declined below the 80-percent level until 
the middle of 2017 (Levada 2017). 
198
 See, for example, Troitsky (2015). 
199
 Victor Chernomyrdin, the Russian ambassador to Ukraine from 2001 to 2009, formerly held office of the 
prime minister of the Russian government (1993–1998) and was accountable for many economic problems of 
the 1990s. Mikhail Zurabov, the Russian ambassador to Ukraine from 2009 to 2016, is ex-minister of healthcare 
and social development. Besides large reductions in medicine, he is also notorious for being an initiator of the 
reform of the “Monetization of [social] benefits” (the federal law No. 122), which triggered a large-scale 
protest among pensioners. 
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evidence that contradicts their prior attitudes on an issue because this 
contradictious evidence engenders an emotional conflict known as cognitive 
dissonance, which is associated with very uncomfortable psychological conditions. 
Research has shown that motivated reasoning produces various biases in the ways 
people acquire and process information. While summarizing findings of their 
studies, Lodge and Taber (2007: 35) note:  
“[f]irst, people simply feel that the information they agree with is stronger than 
the information with which they disagree. Second, when thinking about the 
evidence on a policy issue, people actively denigrate the information with which 
they disagree while accepting supportive information with little scrutiny. Third, 
people seek out confirmatory information and avoid evidence that might 
challenge their priors. Fourth, all of these biases conspire to drive attitudes 
further in the direction of priors the more they think and reason about the 
issues. Finally, all of these biases are particularly pronounced for citizens with 
more knowledge and stronger political attitudes, the very folks on whom 
democratic theory relies most”.  
These findings have been confirmed by the other studies (Westen et al. 2006; 
Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Robertson 2017).200  
However, it should be underlined that the psychological simplifying mechanism, 
a cognitive shortcut, underlying the process of motivated reasoning is not vicious as 
such. Having a large number of observations and a linear trend, which perfectly 
summarizes them, one does not need to consider in detail all the circumstances of 
each new case in order to make a judgment, since it can be reliably inferred from 
the linear trend. Similarly, having learned a candidate’s position and policy 
performance on issues a, b, c,… y, one may with high degree of reliability predict 
the candidate’s standing on issue z and the probable policy outcome on this issue. 
A problem is that people frequently do not update their attitudes when new 
contradictious facts appear but instead they reject the evidence and stick to their 
false beliefs. Not the use of cognitive shortcuts in the process of searching and 
                                                          
200
 Westen and colleagues (2006) studied strong partisans during the U.S. presidential election of 2004. The 
subjects were shown a set of initial, contradictory, and exculpatory statements of their co-partisan candidates 
and oppositional candidates (many of these statements and quotations were edited or fictionalized). While 
evaluating the degree of inconsistency of the statements, subjects identified the statements of their own 
candidates as much less contradictory compared with the statements of the oppositional candidates. Besides 
that, motivated (as opposed to “cold”) reasoning, as detected by magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), appeared 
to activate the parts of the brain associated with emotions.  
To investigate the extent to which false or unsubstantiated beliefs can be corrected by alternative information, 
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) conducted a series of experiments in which subjects read mock news articles 
reporting misleading information and correction paragraphs on three salient issues in U.S. politics: 1) that Iraq 
had weapons of mass destruction; 2) president Bush’s tax cuts have increased government revenue; and 3) 
president Bush had banned stem cell research. The results indicate that not only did corrections have no effect 
on misperceptions, but also conservative subjects (i.e., G.W. Bush supporters) in several instances increased 
their misperceptions as a reaction against correction statements (i.e., a “backfire effect”).  
Based on a survey experiment from the Russian presidential election of 2012, Robertson (2017) demonstrates 
that regime supporters, when evaluating their trust in electoral observers, disregarded positive information 
about OSCE and Golos observers, while showed lower trust when presented with regime-generated negative 
information that Golos is the U.S. agent. Regime opponents, by contrast, increased their trust in observers 
when they learned that observers came from the OSCE, opponents also were immune to the image of Golos as 
the U.S. agent, yet they were persuaded by the two-minute NTV television clip entitled “Voice from Nowhere” 
portraying Golos as a politically engaged organization working for U.S. interests. 
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evaluating of information but rather the systematic rejection of contentious facts 
and the acceptance of mentally proximate yet admittedly false information 
constitute the essence of motivated reasoning. 
The literature on motivated reasoning jointly views people as biased reasoners 
who evaluate new emotionally-relevant information on the basis of the pre-existing 
beliefs, opinions, and attitudes. However, this literature says nothing about how the 
psychological mechanisms involved in the process of motivated reasoning can 
generate incumbency advantage for a candidate, even if the candidate has a 
monopolistic access to the sources of the spread of information. Following the 
theory, opponents of the incumbent would reject state-sponsored propaganda as 
contradictory to their prior attitudes regardless of facts supporting it, even if it 
dominates the media. That is, the theory cannot explain why authoritarian 
incumbents’ popular coalitions enlarge and dwindle over time, in particular, how 
state-sponsored propaganda can reach hearts and minds of moderate and 
opposition voters. The fact of the broad popular acceptance of admittedly false 
information disseminated by the biased media under authoritarianism is not 
accounted for by existing theories so far. As Guriev and Treisman (2015: 4) note, 
“the effectiveness of propaganda in authoritarian regimes is a prima facie puzzle. 
Given that citizens know the dictator has an incentive to lie about his type [of 
competence], why do they ever listen?” 
An extension of the motivated reasoning theory to the purposefully distorted 
information provided by the biased media in authoritarian regimes suggests that 
voters may adopt admittedly false information not only because they are regime 
supporters but also due to psychological attractiveness of propaganda compared 
with true information. The biased media tend to exaggerate incumbent’s 
achievements and gloss over his faults by portraying the country’s political and 
economic affairs in such a fashion that the authoritarian leader’s political decisions 
are indisputably the best possible solutions. They also tend to blame regime 
opponents or foreign powers for worsening of the economy or other difficulties that 
chiefly result from the incumbent’s incompetence or immanent characteristics of 
authoritarianism (such as pervasive elite corruption that is permitted and even 
encouraged by the incumbent as a form of payment for political loyalty). And almost 
always propaganda draws favorable perspectives for the future. In a grotesque 
manner, the work of propaganda in Putin’s Russia can be summarized in the 
following core messages. 1. “Putin is the best.” 2. Toward a successful event: “he 
outwitted everyone, it was the cunning plan of Putin (khitryy plan Putina).” 3. 
Toward an unsuccessful event: “it should be so, it is stipulated in the cunning plan 
of Putin, he will outwit everyone in future.” 4. “Who else, if not Putin?” 5. 
“Americans, Anglo-Saxons, NATO, and Ukrainians (Ukry) are guilty for everything.” 
6. “The cunning plan of Putin will have inevitably worked.” In particular, 6.1. 
“[Donald] Trump is our candidate, he will help us to restore good relationships with 
America.” 6.2 “We will combat terrorism in the far reaches in Syria, it will allow us 
to eliminate terrorists there lest they come here.” 6.3. “The Olympic Games of 2014 
and the 2018 FIFA World Cup will raise prestige of the country, we will be again 
respected abroad.”... Then return to a message from the 1st to the 5th conditionally 
on the outcome of the 6th.  
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The reality may and frequently is in a sharp contrast with propaganda. Having 
reality with its detrimental consequences of the incumbent’s policies for the country 
in general and for the voter in particular on the one hand and propaganda with its, 
speaking in Stalin’s words, appealing message that “life has become better, life has 
become merrier” – on the other hand, the voter then has to choose between two 
options: whether, loosely speaking, everything is bad or everything is nice. The last 
option is psychologically more attractive inasmuch as propaganda reduces 
psychological costs of perception of the reality. And the greater the discrepancy 
between the reality and its propagandist interpretation is, the more incentives the 
voter has to turn and stick to the “better” option.  
It might be argued that so long as motivated political reasoning is of emotion-
based and largely subliminal character, this principal decision is unconscious. To 
some extent, this is true. Taber and Lodge (2016: 62) argue that conscious thinking 
“is the cart and not the horse, in which case our explicit reasoning processes serve 
to rationalize behavior rather than to cause it”. On the other hand, it is not the case 
of “hot cognition” to rest responsibility entirely on the sphere of the unconscious 
since voters have enough time (months if not years) for cold rational consideration 
and re-evaluation of authoritarian policies. Scholars underline that motivated 
reasoning theory shares a common assumption with rational choice theory, namely, 
that rational decision makers aim to maximize the net balance of costs and benefits 
(Lodge and Taber 2007: 40). The specificity of motivated reasoning behaviour is that 
it aims to maximize psychologically perceived utility (i.e., to minimize negative and 
maximize positive affect states) rather than physically existing utility. That is, the 
process of estimation of benefits is mediated by human psychology. Therefore, we 
cannot conclude that voters deny the truth unconsciously. They deliberately close 
their eyes to faults of authoritarian leaders and understand that by doing so they 
maximize their positive emotions and use their mind to rationalize and justify their 
psychological decisions.   
Thus, not simply do the voters not see the reality while being indoctrinated by 
the official propaganda, they maliciously refuse to see it. If their fridge shows them 
that they have become less well off, but the TV set tells the contrary, they would 
rather believe the TV set because looking at the world through the lens of rose-
colored glasses gives them more joy and less pain. Since the truth is unflattering 
and painful, searching for it is costly, but lies are widely available, pleasant, and 
seductive, there are few of those who wish to follow the narrow way of truth-
seeking. Put otherwise, the root of the evil, which is popular support for 
authoritarianism, is that people value personal utility higher than the truth or 
justice. And even though several of them manage to reap some poisonous fruits 
offered by the regime, the society in general does not only lose its welfare but also 
paves its historical way to nowhere. 
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